then made

six payments to Customs, totalling $242,987.        See 
id. at 11342-43.

RAD 
issued its final report for that fiscal year and stated that

the Service's audit had been expanded to cover the other fiscal

years 1989 through 1993.   See 

then admitted

that it had failed to disclose $8,916,794 during that period, but

reiterated its belief at the times of the entries that that total

cost difference was not dutiable.       See 
id.


          Customs completed its 
audit in October 1993, by which

time the period of limitations had run as to the fiscal year 1988.

It concluded that Yuchius had not maintained sufficient records to

determine the actual price paid on an entry-by-entry basis.          There

had been a failure to identify the undervaluations by entry number,

port of entry, date of entry. Total undervaluation was found to be

$10,252,462.00.     However,   the   Service    only   reported   loss   of

revenues for the four fiscal years beginning February 1, 1989,

namely $569,431.


          The   second   attempt   at   prior   disclosure   occurred    on

September 28, 1993, whereupon Customs examined the related imports.

See Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, p. 011322.            Defendant Yuchius now
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                      Page 18


argues that the reason it failed to submit any duties owed is that

continuing negotiations through January 30, 1996 gave it the im-

pression that the deadline for tendering them had been extended by

Customs. See Post-Trial Submission of Defendant Yuchius, p. 5,

para. 14.


            ISET agreed with the Service auditors that Yuchius had

not made a proper disclosure of all the circumstances of its

imports and advised that the September 1993 attempted prior dis-

closure was not valid.     See Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, p. 011296.

Customs thereafter issued Yuchius a prepenalty notice, demanding

duties in the amount of $328,665 and indicating that it was

considering a $1,153,580 penalty, twice the calculated loss of

revenues. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 17; Defendant Yuchius Exhibit 5.

The Service also issued a demand for duties and fees.   The company

submitted a response, claiming that there had been double-counting

of an accrual for 1992 and arguing that its undervaluation was the

result of poor recordkeeping, in essence, a mistake of fact or

clerical error.   See Defendant Yuchius Exhibit 6; 19 Tr., pp. 91-

92.   Yuchius requested an extension of time for tender but did not

receive one.    A formal penalty notice issued on June 13, 1995,

plaintiff's exhibit 23. Yuchius petitioned for relief, offering to

remit the lost revenues.   See Plaintiff's Exhibit 24. The district

office forwarded the petition to Customs Headquarters for final

decision, and on January 26, 1996, it provided Yuchius with a draft
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                               Page 19


of its decision, which indicated denial of the petition.               The

stated    reason   was   that,   although   Headquarters   believed   that,

contrary to the port director's determination, the circumstances of

the violation had been disclosed to the best of the company's

knowledge, Yuchius had not tendered the outstanding duties owed, as

required    by   the   prior-disclosure     regulations.    See   Defendant

Yuchius Exhibit 4, pp. 3-4.       The draft also noted that because the

statute of limitations was set to expire with respect to some

entries, the matter would be referred immediately to the Department

of Justice for collection.


            Yuchius offered to enter into an agreement with Customs,

waiving any time defense for the entries which was about to ma-

terialize and providing that the company pay the loss of revenues

and an interest-based penalty only.          See Plaintiff's Exhibit 27.

On January 30, 1996, one day before the period of limitation was to

expire, Yuchius refused to provide the waiver13, and therefore, on

that same day, Customs formally determined that the attempted prior

disclosure was not valid for failure to tender the duties owed.

See Plaintiff's Exhibit 30.


            That denial was pursuant to 19 C.F.R. §162.74(h) (1996),

which required that a person disclosing the circumstances of a

violation tender any actual loss of duties at the time of disclos-

ure or within 30 days after Service notification of its calculation

     13
          See Plaintiff's Exhibit 28, p. 011399.
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                         Page 20


of the actual loss.     Defendant Yuchius claims it could not have

made such tender at the time of its second attempted disclosure to

Customs on September 28, 1993 because it believed that the com-

missions and payments for training and technical assistance were

not dutiable and that, when it was notified of the actual amount by

the Service, the prepenalty notice had already been issued.       See

Post-Trial Submission of Defendant Yuchius, pp. 9-10.      Of course,

the company has acknowledged that the very reason why the amount

owed was difficult or impossible to calculate was its own inade-

quate recordkeeping.    Nonetheless, it argues now that

     [t]endering the lost revenues . . . --even if Yuchius and
     Customs had reached an agreement as to their amount--
     would not have perfected the prior disclosure. By the
     time Customs Headquarters concluded that PD2 was substan-
     tially complete after all, it was too late to tender the
     duties.

