EATON, Judge:
This matter is before the court on the cross-motions for summary judgment of plaintiff, the United States ("plaintiff" or the "United States"), on behalf of the United States Customs and Border Protection Agency ("Customs"), and defendant American Home Assurance Company ("defendant" or "AHAC"). See Pl.'s Cross Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF Dkt. No. 41-1); Def. American Home Assurance Company's Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF Dkt. No. 44) ("Def.'s Br."). In this action, the United States seeks to recover on a continuous transaction bond, issued by AHAC to secure unpaid duties and interest on freshwater crawfish tail meat imported into the United States from the People's Republic of China ("PRC"). The United States claims that AHAC is liable to Customs for: (1) unpaid antidumping duties; (2) statutory prejudgment interest pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 580, in excess of the bond amount; (3) post-liquidation interest under 19 U.S.C. § 1505(d) for non-payment of the duties; (4) equitable prejudgment interest; and (5) post-judgment interest.
For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted in part, and plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment is granted in part.
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." USCIT R. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "When both parties move for summary judgment, the court must evaluate each motion on its own merits, resolving all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration." JVC Co. of Am. v. United States, 234 F.3d 1348, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2000).
The facts described below have been taken from defendant's statement of undisputed material facts.
"Importers must generally post security before [Customs] will release imported merchandise from its custody. Importers often use surety companies to post the required security." United States v. Am. Home Assurance Co. (AHAC II), 38 CIT ___, ___, 964 F.Supp.2d 1342, 1345 (2014) (citation omitted), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 789 F.3d 1313 (Fed.Cir.2015); see 19 C.F.R. § 142.4(a) (2001). "A surety bond creates a three-party relationship, in which the surety becomes liable for the principal's debt or duty to the third party obligee (here, the government). `If the surety fails to perform, the Government can sue it on the bonds.'" Ins. Co. of W. v. United States, 243 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir.2001) (quoting Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed.Cir. 1985)).
In January 2001, AHAC, a company authorized to issue surety bonds, entered into a continuous transaction bond
Between June and August 2001, Grand Nova made twenty-three entries that were subject to the antidumping duty order on freshwater crawfish tail meat from the PRC. Def.'s Statement ¶¶ 1, 2; Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat From the PRC, 62 Fed.Reg. 48,218 (Dep't of Commerce Sept. 15, 1997) (notice of amendment to final determination of sales at less than fair
On April 21, 2003, the Department published the final results of its administrative review of the antidumping duty order on freshwater crawfish tail meat for the period of review September 1, 2000 through August 31, 2001, in which it assigned both exporters, Qingdao Zhengri and Yancheng Yaou, the PRC-wide rate of 223.01%. See Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat from the PRC, 68 Fed.Reg. 19,504, 19,508 (Dep't of Commerce Apr. 21, 2003) (notice of final results of antidumping duty administrative review) ("Final Results").
On May 21, 2003, Qingdao Zhengri, Yancheng Yaou, and a third exporter, China Kingdom Import & Export Co., Ltd. ("China Kingdom"), whose merchandise was subject to the Final Results, brought suit in this Court, challenging the rates they were assigned by Commerce. See China Kingdom Imp. & Exp. Co. v. United States (China Kingdom I), 31 CIT 1329, 1330, 507 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1340 (2007). On July 1, 2003, the China Kingdom Court entered an injunction against liquidation of subject merchandise, including merchandise with duties covered by AHAC's bond. See Prelim. Inj. to Enjoin the Liquidation of Certain Entries, China Kingdom Imp. & Exp. Co. v. United States, No. 03-00302 (CIT July 1, 2003) ECF Dkt. No. 8 ("China Kingdom Prelim. Inj."). On September 4, 2007, the Court sustained the PRC-wide rate of 223.01% assigned to Qingdao Zhengri and Yancheng Yaou in the Final Results. See China Kingdom, 31 CIT at 1366, 507 F.Supp.2d at 1370-71. The Court also remanded to Commerce China Kingdom's rate, directing the Department to calculate and assign a new antidumping duty rate for that company. See id. at 1366, 507 F.Supp.2d at 1370-71.
