McDONALD, J.

This certified appeal requires us to consider whether General Statutes § 12-163a, under which a court may appoint a receiver of rents when real property taxes due to a municipality are delinquent, authorizes the receiver to: (1) evict a tenant from the property in the event of a default; (2) lease the property to a new tenant; and (3) use legal process to collect back rent allegedly due. The Appellate Court concluded that none of these acts falls within the scope of a receiver's authority under the statute. See Canton v. Cadle Properties of Connecticut, Inc., 145 Conn.App. 438, 450-58, 77 A.3d 144 (2013). We conclude that § 12-163a does authorize a receiver to use legal process to collect rent due prior to the date of the receiver's appointment, but we agree with the Appellate Court's conclusions in all other respects. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the Appellate Court's judgment, which had reversed in part the judgment of the trial court insofar as that court had modified the receivership orders to confer authority to undertake the three aforementioned actions.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The defendant, Cadle Properties of Connecticut, Inc. (Cadle), is the owner of real property in Canton (property).1 After Cadle effectively abandoned the property, which is allegedly environmentally contaminated, the plaintiff, the town of Canton (town), filed a petition seeking the appointment of a receiver of rents pursuant to § 12-163a. The petition alleged that Cadle had failed to pay real property taxes due to the town in the amount of $362,788.59, plus interest and lien penalties, for a total amount due of $884,263.04. The petition further alleged that, during all relevant periods, the property was occupied by a Volkswagen dealership owned by M & S Associates, LLC (tenant), which had a legal obligation to pay rent to Cadle.2 The court, having found that Cadle owed the town taxes in the amount of $358,220.04, granted the petition to appoint the receiver, and issued orders authorizing the receiver to collect all rents or use and occupancy payments due with respect to the property.

After the receiver served the tenant with a notice to quit possession of the property on the ground of nonpayment of rent, the tenant filed a motion to intervene in the town's action against Cadle in order to challenge the receiver's authority to take legal action against it. Shortly thereafter, the receiver filed a motion to modify the receivership order to authorize it to pursue an eviction of the tenant in the event of nonpayment of rent, to lease the property to a new tenant, and to use all legal process to collect back rent. Prior to acting on the tenant's pending motion to intervene, the court granted the receiver's motion to modify without objection.

Subsequently, the trial court granted the tenant's motion to intervene in the action. The tenant then filed a motion to remove the receiver, asserting, inter alia, that the receiver had exceeded its authority under § 12-163a by serving it with a notice to quit and by bringing an action to collect back taxes and prior rents. The court denied the motion for removal, reasoning that, because the receiver acts in the owner's stead, it would not be constrained from collecting back rent or evicting a nonpaying tenant through legal process. The court noted, however, that its order did not authorize the receiver to collect any back taxes owed by the tenant.3

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the tenant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly had denied its motion to remove the receiver because the court exceeded its authority under § 12-163a when it modified its order to allow the receiver to evict the tenant, to secure a new tenant, and to bring an action against the tenant for all rents due, including back rents allegedly owed. Id., at 450, 77 A.3d 144. The Appellate Court agreed. That court concluded that the receiver's responsibilities are prescribed in § 12-163a and cannot be expanded by the trial court. Id., at 454, 77 A.3d 144. Those duties, according to the Appellate Court, are limited to collecting rents that in turn are to be used to pay taxes and utilities due after the date of the receiver's appointment. Id., at 455-58, 77 A.3d 144. Although the Appellate Court concluded that the statute was ambiguous as to the receiver's authority to collect back rent, it reasoned that a construction limiting the collection of rent to that which is due after the receiver's appointment was more harmonious with the receiver's authority to pay only those taxes and utilities due after the date of the receiver's appointment. Id., at 457-58, 77 A.3d 144. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it had granted the receiver's motion to modify the receivership orders, but it affirmed the judgment insofar as it had denied the tenant's motion to remove the receiver. Id., at 458, 77 A.3d 144. The town's certified appeal to this court followed. See Canton v. Cadle Properties of Connecticut, Inc., 310 Conn. 941, 79 A.3d 893 (2013).

The scope of a receiver's authority under § 12-163a is a question of statutory construction subject to plenary review and well established principles. See General Statutes § 1-2z (setting forth plain meaning rule); Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 742, 865 A.2d 428 (2005) ("[w]hen a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also seek interpretive guidance from the legislative history of the statute and the circumstances surrounding its enactment, the legislative policy it was designed to implement, the statute's relationship to existing legislation and common-law principles governing the same general subject matter").

