OPINION AND ORDER

POGUE, Chief Judge:

In this action, the Plaintiffs seek review of two determinations by the United States Department of Commerce ("Commerce" or "the Department") in the final results of the third administrative review of the antidumping duty order covering certain frozen warmwater shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam ("Vietnam").1

First, Plaintiff Amanda Foods (Vietnam) Ltd. ("Amanda Foods"), challenges the Department's calculation of separate rates for cooperative, non-individually investigated respondents. This issue will be voluntarily remanded to Commerce for review in light of the Court's decision in Amanda Foods (Vietnam) Ltd. v. United States, ____ CIT ____, 774 F.Supp.2d 1286 (2011). Order, Aug. 9, 2011, ECF No. 56.2

Second, Plaintiff Viet Hai Seafood Co., Ltd. a/k/a Vietnam Fish One Co., Ltd. ("Fish One") challenges the Department's determination not to revoke the antidumping duty order with regard to Fish One under the Department's statutory authority provided by Section 751(d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d) (2006).3 This second issue is the focus of this opinion.

The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c).

As explained below, the court concludes that (I) Commerce's interpretation of the revocation statute is a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous provision and consistent with Commerce's reasonable interpretation of its own regulations and policies regarding revocation for non-mandatory respondents; (II) because Fish One failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, it may not now challenge the mandatory respondent selection process; and (III) Fish One is not entitled to revocation based on three years of de minimis dumping margins.

BACKGROUND

Fish One is among the companies subject to Commerce's February 1, 2005, antidumping duty order covering certain frozen warmwater shrimp from Vietnam.4 Fish One requested a review of its sales covered by the order for the 2007-2008 period (the third administrative review) and also requested revocation of the antidumping duty order pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d) and 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(b)(2) (2011).5 Letter from DeKieffer & Horgan to Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce 1 (Feb. 29, 2008), Admin. R. Pub. Doc. 9.

As required by the statute, Commerce initiated the third administrative review,6 and, in due course, issued its preliminary results of the review.7 In the Preliminary Results, Commerce determined, "not to revoke the Order with respect to Fish One." Preliminary Results, 74 Fed.Reg. at 10,-011.

Commerce found Fish One ineligible for revocation because it was not chosen as a mandatory respondent.8 Id. According to Commerce,

Id. Commerce neither altered its determination or its basic rationale in the Final Results.10 See Final Results, 74 Fed.Reg. at 47, 193; I & D Mem. Cmt. 16 at 57-63.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the Department's decisions made in administrative reviews of antidumping duty orders, the court "shall hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found . . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i).

DISCUSSION

Fish One makes three principle arguments before the court. Fish One first contends that the Department's determination not to individually review its sales for the purpose of revocation is not in accordance with law because it is (A) contrary to Congressional intent, (B) an unreasonable interpretation of the statute, (C) counter to the Department's regulations, and (D) inconsistent with the Department's precedent and policy. Second, Fish One contends that Commerce employed a flawed process for selecting mandatory respondents. Third, Fish One contends that the zero percent dumping margin assigned to it in the Final Results entitles it to revocation. Each of these arguments are considered separately.

I. The Department's determination not to individually review Fish One for the purpose of revocation is based on a reasonable interpretation of the statute, regulations, and agency policies

The heart of the parties' dispute is their disagreement over the existence and nature of a "revocation review" under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d). Specifically, Fish One asks the court to conclude that § 1675(d) requires Commerce to conduct an individual review upon receipt of a request for revocation.

Commerce contends that § 1675(d) permits the revocation of an anti-dumping duty order after a § 1675(a) review, also referred to as an administrative review, but does not create a separate revocation review process.11 Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. J. Admin. R. 8-10, ECF No. 67 ("Def.'s Resp. Br."). Fish One argues, in contrast, that § 1675(d) mandates a separate and parallel revocation review that is to be conducted simultaneously with a § 1675(a) administrative review. Pl.'s Br. 11-14.

