CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO, District Judge.
The matter before the Court is an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed pro se by Applicant. See ECF No. 1. The Court has determined it can resolve the Application without a hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); Fed. R. Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(a).
Applicant was convicted of one count of possession with intent to distribute more than one kilogram of cocaine in State of Colorado Criminal Case No. 02-CR-1419 in the Adams County District Court in Brighton, Colorado. See People of the State of Colo. v. Loya-Quezada, 14CA1229, 2 (Colo. App. Aug. 17, 2017); Pre-Answer Resp., Ex. C, ECF No. 8-3 at 7. In the Colorado Court of Appeals' (CCA's) order affirming Applicant's conviction, the CCA summarized the underlying facts of the criminal case as follows:
Loya-Quezada, No. 14CA1229 at 1-2; ECF No. 8-3 at 7-8.
Applicant filed the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Application on July 30, 2018. On July 31, 2018, the magistrate judge directed Respondents to file a Pre-Answer Response and to address the affirmative defenses of timeliness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and exhaustion of state court remedies under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), if Respondents intended to raise either or both in this action. Respondents filed a Pre-Answer Response, ECF No. 8, on August 23, 2018. Applicant filed a statement, ECF No. 13, on October 1, 2018, that was construed as a Reply to the Pre-Answer Response.
Senior Judge Lewis T. Babcock reviewed the Pre-Answer Response and the Reply and filed an Order for Answer on December 20, 2018. See ECF No. 14. In the December 20 Order, the Court determined that Applicant's two claims should be drawn to a presiding judge and when applicable to a magistrate judge for a review on the merits. Id. at 10. Respondents were directed to file an answer in compliance with Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases that fully addresses the merits of Claims One and Two, which they did January 22, 2019. See ECF No. 15. Applicant failed to reply to the Answer within the time allowed. On March 21, 2019, Applicant filed a Letter, ECF No. 17, in which he asks about the status of the Court's decision and generally challenges the errors in his state criminal case.
After reviewing the Application, ECF No. 1, the Answer, ECF No. 15, the Letter, ECF No. 17, and the state court record, ECF No. 16, the Court concludes, for the following reasons, that the Application should be denied and the case dismissed with prejudice.
The claims for review on the merits are as follows:
ECF No. 1 at 4-5.
Section 2254(d) provides that a writ of habeas corpus may not be issued with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless the state court adjudication:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The Court reviews claims of legal error and mixed questions of law and fact pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d 825, 830 (10th Cir. 2003). The threshold question pursuant to § 2254(d)(1) is whether Applicant seeks to apply a rule of law that was clearly established by the Supreme Court at the time his conviction became final. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). The "review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the prisoner's claim on the merits." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S.170, 181 (2011). "Finality occurs when direct state appeals have been exhausted and a petition for writ of certiorari from this Court has become time barred or has been disposed of." Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 39 (2011) (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321, n.6 (1987).
Clearly established federal law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Furthermore,
House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 2008).
If there is no clearly established federal law, that is the end of the Court's inquiry pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). See id. at 1018. If a clearly established rule of federal law is implicated, the Court must determine whether the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that clearly established rule of federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05.
House, 527 F.3d at 1018.
The Court's inquiry pursuant to the "unreasonable application" clause is an objective one. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. "[A] decision is `objectively unreasonable' when most reasonable jurists exercising their independent judgment would conclude the state court misapplied Supreme Court law." Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671. In addition,
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court "must determine what arguments or theories supported or, . . . could have supported, the state court's decision" and then "it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court." Id. at 102. "[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citation omitted). "Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. at 102-03 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Under this standard, "only the most serious misapplications of Supreme Court precedent will be a basis for relief under § 2254." Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671. Furthermore,
Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.
The Court reviews claims of factual errors pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See Romano v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1145, 1154 n.4 (10th Cir. 2002). Section 2254(d)(2) allows a court to grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Pursuant to § 2254(e)(1), the Court must presume that the state court's factual determinations are correct, see Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 592-93 (1982), and Applicant bears the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence, see Houchin v. Zavaras, 107 F.3d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir. 1997). "The standard is demanding but not insatiable . . . [because] `[d]eference does not by definition preclude relief.'" Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)).
A claim, however, may be adjudicated on the merits in state court even in the absence of a statement of reasons by the state court for rejecting the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. ("[D]etermining whether a state court's decision resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual conclusion does not require that there be an opinion from the state court explaining the state court's reasoning."). Furthermore, "[w]hen a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Id. at 99.
In other words, the Court "owe[s] deference to the state court's result, even if its reasoning is not expressly stated." Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the Court "must uphold the state court's summary decision unless [its] independent review of the record and pertinent federal law persuades [it] that [the] result contravenes or unreasonably applies clearly established federal law, or is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." Id. at 1178. "This `independent review' should be distinguished from a full de novo review of the [applicant's] claims." Id. (citation omitted).