Section 12-163a (a) sets forth the circumstances under which a municipality may seek the appointment of a receiver of rents and the authority vested in the receiver upon such appointment. That subsection provides in relevant part: "Any municipality may petition the Superior Court or a judge thereof, for appointment of a receiver of the rents or payments for use and occupancy for any property for which the owner, agent, lessor or manager is delinquent in the payment of real property taxes. . . . The receiver appointed by the court shall collect all rents or payments for use and occupancy forthcoming from the occupants of the building in question in place of the owner, agent, lessor or manager. The receiver shall make payments from such rents or payments for use and occupancy, first for taxes due on and after the date of his appointment and then for electric, gas, telephone, water or heating oil supplied on and after such date. The owner, agent, lessor or manager shall be liable for such reasonable fees and costs determined by the court to be due the receiver, which fees and costs may be recovered from the rents or payments for use and occupancy under the control of the receiver, provided no such fees or costs shall be recovered until after payment for current taxes, electric, gas, telephone and water service and heating oil deliveries has been made. The owner, agent, lessor or manager shall be liable to the petitioner for reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred by the petitioner, provided no such fees or costs shall be recovered until after payment for current taxes, electric, gas, telephone and water service and heating oil deliveries has been made and after payments of reasonable fees and costs to the receiver. Any moneys remaining thereafter shall be used to pay the delinquent real property taxes. . . ." General Statutes § 12-163a (a).

We begin with the principal dispute in this appeal, namely, whether the Appellate Court properly determined that the receiver may not collect back rent due, but only rent that is due after the receiver's appointment. The crucial sentence in § 12-163a (a) provides: "The receiver appointed by the court shall collect all rents or payments for use and occupancy forthcoming from the occupants of the building in question in place of the owner, agent, lessor or manager." We agree with the Appellate Court that this sentence is ambiguous, especially as to the meaning of the term "forthcoming." See Canton v. Cadle Properties of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 145 Conn.App. at 455, 77 A.3d 144. Nonetheless, we are persuaded that the more logical and compelling construction is the broader reading of the statute.

We put considerable weight on the fact that the statute refers to "all rents," rather than simply "rent." See General Statutes § 12-163a (a). The words "all" and "rents" (plural), individually and collectively, support the broadest possible reading. Indeed, it is difficult to ascribe any other logical meaning to the phrase "all rents" and still give full effect to both terms. "All" does not modify "occupants." Therefore, we cannot reasonably construe it to mean the collection of rent from every occupant. Rather, the term all rents suggests multiple kinds or sources (type or temporal) of rent. The fact that the receiver is to collect all rents "in place of the owner," who undoubtedly would be entitled to collect past and presently due rent, lends further support to the broader construction. See General Statutes § 12-163a (a). Although the term "forthcoming" does not clearly convey past and presently due, at least one of the various definitions of that term would be consistent with that meaning. See, e.g., The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (3d Ed.1992) (defining forthcoming as "[a]vailable when required or as promised"); Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2d Ed.1993) (defining forthcoming as "ready or available when required or expected").

We are mindful of the fact that, in other receivership schemes referenced in § 12-163a, the legislature used terms that more plainly include past due rent. See General Statutes § 12-163a (e) (requiring receivership proceedings initiated pursuant to General Statutes §§ 47a-14a to 47a-14h or pursuant to General Statutes §§ 47a-56 to 47a-56i to take priority over receivership established under § 12-163a); General Statutes § 47a-14d (b)(1) (providing for "the rents due on the date of entry of such judgment and rents to become due subsequent thereto from all occupying such property [to] be deposited with a receiver"); General Statutes § 47a-56d (c) ("[t]he receiver shall collect the accrued and accruing rents"). Nonetheless, we are persuaded that the use of the term "all rents" effectively conveys the same substance. To the extent that this phrase is ambiguous, we note that the sponsor of the bill enacted as § 12-163a referred to the bill as applying to back rent. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Planning and Development, Pt. 1, 1995 Sess., p. 50, remarks of Representative Robert D. Godfrey; see also Public Acts 1995, No. 95-353, § 1.