Resolving these differing interpretations requires consideration of the interplay of three statutory provisions (19 U.S.C. §§ 1675(a), 1675(d), and 1677f-1(c)(2)), all relating to administrative review of antidumping duty orders.

According to Commerce's view, the § 1677f-1(c)(2) provision for limiting the number of respondents in an administrative review also limits the number of respondents eligible for revocation. To Commerce, because an administrative review is a prerequisite for revocation, if a respondent is excluded from review under § 1677f-1(c)(2), they are also excluded from revocation. Thus, in its Final Results, Commerce reasoned that "pursuant to [19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2)(B)], . . . it could reasonably examine the three largest exporters by volume" and because "Fish One was not included among the top three, the Department was under no obligation to select Fish One for individual examination." I & D Mem. Cmt. 16 at 61.

Fish One contests Commerce's interpretation, arguing that because the text of § 1677f-1(c)(2) does not make mention of § 1675(d), the former cannot be applied as an exception to the latter. To Fish One, § 1677f-1(c)(2) applies only to administrative reviews under § 1675(a), and because revocation reviews under § 1675(d) are separate and parallel, they are outside the purview of § 1677f-1(c)(2). Therefore, in Fish One's opinion, "[n]owhere in the statute is there any limitation on the review of revocation requests." Pl.'s Br. 12. Accordingly, Fish One claims that "Congress has spoken and Commerce has no leeway. . . . Commerce must strictly follow the revocation provision of the statute." Id. Fish One further contends that Commerce has acknowledged the parallel review process by making revocation reviews mandatory under its regulations. Id. at 14-16.

Because Fish One challenges Commerce's interpretation of the statute, this question is reviewed using the familiar two step framework required by the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).12

A. The statute is ambiguous regarding individual review following a request for revocation

The plain meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d) is little help in resolving the question at issue. As noted above, the provision states in relevant part:

19 U.S.C. § 1675(d). This language provides no indication of whether a revocation request mandates an individual review. Rather, the "language provides minimal guidance other than providing that the revocation should be carried out `after review under subsection (a) [a periodic administrative review] or (b) [a changed circumstances review]. . . .'" Sahaviriya Steel Indus. v. United States, 649 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2011) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d)(1)).

The statute is clear that a respondent subject to an antidumping duty order must undergo a § 1675(a) administrative review or a § 1675(b) changed circumstances review before the order is revoked under § 1675(d). But whether and how that review is to be conducted is not addressed by § 1675(d). See Sahaviriya Steel, 649 F.3d at 1376 ("The language of the statute is silent as to the conditions that might warrant the revocation of an antidumping duty order or the particular circumstances that would trigger such action."). The statute's ambiguity on this point means that "Commerce was left by Congress to promulgate guidelines as to when revocations `in whole or in part' are appropriate and to set forth proper procedures therefore." Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778).

Fish One argues that all statutory language must be given effect, which requires the separate provisions at §§ 1675(a) and (d) to be interpreted as independent review processes; therefore, "[s]ince it is `possible' to implement both provisions of the statute, Commerce should have done so," Pl.'s Br. 12-13; see Meeks v. West, 216 F.3d 1363, 1366-67 (Fed.Cir.2000).

It is not true, however, that giving each provision of the statute such full, independent effect is the only way to "fit. . . all parts [of the statute] into an harmonious whole." FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 389, 79 S.Ct. 818, 3 L.Ed.2d 893 (1959). Rather, "words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989)). Whether Commerce's interpretation of the overall statutory scheme governing review is reasonable will be taken up below; for now it is sufficient to state that Plaintiff's argument that §§ 1675(a), 1675(d), and 1677f-1(c)(2) cannot be read together, but must be given independent effect, is inconsistent with established practices of statutory construction that seek to interpret the statutory scheme as a harmonious whole. Furthermore, though the statute is clear that revocation cannot occur absent review, the statute is ambiguous regarding the trigger and form of that review.

