BETH LABSON FREEMAN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Rachelle Ridola ("Ridola") brings this Motion for Default Judgment by the Court against Defendants Ingrid Chao, an individual, and Nelson Chao, an individual, collectively d/b/a Executive Inn-Morgan Hill (collectively "Defendants"). See generally Mem. P. & A. ISO Mot. Default J. ("Mem."), ECF 58-1. On November 20, 2017, the court clerk entered default against Defendants. ECF 56. Although Defendants have appeared in this action, as discussed below, they have not filed a responsive pleading to Ridola's First Amended Complaint ("FAC") and they have not moved to set aside the clerk's entry of default, despite having done so with respect to a prior entry of default against them in this case.
The Court held a hearing on the present motion for default judgment on May 10, 2018. Defendants did not appear, despite being served with Ridola's moving papers and filing an opposition indicating their awareness of the hearing date and time. See ECF 60, 62. For the reasons outlined below, the Court GRANTS Ridola's motion for default judgment, and awards statutory damages, attorneys' fees, and litigation costs.
The procedural history of this case differs from a typical motion for default judgment filed after a defendant fails to respond to a lawsuit. As the following factual and procedural history makes clear, despite Defendants' initial participation in this case, they have since failed to comply with the Federal Rules and defend this action. The Court briefly summarizes the facts and then provides the procedural history in detail because Defendants' sporadic attempts to litigate this case are relevant to the Court's determination of Ridola's motion for default judgment.
Ridola is a California resident who has been partially paralyzed since 2013 as a result of a brain aneurism and a stroke. See First Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶ 5, ECF 40; Declaration of Rachelle Ridola ISO Motion for Default Judgment ("Ridola Decl.") ¶¶ 1-2, ECF 58-2. Ridola uses a wheelchair for mobility. Id. Defendants own and operate the public accommodation known as the Executive Inn-Morgan Hill, located at 16505 Condit Rd., Morgan Hill, CA 95037 ("the Motel") and the real property on which the Motel is located. FAC ¶ 6. Ridola stayed at the Motel on four separate occasions including on April 28, 2014 and April 29, 2014. Id. ¶ 14; Ridola Decl. ¶ 4. Each time she stayed at the Motel, Ridola requested an accessible room—but her request was denied each time without explanation. Ridola Decl. ¶ 5. Ridola further had difficulties exiting her car because a ramp encroaches into the access aisle. Id. ¶ 6. Ridola also could not find any compliant accessible seating in the breakfast area for use by persons with disabilities. Id. ¶ 7; FAC ¶ 15.
On April 25, 2016, Ridola filed a complaint pursuant to Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., the California Unruh Civil Rights Act (the "Unruh Act"), the Disabled Persons Act, and the California Health & Safety Code. See generally Compl., ECF 1.
On August 5, 2016, a joint site inspection of the Motel occurred pursuant to General Order 56. See Mem. at 2. Although Defendant Nelson Chao attended the inspection, Defendant Ingrid Chao did not attend. See Declaration of Irakli Karbelashvili ("Irakli Karbelashvili Decl.") ¶ 4, ECF 58-11. On December 20, 2016, Defendant Nelson Chao and Ridola participated in a Court sponsored mediation with Howard Herman, Esq. See Mem. at 2. The parties did not reach a settlement. ECF 22. Having concluded the General Order 56 process, Ridola requested a Case Management Conference, which the Court held on March 23, 2017. See ECF 21, 23, 26. Ridola and Nelson Chao appeared at the Case Management Conference, but Ingrid Chao did not appear. ECF 26. The Court set a case schedule for this action and referred the parties to a settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Nathanael Cousins. ECF 27, 28.
After the settlement conference, Ridola moved to file a First Amended Complaint in order to allege accessibility barriers related to her disability that were identified by Ridola's expert during the parties' joint inspection of the Motel. See ECF 36. Ridola served Defendants with the motion by mail as well as with a courtesy email copy, but they did not file any opposition. ECF 37. On June 22, 2017, the Court granted Ridola's motion for leave to amend pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. ECF 39. The FAC was filed in the record on June 23, 2017, and Defendants were served with the FAC by mail. See FAC; ECF 41 (Certificate of Service). The FAC seeks an award of injunctive relief, statutory damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. See FAC.
Defendants did not respond to the FAC within the applicable time. On July 11, 2017, counsel for Ridola wrote a letter to Defendants notifying them that any further delay will result in a request that the Clerk enter a default against them. See Irakli Karbelashvili Decl. ¶ 6; Exh. A to Irakli Karbelashvili Decl., ECF 58-12. Defendants did not respond to the letter and did not file a responsive pleading to the FAC. Ridola then moved for entry of default against Defendants, which the Clerk ultimately entered on August 10, 2017. ECF 47.
