JacQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff James Amar Singh sued Defendants in Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Alameda, bringing 17 causes of action related to a 2006 home loan.
The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is "substantially identical" to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). "Under the original Winter standard, a party must show `that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.'" All. for the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). "Under the `sliding scale' variant of the Winter standard, if a plaintiff can only show that there are serious questions going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor, and the other two Winter factors are satisfied." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff fails to show either a likelihood of success on the merits or serious questions going to the merits because his action appears barred by claim and issue preclusion, and the "two-dismissal rule" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B).
"Claim preclusion treats a judgment, once rendered, as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on the same claim or cause of action." Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 321-22 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Claim preclusion prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding. Id. at 322 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
"The doctrine of issue preclusion prevents relitigation of all issues of fact or law that were actually litigated and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "The issue must have been actually decided after a full and fair opportunity for litigation." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(B), "if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B); see also Commercial Space Mgmt. Co. v. Boeing Co., 193 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999) (same).
On October 11, 2011, Plaintiff sued Wells Fargo in California state court bringing six causes of action challenging foreclosure related to the 2006 mortgage.
On December 8, 2012, Plaintiff filed another action in California state court bringing seven causes of action against Defendant related to the same underlying loan.
On March 19, 2015, during the pendency of his Ninth Circuit appeal, Plaintiff filed another action in California state court related to the same underlying loan, alleging that Defendant had no right to resume the foreclosure process based on an unlawful detainer judgment in Plaintiff's favor in state court.
On April 4, 2016, Plaintiff filed an adversary complaint against Defendant in United States Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of California, bringing six causes of action related to the same underlying loan and 2013 unlawful detainer judgment in state court. (Dkt. No. 11, Ex. 27.) On June 30, 2017, the court dismissed Plaintiff's first amended complaint without leave to amend. (Id. at 199 (noting that "over the past six years, the parties have gone through ten bankruptcy cases and four lawsuits in both state and federal courts, including an appeal to the [Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals].") Plaintiff appealed the court's ruling, and on June 5, 2018, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit ("BAP") issued a memorandum affirming the court's dismissal with prejudice. (Dkt. No. 11, Ex. 29.)
In affirming the bankruptcy court's dismissal, the BAP noted:
(Id. at 226 (alterations in original).) Further, the BAP noted:
(Id.) As for Plaintiff's equitable claims for "injunctive relief, declaratory relief, quiet title, unfair competition, and accounting," the "bankruptcy court held that [Plaintiff's] failure to tender payment of the [underlying] debt mandated dismissal." (Id.) Further, the BAP noted that Plaintiff's "basic argument—that the Unlawful Detainer Judgment destroyed Wells Fargo's deed of trust—is wrong." (Id. at 228.)
The bankruptcy court's June 2017 order and the BAP's June 2018 memorandum provide thorough discussions regarding the preclusive effect of the prior lawsuits and application of the "two-dismissal rule" under Rule 41(a)(1)(B). The Court sees no reason to revisit those well-reasoned opinions. The instant complaint brings causes of action related to the same underlying loan and alleged conduct as the previous actions or involving conduct that could have been challenged in previous actions. (See Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A at 12-15.) Thus, Plaintiff fails to show a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims or even a serious question because the claims are likely barred by claim and issue preclusion, and the "two-dismissal rule" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B).
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's application for a temporary restraining order and request for an order to show cause.