PHILIP A. BRIMMER, Chief District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Award of Reasonable Attorney's Fees and Non-Taxable Costs [Docket No. 326], Defendant Estate of James Congrove's Request for Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees [Docket No. 424], and defendant's Motion to Substitute Jefferson County as Defendant [Docket No. 425].
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in 2005. Docket No. 1. The Tenth Circuit has summarized the underlying facts of this case as follows:
Zinna v. Congrove, 680 F.3d 1236, 1237-38 (10th Cir. 2012) ("Zinna I"). Plaintiff initially asserted a variety of claims against nineteen defendants. Id. at 1238. By the time of trial, however, the only claim remaining was a claim for First Amendment retaliation against defendant James Congrove. Id.; see also Docket No. 273; Docket No. 288 at 3-4. On December 9, 2009, a jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor, finding that defendant had "used his authority as a Jefferson County Commissioner to take adverse action against [plaintiff] in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution." Docket No. 316-1. The jury awarded plaintiff $1,791 in damages. Id.
On January 20, 2010, plaintiff filed a motion seeking $491,417.50 in attorney's fees and costs. See Docket No. 326. The court
On remand, the court again found that the jury's minimal award indicated "the jury's evident evaluation . . . that [defendant's First Amendment] violation was merely technical." Docket No. 391 at 4. Based on the finding that plaintiff established only a technical First Amendment violation, the court awarded plaintiff $16,240 in attorney's fees, "measured by the application of [plaintiff's counsel's] $290.00 rate to seven hours daily for the eight days" of trial. Id. at 7-8. In a separate order, the court awarded plaintiff attorney's fees and costs totaling $18,687.50 for the time spent on plaintiff's appeal in Zinna I. Docket No. 398 at 7.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the court, in limiting plaintiff's award of attorney's fees to $16,240, "acted in contravention of the law of the case doctrine." Zinna v. Congrove, 755 F.3d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir. 2014) ("Zinna II"). Because the Tenth Circuit held in Zinna I that plaintiff's victory was not merely technical, the court was not permitted to reach the contrary conclusion on remand. Id. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the court's award of appellate fees, but remanded the case for further proceedings and ordered that the case be reassigned to a different district judge. Id. at 1182-83.
The case was subsequently reassigned to this Court. Docket No. 412. The Court ordered plaintiff's counsel to file a status report indicating whether the case could be resolved on the current record or whether plaintiff intended to submit further briefing on the issue of appellate fees. Docket No. 418 at 4. Plaintiff indicated that he did not intend to file a motion for attorney's fees with regard to his second appeal, and that the record was "complete for the adjudication of the plaintiff's initial motion for attorney's fees and costs." Docket No. 419 at 1-2, ¶¶ 1, 3.
The Court begins by clarifying the issues that need not be addressed in this order.
In his status report, plaintiff states that "it is incorrect to assume . . . that a proper Farrar analysis has previously been performed by the Court." Docket No. 419 at 3. To the extent this argument implies that the Court is obligated to re-weigh the Farrar factors, the Court disagrees. The Tenth Circuit has already considered the Farrar factors and determined that plaintiff achieved more than a technical victory at trial. Accordingly, the Court may not re-weigh those factors for purposes of this remand. See Zinna II, 755 F.3d at 1180 n. 1 ("Our prior opinion made clear that Zinna achieved more than a technical victory at trial. Thus, . . . the district court violated our mandate by reevaluating the Farrar factors and determining trial fees without first calculating a lodestar."); Zinna I, 680 F.3d at 1242 (remanding "for the district court to determine — based on the facts and the timesheets submitted by Zinna — what work warrants reimbursement").
The Court also does not need to address the issue of costs or appellate fees. As the Tenth Circuit noted in Zinna II, Zinna I did not disturb Judge Matsch's September 24, 2010 award of costs. Zinna II, 755 F.3d at 1183. Moreover, plaintiff waived any challenge to Judge Matsch's March 15, 2013 award of appellate fees by inadequately briefing the issue on appeal. Id. at 1182-83.
The Court's task, for purposes of this remand, is therefore limited to determining a reasonable award of trial attorney's fees.
