MICHAEL E. HEGARTY, Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Limited Reopening of Discovery [
On March 17, 2014, the Court ordered Defendants to produce certain documents to Plaintiff but otherwise closed discovery. (Docket #157.) Plaintiff's Motion seeks to reopen discovery in order to depose Nationwide Title Clearing, Inc., Erika Lance, and "any other party to the creation and recordation [sic] of the forged assignment of the subject property[.]" (Docket #223, p.5.) The Court may modify scheduling orders upon a showing of good cause. Fed R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); D.C.Colo.LCivR 16.1. "Whether to extend or reopen discovery is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court...." Smith v. United States, 834 F.2d 166, 169 (10th Cir. 1987). In Smith, the Tenth Circuit
834 F.2d at 169 (citation omitted).
First, while a trial date has not been scheduled, this case has been pending for over two years, and cross motions for summary judgment have been fully briefed for approximately six months. Second, Plaintiff states that Defendants oppose the motion (however, the Court is able to resolve the matter without awaiting Defendants' response). Third, there is little doubt that discovery at this late stage would prejudice Defendants, who reasonably expected their discovery obligations had long since been fulfilled in this case. With regard to the fourth and fifth Smith factors, Plaintiff offers no explanation for his nearly eleven-month delay in seeking this discovery. He makes no allegations that recent events gave rise to a new and unforeseeable need to depose certain individuals; indeed, his theory of the case remains the same. Finally, Plaintiff has not established that the proposed discovery is likely to produce any new evidence, and, in any event, the District Court would be unlikely to consider new evidence in resolving the cross motions for summary judgment, which were filed more than seven months ago.
Thus, the Court does not find good cause for reopening discovery, and