CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on review of the Commissioner's decision to deny Plaintiff Thao Thi Pham's ("Plaintiff's") application for social security disability benefits and supplemental security income, under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33. Jurisdiction is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Plaintiff, who is now 42 years old, filed an application for disability benefits, as well as an application for supplemental security income, in September of 2008. She alleged a disability onset date of February 22, 2008. (AR at 80.)
The second hearing was held on September 6, 2012, and on September 28, 2012, the ALJ again issued an unfavorable decision, denying benefits. (AR at 77-106.) Plaintiff again requested review of the decision on November 9, 2012 (id. 75-76), but her request was denied on May 20, 2014 (id. at 1-7.) This appeal followed.
Plaintiff was born in Vietnam in 1973. When she was a teenager, she sustained a fracture of her left leg when a car hit her while she was crossing the street. Although she could not obtain treatment for her leg at the time of this injury, she ultimately did so after moving to Denver in 1990. (Id. at 501-02.) Thereafter, Plaintiff graduated from high school in 1996, after studying hair styling. She worked in various manufacturing jobs from 1993 to 2005, and was a hair stylist from 1995 to 2007, when she developed swelling and some white lumps in her right hand. (Id. at 646.) She made a claim for, and received, worker's compensation benefits for this condition, and was diagnosed with a ganglion cyst of the tendon sheath. In August of 2007, she underwent surgery to remove this cyst. (Id. at 711.) At her first hearing before the ALJ in December of 2010, Plaintiff testified that she had been fired from her job as a hairstylist in February of 2008, after injuring her hand at work. (Id. at 119.)
After Plaintiff's hand surgery, she began receiving treatment from Samuel Chan, M.D., to whom she complained of diffuse pain in her upper right extremity. (Id. at 679.) However, Dr. Chan was "objectively . . . unable to find the etiology [origin] to explain the patient's persistent complaints." (Id.) Dr. Chan further noted that her EMG was within "normal limits." (Id.)
Over the next few years, in an attempt to find the source of her hand pain, Plaintiff was examined by a series of physicians. In January of 2008, Thomas Mordick, M.D., a hand surgeon, examined Plaintiff's hand. He noted that there were "no vasomotor changes to suggest reflex sympathetic dystrophy [RSDS],"
In February of 2008, Conrad Tirre, M.D., a plastic surgeon, also examined Plaintiff's hand. (Id. at 511.) He noted that Plaintiff had "full range of motion with flexion of the small joints of the hand," and stated that he "could not elicit any locking, clicking or impedance of excursion of the flexor tendon." He also reviewed an MRI of her right hand and stated that he "did not see any significant lesions, instability patterns, [or] fractures. . . There were some minimal inflammatory changes around the long finger MCP joint which most likely represent a previous surgical intervention." (Id.) Like Dr. Chan and Dr. Mordick, Dr. Tirre was also unable to offer an explanation for Plaintiff's hand pain, but concluded that there was "[n]o real significant evidence of a reflex sympathetic or regional pain syndrome." (Id. at 511).
That same month, Sharon Walker, M.D., who was treating Plaintiff on behalf of her worker's compensation insurer, concluded that Plaintiff reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) without permanent impairment. (Id. at 605.) Specifically, Dr. Walker noted that there were "no objective findings" to support Plaintiff's continued complaints of hand pain and decreased sensation: "She had a repeat MRI and there are no objective findings and she has essentially not improved or has plateaued with each [treatment]." (Id.)
In March of 2008, Plaintiff was examined by her hand surgeon, Craig Davis, M.D. He noted that she had no significant swelling or dystrophic changes in her hand, and that she was able to move her hand with a full range of motion. (Id. at 702.) He also stated, "[r]egarding the possibility of CRPS, she does not fit the typical picture of this in that she does not have significant swelling or dystrophic changes and her pain is relatively localized to the middle finger." (Id. at 702.) He recommended further follow-up, however, and suggested that Plaintiff try a steroid injection in that finger. (Id.)