B. The Department's interpretation is reasonable

As noted above, Commerce has interpreted the exception to individual review of an antidumping duty order found at § 1677f-1(c)(2) to be applicable to revocation under § 1675(d). In short, Commerce argues that because Fish One was not chosen for mandatory review under § 1677f-1(c)(2)(B), it had no subsequent right to an individual review for the purposes of revocation. See Preliminary Results, 74 Fed.Reg. at 10,011-12. Fish One argues in response that "the statute does not limit revocation review in any manner. Without such limitation, Commerce must conduct a revocation review if requested. A mere request by a respondent triggers the pertinent section of the Statute." Pl.'s Br. 14.

Fish One's argument finds no support in the language of the statute. Nowhere in the text of § 1675(d) is there mention of a "request for revocation" nor does § 1675(d) contain any language that compels the Department to do anything. As this Court has previously held, the statutory language of § 1675(d) places the discretionary authority to revoke with Commerce. See Hyundai Elec. Co. v. United States, 23 CIT 302, 308, 53 F.Supp.2d 1334, 1340 (1999) (holding that "may revoke" language in statute conferred discretion on Commerce).13 To conclude that Commerce is required to initiate a review based on a statutory provision that does no more than give Commerce the discretion to revoke an order is contrary to the plain language of the statute.

Nor does the Plaintiff's argument for the unreasonableness of the Department's interpretation find a basis in the objectives of these provisions or the antidumping scheme as a whole. See Windmill Int'l PTE., 26 CIT at 223, 193 F.Supp.2d at 1306. In this regard, the history of the relevant provisions is helpful.

Administrative review of antidumping duty orders was first provided for in the Trade Agreement Act of 1979, Pub.L. No. 96-39, § 751(a), 93 Stat. 144, 175 (1979) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)). In its first incarnation, § 1675(a) made annual, administrative reviews mandatory.14 What is now § 1675(d) was also introduced in the Trade Agreement Act of 1979 using the same language that remains in force today.15 § 751(c), 93 Stat. at 176. In the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-573, § 611(a)(2), 98 Stat. 2948, 3031 (1984), Congress amended § 1675(a) by adding the language, "if a request for such a review has been received." The effect of this amendment was to cease mandatory annual review and place the burden for requesting review on the interested parties. Also in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Congress added § 1677f-1, which permitted Commerce to use sampling and averaging when conducting § 1675 reviews. § 620(a), 98 Stat. at 3039. Finally, in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Congress amended § 1677f-1 by adding subsection (c) as it now reads, including the requirement for individual review when determining dumping margins and the exceptions to individual review. § 229(a), 108 Stat. at 4889. Throughout the various modifications noted here, the relevant language of § 1675(d) has remained consistent. Compare § 751(c), 93 Stat. at 176, with 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d) (2006).

This history points to two important considerations. First, in the original incarnation of § 1675, the revocation provision in § 1675(d) existed in the context of a mandatory, annual review as required by § 1675(a). Thus, each year an annual review would be conducted, after which Commerce could make § 1675(d) revocation decisions. Though the statutory scheme has changed over time, § 1675(d) has remained consistent, and "provisions introduced by an amendatory act should be read together with provisions of the original section that were reenacted or left unchanged as if they had been originally enacted as one section." 1A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 22.34, at 395-96 (7th ed. 2009).

Second, in amending the statutory scheme, Congress has sought to achieve a balance of fairness and efficiency. On the one hand, § 1675(d)(1) provided an opportunity for revocation indispensable to the fair administration of the antidumping duty regime. However, Congress has also evidenced a concern with the efficient administration of the regime and, in particular, with moderating the administrative burden placed on Commerce. See Ipsco, Inc. v. United States, 12 CIT 676, 678, 692 F.Supp. 1368, 1370-71 (1988) (reviewing the legislative history of amendments to 19 U.S.C. § 1675 and noting Congress's emphasis on lessening the burden on Commerce as well as petitioners and respondents). Both the removal of the mandatory annual review under § 1675(a) and the introduction of § 1677f-1(c)(2) indicate a Congressional intent to strike a balance between fairness and efficiency in the administration of the antidumping duty regime, particularly in the process of review.

