MARCIA S. KRIEGER, District Judge.
The Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
In this action, Mr. Sayed, a prisoner within the Colorado Department of Corrections, asserts a single claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of religion based on the prison's failure to provide him with an opportunity to perform full ablution prior to all Islamic Jum'ah services.
In seeking summary judgment, Mr. Profitt asserts Eleventh Amendment immunity as to the claims brought against him in his official capacity and qualified immunity as to the claims brought against him in his individual capacity. Additionally, he argues that Mr. Sayed is not entitled to injunctive relief because he has since been moved to a new facility where full ablution is permitted prior to all Jum'ah services.
The Court has reviewed all of the parties' submissions.
Mr. Sayed is a prisoner in the Colorado Department of Corrections ("CDOC"). Mr. Sayed is a practicing Muslim. The CDOC's administrative regulations provide that Muslim inmates "should be allowed to shower prior to Jum'ah service."
Mr. Sayed routinely attends Jum'ah prayer services on Friday. Ablution, or cleansing, is required prior to prayer, including Jum'ah services. Full ablution (or the "bath") requires that an individual shower or otherwise completely bathe. Partial ablution requires an individual to
In 2007, Mr. Sayed was housed at the Limon Correctional Facility ("LCF"). At LCF, Jum'ah services were held at 1:00 p.m. on Fridays, and in accordance with his religious practice Mr. Sayed was required to engage in ablution before this time. Inmates at LCF were allowed to shower only during "pod-time." The only available pod-time prior to Jum'ah services on Friday morning was from 8:30 a.m. until 10:30 a.m. Mr. Sayed's job
On December 19, 2008, Mr. Sayed attempted to take a shower outside pod-time. Because his actions allegedly were contrary to an order, an incident report was filed, but the charges were later dropped. Mr. Sayed filed grievances based on his inability to access the showers on Fridays prior to the Jum'ah services. The Chaplain at LCF requested guidance from Mr. Profitt in his capacity as the Regional Coordinator for Faith and Citizens Programs at the CDOC, regarding Mr. Sayed's grievances. Mr. Profitt responded that partial ablution or substituted ablution were viable alternatives for complete ablution and, therefore, no allowance for showering outside pod-time was necessary to allow Mr. Sayed to practice his religion.
At some unidentified point in time after Mr. Sayed initiated this action, he was transferred to the Fremont Correctional Facility ("FCF"). In Mr. Sayed's unit at FCF, inmates are free to leave their cells, including to shower, three times per day: 10:15 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.; 3:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.; and 5:15 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. If an inmate has a job, he is free to shower at any time during the day, except during inmate count times. While at FCF, Mr. Sayed has not complained or grieved his ability to shower prior to Jum'ah services.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure facilitates the entry of a judgment only if no trial is necessary. See White v. York Intern. Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir.1995). Summary adjudication is authorized when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Substantive law governs what facts are material and what issues must be determined. It also specifies the elements that must be proved for a given claim or defense, sets the standard of proof and identifies the party with the burden of proof. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Kaiser-Francis
When the movant has the burden of proof on a claim or defense, the movant must establish every element of its claim or defense by sufficient, competent evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Once the moving party has met its burden, to avoid summary judgment the responding party must present sufficient, competent, contradictory evidence to establish a genuine factual dispute. See Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991); Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir.1999). If there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact, a trial is required. If there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, no trial is required. The court then applies the law to the undisputed facts and enters judgment.
When the moving party does not have the burden of proof at trial, it must point to an absence of sufficient evidence to establish the claim or defense that the non-movant is obligated to prove. If the respondent comes forward with sufficient competent evidence to establish a prima facie claim or defense, a trial is required. If the respondent fails to produce sufficient competent evidence to establish its claim or defense, the claim or defense must be dismissed as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
In this case, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which present peculiar problems because parties often frame their arguments on the assumption that the cross motions will be considered together. The Tenth Circuit, however, has repeatedly directed that cross-motions for summary judgment be determined independently. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10th Cir.2000); Buell Cabinet Co. v. Sudduth, 608 F.2d 431, 433 (10th Cir.1979) ("Cross-motions for summary judgment are to be treated separately; the denial of one does not require the grant of another."). This is because, as discussed supra, a determination of whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact turns upon which party has the burden of proof, the standard of proof, and whether the evidence submitted is adequate under the relevant standard of proof. See In re Ribozyme Pharms., Inc., Sec. Litig., 209 F.Supp.2d 1106, 1112 (D.Colo.2002). In accordance with this dictate, the Court analyzes Mr. Profitt's Motion for Summary Judgment
Mr. Sayed brings his claim against Mr. Profitt in both his official and individual capacities. Turning first to the official capacity claim, the Court notes that a suit by a citizen against a state official in his official capacity is, in effect, a suit against the state itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Thus, the Court understands Mr. Sayed to assert a claim against the CDOC for violation of his First Amendment rights.
