PHILIP A. BRIMMER, United States District Judge
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Docket No. 17] filed by plaintiff Wardcraft Homes, Inc. ("Wardcraft") and the Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 24] filed by defendant Employers Mutual Casualty Company ("EMC"). This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Wardcraft manufactures pre-fabricated homes at a facility in Fort Morgan, Colorado. Docket No. 17 at 3, ¶ 1. In 2007, Distinguished Builders, Inc. ("DBI") was an independent contractor of Wardcraft who purchased Wardcraft-manufactured homes and then resold and constructed those homes in, as relevant here, the Oak Creek, Colorado area. Id. at 3, ¶ 2. Wardcraft was insured under a Commercial General Liability insurance policy, policy number 2D9079709 (the "policy"), issued by EMC. Id. at 4, ¶ 9; see also Docket Nos. 17-3 through 17-6.
In March 2007, William and Grace Stuhr contacted Wardcraft about purchasing a modular home to be constructed in Oak Creek, Colorado. Docket No. 20-1 at 2,
In December 2009, the Stuhr Complaint was tendered to EMC. Docket No. 24 at 2, ¶ 2. In a letter received by Wardcraft on February 5, 2010 (the "letter"), EMC informed Wardcraft that it was denying coverage under the policy and any duty to defend, stating, in part:
Docket No. 17-7 at 5. On March 9, 2012, the Stuhrs filed the Second Verified Amended Complaint ("Second Amended Complaint"), which added a negligence claim against James Pool, Terry's Crane and Rigging, Inc., and Preferred Transportation, Inc. Docket No. 24 at 2, ¶ 3; Docket No. 17-2. Daniel Pence, an EMC adjustor assigned to Wardcraft's claim, states that Wardcraft did not tender the Second Amended Complaint to EMC and that Wardcraft first notified EMC of the Second Amended Complaint in a March 14, 2013 letter from Wardcraft's counsel. Docket No. 24-3 at 1, ¶¶ 6-7. Wardcraft responds that "EMC was put on notice of the proceedings," but does not otherwise identify or produce any evidence that the Second Amended Complaint was, at any point, tendered to EMC. Docket No. 32 at 1, ¶ 4. The record contains no evidence that, prior to initiating the present suit, Wardcraft provided EMC with additional information or requested that EMC reconsider its decision to deny coverage. Wardcraft provides no evidence and makes no allegation that, after informing Wardcraft of the decision to deny coverage, EMC took any wrongful action or inaction with respect to Wardcraft's claim.
Wardcraft claims to have defended the Stuhr suit. Docket No. 17 at 4, ¶ 8. In early February 2013, the Stuhrs, Wardcraft, and DBI fully executed a settlement agreement (the "settlement agreement"), retroactively effective as of January 14, 2013, under which Wardcraft paid the Stuhrs $50,000 to settle the claims brought against it in the Stuhr suit. Docket No. 32-1 at 1, 4.
On November 1, 2013, Wardcraft filed its motion for partial summary judgment. Docket No. 17 at 2. Wardcraft asserts that "it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor as to Defendants' [sic] duty to defend" and seeks an order in Wardcraft's favor "as to the breach of Defendant's duty to defend Plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit." Id. at 3, 16. Although Wardcraft does not clearly indicate on which claims it seeks summary judgment, the Court construes Wardcraft's motion as seeking summary judgment only as to EMC's duty to defend the Stuhr suit. On January 15, 2014, EMC filed its motion for summary judgment, arguing that Wardcraft's breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims fail because EMC had no duty to defend or indemnify Wardcraft and arguing that Wardcraft's bad faith and statutory claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Docket No. 24 at 19.
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A disputed fact is "material" if under the relevant substantive law it is essential to proper disposition of the claim. Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir.2001). Only disputes over material facts can create a genuine issue for trial and preclude summary judgment. Faustin v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 423 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2005). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir.1997).
