JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Scanvinski Jerome Hymes brings suit against five current or former San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs (collectively, "Defendants") for use of excessive force during a cell extraction on July 24, 2014, while he was incarcerated at the San Francisco County Jail.
The factual background and procedural history of this case are set forth in the Court's November 13, 2018 order granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (See Dkt. No. 121 at 1-3.) As relevant to the instant motion, the Court's December 8, 2017 pretrial order set the trial date for December 3, 2018. (See Dkt. No. 38 at 1.) On July 3, 2018, the Court denied Defendants' motion to stay civil discovery pending resolution of criminal proceedings against Defendants Neu and Jones.
"The Constitution does not ordinarily require a stay of civil proceedings pending the outcome of criminal proceedings." Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1995). "In the absence of substantial prejudice to the rights of the parties involved, such parallel proceedings are unobjectionable." SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Nonetheless, courts may exercise discretion to stay civil proceedings when the interest of justice so requires. Keating, 45 F.3d at 324. In determining whether to stay civil proceedings in the face of a related criminal action, courts evaluate "the particular circumstances and competing interests involved in the case." Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 1989).
Courts first must assess "the extent to which the defendant[s'] [F]ifth [A]mendment rights are implicated." Keating, 45 F.3d at 324 (citation omitted). In addition, courts consider the following five factors:
Id. at 325.
Defendants seek a six-month continuance "to allow the criminal motion to proceed and any attendant deadlines to run."
Defendant Jones was deposed on August 8, 2018 and invoked his Fifth Amendment rights as to all questions regarding: (1) the cell extraction at issue in this case; (2) any prior complaints or allegations of misconduct and discipline against him; and (3) San Francisco Sheriff's Department policies and practices. (Dkt. No. 101-3, Ex. 1 at 2). Defendant Neu was deposed on August 9, 2018 and did not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights regarding the incident at issue. (Dkt. No. 101-4, Ex. 2.) However, Defendant Neu did invoke the Fifth Amendment as to questions regarding: (1) any prior complaints or allegations of misconduct and discipline against him; (2) his employment history with the San Francisco Sheriff's Department; and (3) boxing and martial arts training.
As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Keating:
Keating, 45 F.3d at 326 (emphasis added). "[T]he strongest case for deferral of proceedings until after completion of criminal proceedings is where a party under indictment for a serious offense is required to defend a civil or administrative action involving the same matter." Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d at 1375-76 (emphasis added).
Here, both the civil and criminal cases involve allegations of proscribed conduct against inmates by Defendants Neu and Jones. However, as discussed in detail in the Court's July 3, 2018 order denying a stay of discovery, (Dkt. No. 58 at 4-5), the two cases do not implicate the same "nucleus of facts." See McCormick v. Rexroth, No. C 09-4188 JF, 2010 WL 934242, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2010) (finding that civil and criminal cases implicated the same "nucleus of facts" where both arose out of the same physical altercation between plaintiff and defendant); see also Amatrone v. Champion, No. 15-CV-01356, 2017 WL 3334889, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2017) (finding that movant's Fifth Amendment rights were not sufficiently implicated to warrant a stay where there was some overlap between the facts of the criminal and civil cases, but movant had not met his burden of establishing "a large degree of overlap"). As the Court previously noted, Plaintiff's claims "arose out of a single incident on July 2014, while the criminal complaint is based on a separate series of incidents that took place several months later and continued into 2015." (Dkt. No. 58 at 5.) Further, "the conduct at issue in the criminal case does not involve Plaintiff," nor does it involve three of the five defendants in this action. (Id.)
In other words, Plaintiff's civil case and the criminal proceedings against Defendants Neu and Jones are loosely "related" only in the sense that they share two defendants and contain allegations of impermissible conduct against inmates at the San Francisco County Jail. And although Defendant Jones invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege regarding all questions related to the sole incident at issue in this case, his strategic decision to invoke the Fifth Amendment for those questions does not sufficiently implicate his Fifth Amendment rights for purposes of a stay where the criminal proceedings are factually unrelated to those questions and this case. See Keating, 45 F.3d at 326 (noting that "[a] defendant has no absolute right not to be forced to choose between testifying in a civil matter and asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege[,]" even in related proceedings); see also Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d at 1375-76. Defendant Neu's Fifth Amendment rights are implicated to an even lesser degree because he did not invoke the Fifth Amendment in response to questions related to the sole incident at issue in this case.
Plaintiff filed his initial complaint in this action on July 2016, two years after the incident at issue. Plaintiff has an obvious interest in the expeditious resolution of his civil claims against Defendants, three of whom are not party to the criminal proceedings in state Court. Other than arguments regarding "significant hardship and unfairness" under the Landis factors, Defendants identify no burden if the trial proceeds as scheduled.
Defendants argue that "[r]esolution of the criminal case may allow the parties to avoid complicated evidentiary issues that will unquestionably arise at trial if [Defendants] Neu and Jones are called to testify, as well as jury-instruction disputes concerning the scope of any adverse inference." (Dkt. No. 101 at 18.) Plaintiff counters that Defendants' six-month timeframe is unrealistic because, even if the court grants the motion to dismiss in the criminal matter, the entire process from decision on that motion to resolution of the appeals process will likely take at least a year. (Dkt. No. 108 at 4-5.) Thus, Plaintiff insists, "not only is it unlikely that [Defendants] Neu and Jones will be better situated to go to trial in six months than they will be on December 3, [2018,] it is virtually impossible." (Id. at 5.) The Court agrees.
Defendants' request for a six-month continuance assumes the occurrence of factors outside of their control in the criminal case against Defendants Neu and Jones—chief among them, the expeditious resolution of the yet-to-be-filed motion to dismiss. In other words, the Court is not convinced that the state court criminal proceedings will be "resolved" by June 2019 such that Defendants will not request another continuance at that time.
Further, Defendants had ample time to bring this motion prior to the eve of trial and did not do so. Defendants were aware that Defendants Neu and Jones invoked their Fifth Amendment rights during their respective depositions in August. Yet they waited to file their motion to continue until October 26—guaranteeing that the Court would not hear it until the eve of trial. Further, Defendants were also aware—as of October 4, 2018—that Defendant Neu "had reserved a hearing date in [his] criminal matter for December 14, 2018, for which [he] intended to file a motion to dismiss the criminal charges against [him]." (Dkt. No. 101-2 at ¶ 2.) Defendants give no explanation as to why the criminal motion could not be heard before the trial in this action. And, as no copy of the motion has been provided to the Court, it cannot evaluate its likely merits.
The parties have expended resources in submitting their pretrial briefing by the Court's November 13, 2018 deadline and have made witnesses available for the imminent and long-scheduled trial. And the Court has expended resources in preparing to try this case; in particular, the Court has cleared its calendar for nearly all of the first two weeks of December. Simply put, "the convenience of the court in the management of its cases, and the efficient use of judicial resources," see Keating, 45 F.3d at 325, weigh in favor of denying a continuance.
Defendants argue, in a footnote, that these factors likewise support a stay because "[t]he public interest in the orderly administration of criminal justice dovetails with the paramount interests of public and nonparty State of California in ensuring that legal proceedings involving public officers proceed fairly and openly." (Dkt. No. 101 at 18 n.7.) It is equally true, however, that the public and the State of California have an interest in fair, open, and expeditious civil legal proceedings involving public officers as well. Indeed, because only two of the five defendants in this case are party to the state criminal proceedings, allowing both cases to proceed will best serve the interest of ensuring the accountability of all public officers involved.
On balance, the Court concludes that the continuance requested by Defendants is not warranted.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to continue the trial.