On August 18, 2017, counsel for Ridola mailed a letter to Defendants notifying them of the entry of default and suggesting that the parties could stipulate to set aside the default if Defendants agreed to defense this action, including filing a response to the FAC. See Exh. B to Irakli Karbelashvili Decl., ECF 58-13. In the letter, Ridola also notified Defendants of her intention to move for default judgment seeking injunctive relief and statutory damages as well as reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Id. Defendants did not respond to the August 18, 2017 letter. See Irakli Karbelashvili Decl. ¶ 7.
On September 6, 2017, Defendants moved to set aside the Clerk's entry of default. ECF 48. Defendants represented that they did not know that they needed to do anything other than show up at the trial set for August 2019. See ECF 48. Defendants further represented in their motion that: "I understand now I have to respond to the first amended complaint and we will do so if given the chance." Id. at 2-3. In support of the motion, Nelson Chao and Ingrid Chao further testified in their declarations that they understood that they had to respond to the FAC. See ECF 49 ¶ 5; ECF 50 ¶ 6. Ridola did not oppose Defendants' motion to set aside the Clerk's entry of default. Irakli Karbelashvili Decl. ¶ 8; see also Statement of Non-Opposition, ECF 53. On September 11, 2017, the Court granted Defendants' motion to set aside the Clerk's entry of default and vacated the entry of default. ECF 54. Defendants were served with the Court's Order by mail but still did not respond to the FAC. See ECF 54-1, 54-2.
On October 25, 2017, counsel for Ridola again mailed a letter to Defendants notifying them that Ridola would move for entry of default if a response to the FAC was not filed by October 31, 2017. See Declaration of Irakli Karbelashvili ISO Pltfs' Third Request to Enter Default ¶ 9, ECF 55-1. Defendants did not respond to the letter or to the FAC, and Ridola filed her third request for the Clerk to enter default against Defendants. See ECF 55. The Clerk entered default against Defendants on November 20, 2017. ECF 56.
On December 8, 2017, Ridola filed the present motion for default judgment against Defendants, requesting that the Court award her $8,000.00 in statutory damages and $19,094.50 in attorneys' fees and costs. See generally Mem. Ridola also seeks an injunction requiring the removal of the architectural barriers to access identified in her FAC. Id. After being served with Ridola's moving papers, Defendants filed a request to file a motion to dismiss (ECF 61), and an opposition to the motion for default judgment (ECF 62). The Court issued an order striking without prejudice Defendants' request to file a motion to dismiss, explaining that Defendants must first seek to set aside the entry of default for good cause pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) as they had previously done on September 6, 2017. See ECF 67. The Court advised Defendants to move to set aside the entry of default on or before February 3, 2018, otherwise the Court would review Ridola's motion for default judgment. Id.; see also Certificates of Service (ECF 67-1, 67-2).
Defendants did not move to set aside the Clerk's entry of default, and they did not appear at the hearing on Ridola's motion for default judgment held on May 10, 2018. See ECF 68. Given Defendants' previous participation in this case, the Court explained to Ridola that it would wait until the end of the day to provide Defendants with a final opportunity to appear and request to set aside the Clerk's November 20, 2017 entry of default. Defendants did not appear or move to set aside the entry of default. The Court now GRANTS Ridola's motion for default judgment for the reasons that follow.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b), the Court may enter default judgment against a defendant who has failed to plead or otherwise defend an action. "The district court's decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one." Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980).
In exercising its discretion to enter default judgment, a district court considers seven factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Eitel factors"): (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. In considering these factors after a clerk's entry of default, the court takes all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, except those with regard to damages. Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court may, in its discretion, consider competent evidence and other papers submitted with a motion for default judgment to determine damages. Id.
Before the Court analyzes the Eitel factors, the Court notes that default judgment pursuant to Rule 55 is appropriate even though Defendants have appeared in this action.
Defendants also had months to request that the Clerk's November 20, 2017 entry of default be set aside. The Court expressly extended such an opportunity on January 5, 2018, and again at the hearing on Ridola's motion for default judgment held on May 10, 2018—at which Defendants did not appear. Based on the foregoing, and as discussed further below, Defendants have failed to respond to the FAC and "otherwise defend" the action in accordance with Rule 55(a). The Court now turns to the procedural requirements for a default judgment, followed by an analysis of the Eitel factors and Ridola's request for relief.
When a plaintiff requests default judgment, the court must first assess whether the defendant was properly served with notice of the action. See, e.g., Solis v. Cardiografix, No. 12-cv-01485, 2012 WL 3638548, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2012). Defendant Nelson Chao was personally served with the summons and complaint on May 1, 2016 by a registered process server. ECF 7. Defendant Ingrid Chao was also properly served via substitute service on May 1, 2016, when the process server left the documents with Nelson Chao at Ingrid's residence. Id. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e), service on an individual within a judicial district of the United States is adequate if made by "leaving a copy of [the summons and complaint] at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(B).