In the subject motion, Mr. Profitt argues that, to the extent that Mr. Sayed
As to any request for injunctive relief, Mr. Profitt
Mr. Profitt submits an affidavit by Captain Lance Johnson, in his capacity as the Cell House Captain for Unit 3 at FCF, in which he describes the conditions for inmates FCF
Mr. Sayed presents no evidence to rebut Captain Johnson's affidavit. Mr. Sayed merely states that he "does not submit that he is not still being deprived of the ability to perform complete ablution prior to Jum'ah services based upon Defendant's directions to C.D.O.C. in general." He gives no examples or specifics, nor does he specify what conduct should be enjoined or mandated at FCF. Mr. Sayed also states that he "is still suffering mental and emotional distress as a result of his time at L.C.F." This, however, is not material to a request for injunctive relief regarding conduct at FCF. Therefore, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute as to material fact on the claim for injunctive relief and that it lacks any ability to grant injunctive relief because Mr. Sayed has identified no practices at FCF that are constitutionally deficient.
With respect to the claim against Mr. Profitt in his individual capacity, Mr. Profitt asserts the defense of qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials who perform discretionary government functions from liability for civil damages and the obligation to defend the action. See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 914, 117 S.Ct. 1800, 138 L.Ed.2d 108 (1997); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). This immunity is only applicable, however, if the official's conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights that would have been known by a reasonable government official. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727; McFall v. Bednar, 407 F.3d 1081, 1087 (10th Cir. 2005).
When a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to a plaintiff to satisfy a two-part test. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); Green v. Post, 574 F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff must show that he or she had a constitutional right that was infringed (the "violation prong"), and that such right was clearly established at the time of the alleged infringement (the "clearly established prong"). Although a plaintiff must ultimately establish both elements to avoid application of the doctrine, the Court has discretion to consider the elements in any order. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009); Green, 574 F.3d at 1299.
Here, the Court begins with the violation prong. With respect to this prong, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's actions deprived him or her of a constitutional or statutory right. See Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir.1995). Identification of a constitutional right in the abstract is insufficient; instead, a plaintiff must precisely articulate the clearly established right that was allegedly violated and specifically identify the defendant's conduct that violated the right. See Green, 574 F.3d at 1300.
Mr. Sayed's claim is based on his right to free exercise of religion. It is well-settled that "[i]mates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion." O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) (internal citations omitted); see Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009). A prisoner's First Amendment rights, however, are constrained by the realities of incarceration. See id. Prison regulations or practices that infringe upon prisoners' constitutional rights are valid as long as they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See id.; Boles, 486 F.3d at 1181. Accordingly, the violation prong on a qualified immunity analysis is subject to a two-step inquiry. First, the inmate must show that the challenged action substantially burdened his sincerely-held religious beliefs. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir.2007). To do so, the inmate must establish that (i) the beliefs at issue are religious and sincerely held and (ii) that the restriction imposes a substantial burden on them.
The Tenth Circuit has identified three manners in which religious exercise can be substantially burdened: (i) by requiring participation in an activity prohibited by a sincerely held religious belief; (ii) by preventing participation in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief; or (iii) by placing substantial pressure on a prisoner either to not engage in religious conduct or to engage in conduct contrary to his religion. See Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone,
In this case, Mr. Sayed is of the Islamic faith. Engaging in ablution prior to prayer is a requirement of his faith. There is no challenge that his Mr. Sayed's religious beliefs are sincerely held. The question before the Court is whether there is evidence to establish that Mr. Sayed's practice of ablution prior to prayer was prevented by Mr. Profitt's denial of his request to shower prior to Jum'ah services.
Mr. Sayed's claim is premised upon the contention that full ablution is required prior to Jum'ah services. Specifically, he argues that partial ablution was not sufficient if he slept deeply or experienced a "wet dream" during sleep and that the sink in his cell was not sufficient for him to perform partial ablution.
Mr. Profitt contends that substitute ablution was sufficient. He submits pages from the book "Islam in Focus" by Hammudah Abdalati
Mr. Profitt's Motion to Dismiss