ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECUSE OR DISQUALIFY DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

[Doc. No. 6]

ROGER T. BENITEZ, District Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiff Dianna Montez's ("Plaintiff") Motion to Recuse, or in the alternative, Disqualify District Judge Roger T. Benitez ("Motion") from presiding over this suit. Defendants Chase Home Finance LLC and JP Morgan Chase, N.A. (collectively "Defendants") have not filed a Response to Plaintiff's Motion. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is DENIED.

Plaintiff moves to recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455, and 28 U.S.C. 144. Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), any judge "of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."1 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Likewise, under 28 U.S.C. § 144, a judge should recuse himself when a party "makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party[.]" 28 U.S.C. 144. Thus, the standard for recusal under both 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 455 is whether "a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1179 (9th Cir. 1986).

Plaintiff alleges recusal is warranted due to the undersigned's financial interest in Defendant JP Morgan Chase, N.A. Specifically, his 2011 Financial Disclosure Report ("Report") indicates stock ownership in Chase Manhattan.2 Thus, "any reasonable mind would look at the Report and believe that this suit against Chase will result in the case being dismissed even if it is pled with the legal sufficiency to proceed." (Doc. No. 6 at 3.) Despite Plaintiff's claim, the undersigned does not own stock in Chase or possess any financial interest in Defendant JP Morgan Chase, N.A.

1. Judge Benitez Has No Financial Interest in the Subject Matter in Controversy or in a Party to the Proceeding.

Generally, aside from a few inapplicable exceptions, "financial interest" is defined as "ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as a director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party." 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4). Here, the undersigned's accounts do not constitute a legal or equitable interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding.

Summary review of section VII (Investments and Trusts) of the undersigned's 2011 Report reveals three entries listing "Chase" or similar delineation as the assigned "Description of Asset." (Doc. No. 6 at 3.) Specifically, entry 60 lists (Washington Mutual-now Chase Bank-aggregate), entry 69 lists (Chase Manhattan-aggregate) and entry 71 lists (Chase Manhattan-aggregate) in the Description of Asset field.3 (Doc. No. 6-1 at 13-14.) While Plaintiff alleges such entries are conclusive proof of ownership of stock in Chase, that assumption is mistaken. The Chase accounts in question are NOT stock holding accounts, but bank accounts (such as a checking or savings). Moreover, entry 69 refers to a closed account, while entry 71 was held ONLY as the Executor of an Estate.

Thus, there were no stock holdings in Chase as alleged by the Plaintiff. Nor are there any other legal or equitable interests which could potentially affect the outcome of this suit. Moreover, the undersigned has no authority to act as a director, adviser, or any other active participant in Defendants business affairs.

Therefore, the Court finds that it need not recuse itself from presiding over this suit for allegedly holding a financial interest in Defendant Chase under 28 U.S.C. § 455.

2. Judge Benitez's Accounts Do Not Constitute an Interest that Could Be Substantially Affected by the Outcome of the Proceeding.

The Court next looks to see if knowledge of the accounts would lead a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts to question his impartiality.

Here, the crux of Plaintiff's argument is that since the undersigned once maintained three bank accounts at a financial banking entity owned by Defendants, he must, therefore, be biased in this case. Such an argument is speculative and lacks merit. Furthermore, "practical problems abound if recusal is required whenever a judge benefits simply as a member of the common populace," as "[t]here is much litigation today that can have far-reaching effects on large segments of the nation." N.M. Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 620 F.2d at 797. Undoubtedly, a large segment of California residents maintain similar accounts. This is not a close case—the effect of having a Chase Manhattan bank account is simply too attenuated and indirect to require the disqualification of any judge who might also hold a similar account. Moreover, it would be a stretch for a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts of this case to question this Court's impartiality.

Therefore, the Court finds it need not recuse itself for alleged bias under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).

3. Recusal Under 28 U.S.C. 144 is Not Warranted Based on Speculation

Lastly, Plaintiff seeks recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144. Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, a party may challenge a district court judge if the judge "has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party." See 28 U.S.C. § 144, 28 U.S.C. § 144 differs from 28 U.S.C. § 455 in that § 144 requires proof of actual bias whereas § 455 requires only the reasonable appearance of bias. Id.

In this case, Plaintiff speculates—but does not offer—any actual evidence of judicial bias towards Plaintiff, or in favor of the Defendant. Plaintiffs proof is simply that, "... Judge Benitez's financial disclosures reveal a stock ownership interest in CHASE...." as described in the Declaration of Amid T. Bahadori. (Doc. No. 6-1 at 6.) This statement is not only speculative but also factually inaccurate. As described supra, the accounts which are the focus of Plaintiffs Motion were not stock holdings, but bank accounts. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to offer any additional evidence to support her claim under 28 U.S.C. 144.

Therefore, the Court finds no need to recuse itself for actual bias under 28 U.S.C. § 144.

Accordingly, this Court has thoroughly considered all circumstances relevant to the merits of the Plaintiff's Motion. This Court harbors no personal bias or prejudice towards Plaintiff, Defendant or any other party to this case. Moreover, Plaintiff has made no showing that a reasonable and informed observer would question this court's impartiality. Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion for Recusal or Disqualification is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.