Both the statutory structure and Congress's intent to balance fairness and efficiency suggest that the Department's interpretation is reasonable. Commerce's decision to subordinate revocation decisions under § 1675(d) to the review process, including § 1677f-1(c)(2), tracks the structure of the statute and maintains the balance between fairness and efficiency. Moreover, as will be discussed below, Commerce's interpretation does not eliminate Fish One's opportunity for selection as a voluntary respondent and therefore does not foreclose Fish One's opportunity for review and revocation. In addition, Defendant-Intervenor's point out that recognition of Commerce's resource constraints is not a factor that limits only the opportunity for respondents to obtain review. Rather, it also limits the opportunity for domestic producers to obtain review of additional respondents. Accordingly, because the statutory language is ambiguous and the Department's interpretation is reasonable, the court defers to Commerce's interpretation of the statute. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778.

C. Commerce's interpretation of its regulations is reasonable and consistent with its interpretation of the statute

Fish One next argues that Commerce has failed to abide by its own regulations, once again resting this argument on the notion that an administrative review and a revocation review are separate and independent procedures. Pl.'s Br. 14-16. Fish One claims that the Department's regulations require the initiation of a revocation review upon request by a party and that Commerce violated its regulations on revocation when it did not conduct a revocation review upon Fish One's request. Id. Under this theory, Fish One points to language in 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(f)(2), which it argues compels Commerce to take specific, enumerated actions with regard to a request for revocation.16 Plaintiff makes much of the fact that the "regulatory language is mandatory, stating that Commerce will perform certain functions as part of the revocation review," Id. at 3., and in particular that "[19 C.F.R.] § 351.222 states that Commerce `will' initiate a partial revocation review, if requested," Id. at 15-16.17

Commerce argues in response that Fish One's distinction between administrative and revocation reviews is, again, illusory. Def.'s Resp. Br. 10-11. According to Commerce, "[a] review under the regulation means an administrative review under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)," id. at 10; therefore, the regulatory provisions under 19 C.F.R. § 351.222 are only applicable when a respondent is selected for review under 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2). As Commerce stated in the Preliminary Results, "[n]othing in the regulation requires the Department to conduct an individual examination and verification when the Department has limited its review, under [19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2)]." Preliminary Results, 74 Fed.Reg. at 10,012; see also I & D Mem. Cmt. 16 at 61.18

An agency is, of course, bound by its regulations. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) ("So long as this regulation remains in force the Executive Branch is bound by it. . . ."); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40, 79 S.Ct. 968, 3 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388, 77 S.Ct. 1152, 1 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1957). However, the court defers to the agency's error-free interpretation of its own regulations. Carpenter Tech. Corp. v. United States, 31 CIT 181, 184, 474 F.Supp.2d 1347, 1350 (2007) (citing Torrington Co. v. United States, 156 F.3d 1361, 1363-64 (Fed.Cir.1998)). "[The court's] task is not to decide which among several competing interpretations best serves the regulatory purpose. Rather, the agency's interpretation must be given `controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'" Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945)). Furthermore, the court will "uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned." Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974).

Because Commerce's interpretation is neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation, the court defers to that interpretation. See Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381. According to 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(f)(2) certain actions must be taken by Commerce; however, it is a reasonable interpretation to conclude that these provisions do not require an individual review so much as they define the procedures of a review when it has been initiated.19 While § 351.222(f)(1) states that "[Commerce] will initiate and conduct a review," it has already been established above, see supra Section I.B, that a review under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) is not synonymous with a revocation. The Department's understanding that its regulations under 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(f) initiate an administrative review under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a), and therefore are subject to the exception to individual review found at 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2), is entirely consistent with its statutory interpretation, held reasonable above. Thus, it is reasonable for the Department to conclude that 19 C.F.R. § 351.222 only requires Commerce to initiate an administrative review under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) and requires further action only when a respondent is chosen for individual review consistent with 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2).