Defendants then answered the original complaint, and all documents in this action have been served upon them by mail at their address of record. Importantly, Defendants were served with the operative FAC by mail on June 23, 2017. ECF 41. Defendants have filed documents in this case making clear that they are aware of the FAC and their obligation to respond to it. See ECF 48, 49, 50. Moreover, neither Defendant is a minor, an incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e), 55(b)(2). The Court is satisfied that service of process was adequate.
The Court next considers whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the action, and personal jurisdiction over the parties. Both are satisfied here. The FAC seeks relief under federal law, including violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12181 et seq. (fourth cause of action). See FAC ¶¶ 40-43. Therefore, federal question jurisdiction exists over the ADA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Ridola's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court also has personal jurisdiction over Defendants, as the FAC alleges that at all relevant times, Defendants owned and operated the Motel and adjacent parking lot in Santa Clara County. See FAC ¶¶ 1, 6, 12-13. Defendants also reside in California, and are therefore subject to general personal jurisdiction in this Court.
The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if default judgment is not entered. Without entry of default, Ridola would have no other means of recourse against Defendants for the damages caused by their conduct. Mem. at 14. Accordingly, the first factor favors entry of default judgment. See, e.g., Wilamette Green Innovation Ctr., LLC v. Quartis Capital Partners, No. 14-cv-00848, 2014 WL 5281039, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) (citations omitted) ("Denying a plaintiff a means of recourse is by itself sufficient to meet the burden posed by this factor.").
The Court considers the second and third Eitel factors—concerning the merits of Ridola's substantive claims and the sufficiency of her FAC—together because of the relatedness of the inquiries. In analyzing these factors, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded allegations regarding liability. See, e.g., HICA Educ. Loan Corp. v. Warne, No. 11-cv-04287, 2012 WL 1156402, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2012). However, Defendants are "not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law." DIRECTV, Inc. v Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007). "[N]ecessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default." Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of No. America, 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992).
The Court first addresses Ridola's federal claim for violations of Title III of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination by public accommodations. The statute provides that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, Ridola must show that (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) Defendants own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation; and (3) she was denied public accommodations by Defendants because of her disability. See Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007).
In this case, Ridola's claim for discrimination under Title III includes "a failure to remove architectural barriers . . . in existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The term "readily achievable" means "easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense." Id. § 12181(9). Accordingly, "[t]o succeed on an ADA claim of discrimination on account of one's disability due to an architectural barrier, Ridola must also prove that: (1) the existing facility presents an architectural barrier prohibited under the ADA; and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable. See Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Restaurant, 96 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1085 (D. Haw. 2000); see also Johnson v. Beahm, No. 2:11-cv-0294 MCE JFM, 2011 WL 5508893, *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011).
For the reasons that follow, the Court determines that Ridola has stated a claim against Defendants under Title III of the ADA.
The Court must first determine whether Ridola has Article III standing to bring a claim under the ADA. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has suffered an injury in fact, that the injury is traceable to the defendant's challenged conduct, and that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision. Hubbard v. Rite Aid Corp., 433 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1162 (S.D. Cal. 2006). Ridola has Article III standing because she alleges in her FAC that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA and she was denied access to the goods and services offered by the Motel to its non-disabled guests, which has deterred disabled persons from patronizing the Motel in the future. FAC ¶¶ 2, 5. Specifically, Ridola alleges that she personally encountered barriers to her full and equal access at the Motel and parking lot, including that she twice requested an accessible room but her request was denied each time. FAC ¶ 14. She also had issues in the parking lot area because the ramp adjacent to the access aisle encroached into the access aisle, making it difficult to stabilize her wheelchair prior to getting out of her car. Id. Ridola also could not eat breakfast in the breakfast area with ease because Defendants did not provide ADA seating. Id. ¶ 15. Ridola has also alleged that these encountered architectural barriers were the cause of the denial of access and that Defendants knew these areas of the Motel were inaccessible. See, e.g., FAC ¶ 19. Finally, an award of statutory damages and injunctive relief would redress Ridola's alleged injuries. Id. at 14. In light of Defendants' default in this case, the Court accepts Ridola's allegations as true and finds that she has standing to bring an ADA claim against Defendants.