The nonmoving party may not rest solely on the allegations in the pleadings, but instead must designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). "To avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant must establish, at a minimum, an inference of the presence of each element essential to the case." Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 252 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir.2001) (citing Hulsey v. Kmart, Inc., 43 F.3d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 1994)). "In applying this standard, we view all facts and any reasonable inferences that might be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
Wardcraft argues that a duty to defend the Stuhr suit arose because the Stuhr Complaint contained claims falling within the policy's property damage coverage and advertising injury coverage. Docket No. 17 at 5-6. EMC claims that the Stuhr Complaint did not allege any claims potentially covered under the policy. Docket No. 24 at 2. Under Colorado law,
Constitution Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 930 P.2d 556, 563 (Colo.1996) (emphasis in original, citation omitted).
"As a general rule under Colorado law, an insurer's duty to defend an insured is triggered solely on the basis of the allegations made within the four corners of the complaint, read against the insurance policy." United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Boulder Plaza Residential, LLC, 633 F.3d 951, 960 (10th Cir.2011); see also Cotter Corp. v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 90 P.3d 814, 829 (Colo.2004). To show that the insurer had a duty to defend, "the insured need only show that the underlying claim may fall within policy coverage." Compass Ins. Co. v. City of Littleton, 984 P.2d 606, 614 (Colo.1999) (internal citations and quotations omitted). To defeat a duty to defend, an insurer bears a "heavy burden." Hecla Mining, 811 P.2d at 1089. The insurer must establish that "there is no factual or legal basis on which the insurer might eventually be held liable to indemnify the insured." Id. at 1090. Where policy exclusions are implicated, "the insurer bears the burden of establishing that `the allegations in the complaint are solely and entirely within the exclusions in the insurance policy.'" Cotter Corp., 90 P.3d at 829 (citation omitted). Accordingly, where "there is some doubt as to whether a theory of recovery within the policy coverage has been pleaded, the insurer must accept the defense of the claim." City of Littleton, 984 P.2d at 613-14. If the underlying complaint includes more than one claim, a duty to defend against all claims asserted arises if any one of the claims arguably is a risk covered by the relevant insurance policy. Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Peters, 948 P.2d 80, 85 (Colo.App.1998) (citation omitted). The existence of a duty to defend against a particular claim is a question of law. See Bumpers v. Guar. Trust Life Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 358, 360 (Colo.App.1991); see also Carl's Italian Rest. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 183 P.3d 636, 639 (Colo.App.2007).
The interpretation of an insurance policy is a legal question. Allstate
The parties initially disagreed as to which underlying complaint should be considered in determining EMC's duty to defend. In its summary judgment motion, Wardcraft claimed that the duty to defend arose from the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. See, e.g., Docket No. 17 at 3, ¶¶ 4, 5 (citing Docket No. 17-2). However, Wardcraft failed to provide any evidence disputing EMC's claim that Wardcraft did not tender to EMC the Second Amended Complaint. Docket No. 32 at 1, ¶ 4. In its reply brief, Wardcraft appears to have abandoned its earlier position and now argues that "[a]ll of the information necessary to establish the duty to defend is contained in the four corners of the original complaint." Docket No. 29 at 8.
The Court first considers the parties' arguments concerning property damage coverage under the policy. The policy covers "those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of `bodily injury' or `property damage.'" Docket No. 17-3 at 12, ¶ 1.a. Property damage can be either "a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property...; or b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured...." Docket No. 17-4 at 6-7, ¶ 17. The policy applies to, as relevant here, property damage "only if ... [t]the `bodily injury' or `property damage' is caused by an `occurrence' that takes place in the `coverage territory.'" Docket No. 17-3 at 12, ¶ 1.b.(1). "Occurrence" is defined under the policy as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions." Docket No. 17-4 at 6, ¶ 13. The parties dispute whether the Stuhr Complaint alleges an "occurrence."
