LAUREL BEELER, Magistrate Judge.
This is a breach-of-contract case regarding bonus payments under an employment agreement — with a twist.
In 2010, plaintiff Judy Codding, an education professional, entered into an employment agreement ("Employment Agreement") with Pearson plc, an education and information company that provides curriculum assessment and other services to schools, school districts, and students. In 2016, Dr. Codding and a subsidiary of Pearson plc — Pearson Education, Inc. — entered into a release agreement ("Release Agreement"), which, among other things, (1) memorialized the termination of Dr. Codding's employment, (2) released Pearson Education and its affiliates, including Pearson plc, regarding any matter or event occurring before the signing of the Release Agreement (other than some exceptions not relevant here), and (3) modified the bonus provisions under the Employment Agreement, which were to survive after Dr. Codding's employment ended.
The Employment Agreement, as modified by the Release Agreement, provided that Dr. Codding would receive certain monetary bonuses in the event that sales of the "Pearson System of Courses" ("PSoC") course offerings, which Dr. Codding helped to develop, exceeded a certain threshold dollar amount ("Threshold Amount") by the end of 2019. As of today, sales of PSoC course offerings have not exceeded that Threshold Amount. Dr. Codding alleges that Pearson plc and Pearson Education have failed to adequately promote and sell PSoC and that, had they done so, PSoC sales would have hit the Threshold Amount and she would be entitled to receive her bonuses. Dr. Codding alleges that Pearson plc and Pearson Education breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that attaches to the Agreements by not adequately promoting and selling PSoC.
The twist is that while Dr. Codding makes allegations against Pearson plc and Pearson Education, she is not actually suing Pearson plc — she is suing only Pearson Education. Her allegations grouping Pearson plc and Pearson Education together do not adequately plead that Pearson Education — the only defendant in this case — breached the Agreements in a way that caused her injury. The court therefore dismisses Dr. Codding's complaint, with leave to amend.
Dr. Codding is an education professional who, among other things, was the award-winning principal of Pasadena High School in Los Angeles County, was a charter principal of the Coalition of Essential Schools (a national high-school reform effort), was an education consultant to the Ministry of Education in the People's Republic of China and the U.S. Department of Defense Schools, and was a commissioner on the California Commission for the Establishment of Academic Content and Performance Standards.
Dr. Codding served as Chief Operating Officer and Vice President of the National Center on Education and the Economy ("NCEE"), a nonprofit policy and school reform company.
Defendant Pearson Education is a wholly owned subsidiary of non-party Pearson plc, a British education and publishing company.
In December 2010, following Pearson plc's acquisition of America's Choice, Pearson plc and Dr. Codding entered into a letter Employment Agreement, whereby Pearson plc hired Dr. Codding as its Managing Director for the Common Core System of Courses.
The Employment Agreement assigned Dr. Codding responsibility for overseeing two separate programs.
Under the Employment Agreement, Dr. Codding was entitled to bonus amounts "based on the amount of sales Pearson [plc] made of the products for which for which Dr. Codding was responsible as Managing Director, referred to as the `Pearson System of Courses' or `PSoC.'"
Paragraph 2(c)(ii) provides that once PSoC sales exceed a certain specified Threshold Amount, Dr. Codding would receive a set bonus amount.
On July 15, 2016, Dr. Codding and Pearson Education entered into a Release Agreement.
The Release Agreement's first paragraph states that it "set[s] forth the agreement between [Dr. Codding] and Pearson Education, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively, the `Company') regarding [Dr. Codding's] separation from the Company."
The Release Agreement uses the term "Pearson" (without a suffix) in a number of places. (For example, it recites that Dr. Codding and "Pearson" were parties to an Employment Agreement
Dr. Codding alleges that "[t]he United States K-12 comprehensive-curriculum market spends some $3 billion each year" and the K-12 English language arts ("ELA") and math curriculum market spends approximately $2 billion each year.
California and New Mexico adopted the PSoC ELA and math curricula, which were on both states' approved lists.
Dr. Codding alleges that Pearson plc has abandoned any meaningful efforts to sell the PSoC math and ELA programs.
Dr. Codding additionally alleges that PSoC goes from grades K-12 in ELA and K-11 in math, matched to the grades in the Common Core State Standards.
Dr. Codding additionally alleges that Pearson plc maintains a nominal website for PSoC but that the website is "moribund" and has not been updated since 2015.
Dr. Codding alleges that after July 15, 2016 and through the present, Pearson plc and Pearson Education have incentivized their sales force to sell other Pearson products and disincentivized their sales force from selling PSoC.
With respect to Pearson plc, Dr. Codding alleges that Pearson plc's sales personnel have received no credit for selling PSoC in connection with their evaluations and consideration for promotion within the company.
With respect to Pearson Education, Dr. Codding alleges that Pearson Education has not included PSoC within its core products.
Every year, all of the national education associations have national conferences, and many also have regional and state conferences.
Before joining Pearson plc, Dr. Codding attended many of these conferences, keynoted several of them, and spoke at many of them.
Dr. Codding alleges that after July 15, 2016 and through the present, Pearson plc and Pearson Education have rarely, if ever, presented or showcased PSoC at any of these conferences.