The Ninth Circuit has made clear that "an ADA plaintiff who establishes standing as to encountered barriers may also sue for injunctive relief as to unencountered barriers related to [her] disability."Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 944 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008) (" We hold that Doran has standing to sue for injunctive relief for all barriers in the North Harbor 7-Eleven store related to his specific disability, including those identified in his expert's site inspections.") Accordingly, because Ridola has Article III standing with respect to the barriers she encountered, she also has standing to pursue injunctive relief with respect to unencountered barriers identified in the FAC that were discovered at the joint site inspection. See FAC ¶ 17.
Finally, where a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, he or she must also demonstrate a significant possibility of future harm. See San Diego County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996). "In the ADA context, in determining the likelihood that a plaintiff will return to defendant's facility, courts have examined such factors as (1) the proximity of the place of public accommodation to plaintiff's residence, (2) plaintiff's past patronage of defendant's business, (3) the definitiveness of plaintiff's plans to return, and (4) the plaintiff's frequency of travel near defendant." See Hubbard v. Rite Aid Corp., 433 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1163 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir.2002)).
A disabled individual suffers a cognizable injury if she is deterred from visiting a noncompliant public accommodation because she has encountered barriers related to her disability there. See Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F.Supp.2d 998, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Chapman, 631 F.3d at 949); see also Doran, 524 F.3d at 1042 n. 5 ("Once a disabled individual has encountered or become aware of alleged ADA violations that deter his patronage of or otherwise interfere with his access to a place of public accommodation, he has already suffered an injury in fact traceable to the defendant's conduct and capable of being redressed by the courts, and so he possesses standing under Article III"); Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1138 ("We hold that a disabled individual who is currently deterred from patronizing a public accommodation due to a defendant's failure to comply with the ADA has suffered `actual injury'"). Ridola alleges that Defendants' failure to make the Motel and its parking lot accessible to all customers regardless of disability has deterred her from patronizing the Motel. FAC ¶ 2; Ridola Decl. ¶ 3. Specifically, Ridola states that due to her housing situation, she would choose to stay at the Motel again due to their reasonable rates. See Ridola Decl. ¶ 3. However, she fears that her rights and those of disabled persons will continue to be ignored by Defendants. Id. Accordingly, Ridola has satisfied the requirements for Article III standing and can seek injunctive relief for both encountered and unencountered barriers under the ADA.
Accepting Ridola's allegations as true, Ridola has shown that (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) Defendants own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation; and (3) Ridola was denied public accommodations by Defendants because of her disability. See Molski, 481 F.3d at 730. First, Ridola alleges that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. FAC ¶ 5; Ridola Decl. ¶ 1. Under the ADA, an individual who requires the use of a wheelchair is considered disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (defining a physical impairment substantially affecting a major life activity as qualifying as a disability); § 12102(2)(A) (stating that "major life activities include . . . walking"). Second, Ridola alleges that Defendants are the tenants and/or owners of the Motel and adjacent parking lot, which she alleges are places of public accommodation under the ADA. FAC ¶¶ 1, 6, 41; see 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendants are therefore liable for violating the ADA if Ridola shows that she suffered discrimination at the Motel due to her disability. See, e.g., Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.
Third, as alleged in the FAC, Ridola's ADA claim requires her to show that the alleged architectural barriers at the Motel and adjacent parking lot denied her public accommodations due to her disability. The Court finds that Ridola has adequately alleged that the subject property has architectural barriers that render the premises inaccessible to and unusable by wheelchair users. See FAC ¶¶ 14-18; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Ridola states that she visited the Motel on four separate occassions and that she encountered numerous barriers at check-in, in the parking lot, and in the breakfast area. FAC ¶¶ 14-15; Ridola Decl. ¶¶ 4-7. The FAC also alleges a host of additional barriers related to Ridola's disability that were discovered at the August 5, 2016 joint site inspection. FAC ¶ 17. Ridola contends that all of these barriers violate the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines, found in the ADA's implementing regulations at 28 C.F.R. Part 36 ("ADAAG"). See Mem. at 6-7.
The Ninth Circuit has held that the ADAAG provide "objective contours of the standard that architectural features must not impede disabled individuals' full and equal enjoyment of accommodations." Chapman, 631 F.3d at 945. Accordingly, a violation of the ADAAG constitutes a barrier under the ADA. "The ADAAG's requirements are as precise as they are thorough, and the difference between compliance and noncompliance with the standard is often a matter of inches." Chapman, 631 F.3d at 945-946. Violations of Title III of the ADA entitle a plaintiff to injunctive relief in the form of an "order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2).