Id. at 12.

            In 
its second attempted prior disclosure, the company

admitted failing to account for some $8,916,794.    The final audit

report dated October 14, 199414 set forth the total as $10,252,462,

the prepenalty notice was dated February 16, 199515, and on January

26, 1996, Yuchius was negotiating an interest-based penalty only

with Customs but refused to provide the limitations waiver one day

before the statute was to run, and still the outstanding duties had

not been tendered.     See Defendant Yuchius Exhibit 10.


     14
          See Defendant Yuchius Exhibit 13.
     15
          See Defendant Yuchius Exhibit 5.
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                               Page 21


            There was no requirement under 19 C.F.R. §162.74(h)(1996)

that the tender of the duties be tied to an importer's belief that

disclosure would be effective.           Indeed, the obligation to pay

duties exists independent of any penalty imposed.              See United

States v. Blum, 
858 F.2d 1566 
(Fed.Cir. 1988).              See also TIE

Communications, Inc. v. United States, 
18 CIT 358 
(1994); United

States v. Snuggles, 
20 CIT 1057
, 
937 F. Supp. 923 
(1996). Defendant

Yuchius's position that it was "whipsawed" by the decision of the

port director, later overruled by Customs Headquarters, regarding

the   adequacy   of   the   disclosure   of   the   circumstances   of   the

violation does not obviate tender.         The requirement is clear and

unambiguous.     If the company believed that Customs was wrong about

the adequacy of the disclosure of the circumstances, it could have

and should have paid the duties and continued to pursue its

position.    It claims to have deferred tender for a good reason,

namely, that if it paid an amount which was later determined to be

greater than necessary, refusal of the Service to refund would not

have been a protestable decision.        While the law on the point may

be uncertain16, tender of duties is still required to qualify for

prior-disclosure treatment.        Defendant Yuchius cannot take the

position that it believed that the amounts for commissions and

technical and training expenses were not dutiable, and delayed


      16
       See, e.g., Bridalane Fashions, Inc. v. United States, 
22
CIT 1064
, 
32 F. Supp. 2d 466 
(1998).
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                      Page 22


paying in the hope of substantiating its view, because it never had

support for that position, and has not proven otherwise herein.


          The company may have believed that Customs negotiations

with it meant that tender could wait, but it has produced no

evidence or testimony in support thereof.   On the contrary, it was

reaffirmed at the trial that the Service "always take[s] the

money."   19 Tr., p. 80.    Moreover, there is no evidence that

acceptance of the monies paid thus far constituted a waiver or an

attempt to mislead Yuchius about the status of prior disclosure.

There is also no evidence that there was an extension granted

pursuant to 19 C.F.R. §162.74(h).     Finally, the company did not

actually disclose the circumstances of its violation(s) until after

Customs had begun an investigation.    While the Service may have

been willing to proceed on the basis of a prior disclosure,

accompanied by appropriate tender, technically, the period had

passed for Yuchius to qualify therefor.


                                 B


          Congress has chosen to adopt only maximums, as opposed to

prescribing precise penalties, for proven violations under 19

U.S.C. §1592 and has left any imposition thereof to the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade.    And the court

has understood the purpose of this approach essentially to be

remedial rather than punitive.   E.g., United States v. Gordon, 10
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                                 Page 
23


CIT 292
, 297, 
634 F. Supp. 409
, 415-16 (1986).        Moreover, the court

has compiled an exhaustive list of considerations that might apply

in a given case, including a defendant's good faith effort to

comply with the statute, a defendant's degree of culpability, a

defendant's history of previous violations, the public interest in

ensuring compliance with the law, the nature and circumstances of

the violation(s) at issue, a defendant's ability to pay, the po-

tential impact of a penalty on a defendant's ability to continue in

business, that a penalty not be shocking to the conscience, the

economic benefit of the violation(s) to a defendant, the degree of

harm to the public, and the value of vindicating agency authority.

See United States v. Complex Machine Works Co., 
23 CIT 942
, 949-50,

83 F. Supp. 2d 1307
, 1314-15 (1999).


           Agency authority may be down this list, but that circum-

location cannot be interpreted to mean that it is not a paramount

consideration and concern of this court.        Indeed, the multifarious

tasks and enormous responsibilities of the U.S. Customs Service are

much too daunting to permit the lack of reasonable care cum

negligence reflected by the record in this case to go without

correction. Perhaps, the extended administrative process, and then

this case itself, have already had a remedial impact upon defendant

Yuchius and its principals.      None of them, however, presented him-

or   herself   herein   for   closer   court   scrutiny   on   this   issue.

Instead, they have relied upon their privilege to have accountants
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                          Page 24


and attorneys do their reckoning.      And the latter have carried out

their assignments admirably.       Counsel have not sought to deny the

undeniable, rather to minimize the damage that emanates therefrom.

They have sought to portray their client(s) as unsophisticated, not

well-educated, too busy to have kept complete and proper track of

all that matters to Customs.17     They understand (and have stipulat-

ed) that the Service is still owed duties in the amount of

$321,306.00 plus interest thereon.      Whereupon, they propose that,

     if any penalties are assessed, the maximum permissible
     amount is $642,306, twice the amount of the loss of
     revenue in the second disclosure period.

Post-Trial Submission of Defendant Yuchius, p. 8, para. 5.


            On its part, the plaintiff continues to "seek the maximum

penalty of two times the lawful duties that the United States was

deprived"18, which it computed in the pretrial order to be $569,-

431.00 x 2 = $1,116,454.0019.      While both sides appear to continue

to have difficulty with their arithmetic, the logic and analysis in

support of their respective positions are clear enough.      Both rely

on the factors of the Complex Machine Works 
case, supra
, albeit to

divergent final penalty amounts.

     17
       While these insinuations may all be true, the court is
required to remind the defendant that none of them can be the
basis of an acceptable defense.
     18
          Plaintiff's Post-Trial Submission, p. 20.
     19
          Pre-Trial Order, p. 6.
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                       Page 25


            Taking those considerations into account, and comparing

them with the specific facts of this case, the court concludes that

the maximum penalty multiplier should apply -- but only to the net

lost revenues stipulated by the 
parties, supra
, $321,306, equals a

penalty of $642,612.00 that the government of the United States of

America should collect from defendant Yuchius. While the company's

disclosure of the circumstances of some of its violations may have

been "substantially complete and effective"20, as Customs Head-

quarters came to conclude, the record developed herein as a whole

still counsels a penalty of this magnitude.


                                  IV

            As set forth hereinabove, defendant Intercargo Insurance

Company has already settled its obligation to the plaintiff under

its bond.     Whereupon it cross-claims herein against co-defendant

Yuchius for the amount thereof, plus interest thereon from the date

of payment, as well as reasonable attorney's fees and costs and

expenses for pretrial preparation, trial participation, and pre-

sentation of the cross-claim.21

                                  A

            Cross-claimant Intercargo presses two paths to recovery,

to wit, its indemnity agreement with Yuchius, and implied contract

     20
          Defendant Yuchius Exhibit 4, p. 3.
     21
       The court notes in passing that its jurisdiction over
this claim has not been extinguished by the cross-claimant's
settlement with the plaintiff. See, e.g., Nishimatsu Constr.
Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 
515 F.2d 1200
, 1204 and n. 2 (5th Cir.
1975).
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                                  Page 26


between principal and surety.      According to the agreement produced

at trial as exhibit INT-5, Yuchius Morality Company, Ltd. did

     bind itself, it successors and assigns, to indemnify and
     save [Intercargo Insurance] Company harmless . . . and on
     demand to pay it any and all claims, demands, loss and
     damages of every nature and kind, and on demand to pay it
     all legal and other costs, counsel fees and expenses
     directly or indirectly, which the Company shall at any
     time sustain by reason or in consequence of such surety-
     ship, or any renewal, extension, modification or continu-
     ation thereof, or Consent of Surety or additional surety-
     ship, . . . whether before or after legal proceedings by
     or against the Company, and without notice thereof to the
     undersigned [Yuchius].

