YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS, District Judge.
On September 11, 2017, plaintiff Robert L. Williams, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint appearing to allege unlawful search and seizure, false imprisonment, and racial profiling and discrimination as a result of inadequate training. (Dkt. No. 1, Complaint ("Compl.").)
Having carefully considered the pleadings, the papers submitted,
The complaint alleges as follows:
Williams was arrested on Saturday, July 15, 2017 in Oakland, California. (Compl. at 5.) On the date of plaintiff's arrest, Yamashita approached and handcuffed Williams without announcing his presence or that he was placing Williams in handcuffs. (Compl. at 3.) Padilla then arrived, and the two officers put plaintiff in the back of Padilla's patrol car and detained him there for several hours without providing a reason for plaintiff's detention. (Id.) When the police sergeant arrived and told Williams that the police were arresting him, the sergeant did not provide plaintiff with a reason for his arrest. (Id. at 4.) While Williams sat in the back seat of Padilla's patrol car, unnamed officers told plaintiff that he had "misdemeanor court probation with a four-way search clause." (Id. at 9.)
At the time of Williams' arrest he was near his parked vehicle and had two cell phones in his possession. (Id. at 4.) An unnamed officer removed the two cell phones from plaintiff's car, one of which the officer retrieved at plaintiff's request, and put both phones in Padilla's car. (Id.) Unnamed officers instructed Williams to lock his car and noted that another officer would wait for the tow truck because although plaintiff had a valid registration, he had parked the truck in a tow-away zone. (Id.) Williams and the officers disagreed as to the applicability of the tow-away provision, and Williams noted that the provision was only in effect the first and third Tuesday of the month.
Williams was in custody from his arrest on July 15, 2017 until his release on August 28, 2017, and plaintiff's two cell phones were returned to him on August 31, 2017. (Id. at 5-7.) One of plaintiff's phones was compromised and searched without his permission as Williams noticed that some saved emails had been deleted. (Id. at 6.) On August 30, 2017, Williams spoke with Rivera, who told him that "she had [the] phones taken for investigation on [July 15, 2017] and they were waiting for a search warrant." (Id.) Williams never received any property receipts or inventory records related to the confiscation of his two cell phones or the towing of his vehicle. (Id. at 7.)
Williams alleges that the individual defendants, who are all either Caucasian or Hispanic, engaged in the conduct described above as a result of racial profiling and discrimination on the basis of plaintiff's race. (Id. at 5, 6, 8.) Specifically, Williams argues that the City, the Chief of Police, and the OPD have failed to train properly their employees to avoid racial profiling and discrimination, particularly of African-American men and other people of color, which resulted in officer defendants' search and seizure of his person and property. (Id. at 3.)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a "lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). The complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If the facts alleged do not support a reasonable inference of liability, stronger than a mere possibility, the claim must be dismissed. Id. at 678-79. Mere "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004). Pro se pleadings must satisfy the same standard. See Brazil v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that courts must construe pro se pleadings liberally, but "those pleadings nonetheless must meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.").
Section 1983 "provides a cause of action for the `deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).
Defendants Kirkpatrick, Padilla, Yamashita, and Rivera, as well as the City, now move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that Williams fails to state a claim against the officer defendants for a search of his vehicle or seizure of his phones or his vehicle in violation of the Fourth Amendment and fails to state a Monell, or supervisory liability, claim against the municipal defendants for lack of an underlying constitutional violation. see Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). (Motion at 3.) The Court addresses each of the claims the plaintiff attempts to assert, namely (a) seizure of plaintiff's person; (b) seizure of his cell phones; (c) seizure of his vehicle; (d) search of his cellphone; and (e) Monell claims for municipal liability.
Williams alleges that officers Padilla and Yamashita held him in the back of Padilla's patrol car for several hours without any explanation as to why he was detained.
Although defendants state in their motion to dismiss that "[p]laintiff was charged with assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm and corporal injury to a spouse or cohabitant," the citation to which defendants point is not a record of arrest but a petition to revoke plaintiff's probation dated July 17, 2017, two days after his arrest.
Williams alleges that an unnamed officer removed two cell phones from plaintiff's car and placed both phones in Padilla's car. (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff further alleges that on August 30, 2017 he spoke with Rivera, who told him that "she had [the] phones taken for investigation on [July 15, 2017] and they were waiting for a search warrant." (Id. at 6.)
Defendants argue that the confiscation of plaintiff's cell phones on July 15, 2017 constituted a seizure incident to arrest in order to preserve evidence and is therefore exempt from the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. (Motion at 4-5 (citing Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-117 (1998).) However, the incident-to-arrest exception applies only when a proper arrest has occurred. See Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding a search and seizure unlawful where no arrest was made, even though probable cause for an arrest existed). For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff has adequately alleged an invalid arrest. (See supra, III.A.)
However, to establish liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that an individual defendant personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation. See, e.g., Avalos v. Bacca, 596 F.3d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 2010). Williams fails to allege that defendants Padilla and Yamashita were involved in the seizure of his cell phones.
Accordingly, regarding plaintiff's claim for seizure of his cell phones, the Court
Williams alleges that Yamashita and Rivera directed the seizure of his vehicle despite the fact that he had a valid registration. (Compl. at 4, 6.) Williams further alleges that he noted that the tow-away provision was only in effect the first and third Tuesday of the month and that he explained to the officers that he slept in the vehicle every night, that other trucks were parked in the area, and that he was attempting to reach his daughter to move the vehicle. (Id. at 4.)
