ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

JEFFREY T. MILLER, District Judge.

Plaintiff Alberto Luciano Gonzalez Torres moves for reconsideration of this court's April 12, 2018 order denying Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, granting Defendants' motion to dissolve the original preliminary injunction, and granting Defendants' motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint without leave to amend (the "Order").1 Defendants U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") oppose the motion. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the court finds the matters presented appropriate for resolution without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the motion for reconsideration.

DISCUSSION

Reconsideration is generally appropriate "if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law. . . . There may also be other, highly unusual circumstances warranting reconsideration." School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Oregon v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).

Plaintiff raises several arguments previously addressed in the Order, and only briefly discussed herein. In the main, Plaintiff contends that the court committed clear error by concluding, under APA review, that Defendants' challenged conduct was neither arbitrary, capricious nor contrary to law. Defendants complied with DACA in revoking Plaintiff's DACA status by concluding, in their discretion, that he constituted an enforcement priority based upon his involvement in alien smuggling (i.e. conduct that violated 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and §1182(a)(6)(E)(i)).2 Plaintiff seeks to limit Defendants' ability to exercise their discretion in determining DHS's enforcement priority to only those situations where the DACA recipient possesses a disqualifying criminal conviction, a public safety concern finding, a national security concern finding or an EPS (Egregious Public Safety) finding. For the reasons set forth in the Order, the court rejects this argument.3

Plaintiff also argues that the November 17, 2017 NOIT, (ECF 39-6 at 9-10), violated his due process rights by failing to provide him with adequate notice of the "events or facts [DHS] w[as] relying on" in revoking his DACA status. Plaintiff correctly asserts that the NOIT does not directly inform him of the basis and circumstances for revocation of his DACA status. However, the NOIT made express reference to this action and the first revocation of his DACA status. In any event, by means of the on-going administrative proceedings and this action, Plaintiff does not dispute that he had actual notice of the underlying basis and circumstances for terminating his DACA status. Similarly, there is no showing that he suffered any prejudice by such omission.

Finally, Plaintiff contends that his substantive due process rights were violated because of the "determination of criminality made by a non-neutral arbiter." (Motion at p.25:6-7). Notably, Plaintiff cites scant authority to support this conclusion.

Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 651 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)). Here, there is no indication that Defendants engaged in any conscience-shocking or clearly arbitrary and unreasonable conduct, or that factual determinations by duly constituted administrative bodies made in the ordinary and normal course of an administrative proceeding violate the concept of "ordered liberty." Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot prevail on his substantive due process claim.

In sum, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.