PER CURIAM.
The plaintiff, Anne M. Amato, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, The Hearst Corporation, following the granting
The following procedural history and facts, as alleged in the complaint, are relevant to our resolution of the issues on appeal. The plaintiff was born in 1948 and had worked at The Connecticut Post, a newspaper then owned by the defendant, for more than twenty years. She had been employed by the defendant for ten years, most recently as a senior reporter covering the valley area of the state. The plaintiff's job evaluations consistently characterized her performance as satisfactory or better than satisfactory.
On October 7, 2011, the defendant informed the plaintiff that she "had been placed on a Performance Improvement Plan subjecting her to termination on December 7, 2011." It is also alleged in the complaint that between October 7, and December 31, 2011, three additional senior reporters with outstanding employment records and twenty or more years of service received similar threats of termination. The defendant, by this conduct, was attempting to remove the older employees from its workforce without regard for their skill or performance history. In response to the defendant's actions, the plaintiff filed a complaint of age discrimination with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission) on December 1, 2011. After the complaint had been filed with the commission, the defendant ended or suspended its actions against older employees, and neither the plaintiff nor any of the three other senior reporters were terminated from employment.
On September 7, 2012, the plaintiff commenced this age discrimination action against the defendant, alleging that its conduct "placed the plaintiff in great fear of losing her employment and caused her to suffer severe emotional distress."
The standard of review in an appeal from the granting of a motion to strike is well established. "Because a motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court, our review of the court's ruling ... is plenary.... It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.... For the
The plaintiff's first claim is that the trial court "erred in holding that it is bound by federal case law in interpreting the [act]." The plaintiff argues that the court improperly relied on federal cases in determining whether being placed on a performance improvement plan constituted an adverse employment action. Acknowledging that there is no Connecticut appellate case law on this precise issue, the plaintiff claims that the court was "not locked into interpretations by lower federal appellate courts of different, albeit similarly worded, federal statutes when defining for the first time the meaning of [the act]."
We first note that the court did not state that it was bound by federal case law in reaching its determination as to the meaning of the term "adverse employment action."
"In interpreting our antidiscrimination and antiretaliation statutes, we look to federal law for guidance. In drafting and modifying the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act ... our legislature modeled that act on its federal counterpart, Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.]... and has sought to keep our state law consistent with federal law in this area."
In order to prevail on a claim of age discrimination based on disparate treatment,
In the present case, the court determined that the plaintiff failed to plead the elements of a prima facie case because she failed to allege that she suffered any adverse employment action as a result of being placed on a performance improvement plan. In reaching that conclusion, the court looked to federal court decisions that have considered whether a particular action or conduct by an employer
Referencing Brown and Reynolds in its decision, the trial court determined that placement of an employee on a performance improvement plan in and of itself would not constitute an adverse employment action as that term is defined in federal case law. We conclude that the court's decision to follow the federal courts' interpretation in this case was not improper because, as previously discussed, Connecticut case law clearly provides that our courts may look to federal court precedent for guidance in enforcing Connecticut's antidiscrimination statutes.
The plaintiff's next claim is that, even applying federal law to the facts alleged in this case, her complaint states a valid cause of action for age discrimination. The plaintiff focuses on the following allegations in her complaint: (1) she was placed on a performance improvement plan; (2) she was told she was subject to termination on a specific date; (3) the defendant had established a pattern of terminating or threatening to terminate its older employees; and (4) the defendant's conduct placed her in fear of losing her employment and caused her to suffer emotional distress. She argues that those allegations, collectively, were sufficient to state a claim for age discrimination. We disagree.
As discussed by the court in its memorandum of decision, the federal cases of Reynolds and Brown specifically addressed performance improvement plans in the context of age discrimination claims. In Reynolds, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in agreeing with other federal circuit courts, concluded that being placed on a performance improvement plan is not an adverse employment action absent accompanying changes to pay, benefits or employment status. Reynolds v. Dept. of the Army, supra, 439 Fed.Appx. at 153-54 In reaching that conclusion,
Here, the trial court reasonably could have found that the holdings in the federal cases, which addressed the precise issue in this case, were persuasive. In reviewing the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, the court correctly determined that she failed to allege any adverse material changes in the terms or conditions of her employment as a result of being placed on the performance improvement plan. She did not allege that her salary decreased or that she had fewer benefits or that her employment status changed. Although she argues that she was given a specific termination date, she acknowledged that she was not discharged from employment.
The judgment is affirmed.
The relevant federal provision in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., provides in relevant part: "It shall be unlawful for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age...." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012).