In June of 2008, John Aschberger, M.D., performed an independent medical examination as part of Plaintiff's worker's compensation case. Dr. Aschberger examined Plaintiff and also reviewed her medical records. (Id. at 520-23). He concluded that "the patient's presentation has subjective limitations only, without significant objective findings to indicate the presence of a permanent impairment. I agree with previous evaluations indicating that [Plaintiff's] pain complaints and functional limitations are excessive for the objective findings." (Id. at 522.) He also stated that his "examination is not suggestive of CRPS or other sympathetically mediated pain syndrome," that Plaintiff had reached MMI, and that she had zero percent impairment. (Id.)
Around this same time period, Plaintiff also began receiving treatment from the Lakewood Medical Center for hand pain. (Id. at 572.) In September of 2008, her treating physician, Dr. Hai Bui, concluded that Plaintiff had RSDS, but the only physical finding supporting this conclusion was a finding of "tenderness." (Id. at 567.) In October of 2008, Dr. Bui opined that Plaintiff was disabled due to hand pain (with a side note indicating "possible reflex sympathetic dystrophy"), anxiety, and depression. (Id. at 533-34.) In a letter, Dr. Bui stated that "Currently she complained of severe pain in the right hand, making her unable to work. . . . At this time, I believe she is not able to work due to her medical problems until further evaluate [sic] and treat [sic.]" (Id. at 534.)
In December of 2008, James Crosby, D.O., and Kathryn Polovitz, M.D., both neurologists at the University of Colorado, examined Plaintiff at Dr. Bui's request. (Id. at 526). During her appointment, Plaintiff complained of worsening pain. (Id.) Upon examination, Dr. Crosby noted that Plaintiff's right hand had normal muscle bulk and tone, but that he had difficulty performing a strength examination test "as she had difficulty understanding the instructions." (Id. at 527.) Nevertheless, the doctors did note that there was "much give way weakness
In April of 2009, Laura Moran, D.O., examined Plaintiff as part of her disability application. (Id. at 588-91.) At that time, Plaintiff complained of pain in her right hand and right middle finger, which radiated into her right arm and neck, as well as lower back pain with radiation into her left leg. (Id. at 588.) Plaintiff also reported that "she does nothing at all around the house all day and is unable to do any chores at all except for preparing simple meals." (Id.) After examining Plaintiff's right hand and right middle finger, Dr. Moran stated that she "found no evidence of cysts, abnormal range of motion or swelling," and that her finger and hand joints had a normal range of motion, as well as full strength (a "5" rating on a "5" scale.) (Id. at 589, 590.) Dr. Moran also opined that Plaintiff had no physical limitations, including in "all daily self-care activities and repetitive motions with her hands." (Id. at 591.)
That same month, Plaintiff received outpatient treatment from Jay Lee, M.D., at Denver Health Medical Center (Denver Health), for her right hand and lower back pain. (Id. at 787.) In May of 2009, Dr. Lee referred Plaintiff to an orthopedist at Denver Health, who stated that "she does not appear to have any appreciable joint swelling or redness," and "[s]he does not have any hard findings of CRPS at this point in time for our examination, and this does not appear to be a likely diagnosis." Nonetheless, this doctor believed it was possible that Plaintiff had myofascial pain and, thus, referred her to receive ganglion block injections. (Id. at 782-83.) When Plaintiff returned to Dr. Lee in October and November of 2009, with complaints of body aches, Dr. Lee believed that she might have fibromyalgia. (Id. at 803, 804.)
In January of 2010, Plaintiff was seen by Susan Ladley-O'Brien, M.D., a neurologist at Denver Health, who also thought that she might have fibromyalgia; she underwent a nerve conduction test of her right arm, which was only mildly abnormal, showing signs of possible median neuropathy. (Id. at 892-93.) She was subsequently treated at Denver Health for possible fibromyalgia and temporomandibular joint disorder (TMJ), throughout the beginning half of 2010. (Id. at 855, 866, 873, 881.) Specifically, Plaintiff obtained treatment for TMJ syndrome from the dental clinic at Denver Health. (Id. at 833-41, 848-56, 860-81). She was provided with a mandibular occlusive mouth guard split to wear at night (id.), but claims that her disorder continues to the present time, resulting in frequent headaches and neck stiffness (Doc. # 18 at 4.)