Finally, we observe that § 12-163a (a) authorizes the receiver to collect rents "in place of the owner," without indicating or limiting the means by which the receiver may do so. As such, it seems reasonable to infer that the statute authorizes the receiver to use the legal means that otherwise would have been available to the owner to collect such unpaid obligations.4

To the extent that the Appellate Court assumed that reading § 12-163a as limiting the receiver's authority to the collection of rent due subsequent to its appointment would be more consistent with other authority conferred on the receiver, the predicate for its conclusion was flawed. Specifically, the Appellate Court determined that the statute authorizes the receiver to pay only those tax and utility bills that are due on or after the date of the receiver's appointment. See Canton v. Cadle Properties of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 145 Conn.App. at 457-58, 77 A.3d 144. It therefore reasoned that imposing a similar temporal limit on the receiver's collection of rent was the most harmonious construction. Id. The Appellate Court appears to have overlooked the fact that § 12-163a (a) sets forth an order of priority of payment, under which payment is made: "first for taxes due on and after the date of [the receiver's] appointment and then for electric, gas, telephone, water or heating oil supplied on and after such date"; next, for the fees and costs of the receiver and the petitioner's attorney; and finally, that "[a]ny moneys remaining thereafter shall be used to pay the delinquent real property taxes. . . ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 12-163a (a); cf. Southern Connecticut Gas Co. v. Housing Authority, 191 Conn. 514, 527, 468 A.2d 574 (1983) (citing similar language in General Statutes § 16-262f as setting "statutory priority which allocates collected rentals to arrearages only after current charges, receivership fees, and attorney's fees have first been paid"). Thus, because the receiver may use rents collected to pay taxes that became delinquent before its appointment, our obligation to harmonize the various terms of a statute to achieve a consistent outcome; see Stewart v. Watertown, 303 Conn. 699, 711, 38 A.3d 72 (2012); does not counsel in favor of a construction limiting the receiver's authority to the collection of rent due on or after the receiver's appointment.

Having determined that the receiver may collect past due rent, we turn to the question of whether § 12-163a confers additional authority on the receiver to evict a defaulting tenant and to lease the premises to a new tenant. A review of the statute reveals that the only authority expressly conferred on the receiver is to undertake the following actions: (1) collect funds; and (2) make payments. There is no authority to evict a tenant or to enter into a new lease. Although § 12-163a (a) authorizes the receiver to collect use and occupancy payments, which arise after a notice to quit has been served on a tenant; see Waterbury Twin, LLC v. Renal Treatment Centers-Northeast, Inc., 292 Conn. 459, 473 n. 18, 974 A.2d 626 (2009);5 the statute does not authorize the receiver to cause such a notice to be served (or reference chapter 830 of the General Statutes addressing landlord remedies), to take possession of the property, or to undertake any other action in the owner's stead with respect to the property except collecting payment from the building's occupants. Indeed, the authority conferred under § 12-163a is quite narrow in comparison to some other receivership statutes. Cf. General Statutes § 42-110f (receiver shall have power to take property into his possession and to sell, convey and assign same); General Statutes § 52-505 (receiver shall be vested with property to manage and use for benefit and support of members of certain associations, communities or corporations); General Statutes § 52-509 (receiver to hold business and all property, real and personal, belonging to partnership); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. DaSilva, 231 Conn. 441, 446, 650 A.2d 551 (1994) (noting with respect to § 16-262f, on which § 12-163a is modeled,6 that "wide-ranging equitable and discretionary principles that govern rent receiverships in ordinary mortgage foreclosure proceedings" do not apply).

Moreover, because there is no indication in § 12-163a that the legislature has conferred the extraordinary authority on the receiver to enter into a contract with a new tenant that would bind the owner of the property,7 it would make no sense to construe the reference to use and occupancy payments as implicitly authorizing the receiver to evict the tenant. It is only when both actions may be taken that the receiver would be able to collect payments. That authority must rest with the owner, who has every incentive in the usual case to evict and replace a defaulting tenant in order to remedy the deficiency and regain access to the rental income. Therefore, the authority to collect use and occupancy payments, reasonably construed, simply ensures that, if a lease has expired or an owner has served a notice to quit on a tenant, either before or after the receiver's appointment, the receiver may collect payments for use and occupancy, just as it may collect rent payments. Thus, the text of the statute weighs heavily against a construction permitting a receiver appointed under § 12-163a to evict a defaulting tenant and to lease the premises to a new tenant.

