Joseph G. Rosania, Jr., United States Bankruptcy Judge.
This case presents this Court with its first occasion to weigh in on the recent trend of lenders objecting to discharge at the conclusion of a Chapter 13 case because a debtor has failed to make post-petition mortgage payments. After a status conference, the Court asked the parties to brief the issue so it may consider the most recent decisions from other divisions of this Court in rendering its decision. The parties have submitted their briefs, and being advised, the Court is ready to rule.
The Debtor filed for relief under Chapter 13 on December 2, 2010, and her Chapter 13 Plan was confirmed on September 13, 2011. The Plan provided for payments to be made directly to the Chapter 13 Trustee ("Trustee") over a period of 60 months, and contained the following language in Section IV B:
The Plan payments included the cure of a $1,401 pre-prepetition default to Debtor's
Debtor's mortgage debt to Chase was assigned to Carrington Mortgage Services ("Carrington") in April 2014. Trustee issued a Notice of Final Cure Mortgage Payment pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. 3002-1(f) on March 21, 2016 (docket #144), indicating Debtor had paid the entire pre-petition default on her mortgage through the Plan. Carrington filed its response to the Notice of Final Cure, asserting Debtor still owed $29,055.97 in post-petition payments. In the response, Carrington also noted "[t]he Debtor is in the process of completing a Loan Modification. If the Loan Modification process is completed and approved the Debtors will then be current with mortgage payments." (docket entry dated April 11, 2016).
A month later, the Trustee filed a motion to dismiss under 11 U.S.C. § 1307
Debtor filed a response, indicating she had entered into a loan modification with Carrington, and that as of July 2016, she had made all required payments and "a modified loan is in underwriting." Further, Debtor stated "Carrington agrees that, once modified, [Debtor] will be current with her mortgage and there will be no default." (Docket #151).
On September 27, 2016, Debtor filed her Certification to Obtain Discharge under § 1328 indicating she had completed all payments and obligations required by her Chapter 13 Plan. The Court set a hearing on the Trustee's Motion to Dismiss, Debtor's Response, and Debtor's Certification to Obtain Discharge. After the hearing, held on October 6, 2016, the Court ordered the parties to submit briefing on whether Debtor had made all payments under the Plan and was entitled to discharge.
In her brief, Debtor recognizes other divisions of this Court have ruled that post-petition mortgage payments are considered "payments under the plan" when determining whether a debtor is qualified for discharge under § 1328(a).
In this case, Debtor explains that in 2015, her income dropped to about half what it had been when her Chapter 13 Plan was confirmed. She approached Carrington about modifying her home loan so that she could stay current on payments with a reduced income, and Carrington agreed. Consistent with her instructions from Carrington, Debtor did not make
The Trustee concedes "a loan modification may cure deficiencies in post-petition mortgage payments under some circumstances." Trustee, however, cites In re Strimbu, 10-19146-MER (March 31, 2016), where the Court held that a loan modification itself does not necessarily mitigate a material default. Trustee contends that, because Debtor did not take steps to address the default until month 60 of her plan, and did not complete the mortgage modification until month 70, Debtor's case should be dismissed without a discharge.
In their briefs, the parties cite eight cases from other divisions of this Court, which this Court has thoroughly reviewed.
Most recently, in In re Payer, No. 10-33656 HRT, 2016 WL 5390116 (Bkrtcy. D.Colo. May 5, 2016), the Court initially denied debtors' discharge because they had failed to make eight post-petition payments, "leaving over $10,000 that the debtors had committed to use for making ongoing mortgage payments unaccounted for." (Docket #76, case 10-33656). While debtors argued they were in the process of obtaining a loan modification, the Court observed it would be at least three months before the modification was approved. Importantly, however, Judge Tallman noted as follows:
Nevertheless, the Court reasoned it was not likely debtors could cure a $10,000 deficiency within a reasonable time, and gave the debtors 30 days to file a motion to convert to chapter 7, failing which the case would be dismissed.
Instead, the debtors filed a motion to reconsider the order, indicating they were "devastated" by the Court's ruling, because they had actually continued to make payments to the lender while applying for the loan modification, and were only behind by three mortgage payments. Further, debtors stated:
On reconsideration, Judge Tallman vacated the prior order and entered debtors' discharge, finding "the debtors have fully complied with the terms of their confirmed plan." (Docket #89, case #10-33656).
After thoroughly reviewing these cases, the Court determines the instant case is most like the situations presented in Cherry and Payer. Here, on October 24, 2016, Carrington filed a "Supplemental Statement in Response to Notice of Final Cure Payment" stating: "Debtors' Loan Modification has been finalized. Creditor agrees that the Debtor is otherwise current on all payments consistent with § 1322(b)(5)." (Claims register, POC #21, doc filed October 24, 2016).
As in the Cherry and Payer cases, it would be inequitable to deny discharge in this unique situation. Unlike the debtors in the Strimbu case, Debtor regularly paid her mortgage for four years of her plan, and then acted promptly to modify the mortgage as soon as her income dropped. Even if this Court believed that Debtor's temporary inability to make payments to Carrington as they worked out a modification was a default, it was not material under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6). See, e.g., In re Sanchez, 2016 WL 6127507 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. October 20, 2016) (holding a failure to timely turn over tax returns was a default, but not a material default). Any default was technical and temporary, and has since been cured to the lender's satisfaction.
The Court also agrees with Debtor that the provisions of 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322 and 1325 permit "preferred treatment" for some creditors. In re Binder, 224 B.R. 483, 490 (Bankr.D.Colo. 1998). Specifically, for a creditor holding "long-term debt secured only by a lien against the debtor's residence" the debtor is allowed to "cure arrearages over a reasonable period of time" so long as they keep current with regard to other obligations. Id.
Further, "although sections 1322 and 1325 prohibit a debtor and a bankruptcy court from knowingly ... extending a plan that extends beyond five years ... these sections of the Bankruptcy Code do not mandate dismissal of a bankruptcy case if a debtor needs a reasonable period of time to cure an unanticipated arrearage incurred during the sixty-month period." In re Handy, 557 B.R. 625, 628 (Bankr.
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that the Trustee's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. The Clerk shall enter the Debtor's discharge and close the case.