SUSAN ILLSTON, District Judge.
Charles Edwards filed this pro se action for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge his murder conviction. The court issued an order to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer, and Edwards has filed a traverse. For the reasons discussed below, the petition will be DENIED.
A two-phase trial was held for Edwards, with the first phase being used to determine guilt and the second phase being used to determine sanity at the time of the offense. The same jury was used for both phases.
The California Court of Appeal described the crime as shown through evidence presented at trial during the guilt phase:
People v. Edwards, 11 Cal. App. 5th 759, 761-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (footnote omitted).
The jury found Edwards guilty of first degree murder with personal use of a deadly weapon. After the jury rendered its guilty verdict on the murder charge, there was a brief court trial on the sentence enhancement allegations regarding prior felonies. A few days later, a trial was held before the same jury to determine whether Edwards was sane at the time of the killings. Most of the evidence in the sanity phase trial came from two psychiatrists who testified for the defense and two psychologists who testified for the prosecution.
The California Court of Appeal described the sanity-phase evidence:
People v. Edwards, 11 Cal. App. 5th at 762-65.
Having been convicted of first degree murder with sentence enhancements, and having been found sane at the time of the offense, Edwards was sentenced on March 25, 2015, to 88 years to life in prison.
Edwards then appealed. The California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction in a reasoned decision issued on May 16, 2017. The California Supreme Court summarily denied his petition for review on August 16, 2017.
He then filed this action. In his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, he alleges that his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when (1) the court allowed the prosecution to impeach a defense expert with Edwards' statements; (2) the trial court allowed the prosecutor to impeach third-party witnesses with illegally obtained statements Edwards had made to police; and (3) counsel failed to object to the testimony of the prosecution witness at the sanity phase of the trial. The court agrees with respondent's assertion that the first and second claims are actually a single claim and therefore evaluates them as a single claim.
This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the petition concerns the conviction and sentence of a person convicted in Santa Cruz County, California, which is within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).
This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") amended § 2254 to impose new restrictions on federal habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
"Under the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decided a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "Under the `unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. "A federal habeas court making the `unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was `objectively unreasonable.'" Id. at 409.
The state-court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the "last reasoned decision" of the state court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991). When confronted with an unexplained decision from the last state court to have been presented with the issue, "the federal court should `look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning." Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
Section 2254(d) generally applies to unexplained as well as reasoned decisions. "When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). When the state court has denied a federal constitutional claim on the merits without explanation, the federal habeas court "must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the U.S. Supreme] Court." Id. at 102.
Statements were taken from Edwards in violation of his Miranda rights. The question in this case is whether those statements could be used to impeach psychiatrists who were testifying for the defense at the sanity phase of his trial. Edwards argues that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the use of those statements at the trial.
When he was arrested, Edwards was advised of his Miranda rights and thereafter was interviewed by the police who disregarded his request to speak to counsel.
He moved in limine to suppress his statements to the police officers on the ground that he had invoked his right to counsel during the interview yet the police continued to speak with him. CT 315. The prosecutor moved in limine to allow the evidence in at trial and to allow expert witnesses at the sanity phase to refer to the content of Edwards' statements if those statements formed the basis of their opinions. CT 390. The trial court ruled that the statements made by Edwards after he invoked his right to counsel were inadmissible as evidence in the case-in-chief in both the guilt and sanity phases. The trial court also ruled that if the defense expert witnesses in the sanity phase relied on statements that defendant had made to them, the prosecutor could impeach the expert witnesses with defendant's inconsistent statements made to the police that otherwise had been suppressed.
As a result of the trial court's rulings, Edwards' statements to the police were admitted as impeachment evidence at the sanity phase.
On appeal, Edwards argued that his Miranda-violative statements to the police should not have been admitted at the sanity phase of his trial. The California Court of Appeal rejected Edwards' federal constitutional challenge to the use of his statements to the police. (The state appellate court's reasoning will be discussed in more depth in the next section.)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966), requires that a suspect be given certain warnings and must waive those warnings before he may be subjected to a custodial interrogation. "[U]nless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him." Id. at 479; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (referring to the "Miranda exclusionary rule"). Although statements obtained in violation of Miranda must be excluded in the prosecution's case-in-chief at a later trial, they may be used to impeach the credibility of a testifying defendant. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). The Supreme Court has limited the use of a defendant's statements for impeachment purposes by holding that the impeachment exception does not extend to third parties, i.e., a third party cannot be impeached with a defendant's statements obtained in violation of the defendant's Miranda rights. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990). Because Edwards' claim turns on the interpretation of James, that case will be examined in more depth.