Plaintiff moves for an award of $503,562 in attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.3. See Docket No. 326 at 1; Docket No. 348 at 1, 19 (increasing fee request to $503,562). Section 1988(b) provides that, "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[] 1983 . . . of this title . . ., the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Because "[t]he purpose of § 1988 is to ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances[,]. . . . a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The reasonableness of a fee request is determined by calculating the "lodestar amount," which represents the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. While there is a strong presumption that this method yields a reasonable fee, see Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010), the party seeking an award of attorney's fees has the initial burden of establishing the reasonableness of each dollar and each hour for which the party seeks an award. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff requests compensation for work performed by attorneys Christopher Beall, Chris Paulsen, and Adam Platt, as well as paralegal work performed by Marla Kelly and Steven Zansberg. Docket No. 326 at 5. Defendant argues that the hourly rates for Mr. Paulsen and Mr. Platt are unreasonable. Docket No. 339 at 11, 13.
A "reasonable rate" is defined as the prevailing market rate in the relevant community for an attorney of similar experience. Guides, Ltd. v. Yarmouth Group Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 295 F.3d 1065, 1078 (10th Cir. 2002). The party requesting fees bears "the burden of showing that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community." Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1203 (10th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff proposes an hourly rate of $225 per hour for Mr. Paulsen. Docket No. 348 at 11.
With regard to Mr. Platt, the Court finds that plaintiff's proposed billing rate — $245 per hour — is high, given that Mr. Platt was an associate attorney with only two to three years of legal experience when he worked on this case. Docket No. 326-1 at 6, ¶ 16; Docket No. 326-8.
Defendant does not challenge the hourly rates for the work performed by Christopher Beall, Marla Kelley, and Steven Zansberg. Nonetheless, the Court finds that plaintiff's proposed billing rate of $160 per hour for paralegal work is unsupported. Such a rate is at the high end of the paralegal billing rates reported in the Colorado Bar Association's 2008 Economic Survey, see Docket No. 326-9 at 35 (reporting rates ranging from $74 per hour to $173 per hour, depending on experience), and would only be appropriate for a paralegal with significant experience. Because plaintiff has not provided any information regarding the experience and qualifications of Ms. Kelley and Mr. Zansberg, the Court finds $100 per hour to be a reasonable rate for the work they performed on this case.
To determine the reasonableness of the hours expended, a court considers several factors. First, it considers whether the fees pertain to tasks that would ordinally be billed to a client. See Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 554 (10th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Penn. v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 717 n. 4 (1987). The party seeking fees must also demonstrate that its counsel used "billing judgment" in winnowing down the hours actually spent to those reasonably expended. Praseuth v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 406 F.3d 1245, 1257 (10th Cir. 2005); Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, Johnson Cty., Kan., 157 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Counsel for the party claiming the fees has the burden of proving hours to the district court by submitting meticulous, contemporaneous time records that reveal, for each lawyer for whom fees are sought, all hours for which compensation is requested and how those hours were allotted to specific tasks."). "In determining what is a reasonable time in which to perform a given task," an attorney submitting billing entries should consider the following factors: (1) the complexity of the case; (2) the number of reasonable strategies pursued; (3) the responses necessitated by the maneuvering of the other side; and (4) "the potential duplication of services" caused by the presence of multiple attorneys when one would suffice. Ramos, 713 F.2d at 554. Ultimately, the Court's goal is to fix a fee that would be equivalent to what the attorney would reasonably bill for those same services in an open market and fees will be denied for excessive, redundant, and otherwise unnecessary expenses. Ramos, 713 F.2d at 553.
Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for a total of 1,971.6 attorney and paralegal hours expended on the litigation. Docket No. 348-1 at 5. Defendant challenges this amount on three grounds. First, he contends that plaintiff's hours calculation should be reduced to account for computational errors. Docket No. 339 at 10-11. Second, defendant argues that plaintiff is not entitled to fees for work performed on matters that should have been delegated to support staff, work performed by Mr. Beall before he became counsel of record, and work that was redundant or irrelevant. Id. at 13. Finally, defendant requests that the Court reduce the attorney hours included in plaintiff's fee motion to account for time spent on unsuccessful claims. Id. at 11-12, 13-16.
