ORDER RE: RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ROBERT E. BLACKBURN, District Judge.

The matters before me are (1) the Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge [#308],1 filed May 28, 2014; and (2) Plaintiff's Objection to Magistrate Judge Hegarty's Recommendation [#308] To Grant Twitter, Inc.'s Motion To Dismiss [#320], filed June 11, 2014. I sustain the objection in part, overrule it in part, and grant the underlying motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Thus, I have construed his pleadings more liberally and held them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)).

As required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), I have reviewed de novo all portions of the recommendation to which objections have been filed. Thus, I have considered carefully the recommendation, objections, and applicable caselaw.

Plaintiff's claims against Twitter arise from two separate sets of factual allegations. In the first, plaintiff alleges causes of action arising from Twitter's 2010 response to a subpoena issued by the California state court in the underlying defamation action. The second arises from Twitter's removal of a threatening tweet that purportedly originated from plaintiff's Twitter account. The magistrate judge recommends that the motion to dismiss be granted on the basis of a valid forum-selection clause contained within Twitter's Terms of Service, which provides, relevantly, that

(Def. Motion App., Exh. 1 at 5.)

I agree with the magistrate judge that this language is sufficiently comprehensive to encompass plaintiff's claims emanating from the tweet that ostensibly was posted by a third party from plaintiff's account. Although plaintiff alleges that he did not post the tweet, the forum-selection clause is not cabined to plaintiff's use of the Services.2 The language encompassing "all claims . . . arising in connection with the Services" is sufficiently expansive to bring plaintiff's allegations within the ambit of the forum-selection clause. To that extent, therefore, I approve and adopt the recommendation.

However, I do not grant the motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens because the magistrate judge's analysis fails to account further for plaintiff's allegations regarding Twitter's response to the subpoena. These allegations do not implicate Twitter's Services at all, and thus the forum-selection clause is irrelevant to such claims. To that extent, therefore, I must respectfully reject the magistrate judge's recommendation.

Nevertheless, I agree with Twitter that the amended complaint fails to plausibly allege valid RICO, COCCA, or state law claims for relief.3 Assuming arguendo that the amended complaint adequately asserts the other elements of a RICO4 and COCCA5 claim — an assumption not at all borne out by perusal of the pleading — plaintiff plainly has failed to allege adequate facts (as opposed to mere conclusions) to plausibly suggest the existence of a RICO enterprise. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (RICO enterprise "includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity"); Gottstein v. National Association for Self Employed, 53 F.Supp.2d 1212, 1219 (D. Kan. 1999) ("A RICO enterprise is an ongoing structure of persons associated through time, joined in purpose, and organized in a manner amenable to hierarchical or consensual decision-making.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The vague allusions in the amended complaint to "relationships" between Twitter and other defendants is completely unsubstantiated by any fact that might even hint at the existence of a RICO enterprise. I therefore find and conclude that these claims must be dismissed pursuant to Rule12(b)(6).6

Likewise, plaintiff has failed to adequately plead any facts supporting his purported state law claims as against Twitter specifically. Instead, plaintiff alleges these claims globally against "defendants" or "the RICO defendants." Such group pleading is insufficient to meet satisfy plaintiff's pleadings burden. See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[I]t is particularly important in such circumstances [where multiple defendants are sued] that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her, as distinguished from collective allegations against the state."); Chambers v. Cooper, 2014 WL 561371 at *1 (D. Colo. Feb. 12, 2014). These claims therefore also are properly dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b0(6) as well.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. That the Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge [#308], filed May 28, 2014, is APPROVED AND ADOPTED in part and respectfully REJECTED IN PART, as follows: a. That the recommendation is APPROVED AND ADOPTED as an order of this court insofar as it recommends dismissal of plaintiff's claims relating to the alleged posting by a third party under plaintiff's Twitter account; and b. That in all other respects, the recommendation is respectfully REJECTED as more fully detailed in this Order;

2. That the objections stated in Plaintiff's Objection to Magistrate Judge Hegarty's Recommendation [#308] To Grant Twitter, Inc.'s Motion To Dismiss [#320], filed June 11, 2014, are SUSTAINED IN PART and OVERRULED IN PART as follows;

3. That Twitter, Inc's Motion To Dismiss [#19], filed November 26, 2013, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED AS MOOT IN PART as follows:

4. That plaintiff's claims against Twitter, Inc., are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

5. That at the time judgment enters, judgment without prejudice SHALL ENTER on behalf of defendant, Twitter, Inc., against plaintiff, Jon A. Goodwin, as to all claims and causes of action asserted against this defendant herein; and

6. That defendant, Twitter, Inc., is DROPPED as a named party to this action, and the case caption AMENDED accordingly.