ORDER AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER

ROBERT E. BLACKBURN, District Judge.

The matter before me is plaintiff's Complaint [#1],1 filed September 23, 2014, seeking review of the Commissioner's decision denying plaintiff's claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. I have jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The matter has been fully briefed, obviating the need for oral argument. I affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled as a result of obesity, affective disorder, degenerative changes to the right knee, substance abuse disorder, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder, and personality disorder. Following an earlier hearing before the agency, plaintiff's applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits were denied. On appeal to this court, the matter was remanded for further proceedings. Baysinger v. Astrue, 2012 WL 1044746 (D. Colo. March 28, 2012). A second administrative hearing was held December 7, 2012. At the time of that hearing, plaintiff was 35 years old. She has an eighth grade education and past relevant work experience as a care provider. She has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 1, 2005, her alleged date of onset.

The ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled and therefore not entitled to disability insurance benefits or supplemental security income benefits. Although the medical evidence established that suffered from severe impairments, the judge concluded that the severity of those impairments did not meet or equal any impairment listed in the social security regulations.2 The ALJ found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a range of light work with certain postural restrictions, which did not require dealing with the general public and required a Specific Vocational Preparation ("SVP") of 2 or less. Although this finding precluded plaintiff's past relevant work, the judge determined that there were other jobs existing in sufficient numbers in the national and local economies that he could perform. She therefore found plaintiff not disabled at step four of the sequential evaluation. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appeals Council. The Council found no basis for disturbing the ALJ's decision and refused to assume jurisdiction. Plaintiff then filed this action in federal court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A person is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act only if her physical and/or mental impairments preclude her from performing both her previous work and any other "substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2). "When a claimant has one or more severe impairments the Social Security [Act] requires the [Commissioner] to consider the combined effects of the impairments in making a disability determination." Campbell v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C)). However, the mere existence of a severe impairment or combination of impairments does not require a finding that an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. To be disabling, the claimant's condition must be so functionally limiting as to preclude any substantial gainful activity for at least twelve consecutive months. See Kelley v. Chater, 62 F.3d 335, 338 (10th Cir. 1995).

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled:

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(I)-(v).3 See also Williams v. Bowen 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988). The claimant has the initial burden of establishing a disability in the first four steps of this analysis. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294 n.5, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). The burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy. Id. A finding that the claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991).

Review of the Commissioner's disability decision is limited to determining whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hamilton v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 961 F.2d 1495, 1497-98 (10th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is evidence a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Brown, 912 F.2d at 1196. It requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of the evidence. Hedstrom v. Sullivan, 783 F.Supp. 553, 556 (D. Colo. 1992). "Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or constitutes mere conclusion." Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). Further, "if the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal test, there is a ground for reversal apart from a lack of substantial evidence." Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993). Although a reviewing court should meticulously examine the record, it may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner. Id.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Plaintiff brings numerous assignments of error in this appeal. None warrants remand. I therefore affirm the disability decision.

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment is infirm because it did not account for his finding that plaintiff "lacks the capacity to perform tasks requiring complex of detailed instructions . . ." (Tr. 646.) Plaintiff conveniently overlooks the remainder of this sentence, by which the ALJ stated that plaintiff nevertheless "appears fully capable of performing simple tasks such as those associated with unskilled work." (Tr. 646.) The ALJ incorporated that relevant conclusion into both in his hypothetical to the vocational expert (Tr. 662) and his residual functional capacity assessment (Tr. 643).

Although plaintiff insists that simple tasks may require complex instructions, she provides neither authority4 nor examples to support this counterintuitive argument. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo the existence of some such theoretical task, the ALJ's finding here is not undermined by failure to draw this distinction. The ALJ specifically found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity for work requiring an SVP of 2 or less.5 (Tr. 643.) That finding corresponds to unskilled work. See Social Security Ruling 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 at *3 (SSA Dec. 4, 2000). See also Vigil v. Colvin, 805 F.3d 1199, 1201 n.2 (10th Cir. 2015). "Unskilled work" is expressly defined as including, inter alia, work involving "[u]nderstanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions." Social Security Ruling 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185 at *9 (SSA July 2, 1996). See also Vigil, 805 F.3d at 1204. Thus, a limitation to unskilled work necessarily excludes jobs that involve complex or detailed instructions. Plaintiff's argument in this regard therefore is meritless.

Relatedly, plaintiff claims the residual functional capacity assessment fails to account for the moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace the ALJ found in connection at step two of the sequential evaluation. This argument is belied by the record. Indeed, the ALJ thoroughly explained why he did not include further limitations on plaintiff's ability to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace in formulating her residual functional capacity at step four, ultimately concluding that such limitations did not preclude her from performing the simple tasks associated with unskilled work. (Tr. 645-646.) Although an unexamined equivalence between unskilled work and the ability to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace may be error, see, e.g., Groberg v. Astrue, 505 Fed. Appx. 763, 770 (10th Cir. Dec. 14, 2012), an adequately substantiated finding — such as the ALJ made here — constitutes substantial evidence in support of the disability determination, see Vigil, 805 F.3d at 1204.