In June of 2010, she was examined by Dennis Boyle, M.D., a treating physician at the Rheumatology Clinic at Denver Health. Dr. Boyle stated that Plaintiff had "widespread chronic pain. Classic story with LBP [low back pain] being 80-90% of the symptoms," and that "this [was] much more than" fibromyalgia. However, he did not describe any physical findings to support this diagnosis. (AR at 847.)
Plaintiff continued to receive intermittent treatment at Denver Health throughout 2010, for a variety of issues — including fibromyalgia, lower back pain, TMJ, dental problems, and infections. In December of 2010, Dr. Lee completed a residual functional capacity form for plaintiff, diagnosing her with chronic lower back pain and complex regional pain syndrome, and stating that she could sit and stand 15 minutes at a time and two hours per day, and could rarely lift up to 10 pounds. (Id. at 929-31).
In October of 2011, Plaintiff returned to visit Dr. Lee, and he concluded that she had complex regional pain syndrome, but provided no physical findings to support this diagnosis. (Id. at 1183.) Over a year later, in March of 2012, Dr. Lee opined that Plaintiff was experiencing significant pain because she "reports having pain" and because she stated that "the pain is severe and constant." He also opined that her pain limited her ability to sit, stand walk, lift, and carry, but he did not determine how long (or under what circumstances) she might be able to conduct these tasks. (Id. at 1011, 1013-14.) Dr. Lee did, however, caution that it was "difficult to answer" whether her "description of the location, intensity, duration and frequency of the pain" was consistent with medical and clinical findings, as, "at times," he "fel[t] that her symptoms [were] not consistent with the medical/clinical findings." (Id. at 1012.)
At her second hearing before the ALJ in September of 2012, Plaintiff testified that she was disabled due to chronic pain in both arms and legs (particularly in her right wrist, which she described as "needle pain, burning, sharp pain, lots of pain"), as well as lower back pain, jaw pain, and neck pain. (Id. at 154-55, 159.) On "bad days," she testified that she could not function well and stayed in bed and took medications, while on "good days," she could "go out in the back yard and take a fresh air [sic] and come back in." (Id. at 155.) Additionally, Plaintiff stated that she must shift positions frequently and required help from family, friends and neighbors to purchase groceries. (Id. at 162, 163.) She also testified that she uses a cane (and has done so since 2010), wears a TMJ device every night (and has done so since 1999 or 2000), and that she wears a splint on her right wrist 5-6 days a week and when she leaves her home. (Id. at 154, 156, 160-61.) She further testified she was limited to lifting 4-5 pounds, standing for 15-30 minutes, and that she could only ascend stairs by crawling. (Id. at 162, 163, 166.) Per the ALJ's questions, she stated that that she can pay bills and count change and needed no reminders to take her medicine or perform her own grooming. (Id. at 166.)
The ALJ also received evidence from a 2009 fraud investigation conducted by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in connection with Plaintiff's disability benefits application. The OIG's Report states that the investigation occurred because Plaintiff's allegations relating to pain in her hand were "in excess of the objective medical findings," and because "one treating source indicated [that] there may be symptom magnification." (Id. at 493.) The OIG report detailed how, on April 17, 2009, two Colorado State Patrol investigators witnessed Plaintiff entering and exiting multiple buildings with a purse over her right shoulder and a bag in her left hand; walking without a cane or other assistive device; and shopping at two different grocery stores by herself (including picking out items at one grocery store and placing them in her cart, and carrying grocery bags to her parked vehicle at both stores). (Id. at 494-95.) A few days later, the investigators conducted another surveillance session, in which they again witnessed Plaintiff carrying her purse over her right shoulder, a plastic bag in her left hand, and walking without the use of a cane or other assistive device. The investigators later approached her parent's house and knocked on the door, and Plaintiff quickly walked to the front door to greet them. (Id. at 496-97).
