RICHARD SEEBORG, District Judge.
The above-captioned matter is set for a status conference on January 22, 2019. For the following reasons, the parties now stipulate and respectfully request that the Court continue the status conference until February 26, 2019, or as soon thereafter as is convenient for the Court.
As reason therefore, the parties state that discovery has been partially provided in this matter. However, the government intends to produce certain additional materials that in the judgment of the government are particularly sensitive and pose a risk of harm to certain individuals. As defense counsel has not had an opportunity to review these materials, she has yet to determine whether the government's assessment is correct. Therefore, the parties are negotiating an interim agreement that would allow defense counsel to review the materials and make an independent determination about the risk they pose to certain individuals. This agreement will not waive any of the defendant's right with regard to that discovery. Once the agreement is reached, discovery will proceed.
The parties agree that the additional time requested will allow this process to proceed in an orderly fashion.
The parties further stipulate that the time between January 22, 2019, and February 26, 2019, be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and (h)(7)(B). For the reasons given above, excluding such time will allow both government and defense counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Based on the parties' stipulation, the Court hereby ORDERS that the status conference in the above-captioned matter be continued to February 26, 2019, at 2:30 p.m.
The Court finds that the exclusion of the period from January 22, 2019, through February 26, 2019, from the time limits applicable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161, is warranted; that the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in the prompt disposition of this criminal case; and that the failure to grant the requested exclusion of time would unreasonably deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and would result in a miscarriage of justice.