Likewise, the Court applies the AEDPA (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act) deferential standard of review when a state court adjudicates a federal issue relying solely on a state standard that is at least as favorable to the applicant as the federal standard. See Harris v. Poppell, 411 F.3d 1189, 1196 (10th Cir. 2005). If a claim was not adjudicated on the merits in state court, and if the claim also is not procedurally barred, the Court must review the claim de novo and the deferential standards of § 2254(d) do not apply. See Gipson v. Jordan, 376 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir. 2004).
The CCA addressed this claim as follows:
In People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292 (Colo. 1989), the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed whether an affidavit underlying a search warrant contained probable cause to justify the search of a van parked in the driveway of a residence. The court concluded that it did because the presence of marijuana in the kitchen, bedroom, and garage of the residence, as well as in a vehicle parked in the garage, would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that contraband would be found on the premises. Id. It noted that "[p]robable cause `may arise out of the type of crime, the nature of the missing items, the extent of the suspect's opportunity for concealment and normal inferences as to where a criminal might likely hide the items.'" Id. (quoting Beeler v. Oklahoma, 677 P.2d 653, 657-58 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984)).
Loya-Quezada, No. 14CA1229 at 4-8; ECF No. 8-3 at 10-14.
"[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (footnotes omitted); see also Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392, 401 (10th Cir. 1992).
Gamble v. State of Okla., 583 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1978) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Applicant fails to demonstrate the absence of a procedural opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in state court. In fact, the record demonstrates Applicant took full advantage of the procedural opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in a suppression hearing. See Case No. 02-CR-1419, Jan. 31, 2014 Hr'g at 3-14. Applicant does not identify anything in the hearing transcripts that is contrary to the court's factual findings. Furthermore, the trial court relied on state and federal law in determining that the search and seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. The record before the Court demonstrates, see Case No. 02-CR-1419, Court Flat File, Feb. 18, 2014 Ord. at 162-64, that the trial court thoughtfully considered and applied appropriate Supreme Court precedent to conclude the motion to suppress properly was denied. See Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1265 (10th Cir. 1999). The trial court (1) noted that Applicant stipulated to the ownership of the truck, which was searched; (2) analyzed the sufficiency of the warrant based on time, crime, objects, and place; (3) found the seventy-two hours from when the informant was at Applicant's residence to when he provided the information to law enforcement was not long enough to constitute stale information; (4) determined the affidavit contained sufficient details regarding the veracity and reliability of the confidential informant; and (5) the affiant who submitted the application and affidavit for search warrant had seen Applicant's vehicle in the driveway. Feb. 18, 2014 Ord. at 162-64.
Disagreement with the state courts' resolution of a Fourth Amendment claim is not enough to overcome the bar in Stone. See Matthews v. Workman, 577 F.3d 1175, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009) (rejecting petitioner's argument that state court misapplied Fourth Amendment doctrine in reaching wrong conclusions about probable cause because that was not the proper question under Stone); see also Pickens v. Workman, 373 F. App' x 847, 850 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that "[t]he opportunity for full and fair litigation is not defeated merely because a participant might prefer a different outcome"). Thus, consideration of the merits of Claim One is barred by Stone.
The CCA addressed this claim as follows:
Loya-Quezada, No. 14CA1229 at 8-15; ECF No. 8-3 at 14-21.
As a rule, federal habeas corpus relief does not lie to review state law questions about the admissibility of evidence. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). The question is whether, "considered in light of the entire record, its admission resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial." Knighton v. Mullin, 293 F.3d 1165, 1171 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68) (further quotation omitted)). Federal courts may only interfere with state evidentiary rulings when the rulings in question are "so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair . . . ." See Lott v. Trammell, 705 F.3d 1167, 1190 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991)); see also Tucker v. Makowski, 883 F.2d 877, 881 (10th Cir. 1989) (state court rulings on the admissibility of evidence are not questioned in federal habeas actions unless they "render the trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights.") (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
"[B]ecause a fundamental-fairness analysis is not subject to clearly definable legal elements, when engaged in such an endeavor a federal court must tread gingerly and exercise considerable self-restraint." Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d 982, 999 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court's "[i]nquiry into fundamental unfairness requires examination of the entire proceedings, including the strength of the evidence against the petitioner." Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1013 (10th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
"Trial error `occur[s] during the presentation of the case to the jury,' and is amenable to harmless-error analysis because it `may . . . be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine [the effect it had on the trial.'" Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991). "Unless the error is a structural defect in the trial that defies harmless error analysis, [the Court] must apply the harmless error standard of [Brecht] . . . ." Bland v. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999, 1009 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) ("For reasons of finality, comity, and federalism, habeas [applicants] are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in actual prejudice.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 (1998) (providing that a federal court must conduct harmless error analysis under Brecht anytime it finds constitutional error in a state court proceeding regardless of whether the state court found error or conducted harmless error review).