D. Commerce's decision not to individually review Fish One is consistent with its prior policy

Fish One next contends that Commerce should have applied a policy that Fish One claims was created in Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Colombia ("Flowers").20 Fish One argues that Flowers is an established precedent to which Commerce must hew. Pl.'s Br. 17. Commerce responds that it does not consider Flowers to be binding precedent because the "procedure was never implemented in practice and was limited to the Flowers proceeding." I & D Mem. Cmt. 16 at 62. Commerce further argues that even if Flowers is considered agency precedent, it has offered a reasonable explanation for its departure from this policy. Def.'s Resp. Br. 12-13.

An agency is not prohibited from changing its policies or adopting a position contrary to prior practice. See Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742, 116 S.Ct. 1730, 135 L.Ed.2d 25 (1996) ("[T]he mere fact that an agency interpretation contradicts a prior agency position is not fatal."). When an agency changes its position suddenly and without explanation or "does not take account of legitimate reliance on prior interpretation," the agency's action may be "arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse of discretion." Id. (internal citations omitted). "[I]f these pitfalls are avoided, change is not invalidating. . . ."21 Id. Furthermore, the binding power of an agency policy is increased by the agency's own adherence, over time to such policy. As the Supreme Court has noted,

INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32, 117 S.Ct. 350, 136 L.Ed.2d 288 (1996) (internal citations omitted).

The policy at issue here was developed in the ninth administrative review of certain fresh cut flowers from Colombia. In that review, Commerce, for the first time, reviewed only the largest subject exporters pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2). Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Colombia, 62 Fed.Reg. 16,772, 16,773 (Dep't Commerce Apr. 8, 1997) (preliminary results and partial rescission of antidumping duty administrative review) ("Flowers Prelim. Results"). In light of Commerce's decision to limit the number of respondents, several non-selected respondents requested an alternative process by which they could preserve their revocation eligibility. Id. at 16,774. In response, the Department, put forth three proposals "to allow for the possibility of future partial revocations in this order, while taking into account the Department's limited resources and the requirement that a company be verified in order to be revoked." Id. After taking comments, Commerce adopted a policy whereby a non-selected respondent that met certain criteria22 would be individually reviewed under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) and also have data for the two prior years reviewed for the purposes of revocation. Flowers Final Results, 62 Fed.Reg. at 53,291. A non-selected respondent that met the criteria, requested revocation, and was determined by Commerce not to have sold merchandise at less than normal value in each of the three years examined, would receive a revocation of the antidumping duty order. Id.

Nonetheless, the court cannot construe the Flowers policy to be a continuing limitation upon Commerce's discretion, Yang, 519 U.S. at 32, 117 S.Ct. 350, which would constrain the agency's future decision making. Rather, the agency's case-by-case decision-making places insufficient reliance upon Flowers to give it the sort of precedential weight that would bind Commerce. All that stands in favor of such a finding is the announcement of the procedure through publication in the Federal Register. However, even in the case for which it was created, the procedure was never implemented23; nor has Commerce subsequently implemented the procedure in any case outside of Flowers. Not only has Commerce not consistently relied upon Flowers, see Yang, 519 U.S. at 32, 117 S.Ct. 350, it has never relied upon Flowers, cf. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742-43, 116 S.Ct. 1730.

