MILLER, Senior District Judge.
This matter is before me on the Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Wage Claim Act and Contract Claims Based on Commission and Separation Pay Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Docket No. 8) filed by Defendant International Business Machines Corporation ("IBM"). Plaintiff opposes the motion. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, Plaintiff's only other claim, for bonus payments, has been dismissed. ECF No. 29. After a review of the pleadings and the parties' written arguments, I conclude oral argument is not required. For the reasons that follow, the partial motion to dismiss will be granted.
According to the Plaintiff's Complaint
IBM moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for commissions and separation pay. Jurisdiction in this court is based on diversity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
A complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and construe all reasonable allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. United States v. Colorado Supreme Court, 87 F.3d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir.1996).
IBM seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's contract claim for commission payments on the grounds that the commission plan did
Ex. A to Partial Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 8-2) (emphasis added).
IBM argues that the Quota Letter expressly precludes the formation of a contract and prevents the creation of enforceable promises with respect to amounts to be paid under the commission plan. Plaintiff's plan ended on June 30, 2007 and, therefore, amounts were not earned until September 30, 2007.
In response, Plaintiff offers extrinsic evidence to argue that IBM did not adjust or modify the plan as a plan, i.e., by changing quotas or target incentives, but rather simply notified Plaintiff that he would not receive any further commissions for the quarter ending June 30. Plaintiff further argues that reserving the right to adjust plan terms does not mean that IBM can adjust an employee's payment. Plaintiff contends that, at a minimum, "there is an ambiguity as to what rights the contract provided." Response Brief (Docket No. 11) at 7. With respect to the disclaimer language, Plaintiff argues that "when understood in context, IBM states that the particular commission rates identified in a plan do not constitute a promise to make payment under that rate," in other words, that the language expressly excluding the formation of a contract applies only to the commission rates. Response Brief at 8-9. He also appears to contend that because IBM did not expressly inform him that it was relying on the "Significant Transactions" clause of the Quota Letter, it did not have the right to adjust his final commission payment. Finally, Plaintiff advances an alternative theory based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
I first address the extrinsic evidence submitted by Plaintiff. I have discretion to accept this evidence and convert the motion to a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ("If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56."). If the motion is so converted, all parties "must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Id. I conclude that the issue of whether IBM's commission plan contained a contractual promise to pay incentive amounts can be determined as a matter of law in these circumstances and Plaintiff's evidence does not alter my analysis. Accordingly, I will exclude Plaintiff's proffered evidence and consider the issue under the standards of Rule 12(b)(6).
A party attempting to recover for breach of contract must prove: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff or some justification for nonperformance; (3) failure to perform the contract by the defendant; and (4) resulting damages. W. Distrib. Co. v. Diodosio, 841 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Colo.1992). "Contractual obligations arise from promises made between parties and are enforced to protect the expectancy interests created by those promises." City of Westminster v. Centric-Jones Constructors, 100 P.3d 472, 483 (Colo.App.2003) (citing Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1264 (Colo.2000)).
Examining the language of the Quota Letter as a whole, I conclude that Plaintiff does not have an enforceable contract with respect to the commission payment he claims. The conspicuous disclaimer negates the existence of a contract. In addition, IBM reserved the right to change both the terms of the incentive plan and to make adjustments to individual payments based on any number of factors, including disproportionality, errors, and lack of payment. Indeed, the disclaimer expressly provides that IBM does not promise to make any distributions under the plan and reserves the right to cancel the plan even after sales have closed. Interim payments are categorized as "advances" pending final determination of commission amounts, which could thereafter be reclaimed or deducted from future commissions. Because IBM reserved to itself discretion to adjust or cancel the amounts until payment has been earned (September 30, 2007) under the terms of the Plan,
Although it applied Virginia law, the Fourth Circuit in Jensen applied similar reasoning in concluding that IBM had not made an enforceable promise to pay commissions under a similar software sales incentive program. 454 F.3d at 385. The plaintiff in Jensen had a quota letter that contained the following disclaimer: "[T]his program does not constitute a promise by IBM to make any distributions under it. IBM reserves the right to adjust the program terms or to cancel or otherwise modify the program at any time during the program period, or up until actual payment has been made under the program." Id. The Jensen court held: "By this language, IBM did not invite a bargain or manifest a `willingness to enter into a bargain.' To the contrary, it manifested its clear intent to preclude the formation of a contract." 454 F.3d at 388. In particular, the court relied on the fact that the plaintiff was informed he could not rely on the intended commissions until actual payment was made, that IBM could modify or even cancel the program at any time before commissions were paid, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to any payment in advance of his actual receipt of the payment. Id. "Thus, IBM made clear that
As Plaintiff concedes, if he is not entitled to the commissions under contract, then his Wage Claim Act claim also fails. Therefore, both claims will be dismissed.
Plaintiff's claim for separation pay is similarly based on a separation pay program or plan issued by IBM. The separation pay plan has been provided. See Ex. D to Partial Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 8-5). Its terms are not in dispute. A condition of receiving separation pay is that an employee must sign a release of claims. Id. at 11 ("In order to receive any payments or other benefits under the IBM Individual Separation Allowance Plan, an employee must sign the General Release (Release) and other forms relating to his/ her separation."). Plaintiff's complaint does not allege that he ever accepted the offer of separation pay and indeed in his response brief he appears to concede that he did not sign the release. Response Brief at 12 ("When IBM released Mr. Geras, it said nothing about its intent regarding separation pay except it would not make this payment unless Mr. Geras signed a release."). Plaintiff offers no argument to rebut IBM's showing that Plaintiff refused to comply with a condition for the receipt of separation pay. Rather, he states that the separation pay plan is subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") but provides no argument or authority to explain why this is relevant to any issue. Accordingly, I agree that Plaintiff's contract claim for separation pay fails. In addition, the Wage Claim Act claim for separation pay fails on this basis and because the Wage Claim Act does not cover separation pay. C.R.S. 8-4-101(8)(b) ("`Wages' or `compensation' does not include severance pay.").
Because Plaintiff's Wage Claim Act claims fail, IBM seeks attorneys' fees as provided by statute. Under the statute, if the employee "fails to recover a greater sum than the amount tendered by the employer, the court may award the employer reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred in such action . . . ." C.R.S. § 8-4-110(1). Plaintiff argues that I should not award fees because the claims were not frivolous.
Nothing in the statute prescribes a frivolousness standard and an award of fees appears to be purely discretionary. The statute's precursor has been interpreted to protect an employer against nuisance litigation. See Hartman v. Freedman, 197 Colo. 275, 280, 591 P.2d 1318, 1322 (1979); Voller v. Gertz, 107 P.3d 1129, 1132 (Colo. App.2004). I conclude that a partial award of attorneys' fees is appropriate here. Although the issue of Plaintiff's entitlement to commissions presented legitimate issues,
Accordingly, it is ordered: