PHILIP A. BRIMMER, District Judge.
Applicant, Dirk Brown, a state prisoner in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections, is currently incarcerated at the Buena Vista Correctional Complex-Main & Boot Camp (BVCC) of the Colorado State Penitentiary in Buena Vista, Colorado. He is serving sentences for judgments of conviction imposed by the Arapahoe County District Court in Case No. 10CR131.
On August 13, 2015, Applicant filed a pro se application for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 raising the following claims:
Docket No. 1.
Respondents have filed a Pre-Answer Response [Docket No. 9] and an Answer on the Merits [Docket No. 27]. Applicant has not filed any replies.
The Court must construe the Application liberally because Applicant is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Court does not "assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant." See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that Mr. Brown is not entitled to habeas relief.
On direct appeal of Applicant's conviction, the Colorado Court of Appeals described the relevant factual background as follows:
Docket No. 9-2, pp. 2-4.
Applicant filed a direct appeal. Docket No. 9-3 (opening brief). On June 4, 2014, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. Docket No. 9-2 (People v. Brown, No. 12CA0181 (Colo. Ct. App. June 4, 2014) (not published)). On January 12, 2015, the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari review. Docket No. 9-6.
In the course of reviewing state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings, a federal court does not sit as a superstate appellate court. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). "When a federal district court reviews a state prisoner's habeas [application] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 it must decide whether the [applicant] is `in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.' The court does not review a judgment, but the lawfulness of the [applicant's] custody simpliciter." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991). See also Davis v. Ayala, ___ U.S. ____, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2202 (2015) ("The role of a federal habeas court is to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not to apply de novo review of factual findings and to substitute its own opinions for the determination made on the scene by the trial judge.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Specifically, the Habeas Corpus Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), provides that a writ of habeas corpus may not be issued with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court adjudication:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Mr. Brown bears the burden of proof under § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam).
The Court reviews claims of legal error and mixed questions of law and fact pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d 825, 830 (10th Cir. 2003). The threshold question the Court must answer under § 2254(d)(1) is whether Mr. Brown seeks to apply a rule of law that was clearly established by the Supreme Court at the time his conviction became final. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Clearly established federal law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412. Furthermore,
House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 2008). A legal principle is "clearly established" within the meaning of this provision only when it is embodied in a holding of the Supreme Court. Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). If the circumstances of a case are only similar to Supreme Court precedents, then the state court's decision is not "contrary to" the holdings in those cases. Woods v. Donald, ___ U.S. ____, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1377 (2015) ("Because none of our cases confront the specific question presented by this case, the state court's decision could not be contrary to any holding from this Court.") (quotations omitted). If there is no clearly established federal law, that is the end of the Court's inquiry pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). See Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 191 (2009).
If a clearly established rule of federal law is implicated, the Court must determine whether the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that clearly established rule of federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05.
House, 527 F.3d at 1018.
The Court's inquiry pursuant to the "unreasonable application" clause is an objective inquiry. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. "[A] decision is `objectively unreasonable' when most reasonable jurists exercising their independent judgment would conclude the state court misapplied Supreme Court law." Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671. Furthermore,
Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted). In conducting this analysis, the Court "must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported[] the state court's decision" and then "ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court." Id. Under this standard, "only the most serious misapplications of Supreme Court precedent will be a basis for relief under § 2254." Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671; see also Richter, 562 U.S. at 102 (stating that "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable").
Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.
This deference was explained in Renico v. Lett, 599 U.S. 766 (2010), where the Supreme Court reviewed the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's grant of a writ of habeas corpus to a defendant who was retried for murder following the trial judge's grant of a mistrial after the jury had deliberated for at least four hours following a relatively short, and far from complex, trial. The Michigan Supreme Court had concluded there was no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause because the trial court exercised its sound discretion. The federal district court granted a writ of habeas corpus and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, both concluding that the trial court's declaration of a mistrial constituted an abuse of discretion because there was no manifest necessity. The Supreme Court reversed.
Lett, 559 U.S. at 772-73. The Supreme Court further instructed:
Id. at 778, n. 3 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (it is "not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a `firm conviction' that the state court was `erroneous.'").
In addition, review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) ("If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that state court.").