In Colorado, CGL policies protect the insured from claims for "personal injury or property damage resulting from accidents." Boulder Plaza, 633 F.3d at 959. On the other hand, CGL policies do not protect the insured from unsatisfactory performance of a contract. Id. ("[t]he risk that an owner might reject performance as inadequate is a `business risk' allocated by parties in contract, and is ... not [covered by] general liability insurance intended to provide coverage for injuries or damage resulting from `accidents'" (quoting DCB Constr. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill.,
Applying Greystone,
The Court next turns to the question of whether the Stuhr Complaint alleged the property damage to nondefective property in the form of loss of use of property "that is not physically injured." Docket No. 17-4 at 7, ¶ 17. DBI allegedly promised that the Stuhrs' home would be completed by Christmas 2007, but delivery of the modules was delayed, the issuance of a certificate of occupancy was delayed, and the Stuhrs were unable to move into the home until December 22, 2008. Docket No. 20-1 at 3, ¶ 18. Due to such delays, the Stuhrs alleged that they:
Id. at 3-4, ¶ 19, 24. EMC argues that the Stuhr Complaint fails to allege "non-defective portions," such that the only damage claimed is to defective portions of the home. Docket No. 24 at 10. However, the Stuhr Complaint need only contain sufficient facts to make it possible that the loss of use due to nondefective elements may have been caused by defective elements. It is possible that Wardcraft's poor workmanship with respect to the floor heating system and failure to install correct cabinets and vanities caused a delay resulting in loss of use to other, nondefective aspects of the home.
EMC also argues that the Stuhr Complaint does not state what property was damaged and, as such, fails to allege that any property damage occurred. Docket No. 33 at 5-6. However, this argument fails to account for the fact that loss of use to property that has not been physically injured is considered property damage under the policy. Docket No. 17-4 at 6-7, ¶ 17. Moreover, the Stuhr Complaint's specific allegations concerning loss of use damages, see, e.g., Docket No. 20-1 at 4, ¶ 24, sufficiently allege "additional consequential property damages have been inflicted upon a third party as a result of the insured's activity." See General Sec. Indem. Co. of Ariz. v. Mountain, States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529, 535 (Colo.App. 2009), superseded by statute as stated in TCD, Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 296 P.3d 255 (Colo.App.2012). Thus, this is not a case, as EMC suggests, of conclusory allegations of consequential damages. Cf. TCD, Inc., 296 P.3d at 259 ("Notably absent from Gateway's counterclaims is any specific allegation that Petra caused damage beyond its own work product."). The alleged damages also meet the threshold for unforeseeability established in Greystone. The Stuhr Complaint contains no suggestion that Wardcraft's or DBI's workmanship was intentionally poor or that they intended for their defective work to cause a loss of use to other nondefective aspects of the Stuhrs' home. See Greystone, 661 F.3d at 1285 ("`occurrence' excludes from coverage only `those damages that the insured knew would flow directly and immediately from its intentional act'" (quoting Hecla Mining, 811 P.2d at 1088) (emphasis in original)). The Court finds that the Stuhr Complaint contains sufficient allegations that make it possible that poor workmanship to defective aspects of the Stuhrs' home caused unforeseeable property damage in the form of loss of use to nondefective aspects of the
Docket No. 17-3 at 16, ¶ m. "Your product" is defined under the policy as "goods or products, other than real property, manufactured, sold, handled, distributed or disposed of by" the insured or others trading under the insured's name. Docket No. 17-4 at 7, ¶ 21. "Your work" means "(1) Work or operations performed by you or on your behalf; and (2) Materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection with such work or operations." Id. at 7, ¶ 22. Because the Stuhr Complaint sufficiently alleged an occurrence with respect to loss of use of property that was not physically injured, in order to defeat the duty to defend, EMC must show that this occurrence falls "solely and entirely within the exclusions in the insurance policy.'" Cotter Corp., 90 P.3d at 829 (citation omitted); see also DCB Constr., 225 F.Supp.2d at 1232-33 (determining whether alleged occurrence was subject to policy exclusions).