In James, the day after a shooting, the defendant was found by police at his mother's beauty parlor, where he emerged from under a hair dryer with curly black hair. 493 U.S. at 309. During questioning at the police station, the defendant stated that he "had gone to the beauty parlor in order to have his hair `dyed black and curled in order to change his appearance.'" Id. His statements were ruled inadmissible as the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation because the police lacked probable cause to arrest him without a warrant. Id. At the time of trial, defendant had black hair worn in a "`natural'" style. Id. At trial, several eyewitnesses made in-court identification of the defendant as the shooter but also testified that the person responsible for the shooting had shoulder-length and slicked-back reddish hair. Id. at 310. The defendant did not testify and therefore could not be questioned about his statement to police that he had gone to the beauty parlor to change his appearance the day after the shooting. But the defense called a family friend, who testified that she was with the defendant on the day of the shooting and he had black hair on that day. Id. Over the defendant's objection, the prosecutor then introduced the defendant's "illegally obtained statements as a means of impeaching the credibility" of the friend. Id. A police detective was allowed to testify that the defendant admitted he had reddish hair the night of the shooting and had died and curled it the next day to change his appearance. Id.
The Supreme Court in James put a limit on the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule. Whereas the impeachment exception generally permits the prosecution to introduce illegally obtained evidence for the limited purpose of impeaching the credibility of the defendant's own testimony, id. at 311-12, the Court in James refused to expand the class of impeachable witnesses from the defendant alone to all defense witnesses. Id. at 313. The Court explained that expanding the class of impeachable witnesses to include all defense witnesses "would create different incentives affecting the behavior of both defendants and law enforcement officers." Id. Consequently, it "would not promote the truthseeking function to the same extent as did creation of the original exception, and yet it would significantly undermine the deterrent effect of the general exclusionary rule." Id. at 313-14. The Court considered several reasons for not expanding the impeachment exception. The availability of a defendant's statements to deter perjurious testimony by the defendant did not apply with equal force to other witnesses, and could impede the presentation of a defense because the defense might not call some witnesses who purposely or inadvertently could open the door to the introduction of evidence of statements illegally obtained from the defendant. Id. at 314-15. Also, concerns about weakening the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect counseled against allowing a statement illegally obtained from the defendant to be used to impeach other witnesses. Id. at 317-19.
In the present case, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the rationale of James did not support the exclusion in the sanity phase of Edwards' statements obtained in violation of Miranda:
People v. Edwards, 11 Cal. App. 5th at 768-69.
The California Court of Appeal's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law, as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court. James did not specifically address the use of unlawfully obtained statements in the context of expert witness testimony, nor in the context of a sanity phase of a trial. It was not unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to determine that those two factors made a difference, and supported a conclusion that the James' Court's refusal to extend the impeachment rule to other defense witnesses should not cover expert witnesses at a sanity trial.
The Ninth Circuit relied on similar reasoning to that of the California Court of Appeal when it rejected a defendant's challenge to the use of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda to impeach a psychiatrist's testimony about a defendant's lack of specific intent in United States v. Rosales-Aguilar, 818 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2016). In Rosales-Aguilar, the defendant was charged with two counts of attempted illegal reentry based on two attempts in three days to enter the United States from Mexico. Id. at 968. On the first occasion, he told Border Patrol agents that he was entering to find work and live in the United States; on the second occasion, he told them that he had climbed over the border fence and was on his way to San Diego. Id. The district court suppressed the first statement because Miranda warnings had not been given and suppressed the second statement because the waiver of the Miranda rights was not knowing; the district court also ruled that both statements could be used for impeachment purposes. Id. At trial, the defendant did not testify but did have a psychiatrist testify as an expert witness about the defendant's mental state (i.e., that the defendant lacked the requisite specific intent for illegal reentry because he was under the influence of drugs) based on statements the defendant had made to the psychiatrist. Id. at 969. The district court allowed the government to use the defendant's suppressed statements to cross-examine the expert witness psychiatrist. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding that James was distinguishable because the witness in James "was testifying as to her own perception and recollection," whereas "the statements impeached here were not the observations of [the psychiatrist] as to Rosales's activities on the day he was arrested. Rather, they were Rosales's account of the events as communicated to [the psychiatrist]. . . . It was Rosales's perception, recollection and veracity that were being impeached by Rosales's own prior inconsistent statements." Rosales-Aguilar, 818 F.3d at 970. The Ninth Circuit explained that this case was "much closer" to cases where the defendant's own statements were allowed to impeach the defendant.
Rosales-Aguilar, 818 F.3d at 970.