Commerce has also bypassed the opportunity to implement the procedure outlined in Flowers. In Certain Lined Paper from the People's Republic of China ("Lined Paper"),24 Commerce selected only one mandatory respondent, Shanghai Lian Li Paper Products Co., Ltd. ("Lian Li"). Lined Paper I & D Mem. Cmt. 7 at 43. Non-selected respondents Watanabe Paper Products (Shanghai) Co., Ltd.; Watanabe Paper Products (Linging) Co., Ltd.; and Hotrock Stationary (Sennzhen) Co., Ltd. (collectively "Watanabe") challenged the selection, arguing, inter alia, that by choosing only one respondent Commerce was denying Watanabe the opportunity to seek revocation in the future. Id. Though the facts of Lined Paper are very similar to Flowers, Commerce chose not to invoke the Flowers procedure in Lined Paper. Instead, Commerce found that with, regard to revocation, "the Department has the discretion, pursuant to [19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2)], to limit the number of entities that it reviews if it is not practicable to examine each individual exporter or producer." Id. at 47.

Rather, in Lined Paper, Commerce "extended the opportunity for non-mandatory respondents to seek voluntary status. . . ." Id. at 43. Voluntary respondent status will be discussed further below, but for now the court notes that such an opportunity exists for a non-selected respondent to seek individual review. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(a). Though Commerce developed an alternative policy in Flowers for maintaining the revocation eligibility of non-selected respondents, the court finds it reasonable for Commerce to now require non-selected respondents to instead go through the voluntary respondent process.

Accordingly, because Commerce has failed to implement or rely upon Flowers and has, in practice, changed its policy to rely instead on the voluntary review process in order to achieve the objectives stated in Flowers, the court finds that the procedure announced in Flowers is not binding upon Commerce in this or subsequent reviews.

II. Fish One cannot challenge the mandatory selection process because it failed to exhaust its administrative remedies

Fish One next argues that the Department used an improper methodology for choosing its mandatory respondents when it took into consideration its workload in other antidumping duty proceedings. Pl.'s Br. 18-19. Fish One further argues that it was unreasonable for the Department to limit its review to three mandatory respondents, when it could have included Fish One as a fourth. Id. Fish One relies on this Court's recent opinion in Zhejiang Native Produce & Animal By-Products Import & Export Corp. v. United States, ____ CIT ____, 637 F.Supp.2d 1260 (2009) to support both of these contentions. Pl.'s Br. 18-19.

The court will not reach the merits of these claims because Fish One failed to exhaust its administrative remedies on this issue. Having failed to object to the mandatory respondent selection process at the administrative level, Fish One cannot raise the issue here. Furthermore, Fish One could have sought individual review through the voluntary respondent process, and, failing to do so, it is not in a position to challenge the mandatory respondent selection.

It is a general rule of administrative law that a plaintiff must exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking relief in the courts. United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37, 73 S.Ct. 67, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952) ("Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice."); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) ("[N]o one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938))). Similarly, this Court is required by statute to, "where appropriate, require the exhaustion of administrative remedies." 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d); see also Consol. Bearings Co. v. United States, 348 F.3d 997, 1003 (Fed.Cir.2003) ("In the Court of International Trade, a plaintiff must also show that it exhausted its administrative remedies. . . .").

Fish One never raised its current objections to the mandatory selection process with Commerce. Following the selection of mandatory respondents, Fish One sent two letters to Commerce requesting that Commerce abide by Fish One's interpretation of the statutes and regulations by conducting an individual review of Fish One for the purpose of revocation. See Letter from DeKieffer & Horgan to Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce (Oct. 8, 2008), Admin. R. Pub. Doc. 123 ("First Review Request Letter from Fish One to Commerce"); Letter from DeKieffer & Horgan to Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce (Jan. 2, 2009), Admin. R. Pub. Doc. 184 ("Second Review Request Letter from Fish One to Commerce"). However, in neither of these letters did Fish One raise its concern with how the mandatory selection process was conducted.25 Nor did Fish One raise these concerns in its case brief to the agency. See Case Br., Apr. 13, 2009, Admin. R. Pub. Doc. 270. Because Fish One did not raise these concerns during the administrative process, Commerce had no opportunity to consider them in making its determinations. The court will not decide a question the agency had no opportunity to consider. See Unemployment Compensation Comm'n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155, 67 S.Ct. 245, 91 L.Ed. 136 (1946) ("A reviewing court usurps the agency's function when it sets aside the administrative determination upon a ground not theretofore presented and deprives the [agency] of an opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for its action.").