On March 15, 2012, new federal accessibility standards for alterations and new construction went into effect, known as the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design ("2010 Standards"). 28 C.F.R. § 35.151. See Mem. at 7. Alterations to facilities undertaken after March 15, 2012 must comply with the 2010 Standards. 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(c)(5)(i); Fortyune v. City of Lomita, 766 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014). Ridola contends that the Motel was constructed prior to March 2012 and no construction or alteration has been made to the Motel since March 15, 2012. See Declaration of Irene Karbelashvili ("Irene Karbelashvili Decl.") ¶ 5, ECF 58-8. Therefore, the Court agrees with Ridola that for purposes of determining whether a barrier existed at the time of Ridola's visits to the Motel, the 1991 ADAAG applies ("1991 Standards"). However, the 2010 Standards govern any injunction that the Court issues, as all remedial work will be undertaken after March 15, 2012.
Based on the 1991 Standards applicable to construction completed prior to March 15, 2012, the Court finds that the alleged barriers at the Motel and its parking lot violate the ADAAG. Ridola alleges that no accessible rooms were ever provided despite her request each time she stayed at the Motel. FAC, ¶ 14; Ridola Decl. ¶ 5. At the joint inspection, Defendant Nelson Chao admitted that the Motel had a total of 31 rooms and that only one was reserved for disabled guests (Room 104). Declaration of Bassam Altwal ("Altwal Decl.") ¶ 7, ECF 58-5. Ridola was unable to inspect Room 104 because it was being permanently occupied. Id. Accordingly, there were effectively no accessible rooms at the Motel available to disabled guests. Id. Pursuant to the 1991 Standards, § 9.1.4 a place of lodging that has between 26 and 50 sleeping rooms must provide at least two (2) accessible rooms and such rooms must be dispersed among the various classes of sleeping accommodations to provide a range of options applicable to room size, costs, amenities, and number of beds. Accordingly, Defendants have failed to provide a sufficient amount of accessible rooms.
Next, Ridola alleges that she had difficulty stabilizing her wheelchair prior to disembarking from her car because the ramp adjacent to the access aisle encroaches into the access aisle. FAC ¶ 14. This is in violation of the 1991 Standards, § 4.7.8 ("Curb ramps shall be located or protected to prevent their obstruction by parked vehicles."). As for the complete lack of accessible seating in the Motel's breakfast area (FAC ¶ 15), the 1991 Standards require at least 5%, but no less than one, accessible seating in areas where food is consumed. See 1991 Standards, § 5.1. For the foregoing reasons, Ridola has alleged that the encountered barriers violated the law.
Ridola has also alleged that several unencountered barriers that are related to her disability which were discovered at the joint site inspection also violate the law and must be remediated. See Mem. at 9; FAC ¶ 17. Those allegations include the following:
Accepting Ridola's allegations as true, the Court finds that she has satisfied the ADA's requirement for a plaintiff to show that the alleged barriers are prohibited by the ADA (or as discussed below, the Unruh Act) and that the architectural barriers denied her full and equal access to the Motel and parking lot because of her disability.
Finally, in an existing building, removal of the barriers must be readily achievable, which means that the barrier removal can be accomplished with little difficulty or expense. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). Pursuant to the ADA, determining whether an action is readily achievable involves consideration of four factors: "(A) the nature and cost of the action needed; (B) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the action; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such action upon the operation of the facility; (C) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (D) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9).
Ridola argues that the Ninth Circuit has explicitly held that whether removal of barriers is "readily achievable" is an affirmative defense that must be pled by the answering party. See Mem. at 4 (citing Lentini v. California Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 845 (9th Cir. 2004)). The Court is not persuaded by Ridola's reading of Lentini, which instead held that "[w]hether an accommodation fundamentally alters a service or facility is an affirmative defense," which is a different issue. Id. (emphasis added). However, the Court does find that various district courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied the Tenth Circuit's burden-shifting framework articulated in Colorado Cross Disability v. Hermanson Family, Ltd., 264 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 2001). See, e.g., Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1010-11; see also Sceper v. Trucks Plus, No. Civ S-09-0801 GEB EFB, 2009 WL 3763823, *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2009) (agreeing with the District of Arizona that until the Ninth Circuit provides additional and specific instruction to lower courts, it will follow the overwhelming majority of federal courts that apply the burden-shifting framework, especially in the context of a default judgment where defendants have not appeared).
Accordingly, although Ridola has not identified a case where the Ninth Circuit explicitly decided who has the burden of proving that removal of an architectural barrier is readily achievable, the Court follows the district courts applying the Colorado Cross framework.
Ridola has alleged that Defendants knew of the architectural barriers at the Motel and in the parking lot, and that they have the financial resources to remove these barriers from the Motel without much difficulty or expense to make the Motel accessible to disabled guests. FAC ¶ 19. Moreover, many of the barriers alleged by Ridola are presumed to be readily achievable under 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b) (providing that examples of readily achievable steps to remove barriers include installing ramps, rearranging tables, chairs, vending machines, display racks, and other furniture, widening doors, installing accessible door hardware, and creating designated accessible parking spaces).