Defendant asserts that plaintiff's counsel miscalculated the number of hours reflected in his time records. See Docket No. 339 at 10-11. In the contested time entries, plaintiff's counsel charged for 102.70 hours expended on the litigation. See Docket No. 339-1 at 44. According to defendant, however, those same entries reflect a total of only 79.7 hours. See id. While plaintiff concedes the majority of the computational errors identified by defendant, he argues that counsel's time entries for October 14, 2009 and November 6, 2009 are accurate. See Docket No. 348 at 9-10; see also Docket No. 326-2 at 55, 58 (showing contested time entries). The Court agrees and therefore accepts plaintiff's revised time records, Docket No. 348-1, which remedy the computational errors correctly identified by defendant.
Defendant objects to three categories of time entries included in plaintiff's billing records: (1) time spent on "irrelevant," "unrelated," or "unnecessary" matters; (2) time spent on tasks that could have been performed by a paralegal; and (3) time spent by Mr. Beall before he had formally entered an appearance on behalf of plaintiff. See Docket No. 339-1 at 45-49.
As to the first category, plaintiff asserts that the time entries for November 16, 2007 and August 2009 were related to either the scheduling of discovery matters in this lawsuit or counsel's efforts to respond to defendant's request for information concerning attorney's fees and costs. Docket No. 348 at 12. Plaintiff also contends more broadly that "the vast bulk of the time entries challenged [by defendant] relate to work generated by the defendant's discovery demands and discovery tactics concerning economic damages." Id. at 13. In his declaration, Mr. Beall stated that only those hours spent on this action were included in the compilation of time entries. Docket No. 326-1 at 4. Given defendant's failure to elaborate on his objections, see Docket No. 339 at 13 (arguing only that plaintiff is not entitled to fees for "redundant or irrelevant matters"); Docket No. 339-1 at 45-47 (stating, without further elaboration, that hours claimed were "unrelated," or "unnecessary"), the Court finds no basis on which to exclude the challenged hours from plaintiff's lodestar calculation.
Defendant next challenges plaintiff's entitlement to fees for hours spent on matters that could have been delegated to support staff. Docket No. 339 at 13. Plaintiff concedes that these hours should have been billed at a paralegal rate. See Docket No. 348 at 13. Plaintiff's fee award will therefore be adjusted in accordance with the paralegal rate set above.
Defendant's final argument is that plaintiff should not be compensated for hours expended by Mr. Beall before he became counsel of record. Docket No. 339 at 13. This argument is without merit. The Tenth Circuit has held that whether an attorney has entered an appearance in a case is not relevant to the issue of attorney's fees. See Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, Johnson Cty., Kan., 157 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that "our cases do not require an entry of appearance in order for the court" to grant an award of attorney's fees). Because plaintiff has demonstrated that Mr. Beall's time was spent on matters related to this litigation, see Docket No. 348 at 14 (explaining that Mr. Beall was "advising and counseling" plaintiff as to this litigation); Docket No. 339-1 at 49 (challenged time entries reflecting time spent on matters related to litigation), Mr. Beall's pre-appearance hours will not be excluded from plaintiff's fee award.
Defendant argues that any fee award should be substantially reduced to account for plaintiff's limited success in the litigation. Specifically, defendant requests that the Court (1) exclude, from the lodestar calculation, the hours spent by Mr. Paulsen on claims unrelated to defendant; (2) exclude the hours spent by Mr. Beall on unsuccessful claims; and (3) reduce the lodestar amount by seventy-five percent. See Docket No. 339 at 11-12, 13-16.
When a party prevails on only certain claims, the Court applies a two-part framework to determine a reasonable fee award. See R. M-G. v. Bd. of Educ. for the Las Vegas City Schools, 645 F. App'x 672, 676 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished). The Court first asks whether the party lost "on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. If so, the unrelated claims must "be treated as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and . . . no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim." Id. at 435. If the claims are related, however, the Court must consider "the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation." Id.
