YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS, District Judge.
Plaintiff Louis J. Aguirre brings this action against defendants Clark E. Ducart, D. Wilcox, D. Wells, J. Frisk, S. Burris, and Does 1-70 for deprivations of his civil rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments related to plaintiff's allegedly erroneous designation as a gang affiliate. (Dkt. No. 51 ("SAC").) Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants improperly validated him as an affiliate or associate of a "Mexican Mafia" prison gang, failed to review his gang status in a timely fashion, and inappropriately revalidated that gang status, resulting in plaintiff's improper detention in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU") and over-detention in prison in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. ¶¶ 18-194.) On November 27, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's first amended complaint ("FAC") and afforded plaintiff leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 47 ("MTD Order").) Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint ("SAC") on December 18, 2018. (SAC.)
Now before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss portions of plaintiff's SAC for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
The factual background giving rise to this action is well-known, and the Court will not repeat it here. (See MTD Order at 2-5 (summarizing plaintiff's allegations).) Relevant here, plaintiff's SAC contains the following allegations:
On September 6, 2012, while plaintiff was housed in Corcoran SHU, plaintiff received his meal with all other inmates housed in the same section. (Id. ¶¶ 96-97.) After finishing his meal, plaintiff prepared to return his tray. (Id. ¶ 98.) Another inmate refused to return his tray and announced that he "represented the Southern Hispanic inmates, and that while all would return their trays, he was calling into question the placement of a `PC' inmate in cell 55." (Id. ¶ 99.)
In January 2015, plaintiff informed defendants that his six-year active/inactive gang status review date should be January 16, 2015, six years from the date of the last alleged gang activity, not October 2, 2015. (Id. ¶ 133.) On January 21, 2015, defendants acknowledged the error as well as the fact that the correct six-year review date was January 16, 2015. (Id. ¶ 134.) On February 4, 2015, plaintiff appeared before the Pelican Bay SHU Institution Classification Committee ("ICC") for his annual review, which resulted in retention of plaintiff's SHU status and notation of the error regarding plaintiff's six-year review. (Id. ¶ 135.) Subsequently, defendants re-validated plaintiff's status six times as a gang-affiliate, namely five times in 2015 (April 13, May 11, July 8, August 3, and September 30) and on January 26, 2016. (Id. ¶¶ 140-152.)
While incarcerated, plaintiff brought a number of petitions for a writ of habeas corpus based on the facts alleged in the SAC. He brought five such petitions to the California Supreme Court between November 14, 2011 and August 1, 2016 (see Dkt. No. 24-2, Exs. A, C, E, G, I), each of which the court denied. (Id., Exs. B, D, F, H, J.) On October 12, 2016, the California Supreme Court denied plaintiff's final habeas petition as untimely. (RJN, Ex. B (citing In re Robbins 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998)).)
Plaintiff filed his initial complaint in this action on December 3, 2017.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a "lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). The complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If the facts alleged do not support a reasonable inference of liability, stronger than a mere possibility, the claim must be dismissed. Id. at 678-79; see also In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that a court is not required to accept as true "allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences."). If a court dismisses a complaint, it should give leave to amend unless "the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff alleges that defendants erroneously validated him as a gang affiliate, resulting in improper SHU confinement and then failed to conduct, in a timely or meaningful fashion, a review of plaintiff's inactive/active gang status, erroneously extending his SHU term. (SAC ¶¶ 208, 228). Plaintiff also alleges that due to his placement in SHU and designation as a gang affiliate, and as a result of a 2010 amendment to California Penal Code Section 2933.6(a), defendants denied him his right to earn good-time credits toward an earlier prison release and, as a result, he suffered over-detention in prison by approximately 16 months. (Id. ¶¶ 91-95, 194.) Accordingly, plaintiff alleges that as a result of defendants' actions he suffered, in violation of both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments: (A) over-detention, both in SHU and in prison generally, resulting in deprivation of his procedural and substantive due process rights; (B) improper gang validation resulting in deprivation of his procedural and substantive due process rights; and (C) unconstitutional conditions of confinement in SHU in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment, a plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 claim must prove that the underlying conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under Section 1983. Id. at 487. This limitation, known as the Heck bar, applies whenever "state prisoners seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement—either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's custody." Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005).
When a state prisoner seeks, in a Section 1983 suit, damages for claims related to the duration of their confinement, as plaintiff does here, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. See id.; see also Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. If it would so implicate, the court must dismiss the complaint unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Heck bars any Section 1983 suit which would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the confinement or its duration, no matter the relief sought or the target of the suit. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-82.
Despite amendment, plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to overcome the Heck bar. See id.; see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (holding that the Heck rule applied to a state prisoner who was seeking damages for unconstitutional deprivation of good-time credits, so long as the alleged constitutional violation would, if established, imply the invalidity of the deprivation of good-time credits). In its prior order, the Court noted that the "briefing [did] not suggest that plaintiff [could] allege facts which will overcome" the Heck bar and granted plaintiff leave to amend only "to the extent that he can show that the duration of his sentence has already been invalidated or that despite the one-year delay in filing his initial complaint in the instant action, he diligently sought relief for his claim that defendants failed to timely conduct his inactive/active gang status review." (MTD Order at 9-10.) Plaintiff has not so done. The SAC does not allege or otherwise demonstrate that the duration of his sentence has already been invalidated through reversal on direct appeal, expungement by executive order, declaration of invalidity by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See supra I.A. (enumerating the additional allegations included in plaintiff's SAC); see also Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Nor has plaintiff demonstrated that he diligently sought relief for his claims such that his complaint, filed well over a year after his release from prison, constituted an effort to "immediately pursue[] relief after the incident giving rise to [his] claims" necessitated by "the shortness of his prison sentence." Guerro v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 705 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 874-77 (9th Cir. 2002) (clarifying the Ninth Circuit's holding in Nonnette regarding the application of the Heck bar to claims of a plaintiff not currently in custody) (emphasis supplied).
Instead, plaintiff once again argues that Heck does not bar his Section 1983 claims related to over-detention because he is no longer incarcerated and therefore cannot file a writ for habeas corpus challenging the duration of his incarceration. (See Opp. at 4-5 (citing Nonnette, 316 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2002)).) For the reasons stated in the Court's prior order, the Court reaffirms its previous decision that Heck bars plaintiff's claims of over-detention in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Plaintiff's second claim for "Deprivation of Constitutional Rights — STG Validation and Overdetention — Substantive Due Process — Eighth/Fourteenth Amendments" appears on its face to include an allegation of violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has found that misclassification does not inflict pain so as to rise to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1255-56 (9th Cir.1982) overruled on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566-67 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981).
Because plaintiff does not, and cannot, allege that the classification policy pursuant to which defendants validated his gang affiliate status and assigned him to SHU violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the Court
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government from depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In general, it "provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government, whether the fault lies in a denial of fundamental procedural fairness—denial of procedural due process guarantees—or in the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective—denial of substantive due process guarantees. See Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998). Here, the Court only addresses the latter, as defendants concede they do not challenge plaintiff's claims of the former with respect to his gang validation. (See Dkt. No. 56.)
The substantive due process guarantee prevents the government from engaging in conduct that "shocks the conscience." See id. at 846-49 (discussing abusive conduct "that shocks the conscience" and violates the "decencies of civilized conduct"). "[C]onduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level." Id. at 840 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). However, courts have been "reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (citation omitted). As such, "[i]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision . . . the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process." Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 882 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Cty. of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 843) (alterations in original). Defendants claim, given this fact pattern, that a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment is not available, and in fact, precluded because it more appropriately arises out of the Eighth Amendment. (MTD at 10.)
The Eighth Amendment, in its prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment," places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, use excessive force against prisoners. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). "Not every governmental action affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny, however. After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Defendants have not shown that plaintiff's substantive due process claims stemming from his gang validation constitute allegations of "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions" with which the Eighth Amendment is "specifically concerned." Id. at 327. Each of the cases to which defendants point deal with allegations of infliction of pain. (See Motion at 10 (citing Roberts v. Gonzalez, No. CV 12-2044-JVS (DTB), 2013 WL 4663882, at * 8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2013) (finding that the obligations of prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners and provide adequate medical care fall within the scope of the Eighth Amendment and therefore that plaintiff's claims of indifference to his medical needs properly arise out of the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourteenth)).)
However, plaintiff's substantive due process claim related to his gang validation still fails. The Ninth Circuit has held that dismissal of a prisoner's substantive due process claims stemming from the defendants' alleged "refusal to release him from [SHU] as an inactive gang affiliate" was proper because the prisoner's "segregation from other prisoners, and the prison's definition of an active gang member, were rationally related to prison safety." Ruiz v. v. Cate, 436 Fed.Appx. 760, 761 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Richardson v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1162. Thus, the Court finds that plaintiff's substantives due process claims related to his gang validation, and re-validation, similarly fail because defendants' definition of an active gang member and process for so validating, as well as plaintiff's segregation from other prisoners, was rationally related to prison safety. See Ruiz, 436 Fed.Appx. at 761; see also Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287 (internal citations omitted) ("California's policy of assigning suspected gang affiliates to the Security Housing Unit is not a disciplinary measure, but an administrative strategy designed to preserve order in the prison and protect the safety of all inmates.").
Because plaintiff does not, and cannot, allege that his validation as a gang affiliate violates the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process guarantee, the Court
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
As previously noted, the following of plaintiff's claims survive: (1) plaintiff's claim of procedural due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment as it relates to plaintiff's gang validation; and (2) plaintiff's claim of unlawful conditions of confinement under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
By no later than
This Order terminates Docket Number 52.
Here, plaintiff seeks to redress his placement and retention in SHU. See, generally, SAC; c.f. Santos, 2019 WL 460450, at *4 ("[E]ven though collateral consequences necessarily flow form Santos' validation in the form of increased monitoring, preventing Santos' challenge to his validation from being moot, placement in the SHU on that status alone is not one of those consequences."). Therefore, the basis of his claim is well within the `core of habeas' defined by Nettles. 830 F.3d at 931.
