A. BRUCE CAMPBELL, Bankruptcy Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the cross Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Robertson B. Cohen, Chapter 7 Trustee ("Trustee") and the Debtor/Defendant Marlene M. Moosman ("Debtor"). The Court, having reviewed the Motions, the Responses, and the file in this matter, and being otherwise advised in the premises, finds as follows.
This case requires the Court to interpret C.R.S. § 13-54-102(l)(I)(A), Colorado's exemption for the "cash surrender value" of life insurance policies. The issue central to the parties' motions for summary judgment is the statute's exclusion from the exemption of increases in "cash value" of a life insurance policy during the 48 months prior to bankruptcy. In the this case, the cash value of the Debtor's life insurance policy increased in the 48 months prior to her bankruptcy because of her premium payments. During this 48 month period however, Debtor cashed out some paid-up additions (PUA's) to her coverage which resulted from dividends. She also took loans out against the policy. The parties disagree as to the application of the exemption statute under these circumstances.
In this adversary proceeding, the Trustee sued the Debtor's insurance company, Prudential Insurance Company of America ("Prudential"), for turnover of the cash surrender value of the Debtor's life insurance policy. Debtor intervened, claiming that the cash surrender value was exempt. After the Trustee stipulated that the default entered against Prudential could be vacated, Prudential answered, stating that it is only a "stakeholder" with respect to the competing claims of the Trustee and the Debtor. Prudential requested the Court to "authorize] the appropriate disposition of any non-exempt value of the policy." Debtor and Trustee filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and Prudential filed a response agreeing that there are no material facts in dispute and stating that "it will abide by the Court's determination concerning the turnover of all or any part of the value of the policy."
The material undisputed facts are as follows:
Debtor filed a Chapter 7 case on August 31, 2010. [Case No. 10-32206, Docket #1]. She listed a Prudential "whole life policy" on her Schedule B of personal property with a value of $6,250.00. [Id.] On her Schedule C, Debtor claimed the policy as exempt, under C.R.S. § 13-54-102(l)(I)(A), in the amount of $6,250.00. [Id.].
On November 3, 2010, the Trustee objected to the exemption of the life insurance policy, also citing CRS § 13-54-102(l)(I)(A). [Case No. 10-32206 ABC, Docket #16]. The Trustee alleged that the "guaranteed cash value" of the policy increased from $4,395 to $6,250.20 in the 48 months prior to bankruptcy. The Trustee alleged that "the four (4) year cash value increase was $1855 and that amount is non-exempt." [Id.].
The Debtor did not respond to the Trustee's objection to her exemption, and on May 4, 2011, the Court entered an order
The Trustee then sued Prudential in this adversary proceeding for turnover of "the nonexempt increases in cash value from moneys contributed to the Policy during the 48 months prior to
According to interrogatory responses and documents produced by Prudential, the following table compares the value of Debtor's life insurance policy at the relevant times:
8/31/06 8/31/10 (petition. date) 48 month change +/- Tabular Cash Value2 $4,617.00 $6,495.75 $1,878.75(+) Termination Dividend $ 235.80 $ 361.50 125.70(+) Cash Value PUA's $2,988.43 $ 758.46 $2,229.97(-) Total Cash Surrender Value $7,841.23 $7,615.71 $ 225.52(-) Less: Outstanding Loans $ 0 $6,155.92 $6,155.92(+) Net Cash Surrender Value $7,841.23 $1,459.79 $6,381.44(-)
[Exhibits E and F to Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment].
According to Debtor's policy, "Tabular Cash Value" is the value of the policy "if all due premiums have been
In October, 2008 and in December, 2008, Debtor received checks totaling $4,000 from Prudential
The Trustee argues that the exemption statute, and Colorado case law interpreting it, In re Gedgaudas, 978 P.2d 677 (Colo. App.1999) ("Gedgaudas"), provide that there is an exclusion from the exemption of the cash surrender value of life insurance which is measured by the increase in cash value occasioned by contributions (i.e. premium payments) made by the Debtor during the 48 month period prior to bankruptcy. He asserts that, according to the policy definitions and Prudential's discovery responses, the number that reflects the effect of Debtor's contributions through premium payments is the policy's "Tabular Cash Value." The Trustee argues that it is undisputed that this "Tabular Cash Value" of Debtor's policy increased by $1,878.75 during the 48 months prior to Debtor's bankruptcy, therefore this amount of the policy's "Net Cash Surrender Value" is non-exempt pursuant to the statute. Since the "Net Cash Surrender Value" of the policy on the petition date was less than $1,878.75, the Trustee argues that the entire "Net Cash Surrender Value" of $1,459.79 is non-exempt.