To the extent that the reference to use and occupancy payments gives rise to any ambiguity as to the receiver's authority to evict a defaulting tenant, we find no persuasive evidence in the legislative history that the legislature intended to confer such authority. That history makes clear that the legislature intended to provide a less drastic, expensive and time-consuming mechanism than foreclosure to recover delinquent taxes, as it already had afforded to utility companies to collect delinquent utility payments. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, supra, pp. at 50-51, 53, remarks of Representative Godfrey; id., pp. at 124-26, remarks of Eric Gottschalk, corporation counsel for the city of Danbury. The only authority referenced in that history vis-á-vis the property is the collection of rent. See id., pp. at 50-51, 124-26.

Because we conclude that the receiver is authorized to use legal process to collect past due rent, we disagree with the town's contention that, in the absence of authority to replace a defaulting tenant with one that will provide a consistent revenue stream to discharge the tax obligations, "§ 12-163a would be a toothless lion, able to roar, but not bite." Moreover, the town's argument erroneously assumes that the property owner generally lacks an incentive to regain the income produced from its rental property. It is doubtful that the legislature had in mind the unusual circumstances of abandoned rental property at issue in this case. To the extent that the town believes that greater authority is essential to vindicating its interests, especially in cases like the present one, in which the owner has abandoned the property and purported environmental contamination makes foreclosure of the property an impractical alternative; see, e.g., General Statutes § 12-157; General Statutes § 12-181 et seq.; its recourse lies with the legislature.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed only as to the reversal of the trial court's judgment granting the receiver's motion for modification allowing the collection of back rent allegedly due and the case is remanded to that court with direction to affirm the trial court's judgment in that respect; the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ESPINOSA and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.

ZARELLA, J., with whom EVELEIGH, J., joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the majority that General Statutes § 12-163a (a) authorizes a court-appointed receiver of rents to use legal process to collect rents or payments for use and occupancy1 allegedly due prior to the date of the receiver's appointment (past due rents) for any property for which the owner is delinquent in the payment of real property taxes to the municipality. I also agree with the majority that § 12-163a (a) does not confer authority on the receiver to lease the premises to a new tenant in the event a tenant is evicted or otherwise vacates the premises. I disagree, however, that the receiver cannot commence an eviction proceeding against a tenant for the nonpayment of rent. In my view, the only construction of the statute that makes any sense and that also is consistent with the majority's construction of the same statutory language with respect to the collection of past due rents is that the receiver may commence an eviction proceeding against a nonpaying tenant. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion concluding to the contrary.

It is well established that, "[w]hen construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning . . . [General Statutes] § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. . . . We recognize that terms in a statute are to be assigned their ordinary meaning, unless context dictates otherwise. . . ." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Heredia, 310 Conn. 742, 755-56, 81 A.3d 1163 (2013).

Section 12-163a (a) provides in relevant part: "The receiver appointed by the court shall collect all rents or payments for use and occupancy forthcoming from the occupants of the building in question in place of the owner, agent, lessor or manager. . . ." In construing this language to determine whether a receiver may collect past due rents, as well as rents that become due after the receiver's appointment, the majority determines that "the more logical and compelling construction is [a] broader reading of the statute," even though in other receivership schemes "the legislature used terms that more plainly include past due rent." The majority also relies on the dictionary definition of certain words and observes that § 12-163a (a), in referring to the fact that the receiver may collect rent "in place of the owner," does not indicate or limit "the means by which the receiver may do so. As such, it seems reasonable to infer that the statute authorizes the receiver to use the legal means that otherwise would have been available to the owner to collect such unpaid obligations." Text accompanying footnote 4 of the majority opinion.

Applying this same analysis to the question of whether the receiver may commence an eviction proceeding to enforce the collection of rents due from a nonpaying tenant, I agree with the majority's observation that "the more logical and compelling construction is [a] broader reading of the statute." Accordingly, although the statute does not explicitly define the scope of the receiver's authority to "collect" rents due, I agree with the majority that the term may be read in conjunction with other language in the statute and in accordance with its dictionary definition to determine its most logical meaning.