On January 23, 2009, following the entry of judgment in China Kingdom, Customs liquidated Yancheng Yaou's entry of freshwater crawfish tail meat, and on April 3, 2009, Customs liquidated the other twenty-two entries exported by Qingdao Zhengri. See Def.'s Statement ¶¶ 13, 14. Neither the importer nor AHAC protested the liquidation of the twenty-three entries.
After the importer, Grand Nova, defaulted on payment of the antidumping duties owed on each entry, Customs mailed its first demand to AHAC in April 2009, seeking payment under the bond for the entry of Yancheng Yaou's merchandise. See Compl. Ex. C. In July 2009, Customs also sent AHAC its first demand on the bond for payment of unpaid duties and accrued interest for the twenty-two entries made by Grand Nova of Qingdao Zhengri's merchandise. See Compl. Ex. D. Each month
In June and July 2002, Grand Nova also entered freshwater crawfish tail meat into the United States that was exported by a new shipper,
In June 2004, Customs liquidated Shouzhou Huaxiang's June 2002 entry. Def.'s Statement ¶ 21. Lincoln General timely protested Customs' liquidation of the June entry of Shouzhou Huaxiang's merchandise, and Customs denied Lincoln General's protest on November 8, 2005. Def.'s Statement ¶ 22. AHAC, however, did not file a protest of its own. In January 2006, Customs reliquidated the June entry. Def.'s Statement ¶ 23. In March 2010, following Grand Nova's default in payment of the antidumping duties owed, Customs sent its first demand for payment on the June entry to AHAC, which included post-liquidation interest under 19 U.S.C. § 1505(d). Def.'s Statement ¶ 25. Each month thereafter, Customs sought payment from AHAC on the bond in addition to interest that had accrued.
As to the July entry, it was liquidated in June 2004. Def.'s Statement ¶ 21. AHAC timely protested Customs' liquidation, which Customs denied on June 27, 2005. Def.'s Statement ¶ 28. Thereafter, Customs reliquidated the July entry. Def.'s Statement ¶ 29. AHAC protested Customs' reliquidation in December 2005, which Customs denied shortly thereafter on December 27, 2005. Def.'s Statement ¶ 30. AHAC did not challenge the denial of either protest in this court. In October 2005, after the importer's default on the antidumping duties owed, Customs made its first demand on AHAC for payment on the July entry. Compl. Ex. H. Customs continued to make monthly demands for the unpaid amount plus accrued interest. See Compl. Ex. H.
As noted, in May 2003, three exporters, Qingdao Zhengri, Yancheng Yaou, and China Kingdom, whose merchandise was subject to the Final Results and assigned the PRC-wide antidumping duty rate, challenged Commerce's determination in this Court. These companies immediately sought and were granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining Customs from liquidating their merchandise. See China Kingdom Prelim. Inj. The preliminary injunction provided that it would dissolve by
No appeal of the China Kingdom II judgment was taken to the Federal Circuit. The Department published its Amended Final Results in the Federal Register on December 8, 2008, stating that it "w[ould] instruct [Customs] to liquidate entries of freshwater crawfish tail meat from the [PRC] during the review period at the assessment rate the Department calculated for the final results of review as amended," and that it "intend[ed] to issue assessment instructions to [Customs] 15 days after the date of publication of these amended final results of review." See Crawfish Tail Meat from the PRC, 73 Fed.Reg. 74,457, 74,458 (amended final results of the administrative review pursuant to final court decision) ("Amended Final Results"). Following publication of the Amended Final Results, Customs liquidated Yancheng Yaou's entry of freshwater crawfish tail meat on January 23, 2009, and liquidated Qingdao Zhengri's twentytwo remaining entries on April 3, 2009. See Def.'s Statement ¶¶ 13-14.
