RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

KRISTEN L. MIX, Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Freddie Mac's Motion to Dismiss [#36]1 (the "Motion"). Plaintiff filed a Response [#40] and Defendant Freddie Mac filed a Reply [#41] in further support of the Motion. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 72.1(c)(3), the Motion has been referred [#37] to the undersigned for a recommendation regarding disposition. The Court has reviewed the Motion, the Response, the Reply, the entire docket, and the applicable law, and is sufficiently advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion [#36] be GRANTED.

I. Background

Plaintiff asserts five causes of action against "[a]ll Defendants" and seeks injunctive relief, actual damages, punitive damages, costs, and fees for Defendants' alleged actions relating to the mortgage on Plaintiff's residence located at 548 South Pearl Street, Denver, Colorado, 80209 (the "Property"). See generally Compl. [#5]. In support of these claims, Plaintiff alleges that in June 2001 she signed a promissory note (the "Note") in the amount of $275,000 amortized over 30 years and a deed of trust (the "Deed of Trust") relating to the Property. Id. at 3. The Note was later sold to Defendant Bank. Id. at 3-4. Specifically, Plaintiff brings the following claims against all Defendants: breach of contract, usury, fraud and deceit, intentional misrepresentation, and slander. Id. at 10-17.2

The Court previously summarized Plaintiff's allegations and analyzed Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Bank of America in detail. See generally Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge [#17] (the "Recommendation"); Order Adopting January 23, 2014 Recommendation of Magistrate Judge and Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [#25] (the "Bank Order"). However, at that time Defendant Freddie Mac had not been served and, therefore, had not responded to Plaintiff's claims. See generally Order to Show Cause [#16]; Minute Order [#22]; Return of Service [#24]; Order to Show Cause [#30]; Response to Order to Show Cause [#31]; Minute Order [#32]; Response to Order to Show Cause [#33] (attaching proof of service). After analyzing Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Bank of America, the undersigned recommended that all claims except the slander claim be dismissed. Recommendation [#17] at 20-21. Plaintiff objected [#19] and the District Judge overruled her objections and adopted the Recommendation. Bank Order [#25] at 7.

The Court does not reiterate the factual background included in the Recommendation and instead incorporates it by reference and summarizes certain factual allegations relevant to the Motion. Recommendation [#17] at 2-7. In short, Plaintiff alleges that in 2005 she failed to make two mortgage payments to Defendant Bank of America, but that she reached an agreement with Defendant Bank of America and resumed making monthly payments. Compl. [#35] at 3-4. Plaintiff avers that in the summer of 2007 Defendant Bank of America began to foreclose on the Property and in September 2007 refused to accept her payments toward the Note. Id. Plaintiff maintains that when she spoke to an employee of Defendant Bank of America regarding the refused payments, she was told that "the title work had not been properly filed by [Defendant Bank of America] for the 2005 modification [and], therefore[,] it was not binding." Id. Plaintiff further alleges that when she suggested that Defendant Bank of America file the title work, Defendant Bank of America's "representative stated that they no longer wished to honor the modification terms and it was `your word against ours' that the modification ever existed." Id. at 4-5 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff contends that because the Property was in foreclosure she was unable to obtain financing from any other bank. Id. at 5.

According to Plaintiff, in or around 2009 she discovered that Defendant Freddie Mac had purchased the Note. Id. Notably this is the only mention of Defendant Freddie Mac in the Complaint. Plaintiff states that she spoke to an employee of Defendant Freddie Mac and reached an agreement regarding a modification to the Note and was told that the documents would be mailed to her for signature. Id. at 6. She states that the paperwork she received "[m]any months later" did not reflect the agreed upon terms. Id. Plaintiff maintains that after she refused the new terms, Defendant Bank of America set a foreclosure sale date either "in retaliation or as inducement." Id. at 7. Plaintiff contends that she and Defendant Bank of America have been repeating this cycle for several years and that "for nearly eight years [the Property] has been held in a constant state of foreclosure in which [Defendant Bank of America] would postpone the sale date but never actually remove the [P]roperty from the foreclosure rolls causing it to be continually reported to credit agencies as being in foreclosure, even when [Plaintiff] was in trial modification periods, making payments to [Defendant Bank of America] or working with [Defendant Bank of America] to modify the loan." Id. Plaintiff further alleges that "since 2007 [Defendant Bank of America] has been reporting that [Plaintiff] is delinquent and in foreclosure on two loans when she only has one loan with [Defendant Bank]." Id. (emphasis in original).