Similarly, Edwards' statements were being offered to impeach Edwards' perception, recollection, and veracity rather than that of the psychiatrists who had evaluated him. Consider, for example, Edwards' statement that he stabbed the victims because he was told to do so by skeletons. The defense psychiatrists gave an opinion as to Edwards' sanity based on Edwards' report that he stabbed the victim because skeletons told him to do so. The prosecution was able to ask how that opinion was affected by Edwards' statement to police just after the killing that he stabbed the victim because women had spurned him. The latter statement did far more to impeach the credibility of Edwards than the credibility of the experts. The statement to police cast doubt on the truthfulness of Edwards' account to the experts. In James, the use of the defendant's illegally obtained statement cast doubt on the truthfulness of the witness because the witness said the defendant had black curly hair on the day of the killing whereas the defendant had admitted to police that he had gotten that black curly hair the day after the killing to change his appearance. By contrast, the use of the illegally obtained statement in the present case did not similarly cast doubt on the truthfulness of the defense psychiatrists.
Allowing the jury to hear Edwards' statements to police promoted the truth-seeking purpose of the trial, much more so than would have occurred if the statements he made immediately after the killing could not be used by the experts. The jury was instructed in the sanity phase about expert witness testimony. CT 1494. Part of the instruction stated: "[C]onsider the expert's knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education, the reasons the expert gave for any opinion, and the facts or information on which the expert relied in reaching that opinion. You must decide whether information on which the expert relied was true and accurate." CT 1494. The instruction also stated: "If the expert witnesses disagreed with one another, you should weigh each opinion against the others. You should examine the reasons given for each opinion and the facts or other matters on which each witness relied." Id. Disallowing use of Edwards' statements to the police would have distorted the truth-seeking purpose of the sanity trial as it would have deprived the parties of information about statements highly relevant to Edwards' state of mind on the day he killed the victim.
It was not an unreasonable application of James for the California Court of Appeal to refuse to apply James to the situation where an expert was testifying in a sanity trial and was basing his opinion on the defendant's self-reporting of his reasons for his actions.
Edwards contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because "counsel failed to object to the testimony of the prosecution witness at the sanity phase of the petitioner[`]s trial." Docket No. 1 at 5. In his traverse, he argues that counsel "did not undertake any preparation or advocacy to challenge the alleged inconsistencies in Dr. French's opinion" that Edwards was sane at the time of the murder. Docket No. 29 at 7. Edwards offers nothing more specific than these two statements.
Respondent argues that this constitutional claim is unexhausted but nonetheless should be rejected on the merits. The court agrees.
Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). Here, the federal constitutional claim is unexhausted because Edwards did not present it to the California Supreme Court. See Docket No. 28-10 at 275 (petition for review filed in California Supreme Court). A district court may deny, but not grant, relief on a habeas petition that presents an unexhausted claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The district court can deny an unexhausted claim only when "it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim." Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623-24 (9th Cir. 2005). This court will deny relief on the unexhausted federal constitutional claim because the claim is plainly meritless.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees not only assistance, but the effective assistance, of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Id. In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must satisfy a two-prong test. First, he must establish that counsel's performance was deficient. Id. at 687. A deficient performance is one that falls below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance; he must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.
Edwards' claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance fails on both the deficient-performance prong and the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. Edwards contends in his traverse that counsel did not prepare for or challenge inconsistencies in Dr. French's opinion that Edwards was sane. The record plainly shows this not to be true, as counsel tried various means to undercut Dr. French's testimony. Defense counsel filed motions in limine to exclude all mention of Edwards' statements to the police, which would have cut into the basis for Dr. French's opinion if the motions had been successful. See CT 376, 484, 592, 609. During the sanity phase, defense counsel made some objections during direct examination of Dr. French by the prosecutor (e.g., RT 9014, 9020, 9041), cross-examined Dr. French at length (RT 9061-9147), and even did a brief direct examination of Dr. French (RT 8888-8895). Edwards fails to identify any specific way in which defense counsel failed to prepare for or challenge Dr. French's opinion, nor does he show resulting prejudice. In his petition, Edwards contends that counsel failed to object to the testimony of an unspecified prosecution witness in the sanity phase. Insofar as he is referring to Dr. French's testimony, Edwards fails to identify the objection that counsel should have made and fails to show that there is any reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if counsel had made the objection. Insofar as Edwards is referring to some other witness, his argument fails because he does not identify who that witness was, what the basis for an objection would have been, why the objection would have been successful, and how a sustained objection would have made any difference at his trial. The unexhausted claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance in the sanity phase is denied.
A certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This is not a case in which "reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED on the merits. The clerk shall close the file.