                               *    *     *

          The undersigned [Yuchius] hereby agrees to indemnify
     the Company for any and all expenses, costs and attor-
     ney's fees incurred by the Company in the event that the
     Company is compelled to exercise any of its available
     remedies to ensure compliance with the terms and condi-
     tions of the bond.


On its face, this agreement binds Yuchius to indemnify its surety

in this matter.


           Moreover,   the   Restatement      (Third)      of   Suretyship   and

Guaranty   §22(1)(b)   indicates   that       there   is   an   obligation    to

reimburse a secondary obligor when it makes a settlement with the

obligee that discharges the principal obligor, in whole or in part,

with the respect to the underlying obligation.                    This court's

granting of partial summary judgment to the plaintiff for unpaid

duties covered by the Intercargo bond, and the subsequent penalty

trial, established that the time for satisfaction of the obligation

had arrived.   See Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                                Page 27


§22(2). Defendant Yuchius claims that the settlement was premature

in the absence of court disposition of its defenses herein.              Cf.

id., §24.      It also 
claims that

       the question of the payment of lost duties became
       intertwined with Customs' penalty demands from the very
       outset, and that Yuchius has not been able to resolve one
       question without also resolving the other. Under these
       circumstances, it is premature to conclude that Yuchius
       has breached its duty of performance to Intercargo, and
       thus exoneration would not be appropriate under Section
       21(2) of the Restatement.

Post-Trial Submission of Defendant Yuchius, p. 27.


              Of course, defendant/cross-claimant Intercargo has al-

ready incurred the expenses of the trial (and the settlement).

Hence, its       cross-claim   is   not   now   premature.   While   section

24(1)(e) of the Restatement does set forth a defense to a demand

for reimbursement when, at the time of a settlement of a secondary

obligation, the secondary obligor had notice of a defense of the

principal obligor to the underlying obligation22, the surety takes

the position that this court's slip opinion 99-79 dismissed any

such defense of defendant Yuchius even before the trial.             As for

the trial, the defendant/cross-claimant has pointed to the other

       22
            Cf. Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty §24-
(3):

            Notwithstanding subsection (1)(e), if the secondary
       obligor gives the principal obligor notice of the
       obligee's claim and an opportunity to defend against it,
       the principal obligor may not assert, as a defense to its
       duty to reimburse the secondary obligor, any defense to
       the underlying obligation that was available to the
       secondary obligor as a defense to the secondary
       obligation.
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                                     Page 28


parties' difficulties, even failures, to match entries covered by

its bond with duties owed. Notwithstanding this systemic shortcom-

ing of the record, the surety still presses its settlement now as

a "reasonable business decision". Post-Trial Brief by Defendant and

Cross-Claimant Intercargo, p. 11.               Given the facts and circum-

stances adduced herein23, this court cannot disagree.


            Defendant Yuchius contends that the defendant surety's

defense of this action was voluntary.               The court cannot concur.

The failure-to-match defense asserted by Intercargo was hardly

volitional, nor does the record reflect inadequate or improper

evaluation of the liabilities in the case prior to any tender.

Defendant Yuchius also takes the position that the efforts of the

defendant/cross-claimant's           counsel    were    duplicative,    but   this

assertion also cannot stand in the light of their aforesaid,

original defense and their extensive cross-examination of govern-

ment witnesses.        See 19 Tr., pp. 80-141; 20 Tr., pp. 101-34.

Unlike the case cited by defendant Yuchius in support of its

position, Sentry Ins. Co. v. Davison Fuel & Dock Co., 60 Ohio

App.2d    248,   
396   N.E.2d    1071 
    (1978),      defendant/cross-claimant

Intercargo's counsel did not agree that the principal's counsel was

competent   to   represent      it   in   all   phases    of   this   litigation,

including those inherently tied to the bond. Clearly, the decision

     23
       For example, at the time of its settlement for the $50,-
000 face value of its bond, the surety was still confronted with
a Customs demand for $67,844.44. See Intercargo Proposed Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 2. Cf. Exhibit INT-1.
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                      Page 29


in regard thereto was within the surety's discretion, and this

court cannot find that the resultant approach was out of order.