This history notwithstanding, AHAC contends the entries imported by Grand Nova that were exported by Qingdao Zhengri and Yancheng Yaou, were deemed liquidated by operation of law on May 3, 2008 at the duty rates declared by Grand Nova at entry. Def.'s Br. 11. AHAC insists that this is the case because Customs failed to liquidate the entries within six months of the expiration of the period during which an appeal from the September 4, 2007 Opinion and Order could have been taken to the Federal Circuit (i.e., on November 3, 2007). Def.'s Br. 10-11, 15-16 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d)). Defendant maintains that, because the China Kingdom Court's September 4, 2007 Opinion and Order sustained the rates assigned to Qingdao Zhengri and Yancheng Yaou in the Final Results, this constituted a "judgment" with respect to the two companies' entries, thus triggering the commencement of their appeal time to the Federal Circuit of sixty days. See Def.'s Br. 10-11. For AHAC, upon the expiration of the time to appeal this supposed "judgment," the six-month period during which Customs must liquidate their entries commenced. In other words, according to AHAC, because Customs did not liquidate their entries during this six-month period, they were deemed liquidated by operation of law pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d).
The court finds defendant's claim to be meritless and holds that Customs' liquidation of Grand Nova's entries exported by Qingdao Zhengri and Yancheng Yaou was timely.
Pursuant to statute, following the removal of a statutory suspension of liquidation or court-ordered injunction, Customs must liquidate any entries whose liquidation
The injunction entered in China Kingdom on July 1, 2003 provided that the liquidation of all of the entries at issue was halted until "the final court decision in this action before the United States Court of International Trade." See China Kingdom Prelim. Inj. 2. The Federal Circuit has found that, when this language appears in an injunction against liquidation, the injunction dissolves following the expiration of the parties' time to file an appeal of the final court decision. See Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1377-79. Thus, the China Kingdom injunction expired by its terms on November 11, 2008 (i.e., sixty days after September 12, 2008), following the expiration of the parties' time to file an appeal of the China Kingdom Court's final judgment to the Federal Circuit. In other words, it was the judgment in the China Kingdom case, not entry of the Opinion and Order that terminated the injunction.
Although the September 4, 2007 Opinion and Order sustained the rates assigned by Commerce in the Final Results to two of the companies (Qingdao Zhengri and Yancheng Yaou), it remanded the third exporter's rate (China Kingdom) to Commerce to be recalculated. See China Kingdom I, 31 CIT at 1366, 507 F.Supp.2d at 1369-70. The China Kingdom Court did not enter final judgment when it issued the Opinion and Order, and it issued no other order ending the injunction against liquidation of the companies' entries. Rather, the final judgment was entered on September 12, 2008, following the Court's review of the Department's results of redetermination. See China Kingdom II, 32 CIT at 994. Therefore, despite defendant's insistence that, for Qingdao Zhengri and Yancheng Yaou's entries covered by the AHAC bond, the injunction expired on November 3, 2007 (i.e., the claimed date of expiration of the period during which a party could take an appeal to the Federal Circuit of the China Kingdom I decision), the court finds that, because there was no "final court decision" with respect to the "action" contesting the Final Results until judgment was entered on September 12, 2008, the injunction did not dissolve by its own terms. That is, the China Kingdom I Opinion and Order did not end the injunction. Thus, the first requirement of § 1504(d) for deemed liquidation (i.e., "the suspension [or injunction] of liquidation that was in place must have been removed") was not met when the Opinion and Order was entered. See Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1376.