Additionally, a neutral Vocational Expert testified that based on Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, she could return to her past relevant work as a hairdresser. (Id. at 144.)
On September 28, 2012, the ALJ issued a second unfavorable decision, denying benefits. (Id. at 99.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2012. (Id. at 82.) In applying the five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920 to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ determined that:
1. Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of February 22, 2008 [Step 1];
2. Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: "disorder of the right hand, fingers, and wrist; temporomandibular joint disorder (TMJ); left leg disorder; fibromyalgia; chronic pain syndrome; pain or somatoform disorder; depressive disorder; and adjustment disorder" [Step 2];
3. Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 [Step 3];
4. Plaintiff had the RFC "to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following non-exertion limitations. The claimant is able to frequently push, pull or otherwise operate hand controls with the right upper extremity. She can frequently push, pull or otherwise operate foot controls with the left lower extremity. She is able to frequently handle and finger bilaterally. The claimant should avoid climbing ladders/ropes/scaffolds. The claimant cannot perform any work involving safety operations, or have direct responsibility for the safety of others. The Claimant is able to communicate in English. She cannot perform any work above SVP 6" [Step 4]; and
5. Plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant work as a hairdresser. [Step 5]. (Id. at 82, 84.)
Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review this portion of the ALJ's decision, which it declined to do. (Id. at 1-3.) On July 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed her appeal to this Court of the Commissioner's final decision. (Doc. # 1.) Plaintiff filed her opening brief on December 10, 2014, and the Commissioner responded on January 9, 2015. (Doc. ## 18, 19.)
The Court reviews the ALJ's decision to determine whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the factual findings and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. (quoting Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007)). Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record. Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2005). In so reviewing, the Court may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff raises three arguments in support of her contention that the ALJ's decision should be reversed. First, she argues that the ALJ did not apply the correct legal standards in determining the credibility of her statements and that his determination was not supported by substantial evidence. Second, she contends that the ALJ improperly weighed the opinions and findings of Plaintiff's treating physicians and that his decisions to assign these opinions and findings less than controlling weight were not supported by substantial evidence. Third, she argues that the ALJ did not apply the correct legal standards in determining Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC), and that his determination of her RFC was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court will address each contention in turn.
As the Commissioner noted, the ALJ devoted a significant part of his decision to an evaluation of Plaintiff's credibility. See (AR at 86-88, 94-95.) Plaintiff argues, however, that the ALJ failed to give sufficiently specific reasons for disbelieving the Plaintiff and also contends that he failed to apply
Plaintiff essentially contends that the ALJ improperly discounted her complaints of pain because of a lack of objective evidence. Therefore, Plaintiff argues, the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard. However, "[a] claimant's subjective allegation of pain is not sufficient in itself to establish disability." Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1993). Instead, "[
Id. (citing Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1987)).
In the instant case, the ALJ carefully analyzed the record as a whole and set forth the specific reasons supporting his negative credibility assessment, and these factors are well-supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Although Plaintiff argues that the ALJ impermissibly used evidence of Plaintiff's minimal daily activities as substantial evidence that a claimant does not suffer disabling pain in contravention of the Tenth Circuit's holding in Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1490 (10th Cir. 1993), the ALJ's discussion of Plaintiff's daily activities was in the context of a determination of her credibility, not a determination of her pain. Specifically, the ALJ stated that "The claimant's activities of daily living are not as limited as one would expect given her allegations of debilitating symptoms." (AR at 86.) Moreover, the ALJ specifically noted that she did not follow the advice of treating physicians, including recommendations for biofeedback, acupuncture, and pain injections. (Id. at 90.)
