CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on review of the Social Security Commissioner's decision to deny Plaintiff Diane Martinez's application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Jurisdiction is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff argues that the administrative law judge's ("ALJ") determination that
Plaintiff was not disabled is erroneous because the ALJ improperly weighed various medical opinions and incorrectly assessed Plaintiff's credibility. (Doc. # 16.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms the decision of the Commissioner to deny Plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income.
Plaintiff was 32 years old on August 1, 2011, the alleged onset of her disability. (AR at 159.)
On April 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34, and an application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382-85. (AR at 151-62.) Both applications were initially denied by an administrator at the regional Social Security Office in Alamosa, Colorado, on October 24, 2013. (AR at 54-55, 67, 80.) Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing on December 19, 2013. (AR at 86.) Plaintiff has been represented by counsel since January 12, 2015. See (AR at. 113.)
ALJ William Musseman conducted a hearing on June 3, 2015, in Colorado Springs, Colorado. (AR at 42-53.) Plaintiff testified that she experienced hand and back pain, was anxious and depressed, found it difficult to focus on tasks, and had knee surgery approximately two weeks prior to the hearing. (AR at 44-50.) Bruce Magnuson, a vocational expert, also testified at the hearing. (AR at 50-53.) When prompted by the ALJ, the vocational expert stated that a hypothetical individual of the same age, education, and professional experience, and with the same residual functional capacity as Plaintiff, would not be able to do any of Plaintiff's past work. (AR at 52.) The vocational expert did, however, identify jobs available in Colorado that such a hypothetical individual could perform: an assembler of small products; a cleaner/maid; and a routing clerk or mail sorter. (Id.)
On June 23, 2015, the ALJ issued a written decision, in which he concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. (AR at 26.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff "[was] capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy." (Id.) On July 24, 2015, Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's decision. (AR at 13-14.) When the Appeals Council declined review, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. See Blea v. Barnhart, 466 F.3d 903, 908 (10th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff initiated the instant action on December 1, 2016, seeking reversal of the ALJ's decision and remand for a new hearing. (Doc. # 1.)
The record is replete with medical records from 2009 through 2013, when Plaintiff frequently presented to emergency rooms, physical therapy offices, and primary care clinics with various complaints of back and foot pain, abdominal pain, skin boils, knee injuries, a wrist fracture, insomnia, and pregnancy-related symptoms. See (AR at 247-835.) Throughout this time, Plaintiff's
Various images of Plaintiff's lumbar spine substantiate Plaintiff's complaint of back pain. For example, an x-ray in September 2012 showed "[m]ild retrolisthesis of L4 upon L5," but the exam was "otherwise normal." (AR at 370.) An MRI also taken in September 2012 suggested "[m]ild L5-S1 degenerative disc disease and [a] 3mm central subligamentous disc protrusion without nerve root compression." (AR at 317.) Plaintiff's complaints of back pain were "stable"; there was "no radiation of pain," and "symptoms [were] relieved by pain meds/drugs and physical therapy." (AR at 667.)
Relevant here, the ALJ also considered various medical opinions in the record. See generally (AR at 24-26.) In September 2013,
On October 3, 2013,
Later in October 2013,
The standard of review in a Social Security appeal is whether the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether he applied the correct legal standards. Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. at 1262. The district court is "not to reweigh the evidence or try the issues de novo" but should "meticulously examine the record as a whole, including anything that may undercut or detract from the ALJ's findings in order to determine if the substantiality test has been met." Id. The court should determine if the substantiality test has been met, regardless of whether it would have reached a different result based on the record. Ellison v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 534, 536 (10th Cir. 1990).
Second, in addition to the absence of substantial supporting evidence, "[f]ailure to apply the correct legal standard or to provide this court with a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal principles have been followed is grounds for reversal." Byron v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 1984); see also Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993). "There are specific rules of law that must be followed in deciding whether evidence is substantial in these disability cases." Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 512 (10th Cir. 1987).
