Filed: Jul. 08, 2019
Latest Update: Jul. 08, 2019
Summary: PRETRIAL ORDER No. 156: DENYING MOTION TO REMAND IN SMITH V. MONSANTO CO. VINCE CHHABRIA , District Judge . Monsanto removed this 108-plaintiff case under CAFA's mass action provision, which provides for federal jurisdiction over a case "in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact." 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). After the case was transferred to the MDL, the plainti
Summary: PRETRIAL ORDER No. 156: DENYING MOTION TO REMAND IN SMITH V. MONSANTO CO. VINCE CHHABRIA , District Judge . Monsanto removed this 108-plaintiff case under CAFA's mass action provision, which provides for federal jurisdiction over a case "in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact." 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). After the case was transferred to the MDL, the plaintif..
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PRETRIAL ORDER No. 156: DENYING MOTION TO REMAND IN SMITH V. MONSANTO CO.
VINCE CHHABRIA, District Judge.
Monsanto removed this 108-plaintiff case under CAFA's mass action provision, which provides for federal jurisdiction over a case "in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). After the case was transferred to the MDL, the plaintiffs moved to remand on the basis that their claims were not "proposed to be tried jointly," and that jurisdiction was therefore lacking.1
As a matter of common sense, it was presumably clear to everyone at the outset that these 108 plaintiffs would never proceed to trial together. On one level, therefore, it might seem strange to assume, as Monsanto urges, that a joint complaint is presumed to be a request for a joint trial. Nevertheless, nowhere in the complaint did the plaintiffs disclaim an intent to hold a joint trial, and the complaint in fact requests "a jury trial" seeking damages in "an amount" greater than $25,000. See Visendi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 733 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2013) (assuming that similar language proposed a joint trial); Ramirez v. Vintage Pharm., LLC, 852 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2017) ("Where a single complaint joins more than 100 separate claims involving common questions of law and fact, there is a presumption that those plaintiffs have implicitly proposed a joint trial."). This language is sufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction.2 See Visendi, 733 F.3d at 868 ("Whether Plaintiffs' claims ultimately proceed to a joint trial is irrelevant.").
Moreover, because this case was removed under CAFA, there is no presumption in favor of remand. Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 628 (9th Cir. 2015). To the contrary, "Congress and the Supreme Court have instructed [courts] to interpret CAFA's provisions under section 1332 broadly in favor of removal." Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 781 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2015). Given that and the caselaw interpreting the mass action provision, the motion to remand must be denied. The plaintiffs have 45 days from the date of this order to file individual complaints in accordance with Pretrial Order No. 155.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