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ's discussion of "secondary gain" — that is, the emphasis the ALJ placed on Plaintiff's pecuniary interest in the outcome of her hearing — rendered his entire credibility assessment illegitimate. (Doc. # 18 at 13.) In particular, Plaintiff's Reply brief notes that the ALJ's first decision, which Plaintiff objected to and which was ultimately remanded by the Appeals Council, relied heavily on his concern about Plaintiff's pecuniary gain, as it explicitly stated that "It is clear in this case, that the pecuniary interest factor is present. . . . I conclude that the claimant's evidence is inevitably colored by the claimant's pecuniary interest in the outcome of this disability claim." (AR at 184.) However, the second ALJ decision did not place undue emphasis on Plaintiff's possible pecuniary gain and correctly evaluated her credibility based on her own statements, the OIG investigation, the medical evidence, and the record as a whole. Accordingly, the ALJ "clearly and affirmatively linked his adverse determination of [Plaintiff's] credibility to substantial record evidence . . . and [this Court's] limited scope of review precludes [it] from reweighing the evidence or substituting [its] judgment for that of the agency." Wall, 561 F.3d at 1070.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ "essentially gave no significant weight" to the opinions of Dr. Jay Lee, despite the fact that Dr. Lee had treated Plaintiff for more than two years on a regular basis and had access to her complete medical records. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to apply the guidelines of SSR 96-2p, which provide that "treating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927."
The standards an ALJ must follow when analyzing a treating doctor's opinion are well-settled. The ALJ first considers "whether the opinion is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is consistent with the other substantial evidence in the record." Pisciotta v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 1074, 1077 (10th Cir. 2007). If so, the ALJ must give the opinion controlling weight. Id. But if the ALJ decides the treating physician's opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, "the ALJ must then consider whether the opinion should be rejected altogether or assigned some lesser weight." Id. Relevant factors the ALJ may consider are set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d). These factors include:
Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). The failure to discuss all six factors is not fatal to an ALJ's decision. See Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007) (declining to require ALJ to apply and make specific findings concerning all six factors).
The Court first considers whether the ALJ properly analyzed Dr. Lee's opinion in determining if it was entitled to controlling weight. The ALJ's decision recognized that Dr. Lee was a treating source and thoroughly discussed his opinion, but ultimately provided sound reasons to decide that it was not entitled to controlling weight. Specifically, the ALJ stated that the type of examination performed by Dr. Lee was problematic: "[i]t appears from the medical records that Dr. Lee accepted at face value the statements made and symptoms reported to the claimant. For example, there is nothing in the medical treatment records to suggest that Dr. Lee conducted any sort of validity testing." (Id. at 94.) The ALJ also noted that "It appears Dr. Lee's opinions are simply based upon the claimant's subjective reports of constant pain rather than his own independent clinical findings." (Id. at 95.) Because Dr. Lee's conclusions as to Plaintiff's functional limitations and/or ability to work hinged on the accuracy and credibility of Plaintiff's self-reporting and because the ALJ found that Plaintiff's allegations were not credible, the ALJ properly decided that Dr. Lee's opinions were not entitled to controlling weight. (Id. at 94-95.) An ALJ can properly reject a physician's disability opinion that is premised on the claimant's own subjective complaint of disabling symptoms which the ALJ properly discounted. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). Under such circumstances, the medical source's opinion is no more credible than the statements upon which it was based. Id.
The ALJ also noted that Dr. Lee's opinions were not entitled to controlling weight because they were contradicted by diagnostic medical evidence elsewhere in the record. (AR at 94.) The ALJ cited, for example,
The ALJ's reliance on specific, physical examination findings, rather than Plaintiff's own subjective statements — particularly in the face of his negative credibility findings — was proper. See White, 287 F.3d at 907 (holding that the ALJ set forth specific and legitimate reasons for discounting a treating physician's opinion when the ALJ "noted that the consulting physician performed more specific tests measuring [Plaintiff's] range of motion in her legs, back, and arms," and because her treating physician's assessment "was based on [Plaintiff's] subjective assertions rather than objective medical evidence.").
