KELLER, J.

The petitioner, Francis Anderson, appeals following the habeas court's denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment dismissing with prejudice his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claims that the court erred by denying his petition for certification to appeal and dismissing his amended petition with prejudice because (1) an order that the petitioner had violated, which precipitated the court's dismissal of his amended petition with prejudice, was not reasonably clear; (2) the court's dismissal of his amended petition with prejudice was not proportionate to the petitioner's violation of the order; and (3) the court committed plain error by failing to comply with Practice Book § 23-40 and General Statutes § 52-470. We agree with the petitioner's second claim and reverse the judgment of the court.1

The following facts and procedural history are relevant here. On March 3, 2011, the petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of assaulting a peace officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c.2 The trial court, Hon. Terence A. Sullivan, judge trial referee, sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of five years incarceration, to be served consecutively to any previous sentence he was serving.

On February 19, 2013, the petitioner filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus.3 On June 3, 2013, prior to the evidentiary portion of the petitioner's habeas trial, the habeas court, Kwak, J., asked whether the parties wished to discuss any preliminary matters. The following exchange occurred on the record:

"[The Petitioner's Counsel]: Your Honor, another preliminary matter. My client is handcuffed and, absent any objection from the transporting correction officers, I'd ask that the —

"The Court: That's fine with me as long as the correction officers and the marshals are okay with removing the handcuffs. But, it's up to them.

"The Correction Officer: I have an issue with him being — him not being handcuffed.

"The Court: Okay.

"The Correction Officer: He's assaulted staff on a number of occasions, so I have an issue with that.

"The Court: All right, that's fine. I'm sorry, counsel, but that's —

"[The Petitioner's Counsel]: That's —

"The Court: Security is up to the marshals and the —

"The Petitioner: Excuse me. I got a problem with this officer.

"The Court: Sir —

"The Petitioner: I'm gonna leave. Come on. Let's go back to the facility.

"The Court: Sir, this is your petition. If you leave now, it's going to get dismissed with prejudice. Do you understand? All right. [Petitioner's counsel], I'm sorry, but your client just, for the record, left the courtroom. I advised him that, if he left today, this was his habeas trial and that it would be dismissed with prejudice and he disregarded my warning and left the courtroom. Anything to add, [petitioner's counsel]? ...

"[The Petitioner's Counsel]: I would ask Your Honor to consider based on [the petitioner's] history — and part of the history is a conduct disorder, explosive temper issues — that Your Honor consider a dismissal without prejudice as opposed to with prejudice.

"The Court: Okay. Well, this is — I'm going to take his action as a deliberate bypass of his trial today, which was scheduled, and obviously the state has expended a lot of time and effort to bring him here as well as the counsel and the witnesses that were supposed to be called today. So, therefore, I'm going to deny your motion and dismiss his — his [amended] petition with prejudice."

On June 11, 2013, the petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal, which the court denied on June 17, 2013. Subsequently, he filed the present appeal on July 5, 2013.

On November 26, 2013, the petitioner filed a motion for articulation, wherein he alleged that the habeas court had failed to provide sufficient facts and legal analysis upon which to base its dismissal of his amended petition with prejudice. Specifically, among other requests, he asked the court to: (1) articulate the legal authority it relied on to dismiss his amended petition with prejudice; (2) articulate the specific factual findings it relied on to dismiss his amended petition with prejudice; (3) address a number of specific inquiries, including whether he had received prior notice that actions delaying the habeas trial would result in a dismissal of his amended petition with prejudice and whether it had provided him with its full verbal warning before he left the courtroom; and (4) address why his alleged psychological impairments did not support a dismissal of his amended petition without prejudice.

The court granted the petitioner's motion for articulation. The court began by explaining that it relied on Practice Book §§ 14-34 and 23-29(5)5 to dismiss the petitioner's amended petition with prejudice on the basis of his failure to prosecute his claims.

In response to the petitioner's request that it articulate the specific factual findings it relied on to dismiss his amended petition with prejudice, the court stated: "The petitioner was aware the matter was on for trial and was present in the courtroom with assigned counsel at the onset of trial. Counsel for the petitioner requested that the court permit the removal of the petitioner's handcuffs, absent any objection by the correction officers. The court indicated its willingness to have the handcuffs removed so long as the correction officers agreed to their removal. One of the correction officers indicated that the petitioner had assaulted staff on a number of occasions and opposed the removal of the handcuffs. The petitioner expressed that he had an issue with the correction officer who opposed removal of the handcuffs and then absented himself from the court-room and proceedings, thereby failing to prosecute the claims in his habeas corpus petition."