Plaintiff's first amended complaint asserted three causes of action against nineteen defendants. Plaintiff's first cause of action alleged violations of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Correct Organizations ("RICO") statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1964, and civil conspiracy under Colorado law. See Docket No. 61-1 at 47-51. These claims were based on allegations that various county officials had conspired to: (1) breach their contractual duties under the development agreement entered into by BJC Development Corporation and Jefferson County by failing to negotiate the agreement in good faith, id. at 13-15, ¶¶ 41-47; (2) threaten BJC with the loss of contractual rights under the development agreement if plaintiff attempted to obtain public records or attend public meetings of the Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson County, id. at 16-18, ¶¶ 51-53; (3) discriminate against plaintiff by failing to provide him with the same fee waivers as other members of the media, id. at 18, ¶ 54; (4) make a record of matters discussed at public meetings, id., ¶ 55; (5) negotiate the sale or lease of county property without giving BJC or plaintiff the opportunity to bid on the purchase of the property, id. at 19, ¶ 56; (5) retaliate against witnesses who were willing to testify on behalf of BJC in its state contract action against Jefferson County, id. at 20, ¶ 58; (6) illegally purchase commercial aviation property at Jefferson County Airport to compete with BJC, id. at 21, ¶ 59; (7) defame BJC and its officers by providing known associates and clients of the company with false information about BJC, id. at 21, ¶ 60; (8) violate plaintiff's rights by ordering "close contact" surveillance of plaintiff any time he was in the Jefferson County Courts and Administration Building, id. at 23, ¶ 66; (9) bribe the law clerk of the district court judge presiding over BJC's state-court lawsuit to include facts in the judge's written opinion that were not contained in the record, id. at 24-26, ¶¶ 68-76; and (10) cause plaintiff to publish libelous information on his website, id. at 27, ¶¶ 77-80.
Plaintiff's second cause of action asserted that defendants violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights by making the success of BJC's and Jefferson County's settlement negotiations contingent on plaintiff ceasing all journalistic activities, including filing Open Records Act requests for public information and attending and reporting on political events in Jefferson County. Id. at 29-30, ¶¶ 86, 88-89. In his final cause of action, plaintiff alleged that defendant Congrove had executed false documents using plaintiff's name in order to obtain a bank loan. Id. at 38-45, ¶¶ 49-98.
Through subsequent amendments to his complaint, plaintiff eliminated the majority of claims and defendants initially involved in the lawsuit. In the operative complaint, filed on January 25, 2006, plaintiff asserted a § 1983 claim against defendant Congrove and the Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners for violation of his rights under the First Amendment. Docket No. 89. On May 23, 2008, Judge Matsch granted summary judgment in favor of Jefferson County on plaintiff's municipal liability claim, Docket No. 217, and further narrowed the scope of the lawsuit by granting defendant's pre-trial motion in limine to preclude plaintiff from seeking certain economic damages. See Docket No. 273 (granting defendant's motion in limine, Docket No. 263, which sought to preclude plaintiff from presenting evidence at trial regarding damages arising out of failed negotiations over the BJC development deal and U.S. Bank's foreclosure on the deed of trust granted by Ralph and Carmella Aiello). After plaintiff's presentation of his case-in-chief at trial, the court determined that there had been no evidence to support a claim for economic damages related to the loss of plaintiff's radio show. Docket No. 312 at 4; Docket No. 384 at 4. Accordingly, only two issues were submitted to the jury: (1) whether defendant Congrove had violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights; and (2) whether plaintiff was entitled to emotional distress damages. Docket No. 384 at 4. On December 9, 2009, the jury returned a verdict finding that defendant had "used his authority as a Jefferson County Commissioner to take adverse action against Mr. Zinna in violation of the First Amendment" and awarding $1,791.00 in damages. Docket No. 316-1.
Defendant argues that plaintiff's lodestar amount should be reduced to account for plaintiff's partial success in the litigation. As noted above, this argument requires the Court to determine the relationship between plaintiff's successful and unsuccessful claims.
The Court begins by addressing the first and third causes of action asserted in plaintiff's first amended complaint. Defendant argues that Mr. Paulsen's hours should be reduced to account for the time he spent on these claims. Docket No. 339 at 11-12. "[C]laims are related if they are based on a common core of facts" or "related legal theories." Flitton v. Primary Residential Mortg., Inc., 614 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1512); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (claims are unrelated if they are "based on different facts and legal theories). Here, the first and third causes of action advance entirely different legal theories than plaintiff's First Amendment claim against defendant Congrove. However, only the third cause of action is based on an entirely different set of facts — namely defendant's misappropriation of plaintiff's name on financial documents.