In making this determination, a federal court must accord a presumption of correctness to a state court's factual findings, which a petitioner can rebut only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). Where a state court's factual findings are not made explicit, a federal court's "duty is to begin with the [state] court's legal conclusion and reason backward to the factual premises that, as a matter of reason and logic, must have undergirded it." Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 289 (3d Cir. 2000). In determining what implicit factual findings a state court made in reaching a conclusion, a federal court must infer that the state court applied federal law correctly. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 433 (1982). "The standard is demanding but not insatiable . . . [because] `[d]eference does not by definition preclude relief.'" Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)).
For federal habeas claims not adjudicated on the merits in state-court proceedings, the Court must exercise its independent judgment. McCracken v. Gibson, 268 F.3d 970, 975 (10th Cir. 2001). Any state-court findings of fact that bear upon the claim are entitled to a presumption of correctness rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence. Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1223 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness to state-court factual findings bearing upon the claim, even though the claim was not adjudicated on the merits by the state court).
The Court will apply the foregoing standards in reviewing Applicant's claims.
In his first claim, Applicant essentially asserts a claim of insufficient evidence to support his conviction. A failure to prove the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt renders a conviction for that crime a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228-29 (2001). The proper standard for sufficiency of the evidence is set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). In Jackson, the Supreme Court held that "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319. "This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Id. "Jackson leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw from the evidence presented at trial," and it requires only that they draw "`reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.'" Coleman v. Johnson, ___ U.S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (per curiam).
Federal courts must look to state law for the substantive elements of the criminal offense. Jackson at 324 n.16. To the extent an insufficient evidence claim involves an interpretation of state law, the state court's interpretation "binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus." Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam). See also Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 636 (1991) (federal courts are not free to substitute their own interpretations of state statutes for those of a state's courts); Mulanney v. Wilber, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (exceptional circumstances being absent, United States Supreme Court accepted, as binding, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction of its state homicide law). Moreover, when a state appellate court thoroughly reviews the sufficiency of evidence, that court's determination is entitled to great weight. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 36 (1993).
"Sufficiency of the evidence is a mixed question of law and fact." Maynard v. Boone, 468 F.3d 665, 673 (10th Cir. 2006). Because this Court reviews the state court's sufficiency of the evidence decision under the highly deferential standard of the AEDPA, the Court must determine whether the Colorado courts' decisions upholding his convictions were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented and whether the Courts reasonably decided that a "rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. This doubly deferential standard limits the federal habeas court's inquiry to whether the state court's rejection of a sufficiency of the evidence challenge was an objectively unreasonable application of Jackson. See Johnson, 132 S. Ct. at 2062.
In its review of Applicant's first claim, the Colorado Court of Appeals noted the evidence cited earlier in this order. It also noted:
Docket No. 9-2, pp. 2-8 (some internal quotations and citations omitted).
In reaching its determination of Applicant's first claim, the Colorado Court of Appeals applied the clearly established Supreme Court standard set forth in Jackson. Moreover, its conclusion that the evidence was sufficient is not an unreasonable application of the Jackson precedent; nor is it unreasonable in light of the facts presented. A review of the trial transcript supports the Court's conclusion that the evidence supported the jury's conclusion that Applicant's blood was deposited on the detergent bottle at the time of the robbery. Applicant's claim merely goes to Detective Bryant's credibility, which was the sole province of the jury to decide. "28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) gives federal habeas courts no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but not by them." Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983).
Applicant further appears to assert that Detective Bryant provided perjured testimony during his criminal trial. However, the mere introduction of perjured testimony, alone and without more, does not violate the constitutional rights of the accused. In order to establish a due process violation, an applicant must show that: 1) the witness' testimony was in fact false; 2) the prosecution knew it to be false; and 3) the testimony was material. Napue v. People of State of Ill., 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). See also United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 2002).
