ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE MOTION TO SEAL

[ECF No. 52]

CYNTHIA BASHANT, District Judge.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Rosa Alvarez's Motion to File Certain Exhibits Under Seal. (ECF No. 52.) Plaintiff seeks to file under seal Exhibits A and M to the Declaration of Patricia N. Syverson in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

"[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents." Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). "Unless a particular court record is one `traditionally kept secret,' a `strong presumption in favor of access' is the starting point." Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). "The presumption of access is `based on the need for federal courts, although independent—indeed, particularly because they are independent—to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration of justice.'" Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)).

A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming the strong presumption of access. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. The showing required to meet this burden depends upon whether the documents to be sealed relate to a motion that is "more than tangentially related to the merits of the case." Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1102. When the underlying motion is more than tangentially related to the merits, the "compelling reasons" standard applies. Id. at 1096-98. When the underlying motion does not surpass the tangential relevance threshold, the "good cause" standard applies. Id.

"In general, `compelling reasons' sufficient to outweigh the public's interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exists when such `court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,' such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets." Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). However, "[t]he mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant's embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records." Id. (citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136). The decision to seal documents is "one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court" upon consideration of "the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case." Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), generally, provides the "good cause" standard for the purposes of sealing documents. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. The test applied is whether "`good cause' exists to protect th[e] information from being disclosed to the public by balancing the needs for discovery against the need for confidentiality." Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass'n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002)). Under Rule 26(c), only "a particularized showing of `good cause'. . . is sufficient to preserve the secrecy of sealed discovery documents." In re Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co. Annuity Sales Practices Litig., 686 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added); see also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (requiring a "particularized showing" of good cause). "Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test." Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992).

II. ANALYSIS

Exhibit A contains Defendants' sales information, and Exhibit M is a copy of Plaintiff's expert's report. Plaintiff's sole reason behind her request to seal these exhibits is that the information in the exhibits has been designated by Defendants as "Confidential" under the Parties' Protective Order. This explanation alone is insufficient to demonstrate that sealing the requested information is appropriate under the good cause standard. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. Without more, Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden to demonstrate that sealing the exhibits is appropriate. The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk is not directed to file any exhibits under seal at this time.

IT IS SO ORDERED.