However, not every error in evaluating evidence or applying the correct legal standard warrants reversal or remand. "Courts may not reverse and remand for failure to comply with a regulation without first considering whether the error was harmless." Bornette v. Barnhart, 466 F.Supp.2d 811, 816 (E.D. Tex. 2006); see also Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that the Tenth Circuit has "specifically applied [the principle of harmless error] in social security disability cases" and collecting cases). Harmless error exists where it is "inconceivable" that a different administrative conclusion would have been reached absent the error. Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 622 (5th Cir. 2003).
"Disability" is defined in the Act as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act further provides that
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The claimant bears the burden of proving that she is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a); Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1062 (10th Cir. 2009).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled, which is codified in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4):
A finding that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in the five-step evaluation process is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Casias v. Sec'y of Health & Human Serv., 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991).
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) (2013),
The ALJ must both identify the weight accorded to the opinion of a treating source and also explain the basis for said weight. Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003); Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2004). The ALJ's explanation must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers both the weight given to the medical opinion and the reasons therefor. Id.
The ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled. See generally (AR at 18-26.) At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff "ha[d] not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 1, 2011, the alleged onset date." (AR at 20.) At step two, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff "ha[d] the following severe impairments: lumbar degenerative disc disease; history of right wrist fracture; attentive disorder; [and] anxiety disorder." (Id.) He determined that Plaintiff's complaints of elbow and shoulder pain, skin boils, insomnia, abdominal pain, and knee pain were not severe impairments that satisfied the duration requirement. (AR at 20-21.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff "d[id] not have an impairment or combination of impairments that me[t] or medically equal[ed] the severity of one of the listed impairments" in the applicable regulations. (AR at 21.)
Relevant here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light exertional work, allowing for occasional bending, squatting, and kneeling, and frequent handling or fingering, but disallowing climbing of ladders and scaffolds. (AR at 22.) The ALJ explained, "[Plaintiff] requires unskilled work that involves no complex tasks . . . and cannot deal with the general public." (Id.) The ALJ weighed the medical records and opinion evidence before him and concluded that "[Plaintiff's] medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, [Plaintiff's] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms [were] not entirely credible." (AR at 23.)
Proceeding to step four, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff was "unable to perform any past relevant work." (AR at 25.) The ALJ determined at step five that Plaintiff was able to perform certain jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (AR at 25-26.) Accordingly, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was not disabled under Sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. (AR at 26.)
Psychologist Dr. Wesley examined Plaintiff once and diagnosed her with major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. (AR at 475-80.) Based on her psychological evaluation, Dr. Wesley concluded that Plaintiff's "abilities as related to basic work activities appear[ed] impaired and most likely precluded due to the severity of her depression." (AR at 480.)
In determining Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ gave no weight to Dr. Wesley's opinion. (AR at 24.) The ALJ first observed that there was no record of psychiatric treatment or medication. (AR at 25.) As to Dr. Wesley's report, the ALJ found that "the body of [her] report d[id] not support the level of impairment assessment." (Id.) The ALJ also cited Dr. Matus's review: Dr. Wesley's conclusions were based on Plaintiff's self-reports, and Plaintiff's presentation contradicted Dr. Wesley's opinion that Plaintiff was extremely impaired as to social interaction. (Id.) (citing AR at 66.) Though the ALJ concluded that "the evidence [did] not support Dr. Wesley's opinion," the ALJ "limit[ed] [Plaintiff] to unskilled work that involve[d] no dealing with the general public." (Id.)
Plaintiff argues that ALJ's four reasons for assigning no weight to Dr. Wesley's opinions were invalid. (Doc. # 16 at 4-8.) The Court addresses each reason in turn and is satisfied that there is substantial supporting evidence for the ALJ's treatment of Dr. Wesley's opinion.
The ALJ made this observation about Plaintiff's medical records in explaining why he afforded no weight to Dr. Wesley's opinion and some weight to Dr. Matus's opinion. (AR at 24-25.) The ALJ's observation was objectively accurate at the time of his report. Dr. Wesley herself characterized Plaintiff's mental health treatment as "[n]onexistent." (AR at 476.) Plaintiff also never reported that she was taking psychiatric medication. See, e.g., (AR at 238, 667-69.)
