ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 9]

BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant BMO Harris Bank, N.A.'s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Haresh Mirchandani's and Indra Mirchandani's Complaint. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s MTD"), ECF No. 49.) On June 16, 2018, Plaintiffs filed what the Court will construe as an opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 14.) For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2014, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant in the Superior Court of Arizona, County of Maricopa1. (Def.'s MTD, Ex. A.) Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant engaged in predatory lending when it issued their business, SS Quality Fuels LLC ("Quality"), a swap loan, as well as breached several loan agreements when it sold Quality's loans to TradeCor Desert Sky II, LLC. (Id. at 3-5.) Plaintiffs, the sole members of Quality, served as signatories to the loan agreements. (Id.) The Arizona Superior Court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice and held that Plaintiffs, as guarantors to the loan agreements, did not have standing to bring the lawsuit as the claims belonged to Quality. (Def.'s MTD, Ex. E at 4.) On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the standing issue and a claim of judicial bias. (Id. at 11.) The Supreme Court of Arizona denied Plaintiffs' petition for review. (Def.'s MTD, Ex. G.)

On October 11, 2017, Plaintiffs initiated this action against Defendant alleging a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs allege that this action arises out of the dismissed state court action. (Compl. at 2.) Plaintiffs contend that the Arizona Superior Court did not follow the law when it dismissed their state court action against Defendant and should have recused because of a conflict of interest. (Id.) Plaintiffs petition this Court to overturn the Arizona Superior Court's decision and retry the case. (Compl. at 2-3.)

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' action, arguing that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(1), the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In the alternative, Defendant argues that the Complaint fails to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6). Because the Court agrees with Defendant that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it need not reach the 12(b)(6) argument.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine "prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment." Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004). Rooker-Feldman only applies to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., Corp., 544. U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The Ninth Circuit has provided the following guidance regarding the doctrine's role in federal courts:

Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003).

As pled, Plaintiffs' lawsuit is a de facto appeal of the Arizona state courts' decisions. Plaintiffs allege that the Arizona state court did not follow the law and was conflicted because Defendant made a contribution to Judge David Udall's cousin's campaign. (Compl. at 2.) Plaintiffs allege that this "corruption" constitutes a section 1983 violation. (Id.) As a remedy, Plaintiffs request that this Court "overturn" the Arizona state court decisions and retry the merits of the case. As the Ninth Circuit notes, Rooker-Feldman bars this exact lawsuit. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164.

Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action and Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.