Following this approach, I begin by noting that the statute refers to the collection of "all rents or payments for use and occupancy. . . ." General Statutes § 12-163a (a). As the majority has acknowledged, use and occupancy payments arise after a notice to quit has been served on a tenant. See Waterbury Twin, LLC v. Renal Treatment Centers-Northeast, Inc., 292 Conn. 459, 473 n. 18, 974 A.2d 626 (2009). The statute thus contemplates that a receiver may collect payments arising out of an eviction proceeding. Although this does not fully answer the question of whether the receiver may commence the eviction proceeding from which such payments arise, it does suggest that there may be room for such an interpretation under the broad reading of the statute that the majority has employed to resolve the issue of whether a receiver has authority to collect past due rents.

Turning next to the dictionary for guidance, as suggested by the majority, the term "collect," in the legal sense contemplated by the statute, means "to obtain payment or liquidation of [the claim or debt], either by personal solicitation or legal proceedings." Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990) p. 263. This definition lends support to a reading of the statute that contemplates the collection of rents due by way of an eviction proceeding against the tenant.

I also rely on the majority's observation that language in § 12-163a (a) providing that the receiver may collect rents "in place of the owner" does not indicate or limit "the means by which the receiver may do so" but, rather, supports the inference that the receiver may "use the legal means that otherwise would have been available to the owner to collect such unpaid obligations." Text accompanying footnote 4 of the majority opinion. One of the most obvious legal means available to an owner for collecting unpaid rents is the threat of an eviction proceeding. Accordingly, the statutory language referring to the receiver's authority to collect rents "in place of the owner" supports the view that the receiver may commence an eviction proceeding in furtherance of that goal, just as the majority has concluded that a broad reading of the statute permits the receiver to collect past due rents.

Like the majority, I recognize that other receivership schemes define the receiver's powers more specifically in this respect. See General Statutes § 42-110f (receiver shall have power to take property into possession and "sell, convey, and assign the same"); General Statutes § 52-505(b) (receiver shall be vested with property and manage and use such property for benefit and support of members of certain associations, communities or corporations); General Statutes § 52-509(a) (receiver "to hold the business and all of the property, both real and personal, belonging to the partnership"). When the majority observes, however, that other receivership statutes also are more specific than § 12-163a (a) in allowing receivers to collect past due rents; see General Statutes § 47a-14d (b)(1) ("the rents due on the date of entry of . . . judgment and rents to become due subsequent thereto from all occupying such property [are to] be deposited with a receiver"); General Statutes § 47a-56d (c) ("[t]he receiver shall collect the accrued and accruing rents"); it brushes this distinction aside and concludes that, "[n]one-theless, we are persuaded that the use of the term `all rents' [in § 12-163a (a)] effectively conveys the same substance." I similarly conclude that, under a broad reading of the statute, the receiver may commence an eviction proceeding in the unusual circumstance in which a tenant is not paying rent. The statute's explicit references to "payments for use and occupancy," which arise out of eviction proceedings, and to the fact that the receiver acts "in place of the owner," effectively convey the notion that the receiver may commence an eviction proceeding to obtain rents due from a nonpaying tenant.

The majority neglects to consider the "basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature [does] not intend to enact meaningless provisions. . . . [I]n construing statutes, we presume that there is a purpose behind every sentence, clause, or phrase used in an act and that no part of a statute is superfluous. . . . Because [e]very word and phrase [of a statute] is presumed to have meaning . . . [a statute] must be construed, if possible, such that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 305 Conn. 488, 500, 45 A.3d 627 (2012). The majority's interpretation would contravene this principle because a receiver would have no recourse if the tenant should refuse to pay the rents that are due, as in the present case. In other words, the statute would be rendered meaningless, and the receiver would become what the plaintiff, the town of Canton, has described as "a toothless lion, able to roar, but not bite."

The majority contends that it would make no sense to construe the statute as permitting a receiver to evict a nonpaying tenant because the power to evict allows the receiver only to take possession of the property, and, consequently, an eviction would be effective only if combined with the power to lease the property to a new tenant from whom the rent could be collected. I disagree for two reasons. First, the threat of eviction very likely would give the tenant a strong incentive to comply with the receiver's order and pay the rent, thereby avoiding the potentially expensive and time-consuming option of relocating to another property that would require an equivalent or higher rent. Second, even if an eviction results in nothing more than dispossession, it will have removed, at the very least, a tenant whose activities on the property require municipal services for which neither the property owner nor the tenant is paying. Accordingly, evicting a tenant without leasing the property to a new tenant would have two positive effects. The threat of eviction would serve as an incentive for the tenant to pay the rents that are due, and, should an eviction occur, the municipality would be in a slightly better position because of the reduced demand for public services such as fire, police and traffic control in that location. It is thus not true that eviction, standing alone, has no benefits.

Finally, although the majority notes that § 12-163a (a) is modeled after General Statutes § 16-262f; see text accompanying footnote 6 of the majority opinion; this court's statement in Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. DaSilva, 231 Conn. 441, 446, 650 A.2d 551 (1994), that "the appointment of a rent receiver for the protection of a utility is [not] governed by the same wide-ranging equitable and discretionary principles that govern rent receiverships in ordinary mortgage foreclosure proceedings," does not limit the construction of § 12-163a (a). Representative Robert D. Godfrey, a cosponsor of the bill that subsequently was enacted as § 12-163a, explained that the bill "gives municipalities the same kind of power we currently give [in § 16-262f (a)(1)] to utilities, which can petition for receivership of rent for back payment of electric, water, power"; Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Planning and Development, Pt. 1, 1995 Sess., p. 50; but his statement merely refers to the identical powers of utility companies and municipalities to petition for a receivership and indicates nothing about the scope of that power in the two different contexts.

This is an important distinction because a close reading of Connecticut Light & Power Co. reveals that the authority granted to a receiver under § 16-262f (a), unlike the authority granted to a receiver under § 12-163a (a), is subject to the unique constraints imposed by the statutory scheme that governs the conduct of public utility companies. As the court explained: "Section 16-262f permits public service companies to petition for a statutory rent receivership under limited circumstances that are statutorily linked to the [General Statutes] § 16-262e (a) prohibition on the termination of utility services. Under § 16-262e (a), service may not be terminated: (1) to a residential dwelling; (2) despite nonpayment of a delinquent account; (3) for service billed directly to the residential building's lessor, owner, agent or manager; and (4) when it is impracticable for occupants of the building to receive service in their own name. Unable to terminate service to such a residential dwelling, public service companies are expressly instructed, by § 16-262e (a), to pursue the remedy provided in [§] 16-262f. . . . The summary rent receivership proceedings authorized by § 16-262f constitute, as we have previously recognized, a statutory trade-off for the requirement of continued service imposed by § 16-262e (a). . . . The statutory proceedings authorized by § 16-262f are sui generis. . . .

"In light of the language, the acknowledged purpose and the sui generis nature of § 16-262f, the trial court was mistaken in its assumption that the appointment of a rent receiver for the protection of a utility is governed by the same wide-ranging equitable and discretionary principles that govern rent receiverships in ordinary mortgage foreclosure proceedings." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. DaSilva, supra, 231 Conn. at 445-46, 650 A.2d 551.

A utility company's termination of services to the tenants of a building for the landlord's nonpayment of a delinquent account is the equivalent of an eviction proceeding for the nonpayment of taxes to a municipality. The legislature has determined, however, that the receiver for a utility company cannot terminate services to the tenants of a building except in certain, limited circumstances. Accordingly, this court's discussion of the scope of a receiver's authority under § 16-262f (a) in Connecticut Light & Power Co. is inapplicable to a receiver's authority under § 12-163a (a), which imposes no similar limitations or constraints.

In sum, I believe all of the foregoing considerations compel the conclusion that among the legal tools available to a receiver under § 12-163a (a) for the collection of rents due is the authority to commence an eviction proceeding against a nonpaying tenant. This conclusion is based on a consideration of the same factors the majority considers in deciding that a receiver may collect past due rents. For reasons I cannot fathom, the majority nonetheless rejects this approach in deciding that a receiver has no authority under the statute to commence an eviction proceeding. Thus, the majority does not favor a broad reading of the term "collect" in § 12-163a (a), does not examine the legal meaning of that term, does not infer from the provision allowing the receiver to collect rent "in place of the owner" that the receiver may "use the legal means that otherwise would have been available to the owner to collect such unpaid obligations"; text accompanying footnote 4 of the majority opinion; and, remarkably, relies on the fact that other receivership statutes are more specific in defining the scope of a receiver's collection powers in concluding that the authority conferred under § 12-163a (a) is "quite narrow. . . ." Such a glaring inconsistency in the majority's resolution of these two different issues is, in my view, unsupportable. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority's opinion.