Dr. Codding alleges that if Pearson plc had devoted the same efforts after July 15, 2016 toward selling PSoC that it had devoted to other course products, PSoC sales would have reached the levels necessary for her bonus to be awarded to her.
Dr. Codding does not allege that if Pearson Education had exerted efforts to sell PSoC, PSoC sales would have reached the levels necessary for Dr. Codding's bonuses to be awarded to her. Dr. Codding recites a number of times that if Pearson plc and Pearson Education had devoted meaningful efforts toward selling PSoC, PSoC sales would have reached the levels necessary for her bonus to be awarded to her,
A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" to give the defendant "fair notice" of what the claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a claim for relief above the speculative level[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, which when accepted as true, "`state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of `entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotation marks omitted).
If a court dismisses a complaint, it should give leave to amend unless the "the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990).
Dr. Codding does not allege that Pearson Education breached an express term of the Agreements. Instead, she alleges that Pearson Education breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract and prevents one party from "unfairly frustrating the other party's right to receive the benefits" of the contract. Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 349 (2000) (citing Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 11 Cal.4th 1, 36 (1995)). To allege a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a plaintiff must allege the following elements: (1) the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a contract; (2) the plaintiff did all or substantially all of the things that the contract required her to do or that she was excused from having to do; (3) all conditions required for the defendant's performance had occurred; (4) the defendant unfairly interfered with the plaintiff's right to receive the benefits of the contract; and (5) the defendant's conduct harmed the plaintiff. Qingdao Tang-Buy Int'l Import & Export Co., Ltd. v. Preferred Secured Agents, Inc., No. 15-cv-00624-LB, 2016 WL 6524396, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016) (citing Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions § 325 (2011); Oculus Innovative Scis., Inc. v. Nofil Corp., No. C 06-01686 SI, 2007 WL 2600746, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2007)). Regarding the last element — that the defendant's conduct harmed the plaintiff — "`[c]ausation of damages in contract cases, as in tort cases, requires that the damages be proximately caused by the defendant's breach, and that their causal occurrence be at least reasonably certain.'" Siqueiros v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, No. EDCV 13-01789-VAP (DTBx), 2014 WL 3015734, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2014) (quoting Vu v. Cal. Commerce Club, Inc., 58 Cal.App.4th 229, 233 (1997)). "`The test for causation in a breach of contract action is whether the breach was a substantial factor in causing the damages.'" Id. (internal ellipsis omitted) (quoting US Ecology, Inc. v. State, 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 909 (2005)). "`[M]ere conclusory statements do not suffice' to sufficiently state a breach of contract cause of action." Ketab Corp. v. Mesriani & Assocs., P.C., ___ F. App'x ___, No. 15-56753, 2018 WL 2041424, at *5 (9th Cir. May 2, 2018) (internal ellipsis omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); accord, e.g., Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F.Supp.2d 1010, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
Pearson Education assumes for the purposes of its motion to dismiss that it was a party to the Employment Agreement.
Dr. Codding's complaint lumps Pearson plc and Pearson Education together.
Looking solely at Dr. Codding's allegations against Pearson Education, the court finds that they are conclusory. Among other things, Dr. Codding does not allege any sales figures, sales projections, or any other facts or data that support her conclusion that had Pearson Education exerted reasonable or best efforts, it would have been able to make enough PSoC sales to meet the Threshold Amount. Dr. Codding includes some analyses of Pearson plc's sales figures and sales projections — but Pearson plc is not the defendant in this case, and these analyses do not support a conclusion about Pearson Education.
The court grants Dr. Codding one final opportunity to amend her complaint. Should she file an amended complaint and continue to name only Pearson Education (and not Pearson plc) as a defendant, she should make clear what duties Pearson Education (as opposed to Pearson plc) had to her, how Pearson Education (as opposed to Pearson plc) allegedly breached the Agreements, and how Pearson Education's breach (as opposed to Pearson plc's) caused her injury.
To plead a claim for anticipatory breach, a plaintiff must plead that "`(1) the other party absolutely and unequivocally refused to perform and (2) [the plaintiff] effectuated the other party's breach by materially changing [her] position and treating the repudiation as final.'" Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Bently Holdings Cal. LP, No. C-11-2573 EMC, 2011 WL 6099394, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2011) (quoting Shahani v. United Commercial Bank, 457 B.R. 775, 783 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Guerrieri v. Severini, 51 Cal.2d 12, 19 (1958); Wilton v. Clarke, 27 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 (1938))).
Dr. Codding's claim for anticipatory breach fails for at least two reasons. First, like her breach-of-contract claim, her anticipatory-breach claim improperly groups Pearson Education with non-party Pearson plc. Second, even setting that issue aside, Dr. Codding does not plead that either Pearson Education or Pearson plc absolutely and unequivocally refused to perform under the Employment Agreement. Dr. Codding argues in her opposition that "Pearson [plc] and Pearson Education. . . put it out of their power to perform so as to make substantial performance impossible,"
The court grants Pearson Education's motion to dismiss. The court extends Dr. Codding a final opportunity to amend; she may file an amended complaint within 21 days of this order. (If she files a new amended complaint, she must also file a blackline of her new amended complaint against her current amended complaint as an attachment.) If Dr. Codding does not do so, the court will enter judgment in favor of Pearson Education and will direct the Clerk of Court to close this case.