ORDER

PHILIP A. BRIMMER, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of (2nd) Order to Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [Docket No. 62]. In light of plaintiff's pro se status, the Court construes his filings liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1991).

This is plaintiff's second motion for injunctive relief in this case. See Docket No. 61 at 2-3. On February 22, 2018, the Court denied plaintiff's first motion because he did not address the problems identified by Judge William J. Martínez in denying an almost identical motion that plaintiff filed in a case before Judge Martínez. Id. at 3-4. The Court stated that it would

Docket No. 61 at 4-5.

On February 23, 2018, plaintiff filed the present motion, again seeking an injunction. Docket No. 62. Compared to his prior motion, plaintiff's new motion adds arguments that the loss of his driver's license has had other effects on him and his family; that his civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., claims provide a basis for injunctive relief and can be asserted against government actors, including courts; and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not automatic and requires a fact-specific inquiry with respect to each claim. Compare Docket No. 49 with Docket No. 62.

With respect to the additional harms that plaintiff argues are caused by the loss of his driver's license, plaintiff again alleges economic harm, e.g. that losing his license "significantly reduced my ability to earn a living," and alleges potentially non-economic harms only in conclusory fashion. Docket No. 62 at 10, ¶ c.ii.1 Therefore, the Court finds plaintiff has not shown irreparable harm. See Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1189.

With respect to his RICO claim and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, plaintiff is correct insofar as he argues that government officers and organizations can be subject to RICO liability and that the applicability of Rooker-Feldman is not automatic and requires a fact-specific inquiry with respect to each claim. Docket No. 62 at 8, ¶ b.x (citing United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 984-85 (7th Cir. 1986)), and at 9, ¶ b.xii (citing Iqbal v. Patel, 780 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2015)). The problem with plaintiff's new arguments is that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies with equal force to plaintiff's RICO claim as it does to his other claims, and the relevant inquiry is whether each claim "`consists of a review of the proceedings already conducted by the "lower" tribunal to determine whether it reached its result in accordance with law.'" PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1193 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1143 (10th Cir. 2006)). Like his other claims, plaintiff seeks to use his RICO claim to attack the correctness of state court judgments based on a claim that those judgments were not made in accordance with law. See Docket No. 62 at 11-12, ¶ d.ii; Thompson v. Romeo, 728 F. App'x 796, 799 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred jurisdiction where, "for [plaintiff] to prevail, [the federal court] would have to review, and ultimately reject, the state determinations." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits because he has not shown that he is likely to establish that the Court has jurisdiction to hear his claims.

Because plaintiff has not shown that he can establish each of the four elements necessary to warrant injunctive relief, the Court will deny his motion. See RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of (2nd) Order to Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [Docket No. 62] is DENIED.