Moreover, for a deemed liquidation to occur under § 1504(d), Customs must receive notice of the lifting of a suspension or injunction. No such notice was given with respect to the China Kingdom I opinion. Indeed, the notice required by § 1504(d) was not published in the Federal Register until December 8, 2008. See Amended Final Results, 73 Fed.Reg. at 74,458. This notice, although not published within the
As previously noted, AHAC entered into a continuous transaction bond with Grand Nova to secure the duties on Grand Nova's entered merchandise. In addition to the AHAC continuous transaction bond, Grand Nova also posted single transaction bonds issued by Lincoln General, a surety unrelated to AHAC, for each of the June and July 2002 entries that were exported by Shouzhou Huaxiang. See Def.'s Statement Exs. A, B. Following Grand Nova's default, Customs sought payment from AHAC on the continuous transaction bond, rather than first seeking to recover the duties from the single transaction bond surety, Lincoln General. See Def.'s Statement ¶ 27.
AHAC maintains that it is not liable for the antidumping duties owed for several reasons. First, it argues that a continuous transaction bond cannot be used to secure antidumping duties in excess of 5% ad valorem of the merchandise. Def.'s Br. 17 (citing Antidumping or Countervailing Duties; Acceptance of Cash Deposits; Bonds, or Other Security to Obtain Release of Merchandise; Revision of T.D. 82-56, 19 Cust. Bull. & Decisions 331, 332 (1985) ("Treasury Decision 85-145")). That is, under AHAC's reading of Treasury Decision 85-145, because the bond it issued was a continuous transaction bond, and the amount of antidumping duties owed exceeded 5% of the value of
It is clear that AHAC's reliance on Treasury Decision 85-145 is misplaced. The text of the Decision, which is a memorandum of agreement between the Department and Customs concerning acceptable security for release of merchandise subject to antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings, reads, in relevant part:
Treasury Decision 85-145, at 332. According to AHAC, Treasury Decision 85-145(3) precludes it from being held fully liable for the antidumping duties owed on the continuous transaction bond because a continuous transaction bond cannot be used to secure such duties above 5% ad valorem of the entries. Def.'s Br. 17. The Treasury Decision, however, speaks only to the relationship between Customs and Commerce, and is silent as to AHAC's contractual obligations under the bond. The agreement between Customs and Commerce provides only that, where the estimated antidumping duties are less than 5% ad valorem, a continuous transaction bond may be accepted by Customs to secure the antidumping duties owed on the entry. There is, however, nothing in the Decision that limits the liability under the bond to 5%, or that indicates Customs is prohibited from recovering antidumping duties in excess of 5% ad valorem on a continuous transaction bond.
Next, AHAC claims that it "bonded general entry requirements while Lincoln [General
Relatedly, AHAC claims that plaintiff's failure to collect on the single transaction bonds "against Lincoln General has resulted in changed circumstances and prejudice to AHAC." Def.'s Br. 19 (citing Lyell Theatre Corp. v. Loews Corp., 682 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir.1982)). According to AHAC, this "failure to collect against the Lincoln General single transaction bonds has not only increased AHAC's liability, but also impaired any collateral to which [the] surety could look for reimbursement.". Def.'s Br. 19.
The court finds that plaintiff was permitted to seek recovery against AHAC without first demanding payment from Lincoln General, and that AHAC's contention, that under the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty, as the general obligor, it is relieved of liability until Customs seeks payment from Lincoln General, the specific obligor, is unavailing.
The Restatement reads, in relevant part,
Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty § 53(1), (4)(c).
Relying on this language, AHAC appears to argue: (1) Lincoln General's bond was to secure antidumping duties, while AHAC's bond was to secure regular duties, or as it stated in its protest, "Lincoln [General] undertook the specific obligation to Customs to secure the antidumping duties in this matter whereas [AHAC] undertook the general/broader obligation to secure any other issues that might arise ([e.g.], FDA, Redelivery, etc.)"; and (2) because Lincoln General's bonds covered only specific entries while AHAC's bonds had the potential to cover many entries, Lincoln General's obligations were specific while AHAC's were general. Def.'s Br. Ex. F, at 5.