Plaintiff next faults the ALJ for failing to incorporate in the residual functional capacity assessment the moderate limitations endorsed by the non-examining psychiatrist, Dr. Alberta Ziomek. (See Tr. 449-450.) Here again, however, the ALJ's opinion clearly and adequately substantiates his reasons for doing so. The ALJ gave Dr. Ziomek's opinion "moderate" weight because it was based on a "thorough review of the record" and "consistent with the record as a whole" (Tr. 648), and apparently fully credited Dr. Ziomek's conclusion that plaintiff had "marked" limitation in her ability to interact with the general public by limiting plaintiff's residual functional capacity in that respect (see Tr. 450, 643). Nevertheless, the ALJ noted (as did the district court in the earlier appeal (see Tr. 677-678)) that the moderate restrictions Dr. Ziomek endorsed in the check-box portion of the form she completed did not appear to be incorporated into her ultimate, narrative opinion and lacked support in the record in any event. (Tr. 648.)6 This explanation, substantiated by the evidence of record, is more than sufficient to meet the ALJ's burden to adequately explain why Dr. Ziomek's proposed restrictions were not adopted. See Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *7 (SSA July 2, 1996).7

As directed by the district court on remand, the ALJ also reassessed the opinion of the consultative psychiatric examiner, Dr. Brett Valette. (See Tr. 649, 678-679.) In his original disability determination, the ALJ purportedly afforded this opinion "significant weight." (Tr. 39.) On reconsideration, however, he concluded that Dr. Valette's report could not be construed to state a medical opinion regarding plaintiff's ability to perform work-related activities, and therefore did not assign it any particular weight.8 (Tr. 649.) See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) ("Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.").

Plaintiff's suggestion that this conclusion obligated the ALJ to recontact Dr. Valette is insupportable for at least two reasons. First, the duty to recontact a medical source is triggered only when the ALJ is unable to reach a conclusion regarding disability based on the evidence before him, not merely because he rejects that source's opinion. See White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 908 (10th Cir. 2001). Second, it appears plain to this court that recontacting Dr. Valette would have been futile. Dr. Valette described plaintiff as "vague and evasive" during her examination and questioned whether she had given full effort and had exaggerated her symptoms. Together with the conflicting answers she gave in response to his questions, Dr. Valette stated that, overall, plaintiff was "just not credible." (Tr. 437-439.) In light of these statements, it appears clear to this court that Dr. Valette could not have given a supportable medical opinion about her work-related functional abilities in any event.

Plaintiff next claims error also in the ALJ's alleged failure to conduct a function-by-function assessment of her physical residual functional capacity, as the district court ordered on remand. (See Tr. 671.) See Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at * 3-4. See also Alexander v. Barnhart, 74 Fed. Appx. 23, 28 (10th Cir. Sept. 2, 2003) ("SSR 96-8p . . . requires separate consideration "of seven strength demands: i.e., sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling."). Unlike the judge in Alexander, the ALJ here did not define plaintiff's residual functional capacity merely in terms of a broad exertional category, but instead found her capable of "light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)," with certain further refinements. (Tr. 643 (emphasis added).) The cited regulations define light work in terms of its lifting, sitting, standing, and walking requirements. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). The ALJ's finding that plaintiff could perform the demands of this work is supported by the ALJ's thoroughgoing examination of the evidence of plaintiff's alleged physical impairments and their alleged effects of her functionality. (Tr. 644-645.)

Moreover, plaintiff points to the nothing in the record which contradicts the ALJ's assessment of this evidence, and nothing in the regulations requires the ALJ to mindlessly recite these factors a litany regardless of the circumstances:

Zatz v. Astrue, 2009 WL 3198743 at *4 (7th Cir. Oct. 5, 2009). There is no evidence here, and plaintiff points to none, to suggest physical or mental limitations more restrictive than those imposed by the ALJ. Reversal therefore is not warranted on this basis either.

Finally, plaintiff faults the ALJ's finding her testimony and subjective complaints regarding her functional and other limitation not fully credible. (Tr. 644-646.) in general, "credibility determinations `are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact,' and should not be upset if supported by substantial evidence." White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 909 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 390-91 (10th Cir. 1995)). The ALJ here gave clear, specific, legitimate reasons linked to specific evidence in the record for his credibility assessment. Contrary to plaintiff's characterization, this determination was neither conclusory nor mere boilerplate. The ALJ thoroughly examined and discussed the evidence in arriving at his conclusion, which is more borne out by the record. Nothing in that determination provides grounds to disturb the disability determination.

IV. ORDERS

For these reasons, I find no reversible error in the ALJ's disability determination, which accordingly must be affirmed.

THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the conclusion of the Commissioner through the Administrative Law Judge that plaintiff was not disabled is AFFIRMED.