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that, in and of itself, the absence of psychiatric treatment or medication is an insufficient basis for the ALJ to assign no weight to a medical professional's opinion. See Grostendorst v. Astrue, 370 F. App'x 879, 883 (10th Cir. 2010) ("the lack of treatment for an impairment does not necessarily mean that the impairment does not exist or impose functional limitations."). However, the ALJ did not rely solely on Plaintiff's lack of mental health treatment to reject Dr. Wesley's opinion; the ALJ gave multiple reasons for his assessment, some of which are detailed below. Accordingly, there was no reversible error in the ALJ observing that Plaintiff had not sought treatment or medication for her mental health challenges.
The ALJ explained that Dr. Wesley's final opinion was not fully supported by Dr. Wesley's own notes. (AR at 25.) The ALJ cited Dr. Wesley's observations that Plaintiff's speech was of normal rate, rhythm, and volume, that her thought processes were logical and coherent, and that Plaintiff was able to name presidents and spell simple words backwards correctly. (Id.) Upon review of Dr. Wesley's notes, see (AR at 475-80), the Court agrees that some of Dr. Wesley's observations do not support her conclusion that "[s]ocial interaction is extremely impaired as is adaptation," (AR at 480). In addition to the ALJ's references to Dr. Wesley's opinion, Dr. Wesley also noted that Plaintiff "arrived promptly for the examination," she was "well groomed in casual and appropriate attire," her attitude was "positive," "she was cooperative" with Dr. Wesley, and was "believed to be reliable." (AR at 475.) The Court concludes Dr. Wesley's observations constituted substantial evidence in support of the ALJ's determination that Dr. Wesley's report did
Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ erred by considering Dr. Matus's observation that Dr. Wesley "base[d] [her opinion] on [Plaintiff's] self-reports." See (AR at 25) (citing AR at 79.) "The practice of psychology is necessarily dependent, at least in part, on a patient's subjective statements." Thomas v. Barnhart, 147 F. App'x 755, 759 (10th Cir. 2005). "A psychological opinion need not be based solely on objective `tests,'" id.; it "may rest either on
Thomas v. Barnhart is instructive. There, a consulting psychologist diagnosed the claimant with major depressive disorder with particular difficulties with memory and concentration after conducting "psychological tests for intellectual functioning during which [the claimant] was unable to recall items a few minutes after hearing them and was unable to count backwards." 147 F. App'x at 759. The ALJ wholly rejected the psychologist's opinion, stating that the opinion "was based solely on the subjective findings during the evaluation." Id. The Tenth Circuit held that the ALJ "did not properly evaluate [the consulting psychologist's] opinion," explaining that "[t]he ALJ cannot reject [the consulting psychologist's] opinion solely for the reason that it was based on [the claimant's] responses because such rejection impermissibly substitutes [the ALJ's] judgment for that of [the consulting psychologist]." Id. at 759-60.
Here, as in Thomas v. Barnhart, the ALJ gave no weight to Dr. Wesley's opinion because it was in part based on Plaintiff's responses. This is an invalid reason for rejecting the opinion. The Court analyzes whether this error was harmless in Part III(D) below.
The final fact the ALJ addressed in his RFC analysis was that Dr. Matus wrote that Plaintiff's "presentation contradicted Dr. Wesley's opinion that [Plaintiff] is extremely impaired as to social interaction." (AR at 25) (citing AR at 79). Plaintiff contends that this was in error because the ALJ did not explain why he accepted this portion of Dr. Matus's opinion. (Doc. # 16 at 6.) In the Court's view, this contention is nearly identical to Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Wesley's opinion on grounds that the body of her report did not support her opinion that Plaintiff's social functioning is extremely impaired. The Court addressed that argument above in Part III(C)(1)(b). As to the ALJ's weighting of Dr. Matus's opinion, Plaintiff more fully addresses that issue in a separate argument, see (id. at 8-12), which the Court addresses next in Part III(C)(2). It is therefore unnecessary to address Plaintiff's contention here.
The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's exhortation "to note that the ALJ's RFC follows Dr. Wesley's social limitation, at least with respect to interactions with the general public." (Doc. # 16 at 7.) Plaintiff finds it "ironic that the ALJ stated that Dr. Wesley's opinion is not supported by the evidence, but nevertheless found that [P]laintiff cannot interact with the general public." (Id.) The Court sees no such irony. Rather, in the Court's view, the ALJ tempered the weight he gave to Dr. Matus's opinion,
Non-examining consulting psychologist Dr. Matus analyzed Plaintiff's medical records and conducted a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment ("MRFCA") in late October 2013. (AR at 64-66); see also (AR at 77-79.) In a series of check-box ratings, Dr. Matus assessed Plaintiff as "moderately limited" with regard to: the ability to understand and remember detailed instructions; the ability to carry out detailed instructions; the ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; and "[t]he ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods." (AR at 64-65.) Dr. Matus indicated that Plaintiff did not have social interaction or adaptation limitations.
At step three of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties in social functioning and explained that "[i]n this regard, [he] [gave] some weight to the Psychiatric Review Technique assessment of the State agency psychological consultant, [Dr. Matus]." (AR at 22.) However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was "somewhat more impaired than Dr. Matus assessed, as [the ALJ] conclude[d] that [Plaintiff] [was] moderately impaired in social functioning." (Id.) Later, in determining Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ again gave "some weight" to Dr. Matus's opinion "that [Plaintiff] can perform lower-end, moderately complex work tasks." (AR at 24.)
Plaintiff asserts that "[t]he first problem is that the ALJ did not weigh Dr. Matus's opinion by reference to the regulatory weighing factors, and . . . did not state any reason for affording Dr. Matus's opinion any weight at all." (Doc. # 16 at 9.) Plaintiff also argues that Dr. Matus's opinion "does not deserve any inherent weight." (Id. at 10.)
As the Court explained above, it is the Commissioner's duty to consider all medical opinions in the record and to apply six specific factors in determining what weight to give any medical opinion.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(i)-(ii) (emphases added).
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ did not sufficiently explain why he afforded Dr. Matus's opinion "some weight." The ALJ did not explicitly address the six factors of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6), though he implied that Dr. Matus did not examine Plaintiff, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1), and that Dr. Matus's opinion was well-supported by and consistent with other medical evidence in the record, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3), (4). See (AR at 22-25.) However, the Court is not yet persuaded that the ALJ's failure to plainly explain why he gave "some weight" to Dr. Matus's opinion warrants reversal. The Court addresses whether the absence of an explicit explanation of weighting was harmless in Part III(D).
The Court rejects Plaintiff's assertion that Dr. Matus's opinion does not deserve any inherent weight. (Doc. # 16 at 10.) The regulations require the Commissioner to consider opinions and other findings of federal and state agency medical or psychological consultants," and explain that these medical and psychological consultants "are
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ also erred by "failing to mention and assess" Dr. Matus's answer in the MRFCA that Plaintiff was "[m]oderately limited" in her ability to complete a normal workday and workweek. (Doc. # 16 at 11-12) (citing AR at 65.)
The Court disagrees. Dr. Matus indicated that Plaintiff was moderately limited with regard to completing a normal workday and workweek in Section I of the MRFCA. (AR at 64-65.) As the Tenth Circuit explained in Carver v. Colvin:
600 F. App'x 616, 618-19 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting POMS DI 25020.010 B.1). In this case, the ALJ properly relied on Dr. Matus's Section III narrative—not the summary conclusions in Section I of the MRFCA— in his assessment of Plaintiff's RFC. See (AR at 25.) Moreover, Dr. Matus's Section III narrative adequately explains "the conclusions indicated in Section I, in terms of the extent to which these mental capacities or functions could or could not be performed in work setting." See POMS DI 24510.060 B.4.b. Dr. Matus's Section III statement that Plaintiff is able to perform "unskilled, light work with appropriate procedural and manipulative limitations" are the functional manifestations of the moderate limitations he selected in Section I. See Carver, 600 F. App'x at 619 (rejecting that claimant's argument that the ALJ's finding did not account for moderate limitations in Section I of a MRFCA). The Court therefore rejects Plaintiff's second argument about the ALJ's treatment about Dr. Matus's opinion.