Defendant also argues that plaintiff should not recover for the time Mr. Beall spent on plaintiff's unsuccessful claims for economic damages. See Docket No. 339 at 13; Docket No. 339-1 at 44-47 (objecting to time entries related to claims spent on economic damages). However, defendant does not assert that the economic damages plaintiff was seeking were unrelated to the First Amendment violations. Nor is there any evidence that Judge Matsch made such a finding in dismissing the damages claims. See Docket No. 263 at 5-6 (quoting court as saying that, "even if there could be a nexus between the claims that are properly here under 1983 and the collapse of the negotiations, the ultimate effect was that the county prevailed, so . . . the failure of the negotiations didn't lead to any loss in the ultimate effect"); Docket No. 312 at 4 (stating that there had "been no evidence presented to support a claim for economic damages with respect to the radio show"). The Court therefore finds that plaintiff's claim for economic damages is "related" to his successful First Amendment claim for purposes of determining a reasonable fee award.
Hensley calls for a different analysis depending on whether an unsuccessful claim is related or unrelated to the claim on which the plaintiff ultimately prevailed. If a claim is unrelated, then "no fee may be awarded for services on [that] claim." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. The Court has concluded that only the third cause of action asserted in plaintiff's first amended complaint was "unrelated" to plaintiff's successful First Amendment claim against defendant Congrove. Accordingly, the Court must determine how to reduce plaintiff's fee award to account for the time spent on that claim.
Counsel's billing records are not so detailed as to allow a precise determination of the number of hours spent on the third cause of action. It also appears that Mr. Paulsen spent much of his time developing the case as a whole and responding to motions that were largely unrelated to that claim. See generally Docket No. 348-1 at 14-26. Where, as in this case, it is difficult to identify the number of hours expended on a particular claim, courts have reduced the plaintiff's fee award by a percentage amount. See, e.g., Chavez, 2014 WL 12796784, at *9 (reducing fee award by 10% where "there was substantial overlap in testimony and preparation between Plaintiff's successful and unsuccessful claims"); Milham v. Perez, No. 03-cv-00702-MSK-MJW, 2005 WL 1925770, at *4 (D. Colo. Apr. 11, 2005) (applying 50% reduction to fee award where "counsel's billing records [were] not so granular" as to allow the court to "make a precise finding as to what times were spent developing what claims"); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37 (stating that "[t]here is no precise rule or formula" for accounting for a plaintiff's limited success and giving courts the discretion to "attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or . . . simply reduce the award to account for the limited success").
Mr. Paulsen spent a total of 224.35 hours on the litigation prior to the filing of the third amended complaint. See Docket No. 348-1 at 14-26.
Defendant also seeks a general, seventy-five percent reduction of the lodestar to account for plaintiff's limited recovery at trial. See Docket No. 339 at 4-9, 14-16; see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 ("The product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward, including the important factor of the `results obtained.'"). In determining what effect to give plaintiff's partial success on related claims, such as plaintiff's claims for damages, the Court must consider "the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation." Id.
The Court finds that a seventy-five percent reduction of the lodestar is unwarranted. As the Tenth Circuit has already determined, plaintiff's recovery at trial — though low in comparison with the amount he requested — was not merely "technical." Zinna I, 680 F.3d at 1242. Moreover, plaintiff succeeded in vindicating his First Amendment rights, which was a central goal of the lawsuit. See id. at 1240 (holding it was evident, based on jury's finding that Congrove had "used his authority . . . to take adverse action against Zinna in violation of the First Amendment," that "Zinna succeeded on a significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefits he sought in bringing suit" (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Chavez, 2014 WL 12796784, at *10 (rejecting defendant's proposed 50% reduction in fee award where plaintiff succeeded on his relatively important First Amendment retaliation claim).
