ORDER

BOYD N. BOLAND, Magistrate Judge.

This matter arises on the following:

(1) Jerome J. Doherty's Second Motion to Compel and for Sanctions [Doc. # 74, filed 3/11/2014] (the "Second Motion to Compel");

(2) Defendants' Motion for Blanket Protective Order [Doc. # 77, filed 3/14/2014] (the "Motion for Protective Order"); and

(3) Motion to Quash Deposition of Drew Nelson [Doc. # 80, filed 3/17/2014] (the "Motion to Quash").

I held a hearing on the motions on April 16, 2014, and made rulings on the record, which are incorporated here.

I previously granted an initial motion to compel and ordered the defendants "to provide complete responses to the interrogatories and produce all responsive documents, in compliance with the formalities of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . ." Order [Doc. # 68]. In doing so, I expressly overruled the defendants' objection that the interrogatories were overbroad "blockbusters."1

The defendants provided supplemental discovery responses on February 28, 2014. Rather than comply with my order, the defendants renewed the overruled objections and asserted additional objections not previously made. In an attempt to excuse their improper conduct, the defendants argue in opposition to the Second Motion to Compel:

Response [Doc. # 86] at pp. 2-3.

The argument is strained, at best, and borders on being disingenuous. Continuing to assert objections previously overruled certainly is improper, and defense counsel knows it. In addition, Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b) requires that discovery responses be provided within 30 days after service and that any objection not timely made is waived. My order, fairly read and in the light of Rule 33(b), precludes the assertion of new objections in the supplemental answers.

Although the defendants improperly asserted numerous objections to the interrogatories, the supplemental answers are comprehensive. On inquiry at the hearing, defense counsel responded that no information was withheld based on any asserted objection. Defense counsel also admitted, however, that he had not told Mr. Doherty's counsel that the answers were complete, the objections notwithstanding, despite direct inquiry by Mr. Doherty's counsel.

There are other problems with the supplemental responses. First, the defendants responded to requests to identify documents supporting interrogatory answers by referring Mr. Doherty to "the documents already in disclosure, as well as those which will be provided by supplementation as discovery in this case progresses." Response to Interrogatory # 8 [Doc. # 86-1] at p. 11 of 37.2 Rule 33(d), Fed. R. Civ. P., allows a party to answer an interrogatory by referring to business records, but the responding party must "specify the records that must be reviewed, in sufficient detail to enable the interrogating party to locate and identify them as readily as the responding party could" or to give the interrogating party "a reasonable opportunity to examine and audit the records and to make copies. . . ." The defendants' response fails either to identify adequately the documents to be examined or to segregate and produce, on an interrogatory-by-interrogatory basis, the responsive document and produce them for inspection.

In addition, the defendants have withheld from disclosure the most important documents pending the resolution of a dispute over the form of a blanket protective order which the defendants contend is necessary to protect confidential and trade secret information. Here, the parties are direct competitors. The defendant argues that some of the responsive documents are so confidential that they should be available for inspection only by outside counsel and not by the parties themselves. Plaintiff's counsel responds in opposition to this restriction:

Response [Doc. # 84] at p. 3.

I will enter a blanket protective order which attempts to satisfy the needs of all sides. The parties may designate information for review by outside counsel's eyes only. Where possible, they must produce two copies of the document: one unredacted for counsel's review; and a second, for review by the client, redacting the attorneys-eyes-only confidential information. The receiving party may object to the designation either as unwarranted or as crippling to its ability to present its case. If the parties cannot resolve the matter informally, the party designating the information as attorneys-eyes-only must bring a motion for protection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G).

Most troubling of all of the lawyers' disputes is that contained in the Motion to Quash. Daniel Culhane, counsel for the plaintiffs, requested deposition dates for Drew Nelson, a non-party who is an officer of defendant Peak Innovations. The dates requested were not available, but Mr. Nelson's counsel, Alan Blakeley, offered 12 alternative dates. In addition, Mr. Blakeley stated:

Exh. B [Doc. # 80-1] at p. 3 of 24.

In an email, Mr. Culhane responded:

Exh. C [Doc. # 80-1] at p. 5 of 24.

In other words, the lawyers could not agree about whether to depose Mr. Nelson in Denver or in Fort Collins, cities approximately 64 miles distant. Mr. Culhane was available on the dates proposed by Mr. Blakeley and willing to take the deposition on one of those dates provided Mr. Nelson appeared in Denver without the necessity of a subpoena.3 Mr. Nelson was willing to waive the subpoena requirement provided the deposition occurred in Fort Collins rather than in Denver. Instead of compromising on the point, Mr. Culhane subpoenaed Mr. Nelson for a day he knew defense counsel were not available; Mr. Nelson's lawyers filed the Motion to Quash; and the matter was brought to hearing before me. This is an abusive use of the clients' resources and of the judicial system.

Counsel have been engaged in discovery abuse and abusive litigation practices, and I will not tolerate it. To attempt to cause the lawyers to live up to their professional and legal obligations, I will impose the following requirements before any motions or briefs are filed in connection with discovery matters:

IT IS ORDERED: