WASHINGTON, Chief Judge.
Appellant Tamrat Medhin challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee Teshome Hailu. Hailu sued for a declaratory judgment that funds he had placed in escrow pending resolution of a dispute over a commission fee with Medhin, his real estate broker, belonged to him. Finding that the statute of limitations had run on any claim Medhin may have had to the commission, the trial court granted judgment to Hailu.
On appeal, Medhin argues that the funds held in escrow were presumptively his, and because he would have no reason to sue to obtain his own property, the statute of limitations should not have begun to run until the trial court awarded the funds to Hailu. While it is true that under certain circumstances the placement of disputed funds into an escrow account may extend the limitations period by delaying the onset of an "injury" for statute of limitations purposes, here it is undisputed that Medhin had been aware for over four years that Hailu did not intend to pay him any commission for the sale of the property. Thus, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Hailu since the three-year statute of limitations for bringing breach of contract actions had expired. Accordingly, we affirm.
Beginning in 2001, Medhin, who at the time was an agent with the Remax Premiere Selections real estate firm,
However, an escrow fund was set up by Hailu and the buyers to cover any potential claim by Medhin and Remax. The escrow agreement directed the escrow agent to hold the funds until directed to release them in writing by both the buyers and Hailu, or until the "disposition of Commission status has been determined," at which time the escrow agent was instructed to "release [the] funds to the appropriate party—either [Hailu] or [the] listing company (Remax)." Medhin was not a party to this escrow agreement, and in his brief he asserts that he was not even aware of its existence until Hailu filed his suit for declaratory judgment.
On several occasions after the closing, Hailu contacted Medhin and Remax to ask them to relinquish their claim to the commission payment. Medhin refused, but never took any action to collect the commission. Rather, as Medhin writes in his brief, after being told that "no commission would be paid," he "gave it to God and left it."
Over four years later, Hailu filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the funds in the escrow account belonged to him. Hailu argued that by failing to bring any action to collect the commission, Medhin forfeited any claim he may have had to the commission because the District's three-year statute of limitations for contract-based claims had run.
We review orders granting summary judgment de novo. See Gilbert v. Miodovnik, 990 A.2d 983, 987 (D.C.2010) (citations omitted). In doing so, we independently analyze the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the non-moving party's favor. Id. (citing EastBanc, Inc. v. Georgetown Park Assocs. II, L.P., 940 A.2d 996, 1001-02 (D.C.2008)). We will uphold the grant of summary judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citing Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c)).
In general, a "claim . . . accrues for statute of limitations purposes when injury occurs." Doe v. Medlantic Health Care Grp., Inc., 814 A.2d 939, 945 (D.C. 2003). We have stated that "[w]hat constitutes the accrual of a cause of action is a question of law; the actual date of accrual, however, is a question of fact." Brin v. S.E.W. Investors, 902 A.2d 784, 800-01 (D.C.2006) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts determine the accrual of a claim from the moment a party has either "actual notice of her cause of action," or is deemed to be on "inquiry notice" by failing to "act reasonably under the circumstances in investigating matters affecting her affairs," where "such an investigation, if conducted, would have led to actual notice." Harris v. Ladner, 828 A.2d 203, 205-06 (D.C.2003) (citation omitted). When the relationship between the fact of injury and the conduct is obscure, the so-called "discovery rule" will apply, such that the claim does not accrue until the claimant knows or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know of (1) the injury, (2) its cause in fact, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing. See Bussineau v. President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., 518 A.2d 423, 435 (D.C. 1986). "[T]he quantum of knowledge sufficient to put one on notice of [his] claims against another" will vary depending on the facts of a case. Brin, supra, 902 A.2d at 793; Fred Ezra Co. v. Psychiatric Inst. of Washington, D.C., 687 A.2d 587, 592 (D.C.1996). The limitations period does not run until the claimant has notice of "some evidence of wrongdoing," and its running is not delayed simply because the claimant does not know (or cannot be charged with knowledge of) the full "breadth or nature" of the defendant's wrongdoing. Brin, supra, 902 A.2d at 792; see also Morton v. National Med. Enters., Inc., 725 A.2d 462, 468 (D.C.1999) (noting that the "fact that appellants lacked full knowledge of the extent of appellees' alleged wrongdoing" did not preclude accrual of claim). The question turns on when the claimant had "inquiry notice that she might have suffered an actionable injury." Bussineau, supra, 518 A.2d at 428 (citation omitted).
With regard to contract actions, "[a] cause of action for breach of contract accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, at the time of the breach." Eastbanc, supra, 940 A.2d at 1004 (internal citation omitted). See also Bembery v. District of Columbia, 758 A.2d 518, 520 (D.C.2000). "A contract is breached if a party fails to perform when performance is due," EastBanc, supra, 940 A.2d at 1004, i.e., upon a party's "unjustified failure to perform all or any part of what is promised in a contract entitling the injured party to damages." Fowler v. A & A Co., 262 A.2d 344, 347 (D.C.1970) (internal quotations omitted).
Medhin's entitlement to a commission was based on the parties' brokerage contract. The statute of limitations for a contract-based action is three years. See D.C.Code § 12-301(7) (2001). It is undisputed that more than three years elapsed between Hailu's refusal to pay Medhin a commission and Hailu's declaratory judgment lawsuit. When Hailu represented to Medhin that he would not pay any commission, Medhin could have sued to enforce his rights under the parties' brokerage agreement. See News World Communications, Inc. v. Thompsen, 878 A.2d 1218, 1224-25 (D.C.2005) ("[T]he statute of limitations began to run no later than [the date] Ms. Thompsen had performed her last service to the Times, [and] the Times had declined to compensate her. . ., for by that date she had been definitively told that she would not be paid."); Pardue v. Center City Consortium Sch. of Archdiocese of Wash., Inc., 875 A.2d 669, 679 (D.C.2005) (holding that notice of appellee's "failure to pay . . . gave rise to [appellant's] claim and marked the accrual of her cause of action"); Bembery, supra, 758 A.2d at 520 (finding that appellant's making "successive demands and receiv[ing] no payment from the [appellee]" was sufficient for claim to accrue; explicit refusal to pay by appellee was not necessary) (citations omitted). "As a general rule, an actionable claim accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when a suit thereon could first be maintained to a successful conclusion." Bembery, supra, 758 A.2d at 520 (citations omitted). Indeed, Medhin's attorney threatened to do just that in April 2004. See Harris, supra, 828 A.2d at 206 (finding that "Harris knew of her injury" where she "threatened to sue [appellee] . . . more than three years before she ultimately filed her complaint"). Medhin was well aware that he suffered an injury when he was told "no commission would be paid." Thus, any claim by Medhin to recover that commission brought more than three years after that notice would be untimely. Accordingly, when Hailu sought declaratory judgment over four years later, the trial court did not err in concluding that any claim by Medhin to the commission would have been time-barred.
However, Medhin contends that while the funds at issue were being held in an escrow account he did not suffer any injury and therefore the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the trial court granted Hailu access to the escrowed funds.
For example, in Coleman, supra, which involved a suit between a real estate agent and a seller over the agent's commission, the agent's commission was not paid at the time of closing due to ongoing litigation between the buyer and seller. 304 S.W.3d. at 349. In resolving their dispute, the buyer and seller created an agreement to retain funds in escrow that would eventually cover fees and expenses related to their transaction. Id. The seller's agent's commission was included in those allotted-for expenses and the seller's agent not only participated in drafting the escrow agreement, but agreed to wait on his commission payment until the funds were ultimately disbursed at the close of the escrow. Id. at 349-50. However, when the escrow closed and the funds were disbursed, the seller refused to pay the agent his commission and when the agent ultimately sued the seller for his commission, the seller argued that the suit was time-barred. The appellate court held that the agent's claim did not accrue until the funds were disbursed and the seller refused his request because the conversations and circumstances surrounding the creation of the escrow account did not express to the real estate agent that the seller did not intend to perform. Id. at 351.
Here, like in Coleman, supra, while the escrow account likely was set up to protect the buyer from any claim by Medhin, unlike in Coleman, supra, Medhin was told that he would not be paid his commission. Thus, he was not lulled into a false sense of security that he would eventually be paid for his services.
Without more, the fact that Hailu had placed funds in an escrow account to ensure that the closing on the real estate transaction could go forward does not undermine the trial court's conclusion that Medhin was on notice that he had been
Affirmed.