EMC argues that this exclusion bars coverage for the loss of use of nondefective property under paragraph (1) and for all claims for delay damages for failure to deliver the home on time under paragraph (2). Docket No. 24 at 15. Wardcraft does not respond to EMC's argument that the impaired property exclusion applies. Thus, the Court finds that Wardcraft has conceded EMC's argument on this issue. Moreover, the Court is otherwise satisfied that the exclusion applies to the alleged occurrence identified above. The defects alleged in the Stuhr Complaint occurred while the Stuhrs' home was being manufactured and before the home became real property. As such, the manufactured home falls within the definition of "Your product." To the extent the Stuhr Complaint alleges that the home's defects resulted in loss of use damages, such damages arise out of a defect and are excluded under m.(1). To the extent such loss of use damages arose out of a delay or failure by Wardcraft or DBI to perform under the purchase agreement, such damages are excluded under m.(2). To the extent that any delay in delivery of the modules is attributed to Wardcraft, it falls within the definition of "Your work" and is excluded for the same reasons. See DCB Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill., 225 F.Supp.2d 1230, 1233 (D.Colo.2002) (underlying claim that constructed walls were not designed according to contractual specifications fell within impaired property exclusion because claim did not indicate that walls were in fact physically damaged).
Even if the Stuhr Complaint contains allegations that damages were caused by delay after the home was considered real property, the Stuhrs' home would be considered impaired property, which is defined as
Docket No. 17-4 at 4-5, ¶ 8. The Stuhrs' home, even after it became real property, incorporated Wardcraft's product that was known to be defective (or violated the terms of the purchase agreement) and could have been restored in either manner set forth in the policy. Thus, if the Stuhrs' home was impaired property, for the above stated reasons, it falls under the impaired property exclusion. The Court concludes that EMC has satisfied its burden of showing that the impaired property exclusion applies to the alleged occurrence.
The parties dispute whether the Stuhr Complaint contains sufficient allegations to trigger a duty to defend under the policy's personal and advertising injury coverage. Docket No. 17 at 11; Docket No. 24 at 16. The policy provides coverage for damages the insured is legally obligated to pay because of "personal and advertising injury," which is an injury
Docket No. 17-4 at 6, ¶ 14.
Colorado courts provide little guidance as to the proper interpretation of "the use of another's advertising idea." DISH, 659 F.3d at 1021. The Court therefore will look to the definition provided by other jurisdictions. Most courts presented with this issue have held that the "use of another's idea" means the "wrongful taking of the manner by which another advertises its goods or services" or the "wrongful taking of an idea about the solicitation of business." Discover Fin. Servs., LLC v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 527 F.Supp.2d 806, 824 (N.D.Ill.2007) (quoting Amazon.com Int'l, Inc. v. Am. Dynasty Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 120 Wn.App. 610, 85 P.3d 974, 976 (Wash. App.2004)). Wardcraft makes no meaningful attempt to suggest that the Stuhr Complaint alleges that Wardcraft wrongfully took another's advertising idea and the Stuhr Complaint contains no such suggestion. The Stuhr Complaint contains no allegations that raise the possibility that Wardcraft wrongfully used the Energy Star moniker without permission or otherwise misappropriated the Energy Star moniker from its source. Cf. DISH, 659 F.3d at 1022 (finding that duty to defend arose where complaint alleged that insured misappropriated a product designed for advertising purposes).