          Defendant Yuchius is of the view that exoneration of its

surety would not be appropriate in the absence of an attempt to

collect from the principal and of a showing that the remedy at law

is inadequate, and that remittance to defendant/cross-claimant

Intercargo is not the appropriate form of relief.   It argues that

the case, Milwaukie Constr. Co. v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 
367 F.2d

964 
(9th Cir. 1966), cited by the surety, is inappropriate as the

exoneration remedy referred to therein was granted in circumstances

where that surety did not know what the final amount would be and

so did not have an adequate remedy at law, and in the circumstances

where there was an impending threat of the principal's absconding.

However, that case is not limited to such circumstances, to wit:


     ". . . The doctrine in such cases rests on the simple
     right, as between the principal and surety, that the
     surety has to be protected by the principal; a surety is
     awarded exoneration in order that mischief and circuity
     of action may be avoided; he is not obligated to make
     inroads into his own resources when the loss in the end
     must fall on the principal.

          It is not essential that the claim of the surety for
     relief should depend on the fact that he will incur
     irreparable injury; nor must he show any fraudulent
     disposition of property, or the presence of a wrongful
     purpose, or special reason for fearing loss; and the
     insolvency of his surety will not preclude him from
     maintaining the bill."
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                              Page 
30


367 F.2d at 966
, reciting 72 C.J.S., Principal and Surety §303

(1951).   And also quoting Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Admiral

Oriental Line v. United States, 
86 F.2d 201
, 204 (2d Cir. 1936),

in equity

     the rule is otherwise; before paying the debt a surety
     may call upon the principal to exonerate him by discharg-
     ing it . . 
..

367 F.2d at 967
.    See also Morley Constr. Co. v. Maryland Casualty

Co., 
90 F.2d 976 
(8th Cir. 1937).

            In   this   case,   to   avoid   the   circuity   referred   to,

indemnification is appropriate.        The debt has matured, the surety

has paid out funds in settlement, and therefore defendant Yuchius's

arguments relating to the exoneration remedy are not apposite.

See, e.g., United States v. Almany, 
22 CIT 490 
(1998).            See also

Borey v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 
934 F.2d 30 
(2d Cir. 1991).


            Defendant Yuchius further argues that the form of relief

requested by Intercargo is not contemplated by the Restatement

(Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty §21(2), Comment (k), which

states:

     . . . The relief granted, when exoneration or quia timet
     rights are asserted, depends on the facts of the particu-
     lar case. . . . Among the courses open to the court are
     to direct performance by the principal obligor, to
     require that a sum certain due the obligee by the
     principal obligor be paid into court for the obligee, or
     to require that the principal obligor give the secondary
     obligor adequate security for its ultimate reimbursement.

However, since the amount at issue herein is now a sum certain, it

would serve no purpose to require payment into court of monies or
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                               Page 31


to furnish security.        Judgment should simply be entered on behalf

of defendant/cross-claimant Intercargo Insurance Company directly.


                                      B

             The Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty §23(1)

envisions a principal obligor's reimbursement of a secondary obli-

gor for the "reasonable cost of performing the secondary obliga-

tion, including incidental expenses". Here, the surety claims that

the $13,146.30 requested is a reasonable sum spent in its defense

of the claims against defendant Yuchius prior to the trial, and it

also seeks reimbursement for trial preparation, the subsequent

conduct thereof, and the reasonable fees and expenses incurred in

pursuing its cross-claim. Comment (a) to the Restatement's section

23(1) states that the duty to reimburse a secondary obligor encom-

passes incidental expenses, which "may include reasonable attor-

neys'     fees   incurred   in   conjunction   with   performance   of   the

secondary obligation".


                                     (1)

             As this court, contrary to the claim of defendant Yu-

chius, does not find Intercargo's defense to have been "voluntary",

attorney's fees of $13,146.30 incurred up to the date of trial24 are

clearly recoverable, as are such fees engendered by the govern-

ment's trial itself.