Although the ALJ did not specifically state the weight he conferred to Dr. Lee's opinion (i.e., whether the opinion should be rejected altogether or assigned some lesser weight), he did implicitly assign Dr. Lee's opinion lesser weight than those of the other examining physicians he cited. Accordingly, his failure to explicitly determine its weight is not cause for remand. See Mays v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 569, 575 (10th Cir. 2014) (declining to remand when the ALJ did not expressly state the weight he was giving to treating physician's opinion, because "the ALJ implicitly declined to give the opinion controlling weight," and the Court could "tell from the decision that the ALJ declined to give controlling weight to [the] opinion.")
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's determination of her RFC is not supported by substantial evidence, because he (1) "summarily" rejected the opinions of Plaintiff's treating physicians and (2) gave undue weight to the opinions of her worker's compensation treatment providers and the consultative exam report from Dr. Moran. She also contends that the RFC determination "flies in the face of the objective findings and reports from her treating physicians." (Doc. # 18 at 14-15.)
Plaintiff's argument appears to misunderstand the relationship between the role of the ALJ and the role of medical sources in the determination of a particular claimant's RFC. The ALJ is not obligated to base his RFC findings on any particular medical source's opinion, including the treating physician. Indeed, the ALJ is not required to adopt or rely on
Concomitantly, although the ALJ cannot ignore medical opinions relating to a claimant's functional capacity, Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 2012), he is not obligated to include in his residual functional capacity assessment every limitation possibly suggested by a medical source. See Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that "an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence," and an ALJ's opinion must only discuss the uncontroverted evidence he or she chooses not to rely upon and any significantly probative evidence he or she rejects); Chapo, 682 F.3d at 1288 (noting that "there is no requirement in the regulations for a direct correspondence between an RFC finding and a specific medical opinion on the functional capacity in question.") Moreover, when the medical evidence does not contradict the ALJ's conclusion, "the need for express analysis is weakened." Howard, 379 F.3d at 947.
As discussed above, the ALJ did not "summarily" reject the findings of Dr. Lee, but had sound reasons for failing to assign his opinions controlling weight. The ALJ specifically examined why he credited Dr. Moran's opinion over Dr. Lee's, and his findings clearly demonstrate that he carefully considered the Plaintiff's purported functional limitations in rendering his RFC. Specifically, he included reasonable manipulative (limiting the use of frequent hand and foot controls) and environmental (avoiding climbing ladders, ropes, scaffolds) limitations in his RFC. (AR at 84.) This tempering of Dr. Moran's opinion that Plaintiff had no functional limitations is permissible because it was in Plaintiff's favor and grounded in substantial evidence. Chapo, 682 F.3d at 1288 ("if a medical opinion adverse to the claimant has properly been given substantial weight, the ALJ does not commit reversible error by electing to temper its extremes for the claimant's benefit.")
In her Reply brief, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Moran's worker's compensation examination was limited to considering Plaintiff's hand injury, not her other claimed impairments, including TMJ, fibromyalgia, chronic pain syndrome, or depressive and adjustment disorder. (Doc. # 20 at 5.) As for the depressive or adjustment disorders, Plaintiff did not appeal the ALJ's mental RFC determination, so these limitations are not relevant for purposes of this appeal. As for Plaintiff's other purported limitations, the ALJ specifically discussed why he did not credit the findings of physicians with regard to fibromyalgia and chronic pain syndrome — i.e., a lack of physical, objective medical evidence, which is required for an impairment to be shown under the Social Security Act, and which he explicitly weighed against the credibility of Plaintiff's subjective statements. (AR at 90-93.) See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (emphasis added) ("The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion,
In sum, the ALJ's residual functional capacity findings have substantial support in the record, and he applied the correct legal standard in determining the RFC. As such, the Court finds no grounds for remand on this issue.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the ALJ's denial of social security disability benefits in this case is AFFIRMED. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney fees.