Defendants argue that, "[b]ased on Plaintiff's allegations, the towing of Plaintiff's vehicle was reasonable under the community caretaking doctrine." (Motion at 5.) Specifically, defendants assert that because the tow-away zone would go into effect three days after Williams' arrest, on July 18, 2017, and Williams was in custody from July 15, 2017 until August 28, 2017, his vehicle was properly towed to "protect the vehicle form vandalism or theft, or to protect public safety and the flow of traffic, under the `community caretaking' doctrine." (Id. (citing Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1025 (9th Cir. 2009).) Defendants also point to California Vehicle Code section 22651(h)(1), which authorizes removal of a vehicle where an officer arrests a person in control of the vehicle and takes that person into custody. (Id. (citing Hupp v. City of Walnut Creek, 389 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1233 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (rejecting constitutional challenge to section 22651(h)(1)).)
Defendants have failed to show, based on the pleadings, that Williams could not possibly have retrieved his car prior to the tow-away zone taking affect. C.f. Ramirez, 560 F.3d at 1025 (finding that where there is nothing in the record indicating that arrestee could return to retrieve his car, impoundment was reasonable under the community caretaking doctrine). Here, the record suggests that Williams may have been able to get one of his daughters to retrieve the vehicle or may have been released prior to the tow-away zone taking effect on Tuesday, July 18, 2017.
However, Williams fails to allege that defendant Padilla was involved in the seizure of his vehicle. As noted above, to establish liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the individual defendant personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation. See, e.g., Avalos, 596 F.3d at 587.
Accordingly, regarding plaintiff's claim for seizure of his vehicle, the Court
In support of his claim of illegal search of his cell phone, Williams alleges that he "believes the phone was compromised and searched without his permission . . ." and "[i]t is plaintiff[`]s belief that his phone was comprimed [sic] because emails have been deleted that were saved." (Compl. at 6.)
Williams does not allege any of the individual defendants were involved in the search of his cell phone. As noted above, to establish liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the individual defendant personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation. See, e.g., Avalos, 596 F.3d at 587. Moreover, plaintiff's allegations in support of his claim of a search fail to "nudge . . . claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Larios v. Lunardi, No. 2:15-cv-02451-MCE-CMK, 2017 WL 1383269, at * 3 (E.D. Cal. April 18, 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Accordingly, the Court
Local governments are "persons" subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 where official policy or custom causes a constitutional tort, see Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
Williams avers that the City, the Chief of Police, and the OPD oversaw a practice of "engag[ing] in the racial profiling of black males. The city, chief, and Oakland Police Dept have not been properly trained or doesn't train its employees against racial profiling, discrimination and the illegal taking of `people of color' vehicles." (Compl. at 3 (quotations in original).) Williams appears to allege further that this practice of employing racial profiling and discrimination, especially as to African-American men, resulted in officer defendants' search and seizure of Williams person and property in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at 3, 5, 6, 8.)
Defendants argue that Williams fails to state a claim for relief under Monell because he: (1) "cannot state a viable claim that any OPD officer violated his constitutional rights"; (2) has not alleged that the "purported policy or practice of racial profiling, or inadequate training, was the cause-in-fact-or proximate cause of the seizure of Plaintiff's vehicle or cell phones or the alleged search of his phone"; and (3) has alleged "no facts to support any element of a Monell or supervisory claim." (Motion at 7.) The Court disagrees.
First, for the reasons stated herein, Williams has stated more than one viable claim that an OPD officer violated his constitutional rights. (See, supra III.A, B, C.) Second, although Williams does not use the phrase "proximate cause," with the lens of granting plaintiff all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Court finds plaintiff has alleged that that the purported policy or practice of racial profiling and discrimination, resulting in part from inadequate training, was the cause-in-fact of the constitutional violations articulated in his complaint. (See, e.g., Compl. at 6 (averring that "his truck was illegally towed and punished by the officer's rush to judgment, discrimination, racial profiling, and misconduct of all involved").) Finally, and for the reasons stated above, Williams has alleged facts to support the elements of a Monell claim. He has alleged deprivation of a constitutional right, the existence of a policy or practice, that the policy or practice amounts to deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights, and that the policy is the moving force behind the aforementioned constitutional violation. See Oviatt By and Through Waugh, 954 F.2d at 1474. Accordingly, the Court
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
Accordingly, Williams may file an amended complaint containing facts that suggest the following: (1) that Padilla and Yamashita personally participated in the seizure of plaintiff's cell phones; (2) that Padilla personally participated in the seizure of plaintiff's vehicle; and (3) that defendants searched his phone in violation of the Fourth Amendment, including (i) who conducted or authorized the alleged search and how and (ii) the condition of the phone when it was taken by defendants such that it could be searched. To the extent Williams has a basis for filing an amended complaint containing this information, he must file the amended complaint by no later than
In the event that Williams declines to file an amended complaint, the following claims will remain: (1) wrongful detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment as against all individual defendants; (2) unlawful seizure of plaintiff's cell phones in violation of the Fourth Amendment as against Rivera; (3) unlawful seizure of plaintiff's vehicle in violation of the Fourth Amendment as against Rivera and Yamashita; (4) Monell claims of unconstitutional racial profiling, discrimination, and inadequate training against the municipal defendants. If Williams does not file an amended complaint by Monday, September 10, 2018, defendants shall file their response to plaintiff's remaining claims no later than
The Court advises plaintiff that a Handbook for Pro Se Litigants, which contains helpful information about proceeding without an attorney, is available in the Clerk's office or through the Court's website,
Assistance is available through the Legal Help Center.
Additionally, the Court continues to
This Order terminates Dkt. No. 17.