This result is especially appropriate here because Fish One also failed to exhaust its available remedies by not seeking a voluntary individual review. Where, as here, the number of respondents in an administrative review has been limited under 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2), Congress has provided an alternative process for a respondent to seek an individual review. This process is provided for at 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(a), which reads in relevant part:

19 U.S.C. § 1677m(a).26

Commerce has provided further guidance for requesting voluntary respondent status in its regulations under 19 C.F.R. § 351.204. The relevant sections read:

19 C.F.R. § 351.204(d)(1) & (4).27

At no point during the administrative review underlying this case did Fish One make a request to Commerce for individual review as a voluntary respondent. Rather, in its first submission to Commerce following the selection of mandatory respondents, Fish One requested an individual review under its interpretation of the statutes and regulations relating to revocation.28 See First Review Request Letter from Fish One to Commerce.

Lack of follow-through in the voluntary respondent process constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Schaeffler Italia S.R.L. v. United States, ____ CIT ____, 781 F.Supp.2d 1358, 1363 (2011) ("[P]laintiffs do not qualify for a remand order in this form, having withdrawn their request for voluntary respondent status during the review and thereby failing to exhaust their administrative remedies on the individual examination issue."); Asahi Seiko Co. v. United States, ____ CIT ____, 755 F.Supp.2d 1316, 1327 (2011) ("Asahi II") ("Ashai withdrew from the review rather than taking steps available to it for seeking its own rate, which involve seeking voluntary respondent status under [19 U.S.C. § 1677m(a)]. The court concludes, therefore, that Asahi failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. . . ."); RHI Refractories Liaoning Co. v. United States, ____ CIT ____, 752 F.Supp.2d 1377, 1380 (2011) (holding that respondent lacked standing to intervene in challenge to administrative review of antidumping duty order for failure to exhaust administrative review after withdrawing its request for voluntary respondent status); see also Asahi Seiko Co. v. United States, ____ CIT ____, 751 F.Supp.2d 1335, 1341-42 (2010) ("Asahi I").

These recent cases hold that withdrawing from an administrative review rather than seeking voluntary respondent status constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, which bars a plaintiff's challenge to the respondent selection process. It is equally the case that a plaintiff, such as Fish One, that goes forward with a review but does not request voluntary respondent status, has also failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.29 In both cases, plaintiffs have failed to take advantage of a "prescribed administrative remedy." McKart, 395 U.S. at 193, 89 S.Ct. 1657; see also L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. at 37, 73 S.Ct. 67 ("[C]ourts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice." (emphasis added)).

Fish One's argument that its failure to exhaust the administrative remedies was excused due to futility is unavailing. Fish One appears to argue that because it expected to receive a revocation review upon request—according to its interpretation of the statutes and regulations—it did not timely submit the necessary information to be considered as a mandatory respondent; therefore, it was futile for Fish One to object to the mandatory respondent selection process because it was time barred from becoming a mandatory respondent. Pl.'s Reply to Def.'s & Def.-Intervenor's Resp. Br. 8-9, ECF No. 71 ("Pl.'s Reply Br."). However, because it was Fish One's own interpretation of the law that rendered its objections untimely, it has no recourse to a futility exception, as it was not Commerce's decision, obstinance, or intractability, but rather Fish One's own conduct, that made the effort futile. Furthermore, there is no indication that Commerce would have refused to acknowledge Fish One's objections had they been timely lodged or lodged at all. Though Fish One argues that "Commerce would not have contravened its regulations and selected Fish One as a mandatory respondent," Id. at 9, Fish One offers no indication that this was, in fact, Commerce's position. The bar for a futility exception is high, requiring more than unlikeliness. See Corus Staal BV v. United States, 502 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed.Cir.2007) ("The mere fact that an adverse decision may have been likely does not excuse a party from a statutory or regulatory requirement that it exhaust administrative remedies."); Schaeffler Italia, ____ CIT at ____, 781 F.Supp.2d at 1364-65 ("Plainly, the voluntary respondent request was unlikely to have been approved had Schaeffler not withdrawn it, but Commerce did not close the door entirely on the prospect that Schaeffler Italia might be examined."). Resting solely on its conclusory allegation that Commerce would not have acted upon its objections, Fish One has not shown that lodging the objection would have been futile.30