Contrary to defendant's assertion, however, there is nothing to suggest that Lincoln General undertook obligations more
See Def.'s Statement Exs. A, B. The "condition referenced" is "Importer or Broker... 113.62," which provides, among other things, for the joint and several liability of the principal and surety for "any duties, taxes, and charges imposed." See 19 C.F.R. § 113.62(a); Def.'s Br. Exs. A, B.
As to AHAC's specificity arguments, first, there is nothing in the record to indicate that both Lincoln General's and AHAC's bonds did not provide security for antidumping duties, nor is there anything that would indicate that Lincoln General's understanding of, or obligation with respect to, the word "duties" differed from that of AHAC. The Federal Circuit recently indicated the word "duties," unless there is some indication to the contrary, means that these bonds secure the payment of antidumping duties as well as regular duties. See United States v. Am. Home Assurance Co. (AHAC III), 789 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed.Cir.2015) ("As written, the term `duties' does not modify the type of `bonds' on which interest shall be allowed. Instead, the statute calls for interest on `all bonds.' The term `duties' reflects only the requisite res litigiosae — i.e., the general nature of the disputed property in the government's legal action against the surety. Thus, by the statute's plain terms, it covers, among other things, bonds securing the payment of antidumping duties when the government sues for payment under those bonds.").
As to the bonds themselves, their wording is identical. Both sureties were therefore equally liable with respect to each entry for the payment of duties. That AHAC's continuous transaction bond might make it liable for duties charged on entries made before or after those secured by Lincoln General's single transaction bonds, did not render its obligations as to the subject entries more general than Lincoln General's. That is, for the transactions that each surety insured, their obligations were identical, and AHAC's situation of being liable on other transactions does not make its obligations with respect to the individual transactions at issue less specific. Therefore, there is nothing in the bonds themselves or in the law that surrounds them indicating that Lincoln General's obligations were somehow more specific than AHAC's.
Finally, for the reasons discussed above, Customs was not required to seek payment from Lincoln General before approaching AHAC. Accordingly, defendant's claims of changed circumstances and prejudice as a result of the failure on the part of Customs to first make a demand for payment on Lincoln General are equally unconvincing.
In this collection action, the United States seeks an award of statutory prejudgment interest under 19 U.S.C. § 580, which provides that, "[u]pon all bonds, on which suits are brought for the recovery of duties, interest shall be allowed, at the rate of 6 per centum a year, from the time when said bonds became due." See 19 U.S.C. § 580; Pl.'s Br. 22. AHAC disputes liability for § 580 interest and claims
This question, however, was recently settled by the Federal Circuit in AHAC III. There, the Federal Circuit held "that 19 U.S.C. § 580 provides for interest on bonds securing both traditional customs duties and antidumping duties," and thus "that the government is entitled to statutory prejudgment interest under § 580." AHAC III, 789 F.3d at 1324, 1328. In reaching its holding, the Federal Circuit examined the plain language of § 580 and found the statute to be "short, free-standing... within the Administrative Provisions section of Chapter 3 in Title 19," and that "[i]t d[id] not cross-reference other statutory provisions." See id. at 1325. The Court further found the language of the statute "`all bonds' on which the government sues for `the recovery of duties' is clear and unqualified." Id. Because "the term `duties' d[id] not modify the type of `bonds' on which interest shall be allowed," but rather "the statute call[ed] for interest on `all bonds,'" the Court found that "by the statute's plain terms, it cover[ed], among other things, bonds securing the payment of antidumping duties when the government sues for payment under those bonds." Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 580).
In accordance with the Federal Circuit's construction of 19 U.S.C. § 580, the court holds that AHAC is liable for § 580 interest on the delayed payment of the antidumping duties owed under the bond.
In addition to the antidumping duties themselves and other interest, the United States seeks post-liquidation interest under the provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1505(d)
As to this defense, however, the United States maintains that "these charges [(i.e., post-liquidation interest)] became `final and conclusive' by operation of 19 U.S.C. § 1514" when AHAC failed to either protest Customs' liquidations or challenge the denial of its protests in this Court. See Pl.'s Br. 18. As a result, for plaintiff, AHAC may not raise its defense here.