The Debtor argues that the "Net Cash Surrender Value" of her policy decreased from $7,841.23 during the 48 months prior to bankruptcy to $1,459.79 on the date of bankruptcy. Thus, there is no non-exempt increase in value for the Trustee to recover. The Debtor does not address the Gedgaudas case, nor does she otherwise deal with the statute's use of "cash value" versus "cash surrender value."
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), which is made applicable to bankruptcy proceedings by Bankruptcy Rule 7056, provides that summary judgment should be rendered "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In this case, the parties agree that the material facts stated above are undisputed, and that this adversary proceeding is appropriately resolved on summary judgment.
(emphasis added).
The only reported case dealing specifically with the cash value exclusion from
The trial court in Gedgaudas had determined that the amount of cash subject to garnishment was computed by looking at cash surrender value. Under the facts of that case, in August 1996, the cash value of the debtor's life insurance was $18,158.16 with loans of $15,715.74, leaving a cash surrender value of $2,442.42. In November 1997, when the garnishment was served, the cash value was $20,539.12 and loans were $15,364.95, leaving a cash surrender value of $5,174.17. The trial court ruled that the difference between $5,174.17 and $2,442.42, or $2,731.75, was the non-exempt amount. Id. at 682.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court incorrectly determined the amount subject to garnishment, noting that, "The exclusion from the exemption, which is measured by the incremental increases in `cash value' occasioned by the making of contributions to the policy, i.e., payment of premiums, during the preceding twenty-four months, is the only garnishable or attachable asset." Id. The Court concluded that, "The amount of the garnishable cash surrender value has not been ascertained in this case." Id.
This Court agrees with the reasoning and holding of the Gedgaudas case. That is, that the language of C.R.S. § 13-54-102(l)(I)(A) prescribes different measures for the exemption and the exclusion from the exemption. It is incorrect to measure the exclusion from the exemption by changes in cash surrender value. Debtor's argument that she is entitled to summary judgment because the "Net Cash Surrender Value" of her policy declined in the 48 months prior to her bankruptcy is contrary to the language of the statute and to the holding in Gedgaudas.
The statute's exclusion for money contributed to a life insurance policy during the 48 months prior to bankruptcy reflects a balancing of the purpose of the exemption, "to encourage individuals to insure their lives for the benefit of their families," Gedgaudas, 978 P.2d at 680, against a policy of preventing abusive pre-bankruptcy planning through converting non-exempt cash into exempt cash surrender value. The concern over the conversion of non-exempt to exempt property is especially justified in the case of life insurance because it is relatively easy to "reconvert" the exempt cash surrender value to cash after a bankruptcy is
The exclusion from the exemption clearly focuses only on "increases in value" occasioned by contributions to a policy during the 48 month period. Thus, the statute preserves the right of individuals to insure their lives for the benefit of their families while preventing individuals from creating what is, in essence, an exempt savings account, by contributing cash to their life insurance policies during the four year period prior to bankruptcy or the exercise of judgment collection remedies. Had the legislature also wanted to consider withdrawals of cash value when determining the exclusion from the exemption, it could easily have so provided, or it could have used a term such as "net" cash value when defining the exclusion from the exemption. It did not. In Gedgaudas, the debtor effectively withdrew the cash value increases in his policies by borrowing against them. The Colorado Court of Appeals held that this decrease in the cash available to the debtor upon his surrender of the policy did not effect the computation of the "increase in cash value" for purposes of the exclusion from the exemption. Given the explicit language of the statute and the Colorado Court of Appeals' construction of the statute in Gedgaudas, the Court believes it is also inappropriate, absent an amendment to the statute, to consider a direct withdrawal of cash when computing the exclusion amount. Accordingly, if on the date of bankruptcy a debtor's life insurance policy has a cash surrender value equal to or less than the amount her contributions during the prior four years have increased the cash value of the policy, the entire cash surrender value is non-exempt.
Based on the undisputed facts set forth above, the cash value of Debtor's policy increased $1,878.75 from Debtor's own contributions (through premium payments) to the policy.
Based on the foregoing it is
ORDERED that the Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Debtor's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that judgment will be enter in favor of the Trustee and against the Debtor and Prudential, declaring the entire cash surrender value of Debtor's life insurance policy on the date of the bankruptcy is non-exempt, and ordering Prudential to turn over the sum of $1,459.79 to the Trustee within 14 days from the date of this Order.