RAYMOND P. MOORE, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' unopposed motions to restrict public access to documents upon which they rely in support of their arguments for summary judgment. (Restriction Motions, ECF Nos. 191, 194, 196.)
There is a common law right of access to judicial records. Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1149 (10th Cir. 2007). "Nevertheless, the right of access is not absolute." United States v. Apperson, 642 F. App'x 892, 899 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished). As a result, a court may exercise its discretion to seal judicial records. Helm v. Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011). "In exercising this discretion, [courts] weigh the interests of the public, which are presumptively paramount, against those advanced by the parties." Id. (quotation omitted). The presumption in favor of public access is "particularly strong" when, as here, a district court uses "sealed documents to determine litigants' substantive legal rights." Apperson, 642 F. App'x at 899 (quotation and internal quotation omitted). By contrast, when documents "`play only a negligible role in the performance of Article III duties, the weight of presumption is low and amounts to little more than a prediction of public access absent a countervailing reason.'" Riker v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 315 F. App'x 752, 755 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (quoting Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2006)). The party seeking to restrict public access to judicial records has the burden of showing an interest that outweighs the presumption in favor of access. Helm, 656 F.3d at 1292.
Under this legal umbrella, the Local Rules of this District require a party moving to restrict access to judicial records to (1) identify the document or the proceeding for which restriction is sought; (2) address the interest to be protected and why such interest outweighs the presumption of public access (stipulations between the parties or stipulated protective orders with regard to discovery, alone, are insufficient to justify restriction); (3) identify a clearly defined and serious injury that would result if access is not restricted; (4) explain why no alternative to restriction is practicable or why only restriction will adequately protect the interest in question (e.g., redaction, summarization, restricted access to portions of exhibits); and (5) identify the level of restriction sought. D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(c). Here, Defendants have identified the documents at issue and specified the restrictions they seek. But while they pay lip-service to the public interest, they offer no thorough analysis explaining how this interest outweighs the public's right to view the material portions of documents upon which the Court's judgment—if entered—may be based. Nor do they show why an alternative to restriction, such as redaction, is impracticable.
The Court does not defer to Defendants' assumption that the public's interest in these records would be minimal, especially considering the use to which these exhibits would be put. In Riker, the Tenth Circuit cited with approval the Second Circuit's decision in Lugosch, in which the Second Circuit addressed the public's interest in documents attached to a motion for summary judgment and stated: "As to the weight of the presumption given to such documents, Joy v. North[, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982),] has already clarified that the presumption is of the highest: documents used by parties moving for, or opposing, summary judgment should not remain under seal absent the most compelling reasons." Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 123 (citations and quotations omitted, emphasis in original). Contrary to Defendants' statement, and under the law of this circuit, the public presumably has an interest in access to documents filed in support of a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Hill v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 14-CV-02960-MSK-MJW, 2016 WL 8925432 (D. Colo. June 20, 2016), aff'd, 685 F. App'x 665 (10th Cir. 2017).
The Court's review of the documents at issue here reveals that they contain little-to-no sensitive information, especially given that Plaintiff made the content contained therein exceedingly public through this action. The documents generally are (1) doctors' notes, opinions, evaluations, and other medical materials related to Plaintiff's knee injury and (2) communications and appeal papers related to Plaintiff's requests for treatment of the same. (ECF Nos. 192-1, 192-2, 194-1, 194-2, 194-3, 194-4, 194-5, 194-6.) The Court notes that Plaintiff's social security number appears in several places. (See, e.g., ECF No. 194-1, at 10, 60.) But the Court does not agree that the vast majority of the remaining content is sensitive when his knee injury—together with Plaintiff's attempts to get medical attention—is the centerpiece of this action. As this Court has previously stated, "[a]lthough the Court concedes that [Plaintiff] has some privacy interest in his medical records, that privacy interest is voluntarily compromised when he brings a lawsuit that necessarily concerns his medical condition and the treatment he received." Hill, 2016 WL 8925432, at *8 (prisoner case against same entity that defends here).
Given the public's strong interest in having access to the exhibits upon which the Court will evaluate summary judgment motions and Plaintiff's diminished interest in protecting information that forms the core of his claims, a restriction on public access is not warranted, and the Restriction Motions (ECF Nos. 191, 194, 196) are