The remainder of Plaintiff's factual allegations all involve Defendant Bank of America and Plaintiff's interactions with that Defendant's employees. Id. at 7-11. In the Motion, Defendant Freddie Mac argues that Plaintiff's claims asserted against it should be dismissed for the same reasons that the Court dismissed the claims asserted against Defendant Bank of America. Motion [#36] at 3. With regard to the slander claim that was not dismissed as to Defendant Bank of America, Defendant Freddie Mac argues that Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support a slander claim against it. Id. Specifically,

Id. at 3-4.

In her Response, Plaintiff argues that

Response [#40] at 1. Plaintiff goes on to allege new facts regarding Freddie Mac, such as that she corresponded with Freddie Mac employees as early as August 2007. Id. The remainder of the Response consists of new factual allegations either not included in the Complaint or that expand in detail on allegations made in the Complaint. Id. at 2-4. Plaintiff then attaches various email correspondence and a chart entitled "Loan History March 2005 — forward," which is handwritten at the top. Id. at 5-34.

In the Reply, Defendant Freddie Mac notes that Plaintiff offers no legal support in opposition to the Motion "[n]or does [she] attempt to show that the actual allegations in her Complaint stated a claim against Freddie Mac." Reply [#41] at 1. Defendant Freddie Mac then revisits its arguments regarding Plaintiff's slander claim, noting that "[n]one of Plaintiff's allegations indicate that Freddie Mac reported anything to the credit reporting agencies." Id. at 3. Defendant Freddie Mac further argues that Plaintiff's argument that Freddie Mac and Bank of America should be treated as one entity is not supported by the law. Id. at 3-4. Defendant Freddie Mac maintains that to the extent Plaintiff alleges that the two Defendants are agents for each other, such argument is contrary to existing law. Id. at 3-4. Defendant Freddie Mac further argues that Plaintiff's new allegation that Defendants has a principal-agent relationship is conclusory and not made in the Complaint and, as a result, cannot defeat a motion to dismiss. Id. at 4.

II. Documents Submitted by Plaintiff

In the Recommendation, the Court previously analyzed the documents presented by Plaintiff and Defendant Bank of America and concluded that only certain documents could be considered by the Court. The District Judge summarized these findings as follows:

Bank Order [#25] at 4-5. As the District Judge noted, Plaintiff did not object to that portion of the Recommendation. The Court, again, incorporates by reference this portion of the Recommendation.

As with the emails Plaintiff attached to her response to Defendant Bank of America's motion to dismiss, the Court does not consider the emails Plaintiff attaches to the Response. As previously explained by the Court:

Recommendation [#17] at 7-10. In sum, the email correspondence attached to Plaintiff's Response, Response [#40] at 5-31, appears to be correspondence with employees of Defendant Bank of America and Defendant Freddie Mac. These documents will not be considered by the Court for the reasons stated above and in the Recommendation. Even if the Court could consider them, it could not consider the contents of the emails. Therefore, the emails provide no support for Plaintiff's claims because they simply show that there was correspondence between Plaintiff and employees of these Defendants.

With regard to the chart attached to the Response with the handwritten heading "Loan History March 2005 — forward," Response [#40] at 32-34, the Court cannot consider it because it does not fall within any of the three categories discussed above.

III. Standard of Review

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 8(a)

The Rule 12(b)(6) standard tests "the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint after taking those allegations as true." Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "[t]he complaint must plead sufficient facts, taken as true, to provide `plausible grounds' that discovery will reveal evidence to support plaintiff's allegations." Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "[P]lausibility refers to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiff[ has] not nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, "[a] pleading that offers `labels and conclusions' or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does the complaint suffice if it tenders `naked assertion[s]' devoid of `further factual enhancement.'" Id. (citation omitted). That said, "[s]pecific facts are not necessary[. Instead,] the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[, and is not required to] include all facts necessary to carry the plaintiff's burden." Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1192 (internal citation and quotation omitted).