As an initial matter, defendant is not foreclosed in this action on a bond, from arguing, as a defense, that § 1505(d) interest does not apply to antidumping duties. See United States v. Toshoku Am., Inc., 879 F.2d 815, 817-18 (Fed.Cir.1989) (explaining that even after liquidation, "[p]roof that the importer has complied with the conditions of the bond has traditionally been and still remains a complete defense to a collection suit brought on the
A surety, of course, may protest the liquidation of merchandise on which it undertakes to secure the payment of duties. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). In doing so, however, the surety largely stands in the shoes of the importer and may raise arguments that the importer could make, such as how much the importer owes upon liquidation of the entries. If the protest is denied with respect to these matters (e.g., amount of duties owed by importer, classification, country of origin, drawback, etc.), the surety must appeal to this Court or be bound by the rule of finality as to the liquidation itself. See Utex, 857 F.2d at 1413-14. Thus, if the Court were being asked whether the importer owed § 1505(d) interest, it would be bound by the rule of finality.
As to defenses to claims for damages relating to its contractual obligations to pay under the bond, however, a surety is not precluded from raising defenses in a collection action because it failed to protest or, because its protest was denied, and it failed to appeal to this Court.
Moreover, the Utex rule is a sensible one, as it would be a strange situation indeed if the unreasoned determination
Despite AHAC's ability to raise such defenses, its arguments are unavailing. AHAC contends that 19 U.S.C. § 1505(d) does not apply to antidumping duties, but rather only to ordinary customs duties, and thus is inapplicable to plaintiff's collection action. For its part, the United States insists that post-liquidation interest is owed equally on regular customs duties and antidumping duties. The subsection at issue, 19 U.S.C. § 1505(d) provides:
19 U.S.C. § 1505(d).
As noted, in AHAC III, the Federal Circuit recently construed a different statute, 19 U.S.C. § 580, which provides "[u]pon all bonds, on which suits are brought for the recovery of duties, interest shall be allowed, at the rate of 6 per centum a year, from the time when said bonds became due," and found that this provision covered antidumping duties. See 19 U.S.C. § 580; AHAC III, 789 F.3d at 1324-25 ("Thus, by the statute's plain terms, it covers, among other things, bonds securing the payment of antidumping duties when the government sues for payment under those bonds." (citing Camargo Correa Metais, S.A. v. United States, 200 F.3d 771, 773 (Fed.Cir.1999) ("If the words are unambiguous, no further inquiry is usually required."))). The
As in 19 U.S.C. § 580,
In addition to payment of the 6% interest provided by 19 U.S.C. § 580, the United States also seeks to recover equitable prejudgment interest in excess of the face value of the bond. See Pl.'s Br. 31. Plaintiff insists that it is entitled to such interest "as compensation for the lost use of funds over time." Pl.'s Br. 31. AHAC, however, raises several defenses to liability for such interest.
First, AHAC contends that the funds at issue in this case are subject to the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000
The court finds this argument to be without merit. The antidumping duties on the bonds in this case, like any other case not subject to the Byrd Amendment, are owed to the United States, not to a fund established by the United States. That is, although the funds, once collected, may be placed in accounts for distribution to domestic producers in accordance with the Byrd Amendment, this does not alter the fact that the money is owed to the United States and, when paid, will be paid to the United States. See Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Suppl. Br. 5-6 (ECF Dkt. No. 80) ("[C]hecks issued for antidumping or countervailing duty bills are made payable to the Government, and these checks are not simply forwarded to [affected domestic producers] for them to deposit. Rather, after receiving the funds, the Government computes and distributes the `continued dumping and subsidy offset,' which is generally equivalent to the principal balance and section 1677g interest collected for relevant antidumping and countervailing duty entries. However, as discussed further below, the `continued dumping and subsidy offset' is only distributed if there are [affected domestic producers] who timely file certifications and have qualifying expenditures, which is not always the case."); see also Distribution of Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset to Affected Domestic Producers, 66 Fed.Reg. 48,546, 48,550 (Dep't of the Treasury Sept. 21, 2001) ("[F]unds in Government accounts[
Next, the court must determine whether, as a consequence of
Recently, the Federal Circuit in awarding the United States prejudgment statutory interest under 19 U.S.C. § 580, reaffirmed the longstanding principle that "`[i]n the absence of a statute governing the award of prejudgment interest, the question [of prejudgment interest] is governed by traditional judge-made principles.'" AHAC III, 789 F.3d at 1328 (alterations in original) (quoting Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 397 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2005)). Here, there is a statute, 19 U.S.C. § 580, that has been found to provide prejudgment interest to the United States for interest on bonds securing antidumping duties. See id. at 1324. Thus, where, as here, a statute governs the award of prejudgment interest (i.e., § 580), the Federal Circuit has explained that "the award of prejudgment interest [is] an equitable determination to be exercised at the discretion of the trial judge." Id. at 1328 (citing United States v. Reul, 959 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed.Cir. 1992); United States v. Imperial Food Imps., 834 F.2d 1013, 1016 (Fed.Cir.1987)).
Because the posture of this case is not "in the absence of a statute," the court holds that plaintiff is not entitled to an award of equitable prejudgment interest. The law is clear that the purpose of equitable interest is to ensure that the party be fully compensated for the time during which it was deprived of the use of the funds. Because the United States will be fully compensated by the statutory prejudgment interest it will receive by means of 19 U.S.C. § 580, here, the balance of equities tips in favor of AHAC and against an award of equitable prejudgment interest. In other words, it would be inequitable to award the United States both statutory prejudgment interest under § 580 and equitable prejudgment interest under the principles of equity. Indeed, as this Court recently observed in a similar case,
United States v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 39 CIT ___, ___, Slip Op. 15-112, at 6, 102 F.Supp.3d 1376, 1380, 2015 WL 5718685 (2015) (quoting United States v. Am. Home Assurance Co. (AHAC IV), 39 CIT ___, ___, Slip Op. 15-88, at 17, 100 F.Supp.3d 1364, 1373 (2015)).
Accordingly, in view of the court's holding that plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment statutory interest under 19 U.S.C. § 580, plaintiff may not also recover equitable prejudgment interest in this case.
Last, the United States seeks an award of post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, which provides that "[i]nterest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court." See Pl.'s Br. 34-35; 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). Although § 1961 does not apply directly to the Court of International Trade, the Federal Circuit has confirmed this Court's ability to award post-judgment interest at the rate provided in § 1961. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1585 provides that the Court of International Trade "posses[es] all the powers in law and equity of, or as conferred by statute upon, a district court of the United States." See United States v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 738 F.3d 1320, 1325-26 (Fed.Cir.2013); 28 U.S.C. § 1585.
AHAC does not object to plaintiff's claim that it is entitled to post-judgment interest, nor could it. "Post-judgment interest is not discretionary, but rather is available as a matter of right to prevailing parties." AHAC IV, 39 CIT at ___, Slip Op. 15-88, at 19, 100 F.Supp.3d at 1374. Hence, because plaintiff has prevailed in this matter by means of an award of a money judgment against defendant, plaintiff is entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate set forth in § 1961, calculated from the date of entry of the judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961; AHAC IV, 39 CIT at ___, Slip Op. 15-88, at 19, 100 F.Supp.3d at 1374.
Based on the foregoing, the court grants, in part, defendant's motion for summary judgment, and grants, in part, plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. The parties are directed to confer and provide the court with a proposed judgment by November 19, 2015.
19 U.S.C. § 1505(d).
AHAC III, 789 F.3d at 1327 (alteration in original) (citing Dynacraft, 24 CIT at 993, 118 F.Supp.2d at 1292).