Fish One failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by not raising objections to the mandatory respondent selection at the administrative level and by not seeking voluntary respondent status. As such, the court will not reach the question of whether Fish One should have been individually reviewed as a mandatory respondent or the question of whether the mandatory respondent selection process was reasonable.

III. The zero percent dumping margin assigned to Fish One in the third administrative review does not guarantee revocation

Finally, Fish One argues that because it received a zero percent dumping margin in the third administrative review and has complied with all relevant statutory and regulatory obligations, "a strict interpretation of the statute and regulations warrants a finding that Commerce simply take the information placed by Fish One on the record, verify it, and issue its decision regarding revocation." Pl.'s Br. 20. Insofar as this argument reiterates Fish One's prior assertion that either the statute or regulations should be read to require Commerce to review and revoke the order as it pertains to Fish One, these arguments have been discussed above. Fish One's further argument that, having received a de minimis rate for three consecutive years, it is now entitled to revocation is contrary to the plain language of both the statute and regulations. As has been discussed, both the statute and regulations clearly make the grant of revocation discretionary.

The argument advanced by Fish One is very similar to one dismissed by this Court in Hyundai. In that case, the plaintiff "maintain[ed] that except in extraordinary cases, Commerce should automatically revoke an AD order when respondent can show three years of no dumping and has furnished the required no-dumping agreements." Hyundai, 23 CIT at 307-08, 53 F.Supp.2d at 1339-40. The Court found that such an argument lacked merit because both the statute and regulations made revocation a discretionary decision by Commerce. Id. at 308, 53 F.Supp.2d at 1340. Though the regulatory language has changed since Hyundai, see supra note 13, the court finds that the reasoning behind Hyundai continues to be valid. As discussed above, Commerce has reasonably interpreted the statutes and regulations related to revocation. Together the statutes and regulations create a process for determining whether Commerce should exercise its statutory discretion to revoke an order. According to Commerce's reasonable interpretation, this process requires an individual review of a respondent, which did not occur in this case. There is nothing in the statutory or regulatory language that compels Commerce to make a revocation determination other than through this process. As in Hyundai, Commerce has the discretion to revoke orders, and so long as it acts reasonably in construing and enforcing the statutory and regulatory provisions, the Court will not upset its decision. Thus, Fish One's assertion that three consecutive years of de minimis dumping margins and compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements should guarantee revocation is without merit.

CONCLUSION

Consistent with the court's Order dated Aug. 9, 2011, the issue concerning calculation of separate rates for cooperative non-individually investigated respondents is voluntarily REMANDED for reconsideration in light of the Court's decision in Amanda Foods (Vietnam) Ltd. v. United States, ____ CIT ____, 774 F.Supp.2d 1286 (2011).

For all the foregoing reasons, the remainder of the Department's Final Results, 74 Fed.Reg. 47,191, are AFFIRMED.

Commerce shall have until February 13, 2012, to complete and file its remand redetermination. Plaintiff shall have until February 27, 2012, to file comments. Defendant and Defendant-Intervenors shall have until March 12, 2012, to file any reply.

It is SO ORDERED.