Even if the Stuhr Complaint alleged the existence of an advertising injury, Wardcraft must show that the complained of injury arose in the course of advertising. DISH, 659 F.3d at 1015. As the Tenth Circuit stated in Novell, for an advertising injury to trigger a duty to defend, the "advertising activities must cause the injury-not merely expose it." 141 F.3d at 989 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). EMC relies on Basic Research, LLC v. Admiral Ins. Co., 297 P.3d 578 (Utah 2013), in support of its argument that the Stuhrs' damages did not arise out of an advertising injury. Docket No. 24 at 16. In Basic Research, purchasers of a weight loss product brought suits against the product's manufacturer, claiming false advertising and that the product failed to perform as promised in marketing slogans. 297 P.3d at 579. The manufacturer tendered the claims to its insurer, who refused to defend the suits. Id. Interpreting a CGL policy, the relevant portions of which appear identical to the policy at issue in the present case, the court found that the underlying claims were not covered because the claims were not dependant on the source of the marketing slogans, but rather on whether the manufacturer "used the slogans to market a defective product." Id. at 581. As such, the court held that allowing the manufacturer to invoke coverage "based on underlying claims of this sort would require indemnification where there is any but-for causal link between the `use of another's advertising idea' and an underlying plaintiff's damages, no matter how legally irrelevant the link." Id. (emphasis in original).
Wardcraft's attempts to distinguish Basic Research are unavailing and fail to account for the fact that the Stuhr Complaint does not implicate the source of the Energy Star moniker. Moreover, the Court finds the reasoning in Basic Research persuasive. The Stuhr Complaint does not suggest that the Stuhrs suffered injury from the mere use of the Energy Star representation. Rather, the Stuhrs were "actual consumers" of the non-Energy Star compliant Wardcraft home and "sustained damages as a result." Docket No. 20-1 at 8, ¶ 76. As such, their injuries arose from Wardcraft's failure to deliver on the promise that the Stuhrs' home would be Energy Star compliant, not Wardcraft's misappropriation of the Energy Star moniker. In other words, had the Stuhrs instead chosen not to purchase a home, they would have suffered no injury as a result of Wardcraft's use of the Energy Star moniker. Conversely, if Wardcraft had delivered on its promise, then the Stuhrs would not have suffered the claimed injury.
Given that the Court concludes that EMC had no duty to defend the Stuhr suit, the question becomes whether this conclusion forecloses Wardcraft's claim for failure to indemnify. Ordinarily, "once an insurer has prevailed on the duty to defend, the issue of the duty to indemnify is ripe for resolution because "[w]here there is no duty to defend, it follows that there can be no duty to indemnify." Compass, 984 P.2d at 621 (quotations omitted); see also Boulder Plaza, 633 F.3d at 961. For the foregoing reasons, EMC had no duty to defend the Stuhr suit upon receipt of the Stuhr Complaint and no corresponding duty to indemnify arising from the Stuhr Complaint. However, the Stuhr suit was not entirely adjudicated based upon the Stuhr Complaint, but, after March 9, 2012, was litigated under the Second Amended Complaint until the parties reached a settlement. There is no dispute that Wardcraft did not tender the Second Amended Complaint to EMC as contemplated by the policy's notice provision. See Docket No. 17-4 at 2, ¶¶ 2.b(2), 2.c(1) (requiring Wardcraft to notify EMC of any suit "as soon as practicable" and "send [EMC] copies of any demands, notices, summonses or legal papers received in connection with the claim or `suit'").
The Complaint and Second Amended Complaint contain substantially identical factual allegations. Compare Docket No. 20-1 at 2-4, with Docket No. 17-2 at 2-5. The only apparent difference between the two complaints is that the Second Amended Complaint's negligence claim against Wardcraft is additionally asserted against Mr. Pool, Terry's Crane and Rigging, Inc., and Preferred Transportation, Inc. and alleges that all four entities owed a duty of care "in connection with any services they performed related to the construction of Plaintiff's home," that all four entities "negligently performed the services they provided and breached or may have breached their duties of care related to the construction of Plaintiff's home," and that the Stuhrs incurred damages as a result. Docket No. 17-2 at 6, ¶¶ 48-50. In responding to EMC's motion for summary judgment, which raises the issue of EMC's duty to indemnify, Wardcraft does not argue that the Second Amended Complaint materially changes the allegations forming the basis of the Stuhr suit and the Court finds no basis for so concluding.