Applicant offers no evidence that Detective Bryant's testimony was false. As explained by the Court, her remarks about the age of the blood stain and picking up the bottle are not inconsistent with, let alone contradict, her testimony on direct examination. Inconsistent testimony alone does not establish the knowing use of perjured testimony. See Tapia v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1563 (10th Cir. 1991). Moreover, Applicant fails to show the prosecutor knew, or should have known, that Detective Bryant's testimony allegedly was false. Thus, he has failed to show a violation of his due process rights based on his allegation of perjured testimony. Therefore, Applicant is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
In his second claim, Applicant appears to assert that the Colorado Bureau of Investigation ("CBI") intentionally destroyed evidence. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). This standard of fairness requires that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Id. With respect to the preservation and destruction of evidence, states are required to preserve evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. Id. at 488. "To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." Id. at 489 (internal citation omitted).
Moreover, a defendant can establish a due process violation only if he can show that: 1) the government failed to preserve evidence that was "potentially useful" to the defense; and 2) the government acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). The inquiry into bad faith "must necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence." Id. at 58. However, the "mere fact that the government controlled the evidence and failed to preserve it is by itself insufficient to establish bad faith." Riggs v. Williams, 87 F. App'x 103, 106 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Youngblood). "This is true even if the government acted negligently . . . or even intentionally, so long as it did not act in bad faith." Id.
In its review of this claim, the CCA held as follows:
Docket No. 9-2, pp. 8-12.
Applicant's claim is based on mere conjecture. The evidence of the bottle and blood stains did not have an exculpatory value that was apparent at the time and Applicant has not shown that the failure to do additional testing was the result of bad faith. Cf. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 59 ("the police do not have a constitutional duty to perform any particular tests.") Therefore, this Court finds that the state court's determination of Applicant's second claim did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor did it result in an unreasonable determination of the facts presented in the state court proceeding. Thus, there is no basis upon which to grant the Application with regard to this claim.
Finally, in Claim 3 Applicant asserts that the warrant for his arrest failed the Constitution's particularity requirement because it identified him as being six foot four inches and weighing 465 pounds. He claims that his rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated because he is six feet and 160 pounds.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable search and seizure and is generally enforced through the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 254 (1983); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-87 (1976). In Stone, the Supreme Court limited federal habeas review for alleged Fourth Amendment violations based on the Court's determination that any additional contribution gained from consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review is small in relation to the associated costs. 428 U.S. at 493-94. The Supreme Court further held that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Id. at 494.
The Supreme Court has not defined precisely the phrase "opportunity for full and fair litigation." See Gamble v. State of Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 1978). In Gamble, the Tenth Circuit provided the following guidance:
Id. at 1165. "Thus, a federal court is not precluded from considering Fourth Amendment claims in habeas corpus proceedings where the state court willfully refuses to apply the correct and controlling constitutional standards." Id.
In the instant action, Applicant filed a motion in state court arguing that his detention was illegal based on a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights with respect to the "defective" arrest warrant. See Docket No. 27-3. The trial court ruled on his motion as follows:
Docket No. 27-5, at 9-10 (Tr. 6/23/11, pp. 9-10).
The Court finds that the state court proceedings sufficed to provide Applicant with an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his claim. See Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1265 (10th Cir. 1999). Moreover, the Court finds that the state court recognized and applied correct constitutional standards in resolving Applicant's claim. Thus, the Court finds that Applicant was afforded a "procedural opportunity to raise or otherwise present" his Fourth Amendment claim in the state trial and appellate courts, and that the state courts recognized and applied correct Fourth Amendment standards. See Gamble, 583 F.2d at 1165. Accord Cannon v. Gibson, 259 F.3d 1253, 1263 (10th Cir. 2001) (illegal-arrest claim barred by Stone); Ezell v. Mullin, 201 F. App'x 599, 602 (10th Cir. 2006) (same).
Applicant's disagreement with the result of his hearing does not demonstrate that the state court failed to recognize, or wilfully ignored, controlling legal standards. Thus, the Court finds that Applicant is not entitled to federal habeas relief for his Fourth Amendment claim. Accordingly, Claim 3 provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief.
Adjudication of Applicant's first and second claims by the Colorado state courts did not result in a conclusion opposite to that reach by the Supreme Court on a question of law, unreasonably apply a governing legal principle to the facts of Applicant's case, or result in an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented. Moreover, Applicant's third claim is not cognizable in this habeas corpus application. Therefore, Applicant's request for federal habeas relief will be denied. Accordingly, it is
