JOSEPH C. SPERO, Chief Magistrate Judge.
Pro se Plaintiff Kevin-Paul El Woodruff,
A district court may remand a case sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction, but may not remand sua sponte for non-jurisdictional procedural defects, which may be waived. See generally Smith v. Mylan, Inc., 761 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2014). The statute generally governing removal, and on which Plaintiff relies here, provides for removal in certain circumstances "by the defendant or the defendants." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Considering that same language in the then-effective version of the removal statute, and comparing it to the language of earlier removal statutes that had permitted removal by "either party" but are no longer in effect, the Supreme Court has held that federal courts lack jurisdiction to consider cases removed by a plaintiff rather than a defendant— regardless of whether a defendant files a counterclaim against the plaintiff that could otherwise have been filed in federal court. See generally Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941); see also, e.g., Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Perciado, 479 F.3d 1014, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2007).
This case has been removed by the plaintiff, not by any defendant. The Court therefore lacks jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and Shamrock, and the undersigned recommends that the case be REMANDED sua sponte. Having chosen to file the complaint in state court, Plaintiff cannot now change course and remove to this Court.
Because not all parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this case will be reassigned to a United States district judge for all further proceedings, including action on the recommendation of this report.