On the other hand, plaintiff's billing records show that counsel spent a number of hours pursuing unsuccessful claims for economic damages and responding to motions by defendants who were dismissed from the lawsuit prior to trial. See, e.g., Docket No. 348-1 at 15-27 (time records showing substantial number of hours spent responding to motions to dismiss and motions for sanctions filed by defendants other than defendant Congrove), 56-58 (time records showing over thirty hours devoted to motion in limine concerning damages). In light of this, the Court finds that the total number of hours expended on the litigation was not reasonable in relation to the results obtained. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435; Zinna I, 680 F.3d at 1242 n. 1 (noting that, although the district court's $8,000 fee award was arbitrary, plaintiff was "clearly not entitled to $503,000" in attorney's fees, which included "costs for work related to Zinna's failed damages request and for litigation surrounding claims in which Zinna did not succeed").
Having determined that the number of hours expended on the litigation was unreasonable, the Court has discretion to "attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated" or to "simply reduce the award to account for the limited success." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37. Here, the Court opts for the latter approach and finds that a twenty percent reduction in the lodestar appropriately accounts for plaintiff's lack of success against all of the defendants (except for defendant Congrove) initially named in the lawsuit, as well as for the significant discrepancy between the monetary relief sought, see Docket No. 339-1 at 15-17 (asserting millions of dollars in economic damages), and the monetary relief obtained. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Keala, 361 F.Supp.2d 1171, 1187 (D. Haw. 2005) (reducing lodestar to account for the plaintiff's lack of success against certain defendants and the low damages award which, "[m]easured against the years of litigation, the considerable amount of resources expended on th[e] case, and Plaintiffs' (and their counsels') expectations," represented a "substantial defeat"). While "a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorney's fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention raised," Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440, plaintiff sought a far broader vindication of his First Amendment rights than that which he ultimately obtained. See Flitton v. Primary Residential Mortg., Inc., 614 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2010) ("A reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however, significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole." (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Moreover, it is clear from plaintiff's discovery responses that vindicating his First Amendment rights was not his only objective in bringing the lawsuit. He also sought significant monetary relief. See Docket No. 339-1 at 15-17 (asserting millions of dollars in economic damages); see also Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1511 (stating that district courts "must make a qualitative assessment to determine what less-than-perfect results are `excellent,' justifying full recovery, or to what extent [a plaintiff's] `limited success' should effect a reduction in the lodestar"). Because plaintiff achieved only limited success in relation to that goal, a twenty percent reduction of the lodestar is appropriate. Compare Flitton, 614 F.3d at 1178 (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce fee award based on degree of success where, although the plaintiff's ultimate damages award "did not approach the amount of damages she sought, her award of over $350,000 in th[e] Title VII suit was not inconsequential"), and Chavez, 2014 WL 12796784, at *9 (finding lesser reduction of ten percent appropriate where the plaintiff "succeeded on a relatively important claim . . . and achieved a significant damages award" (emphasis added)), with Doe ex rel. Doe, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 1187 (applying a fifty percent reduction to lodestar where "the monetary relief obtained [was] far less than that sought by the plaintiff").
The hours reasonably expended by plaintiff's counsel (before the additional twenty percent reduction for limited success) are as follows: 650.9 hours for Mr. Beall; 106.1 hours for Ms. Kelley; 282.01 hours for Mr. Paulsen; 863.2 attorney hours for Mr. Platt; 11.8 paralegal hours for Mr. Platt; and 1.5 hours for Mr. Zansberg. Docket No. 348-1 at 5.
Defendant separately moves to substitute Jefferson County as defendant in this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(c). Docket No. 425.
Federal Rule Civ. P. 25(c) provides that, "[i]f an interest is transferred, the action may be continued by or against the original party unless the court, on motion, orders the transferee to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party."
Defendant makes no showing that Jefferson County's agreement to indemnify her in the event of an adverse judgment constitutes a transfer of interest within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(c). See In re Chalasani, 92 F.3d 1300, 1312 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Although granting substitution of one party in litigation for another under Rule 25(c) is a discretionary matter for the trial court, such discretion may not be abused by allowing substitution in the absence of a transfer of interest." (internal citation omitted)); In re Publication Paper Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 3155371, at *3 (D. Conn. June 20, 2013) (denying motion for substitution where third party had agreed only to indemnify defendant, not assume defendant's liability directly). Nor does the Court perceive any reason to substitute Jefferson County as a defendant at this stage of the litigation. Defendant states that James Congrove's estate remains open only because the Personal Representative is named as a defendant. However, given the Court's ruling on plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees above, there are no issues left to be resolved in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, it is