"The plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). As the Tenth Circuit has explained, "the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims." Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are `merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it `stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

"Under Rule 8, a plaintiff must provide a `short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Tuttamore v. Lappin, 429 F. App'x 687, 689 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). As with Rule 12(b)(6), "to overcome a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff's allegations must move from conceivable to plausible." Id. Indeed, "Rule 8(a)'s mandate . . . has been incorporated into the 12(b)(6) inquiry." U.S. ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, 614 F.3d 1163, 1171 (10th Cir. 2010). Rule 8 enables "the court and the defendants to know what claims are being asserted and to determine how to respond to those claims." Tuttamore, 429 F. App'x at 689.

B. Pro Se Litigants

The Court must construe the filings of pro se litigants liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 594, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Court should not be the pro se litigants' advocate, nor should the Court "supply additional factual allegations to round out [the pro se litigants'] complaint or construct a legal theory on [their] behalf." Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110). Additionally, pro se litigants must follow the same procedural rules that govern other litigants. Nielson v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994).

IV. Analysis

A. The Claims Previously Dismissed as to Defendant Bank of America

Plaintiff's breach of contract, fraud and deceit, and intentional misrepresentation claims against Defendant Bank of America were dismissed by the Court for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff makes clear that her factual allegations against both Defendants are identical. Accordingly, the Court will not reanalyze those claims here and instead incorporates by reference the portion of the Recommendation analyzing then and recommending that they be dismissed. See Recommendation [#17] at 12-18.

Briefly, the Court notes that while the Recommendation focused on Plaintiff's allegations regarding her communications with Bank of America employees, her allegation that she corresponded with Ms. Rippeon, an employee of Defendant Freddie Mac, regarding her loan does not dictate a different outcome regarding Defendant Freddie Mac. As noted in the Recommendation, Colorado's Credit Agreement Statute of Frauds ("CCASF")

Recommendation [#17] at 12-13. Therefore, Plaintiff's breach of contract claim against Defendant Freddie Mac, which is premised on Plaintiff's allegations regarding her correspondence with Ms. Rippeon, is barred by the CCASF. As explained in more detail in the Recommendation, the CCASF also bars tort claims that rely on alleged representations pertaining to a credit agreement that are not reduced to writing. Id. at 14 (collecting cases). As a result, Plaintiff's fraud and deceit and intentional misrepresentation claims against Defendant Freddie Mac are barred. Id. at 14-15. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff's first cause of action (breach of contract) is premised on any alleged representations by Defendant Freddie Mac regarding a modification of the Note, the Court recommends that the claim be dismissed with prejudice. See Berneike v. Citimortgage, Inc., 708 F.3d 1141, 1151 (10th Cir. 2013) (the "district court may dismiss without granting leave to amend when it would be futile to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to amend [her] complaint.") (modification in original) (quoting Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006)). The Court further recommends that Plaintiff's third (fraud and deceit) and fourth (intentional misrepresentation) causes of action brought against Defendant Freddie Mac be dismissed with prejudice. See Schwartz v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 10-cv-01225-WYD-MJW, 2011 WL 1135001, at *7, *10 (D. Colo. March 28, 2011) (finding seventh cause of action barred by the CCASF and dismissing it with prejudice).

To the extent Plaintiff attempts to allege a breach of contract claim against Defendant Freddie Mac related to the Deed of Trust, Plaintiff offers no factual allegations to support such a claim against this Defendant. However, even if the Complaint did make clear that Plaintiff was bringing a breach of contract claim against Defendant Freddie Mac relating to the Deed of Trust, such claim would fail for the reasons stated in the Recommendation.

Recommendation [#17] at 15-17. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff's first cause of action (breach of contract) is based on an alleged breach of the Deed of Trust by Defendant Freddie Mac, the Court recommends that the claim be dismissed without prejudice. See Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 127 (10th Cir. 1990) (prejudice should not attach to a dismissal when plaintiff has made allegations "which, upon further investigation and development, could raise substantial issues").

As explained in the Recommendation, to the extent Plaintiff brings a usury claim, that claim fails as a matter of law.

Recommendation [#17] at 17-18. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's second cause of action (usury) be dismissed with prejudice to the extent it is asserted against Defendant Freddie Mac. See Berneike, 708 F.3d at 1151 (the "district court may dismiss without granting leave to amend when it would be futile to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to amend [her] complaint.") (modification in original) (quoting Brereton, 434 F.3d at 1219).