EMC moves for summary judgment on Wardcraft's claim for bad faith breach of insurance contract and claim for violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-3-1115 and 10-3-1116, arguing that both claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Docket No. 24 at 7. Bad faith actions must be "commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(a). A bad faith cause of action accrues "on the date both the injury and its cause are known or should have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-108(1); accord Brodeur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.3d 139, 147 (Colo.2007) (applying § 13-80-108 to bad faith tort claim). "Each bad faith act constitutes a separate and distinct tortious act, on which the statute of limitation begins to run anew when plaintiff becomes aware of the injury and its cause." Cork v. Sentry Ins., 194 P.3d 422, 427 (Colo. App.2008).
Wardcraft's complaint, filed on February 4, 2013, identifies a single act of bad faith: the February 5, 2010 letter from EMC denying coverage, indicating that it would not indemnify Wardcraft, and declining to provide a defense. Docket No. 3 at 3, ¶ 21; Docket No 17-7 at 5 ("Because there is no duty to indemnify, a defense will not be provided."). Wardcraft does not dispute that, as of February 5, 2010, it was aware of an injury and cause as related to EMC's refusal to defend the Stuhr suit. See Docket No. 32 at 3. As such, that portion of Wardcraft's claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
Wardcraft argues that it has also alleged that EMC acted in bad faith by unreasonably refusing to indemnify. Id. Wardcraft argues that, because the contractual duty to indemnify did not arise until it settled the Stuhr suit on January 31, 2013, Wardcraft had no injury until it became responsible for paying the Stuhrs under the settlement. Id. However, Wardcraft does not appear to allege that EMC's actions with respect to the duty to indemnify were unreasonable. Although the general factual allegations in Wardcraft's complaint allege that it was entitled to defense and indemnity, Wardcraft's bad faith claim alleges only that EMC unreasonably refused to "provide a defense" and
The Court turns to Wardcraft's claims for violation of § 10-3-1115 and § 10-3-1116, which accrue in the same manner as bad faith claims. See Gargano v. Owners Ins. Co., No. 12-cv-01109-CMA-BNB, 2014 WL 1032303, at *3 (D.Colo. March 18, 2014) (applying § 13-80-108 to § 10-3-1115 and § 10-3-1116 claims); Duvall v. Cit Grp., No. 13-cv-02634-MSK-MJW, 2014 WL 537445, at *6 (D.Colo. Feb 11, 2014) (same). The parties do not appear to dispute that a two year statute of limitations applies to Wardcraft's statutory claims. Docket No. 24 at 6; Docket No. 32 at 2-3; see also Gargano, 2014 WL 1032303, at *3 (applying § 13-80-102 to § 10-3-1115 and § 10-3-1116 claims); Alarcon v. Am. Fam. Ins. Grp., No. 08-cv-01171-MSK-MJW, 2010 WL 2541131, at *1 n. 5 (D.Colo. June 18, 2010) (noting that both common law bad faith and §§ 10-3-1115 and 10-3-1116 are tort claims and are therefore "governed by the same statute of limitation"). As above, Wardcraft does not dispute that its claim for violation of § 10-3-1115 and § 10-3-1116 is based upon EMC's "failure to provide a defense" and is therefore time barred. As such, that portion of Wardcraft's claim is dismissed. Although Wardcraft again claims to bring a statutory claim based upon EMC's refusal to indemnify, Wardcraft's complaint does not contain factual allegations that give rise to a claim that EMC unreasonably denied or delayed payment of a claim for indemnity. Docket No. 3 at 4, ¶¶ 36-40; see also § 10-3-1115(1)(a) (stating that insurer "shall not unreasonably delay or deny payment of a claim for benefits"). Thus, Wardcraft fails to show that any portion of its statutory claim accrued within the statute of limitations.
For the foregoing reasons, it is
