Filed: Jul. 14, 2014
Latest Update: Jul. 14, 2014
Summary: OPINION AND MEMORANDUM POGUE, Senior Judge. The motion before the court comes from numerous exporters of multilayered wood flooring manufactured in the People's Republic of China ("Movants"), 1 who seek Plaintiff-Intervenor status in Changzhou Hawd Flooring, Co. v. United States, Court Number 12-00020, pursuant to USCIT Rules 7(b) and 24(a)(3). Mot. to Intervene at 1. Defendant, the United States, and Defendant-Intervenor, the Coalition for American Hardwood Parity ("CAHP"), oppose the mot
Summary: OPINION AND MEMORANDUM POGUE, Senior Judge. The motion before the court comes from numerous exporters of multilayered wood flooring manufactured in the People's Republic of China ("Movants"), 1 who seek Plaintiff-Intervenor status in Changzhou Hawd Flooring, Co. v. United States, Court Number 12-00020, pursuant to USCIT Rules 7(b) and 24(a)(3). Mot. to Intervene at 1. Defendant, the United States, and Defendant-Intervenor, the Coalition for American Hardwood Parity ("CAHP"), oppose the moti..
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OPINION AND MEMORANDUM
POGUE, Senior Judge.
The motion before the court comes from numerous exporters of multilayered wood flooring manufactured in the People's Republic of China ("Movants"),1 who seek Plaintiff-Intervenor status in Changzhou Hawd Flooring, Co. v. United States, Court Number 12-00020, pursuant to USCIT Rules 7(b) and 24(a)(3). Mot. to Intervene at 1. Defendant, the United States, and Defendant-Intervenor, the Coalition for American Hardwood Parity ("CAHP"), oppose the motion. Def.'s Resp. to the Mot. for Intervention, ECF No. 97; Def.-Intervenor's Oppo'n to Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 94. Because Movants have not demonstrated good cause for the untimely filing of their motion to intervene, their motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On February 8, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action, challenging Commerce's determination in Multilayered Wood Flooring from the People's Republic of China, 76 Fed.Reg. 64,318 (Dep't Commerce Oct. 18, 2011) (final determination of sales at less than fair value) ("Final Determination"). Compl., ECF No. 9.2 On June 13, 2014, more than two years later,3 Movants filed their motion to intervene pursuant to USCIT Rule 24(a)(3). Mot. to Intervene at 1.
DISCUSSION
Under USCIT Rule 24(a)(3), movants may intervene as a matter of right4 "no latter than 30 days after the date of service of the complaint," or at such later time if good cause is shown. USCIT R. 24(a)(3). It is uncontested that Movants have filed late. Mot. to Intervene at 2. They must, therefore, show good cause for their delay.
Good cause is defined as "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect." USCIT R. 24(a)(3)(i).5 It is "at bottom," an equitable standard incorporating "all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission." Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (discussing the excusable neglect analysis). Relevant circumstances include "the danger of prejudice to the [non-movants], length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith." Id.6
Here, the likely prejudice to the non-movants is minimal, as Movants "do not seek to raise any new legal or factual issue not already brought before the court,"7 and some prejudice to the Movants is probable, as, without intervention, they will be denied "the benefit of the separate rate" that results from this litigation. Mot. to Intervene at 3. However, the length of the delay—over two years with two CIT opinions and two redeterminations by Commerce issued in that time8— is substantial. The Movants allege that they have intervened now because "for the first time, the very important issue of what the new separate rate should be, and to whom it should apply, has arisen." Mot. to Intervene at 2. The reason they provide for their delay is that they could not, in good faith, have "reasonably predicted" that the litigation would take this direction. Id. But Plaintiffs initiated this action to represent the interests of the separate rate respondents in the course of this litigation. Compl. at 1. The separate rate has been at issue, whether directly or indirectly, throughout. Movants had notice of the substantive issues raised because they were full participants in the administrative proceedings below.
As Movants state, the "impetus behind [their] Motion" is the sudden "viable possibility" for "the separate rate companies to achieve a zero rate." Mot. to Intervene at 2. This suggests not so much good cause, as strategic timing, "a conscious decision not to intervene timely." See Siam Food Products Pub. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 22 CIT 826, 830, 24 F.Supp.2d 276, 280 (1998). Allowing such opportunistic intervention would "render the actual time limit [of USCIT Rule 24(a)(3)] superfluous." Id., 22 CIT at 830, 24 F.Supp.2d at 281.9 Accordingly, Movants have not established good cause sufficient to excuse their delay. Cf. Geum Poong Corp. v. United States, 26 CIT 908, 909, 217 F.Supp.2d 1342, 1343-44 (2002) (finding that a party cannot intervene two years late without good cause "because the litigation is now leaning its way").
CONCLUSION
Because Movants have failed to show good cause for their delay in filing, their motion to intervene as Plaintiff-Intervenors is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