B. Slander

In her fifth cause of action Plaintiff makes the conclusory allegation that "[all] Defendants" slandered her "by falsely reporting to credit agencies that [she] was in default on loan payments for the last eight years when in fact [she] was only late on two payments . . ." Compl. [#5] at 16. Plaintiff also alleges that "[a]ll Defendants" reported to credit agencies that she was in default on two loans "when Plaintiff only had one loan with Defendants." Id. at 17. However, Plaintiff's more specific factual allegations made in support of this claim are only directed at Defendant Bank of America:

Compl. [#5] at 7 (emphasis in original).

While Plaintiff argues in her Response that all allegations made against Defendant Bank of America should be construed as implicitly referring to both Defendants, Response [#40] at 1, her position is not supported by the law. As the Supreme Court has explained, "the most basic features of an agency relationship are missing here. Agency requires more than mere authorization to assert a particular interest. An essential element of agency is the principal's right to control the agent's actions." Hollingsworth v. Perry, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2665 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Villalpando v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 181 P.3d 357, 362 (Colo. App. 2007) ("An agency relationship `results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.'" (quoting Rush Creek Solutions, Inc. v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 407 (Colo. App. 2004)). Nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff allege such a relationship or facts that would allow the Court to infer such a relationship. Instead, she merely alleges that "Freddie Mac had purchased her loan. . . ." Compl. [#5] at 5.

Further, Plaintiff, as the party bringing this case, is required to "explain what each defendant did to him or her; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed him or her; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated." Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The general rule that pro se pleadings must be construed liberally has limits and "the court cannot take on the responsibility of serving as the litigant's attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record." Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). The twin purposes of a complaint are to give the opposing parties fair notice of the basis for the claims against them so that they may respond and to allow the Court to conclude that the allegations, if proven, show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Monument Builders of Greater Kansas City, Inc. v. Am. Cemetery Ass'n of Kansas, 891 F.2d 1473, 1480 (10th Cir. 1989). The requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 are designed to meet these purposes. See TV Commc'ns Network, Inc. v. ESPN, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1991), aff'd, 964 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1992). Rule 8(a) provides that a complaint "must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, . . . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought." The philosophy of Rule 8(a) is reinforced by Rule 8(d)(1), which provides that "[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct." Taken together, Rules 8(a) and (d)(1) underscore the emphasis placed on clarity and brevity by the federal pleading rules. Plaintiff's Complaint makes clear which Defendant took various actions. Nowhere in the Complaint does she allege that Freddie Mac reported information to credit agencies. The fact that in her "Fifth Cause of Action," she names "All Defendants" and asserts conclusory allegations against "All Defendants," does not save this claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (2009) ("[A] pleading that offers `labels and conclusions' or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . ."). Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's fifth cause of action (slander) against Defendant Freddie Mac be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

V. Conclusion4

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion [#36] be GRANTED and that all of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Freddie Mac be dismissed as follows:

The Court FURTHER RECOMMENDS that to the extent Plaintiff's first cause of action (breach of contract) is premised on any alleged representations by Defendant Freddie Mac regarding a modification of the Note, the claim be DISMISSED with prejudice.5

The Court FURTHER RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's third (fraud and deceit) and fourth (intentional misrepresentation) causes of action against Defendant Freddie Mac be DISMISSED with prejudice.6

The Court FURTHER RECOMMENDS that to the extent Plaintiff's first cause of action (breach of contract) is based on an alleged breach of the Deed of Trust by Defendant Freddie Mac, the claim be dismissed without prejudice.7

The Court FURTHER RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's second cause of action (usury) against Defendant Freddie Mac be dismissed with prejudice.8

The Court FURTHER RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's fifth cause of action (slander) against Defendant Freddie Mac be dismissed without prejudice.9

IT IS ORDERED that pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service of this Recommendation to serve and file any written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned. A party's failure to serve and file specific, written objections waives de novo review of the Recommendation by the District Judge, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147-48 (1985), and also waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions. Makin v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999); Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1412-13 (10th Cir. 1996). A party's objections to this Recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the District Court or for appellate review. United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996).