     24
           See Exhibit INT-4.
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                       Page 32


                               (2)

          With regard to recovery of attorney's fees and expenses

in pursuit of the cross-claim, cases that have allowed them have

relied upon the language of any indemnity agreement.    See, e.g.,

John Burr v. Alexander Lichtenheim, 
190 Conn. 351
, 460 A.2d. 1290

(1983). In the matter at bar, that agreement's reference to indem-

nification for "any and all expenses, costs and attorney's fees

incurred by the Company in the event that the Company is compelled

to exercise any of its available remedies to ensure compliance" is

sufficiently broad25, and the court therefore finds such fees and

expenses to be recoverable by cross-claimant Intercargo.

          Where, as here, there is such an agreement, case law does

require that it was reasonably necessary for a surety to have

incurred attorney's fees and expenses.   E.g., Fallon Elec. Co. v.

The Cincinnati Ins. Co., 
121 F.3d 125 
(3d Cir. 1997).      See also

Sentry Ins. Co. v. Davison Fuel & Dock 
Co., supra
.      And this

court so finds on the record developed.26


                                V

          The plaintiff seeks prejudgment interest from February

16, 1995 on the $321,306 in lost revenues.   Defendant Yuchius has

     25
       The same can be said of the agreement in Sentry Ins. Co.
v. Davison Fuel & Dock Co., 
60 Ohio App. 2d 248
, 
396 N.E.2d 1071
(1978), upon which defendant Yuchius attempts to rely.
     26
       Of course, before any award thereof, defendant/cross-
claimant Intercargo must serve and file a detailed accounting,
which will be subject to examination by defendant Yuchius. Cf.
Sentry Ins. Co. v. Davison Fuel & Dock 
Co., supra 
note 25.
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                                  Page 33


admitted that it owes the plaintiff lost duties since at least

September 28, 1993.      See Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, p. 011214.             The

duties were demanded on February 16, 1995. See Plaintiff's Exhibit

17, p. 011352.


             Award of such interest is within the equitable powers of

the court.    See, e.g., United States v. Imperial Food Imports, 
834

F.2d 1013
, 1016 (Fed.Cir. 1987); Rheem Metalurgica S.A. v. United

States, 
21 CIT 963
, 966, 
978 F. Supp. 333
, 336, aff'd, 
160 F.3d 1357
(Fed.Cir. 1998); United States v. Utex Int'l Inc., 
11 CIT 325
, 329,

659 F. Supp. 250
, 254 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 
857 F.2d 1408
(Fed.Cir. 1988); United States v. Goodman, 
6 CIT 132
, 139-140, 
572

F. Supp. 1284
, 1289 (1983). That is, it is appropriate to reimburse

the   government   for   what   has   been   essentially   a   loan    to   the

defendant. E.g., United States v. Imperial Food 
Imports, 834 F.2d

at 1016
; United States v. 
Goodman, 6 CIT at 140
. See also Wallace

Beerie & Co. v. United States, 
12 CIT 103
, 107 (1988).                In this

case, there has been no unreasonable delay on the part of the

government.     Whereupon, the plaintiff should recover prejudgment

interest from defendant Yuchius since February 16, 1995.


                                      VI

             The parties are hereby directed to settle and submit

within 30 days hereof a proposed final judgment in conformity with

this opinion, which represents the court's findings of facts and

conclusions of law, awarding (a) the plaintiff lost revenues and
Consolidated
Court No. 96-02-00608                                      Page 34


prejudgment interest thereon, as well as the penalty for the proven

negligence of defendant Yuchius Morality Company, Ltd., and (b)

defendant/cross-claimant Intercargo Insurance Company the amount of

its bond plus the reasonable fees and expenses of its attorneys and

costs incurred before trial, as well as interest thereon and such

reasonable fees and expenses as may have been incurred since that

time and which have been set forth in an application therefor duly

served and filed within the aforesaid 30-day period in conformity

with the CIT Rules.

           So ordered.

Decided:   New York, New York
           October 18, 2002



                                              Judge