The Court finds that on default, Ridola's allegations satisfy her burden of production as to whether removal of the barriers is readily achievable. Vogel, 992 F.Supp.2d at 1011; Johnson v. Hall, 2012 WL 1604715, *3 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (holding that plaintiff's allegation that architectural barriers "are readily removable" and that he sought injunctive relief to remove all readily achievable barriers" satisfied his burden); Johnson v. Beahm, No. 2:11-CV-0294-MCE-JFM, 2011 WL 5508893, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (holding that the plaintiff's allegations that architectural barriers were readily removable was sufficient because the allegations are taken as true on default). Because Defendants have defaulted and chosen not to defend this action, they have failed to meet their burden to show that removal of the identified barriers is not readily achievable. The Court also notes that although Defendants filed answers to the original complaint before they defaulted, they did not raise a "readily achievable" affirmative defense. ECF 9, 11.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Ridola has established all elements of her claim for a violation of Title III of the ADA against Defendants. As the above confirms, Ridola has shown that (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) Defendants own, lease, and/or operate a place of public accommodation; and (3) she was denied public accommodations by the Defendants because of her disability. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 945; Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d at 730; see FAC ¶¶ 40-43. Finally, Ridola has satisfied her burden to show that the barriers are easily removed by Defendants without much difficulty or expense. FAC ¶ 19.
Ridola has therefore satisfied the second and third Eitel factors with respect to the merits of her substantive ADA claim and the sufficiency of the FAC with respect to the ADA claim. The Court next considers the merits and sufficiency of Ridola's state law claims.
Because a violation of the ADA constitutes a per se violation of the Unruh Act, the Court also concludes that Ridola has adequately stated a claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f); Lentini, 370 F.3d at 847 ("[A] violation of the ADA is, per se, a violation of the Unruh Act."); see FAC ¶¶ 27-32.
The Court also finds that Ridola has stated a claim under the California Health and Safety Code. See FAC ¶¶ 21-26; 44-48. Pursuant to California Health & Safety Code § 19955, all public accommodations constructed in California must comply with the requirements of Cal. Gov't Code § 4450. Pursuant to Government Code § 4450, "all buildings, structures, sidewalks, curbs, and related facilities, constructed in this state by the use of state, county, or municipal funds, or the funds of any political subdivision of the state shall be accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities." All buildings constructed or altered after July 1, 1970, must comply with standards governing the physical accessibility of public accommodations. Cal. Gov't Code § 4450(a); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19955; D'Lil v. Stardust Vacation Club, No. CIV-S-00-149 6DFL PAN, 2001 WL 1825832, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2001). Since December 31, 1981, those standards governing accessibility of public accommodations in California have been set forth in Title 24 of the California Regulatory Code. See Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., 220 F.R.D. 604, 607 (N.D. Cal. 2004), amended in part, No. C 02-5849 PJH, 2012 WL 3070863 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2012).
Aside from ADA violations, state law claims may be premised on violations of the California Building Code ("CBC"), also known as Title 24. See Cal. Civ. Code § 54; Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19955; Cal. Code Regs Title 24 § 1134B.1, 2. The CBC does not require facilities that pre-date its enactment to comply with its regulations unless and until the facility is altered. However, Ridola alleges that the Motel is a public accommodation and that it has undergone construction and/or alterations after January 1982, and as such, is subject to access requirements under Title 24/the CBC. FAC ¶ 25. Even though certain barriers listed above do not amount to ADA violations, Ridola has demonstrated that the Motel does not comply with the applicable regulations set forth in Title 24/the CBC—the accessibility requirements for public accommodations in California. See Pickern v. Best W. Timber Cove Lodge Marina Resort, No. CIV.S-00-1637 WBS/DA, 2002 WL 202442, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2002), superseded in part, 194 F.Supp.2d 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2002) ("Under the state statutes, a plaintiff can show either that the ADA was violated, or that the facility in question does not comply with the California Building Code requirements for disabled access, which are commonly referred to as Title 24.")
Because the Motel and parking lot are not accessible to individuals with disabilities in violation of the CBC, Ridola has shown that Defendants have violated California Health and Safety Code § 19953 et seq. FAC ¶ 25.
Ridola also seeks relief under California Business & Professions Code § 17200 & § 17500. Section 17200 prohibits a business from "unfair competition [which] shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising." Because Ridola alleges that Defendants have violated California law described above, she has likewise stated a claim for relief against Defendants under the "unlawful" prong of section 17200. See FAC ¶ 47.