A constitutional error does not warrant habeas relief unless the Court concludes it "had substantial and injurious effect" on the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. "A `substantial and injurious effect' exists when the court finds itself in `grave doubt' about the effect of the error on the jury's verdict." Bland, 459 F.3d at 1009 (quoting O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995)). "Grave doubt" exists when "the matter is so evenly balanced that [the Court is] in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error." O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 435.
The admission of the fingerprint card was harmless beyond a doubt because the prosecution presented evidence that (1) almost a kilo of cocaine was found in Applicant's truck, which corroborated R.M.'s testimony that Applicant had tried to sell him a little under a kilo of cocaine; (2) Applicant admitted prior to trial the truck was his and the cocaine was in the truck; (3) evidence was introduced that the truck was registered to him; (4) his name was embroidered on the dashboard; (5) Applicant first told the police that he allowed friends to put the drugs in his truck but later stated an individual put the drugs in his truck to get him in trouble; and (6) Applicant identified the package as a "kilo" even though he claimed he did not know if the package contained marijuana or cocaine. Given the above evidence, the Court concludes that any error caused by admitting the fingerprint card was not so unduly prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, see Lott, 705 F.3d at 1190, or had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict, Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.
Because Applicant failed to raise a confrontation clause objection at trial, the Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed the claim for plain error.
Colorado's plain error test is rooted in due process. See People v. Kruse, 839 P.2d 1, 3 (Colo.1992) ("Plain error occurs when . . . the error so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because there is no practical distinction between Colorado's plain error test and the federal due process test that requires reversal when error "so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law," Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), the deferential standard of review applies unless the CCA unreasonably applied federal due process law, see Thornburg v. Mullin, 422 F.3d 1113, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
Where a state court assumes a constitutional violation in order to address whether the defendant was actually harmed by the violation, the state court's decision is a merits-based determination entitled to AEDPA deference. See Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2198 (2015); Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817, 850 n.17 (10th Cir. 2013). On direct review, a federal constitutional error in conjunction with a state criminal conviction requires reversal if "there is a reasonable possibility that the [error] might have contributed to the conviction." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). However, on federal habeas review, if the state appellate court found an alleged federal constitutional error harmless under the federal standard in Chapman, "a federal court may not award habeas relief under § 2254 unless the harmlessness determination itself was unreasonable." Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2199 (quoting Fry, 551 U.S. at 119.
The Court considers the following factors in determining whether a Confrontation Clause error was harmless: (1) the importance of the witness's testimony in the prosecution's case; (2) whether the testimony was cumulative; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points; and (4) the extent of cross-examination permitted, and (5) the overall strength of the prosecution's case. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). See also Littlejohn, 704 F.3d at 845 (citing Van Arsdall factors relevant to harmless error analysis).
A review of the Van Arsdall factors shows that only the first factor, the importance of the witness's testimony may weigh in favor of Applicant. The fingerprint examiner, who was with the Colorado Bureau of Investigation testified that she had compared the fingerprints on the cocaine packaging to those on a fingerprint card that contained Applicant's name, birthdate, and other personal details. Case No. 02-CR-1419, May 6, 2014 Trial Tr. at 19-31. Nonetheless, the remaining factors do not weigh in the Applicant's favor. The defense was able to challenge the foundation of the card, id. at 20, there was no cumulative testimony, and the evidence against Applicant was overwhelming. Therefore, it is "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
The Colorado Court of Appeals' decision that any error was harmless was not contrary to, or an objectively unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as set forth in Chapman.
Even if the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, any error was harmless under Brecht. While under Chapman an error is harmless on direct appeal if it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged error did not contribute to the verdict obtained," Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, the "higher threshold" set forth in Brecht "must be satisfied for a state prisoner to obtain postconviction relief in federal court." Malone v. Carpenter, 911 F.3d 1022, 1029 (10th Cir. 2018). Under Brecht, habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error "had substantial and injurious effect" on the verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Based on the evidence presented against Applicant at trial, the Court cannot conclude that any error regarding admission of the fingerprints evidence had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. Therefore, Applicant is not entitled to relief under section 2254(d)(1) with respect to his Confrontation claims.
Applicant has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the admission of the fingerprint card so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. The CCA's decision regarding Claim Two is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established rule of federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the state court. This claim, therefore, lacks merit and will be dismissed.
Based on the above findings, it is
ORDERED that the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the issuance of a Certificate of Appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) is denied. Applicant has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right such that reasonable jurists could disagree as to the disposition of her petition pursuant to the standards of Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). It is
FURTHER ORDERED that leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is denied. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order is not taken in good faith, and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). If Applicant files a notice of appeal he must also pay the full $505 appellate filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit within thirty days in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 24.