Dr. Gregg was Plaintiff's treating primary care physician during the relevant time period. Between August 2011 and April 2015, Dr. Gregg periodically filled out check-box forms for Plaintiff's participation in the local works program; she consistently identified only back pain as a "significant finding" on these forms. E.g., (AR at 492-93, 325-26, 388-89, 390-91, 836-37.) Less frequently, she indicated that Plaintiff was unable to engage in certain physical movements. See (id.) On January 15, 2015, Dr. Gregg completed a check-box report for Plaintiff's attorney, stating that Plaintiff had limited capacities to lift weights, sit for more than two hours at a time, and stand for more than thirty minutes at a time. (AR at 501-03.)
The ALJ gave "very little weight" to the forms completed by Dr. Gregg when he assessed Plaintiff's RFC. (AR at 24.) He explained that "[t]he limitations reflected in [Dr. Gregg's forms], considered together, [were] not consistent with the record as a whole and [were] not supported by objective findings."
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ "did not have valid reasons for assigning very little weight to Dr. Gregg's restrictions," rejecting the ALJ's explanation for doing so as "too general to be valid." (Doc. # 16 at 12.) The ALJ erred in three ways, Plaintiff argues: first, "there is no logical reason why a thoracic sprain and back pain could not cause Dr. Gregg's restrictions;" and second, "the ALJ did not explain why he concluded that a thoracic sprain and back pain is inconsistent with the restrictions Dr. Gregg imposed;" and third, "the ALJ did not explain how or why he interpreted the record as a whole as being inconsistent with Dr. Gregg's restrictions." (Id. at 12-13.) Plaintiff also emphasizes the presumption that a treating doctor's is entitled to deference under C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). (Id. at 13-14.)
The Court concludes that the ALJ's decision to assign very little weight to Dr. Gregg's opinions was supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ himself cited such evidence. For example, imaging of Plaintiff's thoracic spine and cervical spine was consistently unremarkable, and Plaintiff's back symptoms were stable and could be treated with pain medication and physical therapy. (AR at 316, 374, 546, 667.) Additionally, other medical professionals, such as Dr. Susman, concluded that Plaintiff's exertional limitations were far less strict than Dr. Gregg indicated. (AR at 63.) In the Court's view, this evidence "is more than a mere scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support" the ALJ's treatment of Dr. Gregg's opinions and his assessment of Plaintiff's RFC. See Grogan, 399 F.3d at 1261. The ALJ's assignment of very little weight to Dr. Gregg's opinions on the check-box forms was thus supported by substantial evidence. See Raymond v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 2009) (affirming an ALJ's determination that a treating physician's opinion did not merit controlling weight where the physician's notes "simply recite[d]" the claimant's complaints, provided little analysis of the claimant's physical limitations, and were inconsistent with other medical record evidence).
The state agency's consulting physician, Dr. Susman, completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment on the basis of the medical record. (AR at 63-64.) Dr. Susman explained that Plaintiff was "partial[ly]" credible because she overstated her functional limitations. (AR at 64.) Dr. Susman gave no weight to Dr. Gregg's assessment form completed on April 3, 2013, in which Dr. Gross stated that Plaintiff could work zero hours per day, (AR at 485-86), because the assessment was "a marked overstatement of limitations of functional capacities." (AR at 64.) Dr. Susman concluded that Plaintiff could stand or walk for six hours and sit for six hours in a normal eight-hour workday, could perform postural activities at least occasionally, and did not have limitations of her fine manipulation skills. (AR at 63-64.)
The ALJ gave "some weight" to the opinion of Dr. Susman. (AR at 23.) He explained that Dr. Susman's opinion was "generally consistent with residual functional capacity" that the ALJ had identified. (Id.)
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ erred in "not stat[ing] any reason for assigning more weight to Dr. Sussman's [sic] opinion than he assigned to Dr. Gregg's opinion." (Doc. # 16 at 14.) Because the ALJ did not give Dr. Gregg's opinion controlling weight, the ALJ was required to apply the factors identified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) to Dr. Susman's opinion and "explain in the decision the weight given to the opinions of a State agency medical . . . consultant," like Dr. Susman. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(ii). Moreover, the sole reason the ALJ gave for assigning some weight to Dr. Susman's opinion—that the opinion was "generally consistent with the residual functional capacity [he, the ALJ] assessed," (AR at 23)—was also problematic. It suggests that the ALJ considered Dr. Susman's report
At the beginning of his RFC analysis, the ALJ summarized the applicable analytical framework and previewed his RFC conclusion:
(AR at 23) (emphasis added). The ALJ then addressed specific evidence and opinions in Plaintiff's medical record. See (AR at 23-25.) Plaintiff's final argument is that because the ALJ did not "explain why he did not find [P]laintiff's testimony credible" and "never linked the credibility finding to specific evidence in the record," the ALJ's assessment of her credibility was erroneous. (Doc. # 16 at 16-17.) The ALJ's "mere summary," she asserts, was not inadequate. (Id. at 17.) The Court disagrees.
"Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and [this Court] will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence." Johnson v. Berryhill, 679 F. App'x 682, 687 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Newbold v. Colvin, 718 F.3d 1257, 1267 (10th Cir. 2013)); see Perbeck v. Astrue, 487 F.Supp.2d 1267, 1271 (D. Kan. 2007) ("the court will usually defer to an ALJ's credibility determination."). However, "[f]indings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guide of findings." Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1133 (10th Cir. 1988). An ALJ "`need not make a formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of the evidence' pertaining to a claimant's credibility," but "he should consider such factors as [the claimant's] daily activities, reactions to treatment, `persistent attempts to find relief for her pain, . . . willingness to try any treatment prescribed, . . . and regular contact with a doctor.'" Johnson v. Berryhill, 679 F. App'x at 687 (quoting Keyes-Zachary, 695 F.3d at 1167).
Throughout his analysis, the ALJ cited medical evidence that undermined the credibility of Plaintiff's complaints about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her alleged back pain, right wrist pain, depression, panic attacks, and poor memory. See generally (AR at 20-26.) For example, with regard to the limiting effects of Plaintiff's symptoms, the ALJ cited Plaintiff's own Function Report to support his finding:
(AR at 22) (citing AR at 207-14.) With regard to the intensity and persistence of Plaintiff's complaints, the ALJ noted that various imaging of her back and right wrist did not reveal significant abnormalities and that Plaintiff had not sought treatment or medication for her mental impairments. (AR at 24-25.) And as the Court already explained, the ALJ cited various medical opinions that implicitly called into question the credibility of Plaintiff's complaints.
Thus, the Court's review of the record convinces it that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's credibility determination and that the correct legal standards were applied. See Newbold, 718 F.3d at 1268; Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000) ("the ALJ did not simply recite the general factors he considered, he also stated what specific evidence he relied on in determining that [the] plaintiff's allegations of disabling pain were not credible.").
As the Court explained at the outset, the principle of harmless error applies in Social Security appeals. Allen, 357 F.3d at 1145. The Tenth Circuit, for example, has held that some technical errors were "minor enough not to undermine confidence in the determination of th[e] case," Gay v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 1336, 1341 n.3 (10th Cir. 1993), and that an "ALJ's conduct, although improper, d[id] not require reversal" because the procedural error had not "altered the evidence before the ALJ," Glass v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1392, 1397 (10th Cir. 1994).
The Court has already identified three improprieties in the ALJ's analysis of Plaintiff's applications for Social Security benefits:
These minor errors were harmless. As to the first error, the ALJ had three other, valid reasons for assigning Dr. Wesley's opinion no weight.
With regard to the second and third errors, where, like here, "the ALJ does not need to reject or weigh [this opinion] evidence unfavorably in order to determine a claimant's RFC, the need for express analysis is weakened." Mays v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 569, 578 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Keyes-Zachary, 695 F.3d at 1162). Keyes-Zachary is instructive; in that case, the claimant argued that the ALJ erred by discussing but not expressly explaining the weighting of a consulting physician's report. 695 F.3d at 1163. The Tenth Circuit held that the alleged error was harmless because the ALJ's "RFC . . . [was] generally consistent with [the consulting physician's] findings," and "[t]here [was] no reason to believe that a further . . . weighing of this opinion could advance [the claimant's] claim of disability." Id. The same rationale applies here.
Absent these three minor errors, it is still inconceivable that a different administrative conclusion would have been reached. See Frank, 326 F.3d at 622. The Court therefore concludes any errors in the ALJ's analysis were harmless.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the Final Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.