Section 17500, also known as California's False Advertising Practices Act, prohibits ". . . any person, firm, corporation or association . . . to make or disseminate . . . any statement . . . which is untrue." Ridola alleges that Defendants have violated section 17500 because they "have represented that their services are available to all members of the general public, when, in fact, said Defendants deny full and equal access to such services to disabled individuals who use wheelchairs by reason of Defendants' failure to comply with their legal obligations under the Unruh Act." FAC ¶ 52. Accordingly, Ridola has stated a claim for relief under § 17500.
Finally, although Ridola brought a claim under the Disabled Persons Act as her third cause of action in the FAC, she seeks damages on default judgment on her Unruh Act claim and does not move for default judgment on the Disabled Persons Act claim. See Mem. at 14 n.2.
For the foregoing reasons, Ridola has stated claims for relief under California law in addition to the ADA, satisfying the second and third Eitel factors, and making her entitled to injunctive relief under both federal and state law.
Under the fourth Eitel factor, the Court considers the amount of money at stake in the litigation. BMW of North Am., LLC v. Zahra, Case No. 15-cv-2924, 2016 WL 215983, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2016). When the amount is substantial or unreasonable, default judgment is discouraged. Id. Here, Ridola seeks a judgment in the amount of $8,000 in statutory damages for two visits to the Motel on April 28 and 29, 2014 under the Unruh Act and $19,094.50 in attorneys' fees and costs for a total monetary award of $27,094.50. See Mem. at 15; Altwal Decl. ¶ 9; Irene Karbelashvili Decl. ¶ 6; Irakli Karbelashvili Decl. ¶ 15. These amounts are far less than the amount sought in Eitel—$2.9 million—and serves to sway this factor in favor of granting Ridola's motion for default judgment. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472.
Under the fifth and sixth Eitel factors, the Court considers where there is the possibility of a factual dispute over any material fact and whether Defendants failure to respond may have resulted from excusable neglect. BMW, 2016 WL 215983, at *4. The record makes clear that Defendants knew how to move to set aside a default entered against them, but chose not to with respect to the most recent entry of default, despite being given the opportunity to do so. ECF 48, 67. There is no dispute of material fact because Defendants have not responded to the FAC, and upon an entry of default by the Clerk, the factual allegations of the FAC related to liability are taken as true. There is also nothing to suggest that there was been a technical error or excusable neglect on Defendants' behalf. See Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. v. Kuei, 194 F.Supp.2d 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that the "default of defendant . . . cannot be attributed to excusable neglect . . . [when they were] properly served with the Complaint, the notice of entry of default, as well as the papers in support of the instant motion.").
On September 6, 2017, Defendants stated in their declarations and motion to set aside the previous default that they would respond to the FAC "if given the chance." ECF 48, 49, 50. When given the chance, and repeatedly reminded by counsel for Ridola to respond to the FAC, Defendants did not respond. Defendants also did not appear at the hearing on Ridola's motion for default judgment. Thus, both factors five and six weigh in favor of granting default judgment.
Although federal policy favors decisions on the merits, Rule 55(b)(2) permits entry of default judgment in situations, such as this, where a defendant refuses to litigate. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Deleon, No. 5:13-CV-02030, 2014 WL 121711, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014). Therefore, this general policy is outweighed by the more specific considerations in this case outlined above, and the seventh Eitel factor weighs in favor of default.
After considering all seven Eitel factors and the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that default judgment is warranted and GRANTS Ridola's motion for default judgment against Defendants on all of the claims for which she moves for default judgment.
The Court next considers Ridola's request for injunctive relief, statutory damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. See generally Mem. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) allows only the amount prayed for in the complaint to be awarded to a plaintiff on default judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(c) ("A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings"); Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Banh, No. CV 03-4043 GAF (PJWx), 2005 WL 5758392, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2005). Under Rule 8(a)(3), a plaintiff's demand for relief must be specific, and he or she "must `prove up' the amount of damages." Philip Morris USA Inc., 2005 WL 5758392, at *6. Unlike liability, defaulting defendants are not deemed to have admitted facts concerning damages alleged in the complaint. See TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987).
The ADA permits private individuals to seek injunctive relief. Molski, 481 F.3d at 730. When the Court has determined that defendant violated the ADA, "injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12188. The Court may also grant injunctive relief for violations of the Unruh Act under § 52.1(h).
Under the ADA, injunctive relief is proper when architectural barriers at the defendant's establishment violate the ADA and the removal of the barriers is readily achievable. See, e.g., Moreno v. La Curacao, 463 Fed.Appx. 669, 670 (9th Cir. 2011). As discussed at length above under the second and third Eitel factors, Ridola has demonstrated that each alleged barrier at the Motel and parking lot violated either the 1991 Standards or the CBC. Accordingly, Ridola has satisfied the requirements for injunctive relief compelling Defendants to remove barriers at the Motel so that the public accommodation is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.
Ridola seeks an injunction that would require Defendants to make the following modifications on or before December 31, 2018:
See Proposed Judgment, ECF 58-16.
Based on the sufficiency of Ridola's allegations and the entry of default against Defendants, the Court finds that Ridola is entitled to such an injunction under the ADA and the California Unruh Act ordering the removal of each of the alleged barriers at the Motel related to her disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2); Cal. Civ. Code § 52(c)(3); see Chapman, 631 F.3d at 944 (holding that "an ADA plaintiff who establishes standing as to encountered barriers may also sue for injunctive relief as to unencountered barriers related to [her] disability." ) However, in light of the large number of barriers that Defendants are required to address, the Court finds that one year is a more reasonable amount of time for Defendants to accomplish the modifications.
Accordingly, Defendants are hereby ORDERED to modify the Motel and parking lot to be in compliance with the ADA 2010 Standards and Title 24 of the California Code of Regulations, with all work to be completed
Because the Unruh Act provides for a minimum statutory damages award of $4,000.00 for each occasion an individual is denied equal access to an establishment covered by the Unruh Act, the Court finds that Ridola is entitled to a total of $8,000.00 in statutory damages for her documented visits to the Motel on April 28, 2014 and April 29, 2014. See Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a); see FAC ¶ 14; Declaration of Fernando Cervantes ("Cervantes Decl.") ¶ 3, ECF 58-3.
Ridola seeks to recover $19,094.5 in attorneys' fees and litigation costs. Mem. at 19. A court may, in its discretion, award attorneys' fees and litigation expenses, including expert witness fees, to the prevailing party in a discrimination action. 42 U.S.C. § 12205; Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that counsel for Ridola have presented sufficient evidence to conclude that the fees and costs requested are reasonable and justified.
In calculating awards for attorneys' fees, courts use "the `lodestar' method, and the amount of that fee must be determined on the facts of each case." Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). "The `lodestar' is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate." Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996) opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 108 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1997). The moving party bears the burden of providing relevant documentation demonstrating the reasonableness of the hours spent on the litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. In the absence of adequate documentation supporting the number of hours expended on the lawsuit, "the district court may reduce the award accordingly." Id. "The district court also should exclude from this initial [lodestar] calculation hours that were not `reasonably expended.'" Id. at 434 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976)). When determining the reasonable hourly rate, the court must weigh the "experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees," and compare the requested rates to prevailing market rates. Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986) opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 886 (1984). Once calculated, the lodestar amount, which is presumptively reasonable, may be further adjusted based on other factors not already subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation. Morales, 96 F.3d at 363-64, 363 nn.3-4 (identifying factors) (citing Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975)).
Ridola's counsel Irene Karbelashvili declares that she incurred $5,850 in attorneys' fees for a total of 18 hours worked at an adjusted hourly rate of $325 per hour. See Irene Karbelashvili Decl. ¶ 7. Irakli Karbelashvili declares that he incurred $4,522.50 in attorneys' fees for a total of 20.10 hours worked at an hourly rate of $225 per hour. See Irakli Karbelashvili Decl. ¶¶ 14-15. Under the lodestar analysis, the Court must first determine whether counsels' rates are reasonable, as determined by "the prevailing market rates in the relevant community." Blum, 465 U.S. at 886. The market rates used in this comparison should pertain to attorneys with similar "skill, experience, and reputation" to the moving attorneys. Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1211(citing Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11). Second, the Court must examine whether the hours expended on this litigation are reasonable.
The Court finds that counsels' rates of $325 and $225 per hour, respectively, are reasonable rates in light of the attorneys' skill and experience handling disability access cases.
Ridola's expert, Bassam Altwal, also spent 31.75 hours on this matter at a rate of $240 per hour for a total of $7,620.00. See Altwal Decl. ¶¶ 3, 9-10; see also ECF 58-7. The Court finds this rate and amount of hours reasonable and justified. Accord Rodgers v. Fitzgerald, No. 14-CV-00985-DMR, 2016 WL 4658974, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2016) (finding Altwal's hourly rate of $240 reasonable); see also Heifetz v. West San Carlos Court Apartments, LLC et al, No. 5:17-cv-01451-NC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:17-cv-01451-EJD (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2017).
As Ridola's request for attorneys' fees and expert fees is reasonable and adequately justified, the Court GRANTS her request for fees. Ridola also seeks to recover $1,102.00 in filing fees and service costs. See Irene Karbelashvili Decl. ¶ 11. The costs are reasonable and the Court will award them.
In sum, the Court GRANTS Ridola's request for attorneys' fees, costs, and litigation expenses as the prevailing party in this case under both federal and state law. The Court awards fees and costs as follows:
For the foregoing reasons, it is HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