Next, in response to the petitioner's inquiry as to whether the petitioner had received adequate notice that dismissal with prejudice would result from any actions that delayed the habeas proceedings, the court stated that the petitioner was represented by counsel and the court's file contained all of the relevant notices and orders. Last, the court stated that it had warned the petitioner before he left the courtroom that it would dismiss his amended petition with prejudice if he exited the courtroom. The court provided no articulation in response to the petitioner's request for the court to address why the petitioner's alleged psychological impairments did not warrant dismissal of his amended petition without prejudice.6

On January 21, 2014, the petitioner filed a motion for further articulation, which the court denied. He subsequently filed a motion for review with this court on February 20, 2014. This court granted the motion for review, but denied the relief requested therein. This appeal followed.

We begin by setting forth the relevant standard of review. "In Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 187, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), we concluded that ... § 52-470(b) prevents a reviewing court from hearing the merits of a habeas appeal following the denial of certification to appeal unless the petitioner establishes that the denial of certification constituted an abuse of discretion by the habeas court. In Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 615-16, 646 A.2d 126 (1994), we incorporated the factors adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 431-32, 111 S.Ct. 860, 112 L.Ed.2d 956 (1991), as the appropriate standard for determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal. This standard requires the petitioner to demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.... A petitioner who establishes an abuse of discretion through one of the factors listed above must then demonstrate that the judgment of the habeas court should be reversed on its merits.... In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner's request for certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of the petitioner's underlying claims to determine whether the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner's appeal was frivolous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Damato v. Commissioner of Correction, 156 Conn.App. 165, 167, 113 A.3d 449, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 902, 114 A.3d 167 (2015).

The petitioner asserts that the court abused its discretion by denying his petition for certification to appeal, which requires us to examine the merits of his underlying claims. He contends that the court erred by dismissing his amended petition with prejudice because: (1) the court's order demanding that he remain in the courtroom or risk dismissal of his amended petition with prejudice was not reasonably clear; and (2) the court's dismissal of his amended petition with prejudice was too severe in proportion to his act of leaving the courtroom. Alternatively, he claims that the court committed plain error by failing to comply with Practice Book § 23-407 and General Statutes § 52-470.8

The petitioner's claim that the court's dismissal of his amended petition with prejudice constituted an unduly severe sanction for his act of leaving the courtroom is dispositive of the present appeal. Specifically, he contends that the court could have imposed other, less draconian sanctions in response to his act of leaving the courtroom. According to the petitioner, the court could have: ordered a brief recess and provided his counsel with an opportunity to meet with him and discuss the matter; permitted his counsel to proceed with the trial in his absence; rescheduled the trial and permitted him to be present at trial via an interactive audiovisual device; or, as his counsel had requested, dismissed his amended petition without prejudice. We conclude that the court abused its discretion by denying the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal and, under the circumstances of this case, by dismissing the petitioner's amended petition with prejudice because that sanction was too severe.

"It is well established that a court may ... under its inherent power... impose sanctions in order to compel observance of its rules and orders.... The decision to enter sanctions ... and, if so, what sanction or sanctions to impose, is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.... In reviewing a claim that this discretion has been abused the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness.... [T]he ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did....

"At the same time, however, [our Supreme Court] also ha[s] stated: [D]iscretion imports something more than leeway in decision-making.... It means a legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice.... In addition, the court's discretion should be exercised mindful of the policy preference to bring about a trial on the merits of a dispute whenever possible and to secure for the litigant his day in court.... Our practice does not favor the termination of proceedings without a determination of the merits of the controversy where that can be brought about with due regard to necessary rules of procedure.... Therefore, although dismissal of an action is not an abuse of discretion where a party shows a deliberate, contumacious or unwarranted disregard for the court's authority... the court should be reluctant to employ the sanction of dismissal except as a last resort.... [T]he sanction of dismissal should be imposed only as a last resort, and where it would be the only reasonable remedy available to vindicate the legitimate interests of the other party and the court." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Ascanio v. Toyota Industries Corp., 309 Conn. 663, 670-72, 72 A.3d 1019 (2013).9

Furthermore, we acknowledge that "[t]he right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus is enshrined in both the United States constitution and the Connecticut constitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9; Conn. Const. art. I, § 12. Indeed, it has been observed that the writ of habeas corpus holds an honored position in our jurisprudence.... The principal purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to serve as a bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness.... The writ has been described as a unique and extraordinary legal remedy.... It must never be forgotten that the writ of habeas corpus is the precious safeguard of personal liberty and there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fine v. Commissioner of Correction, 147 Conn.App. 136, 142-43, 81 A.3d 1209 (2013).

Turning to the circumstances of this case, we note the following. At the outset, the record lacks any evidence indicating that the petitioner, in leaving the courtroom, understood the gravity of his act. Although the record suggests that the petitioner heard the court's warning prior to exiting the courtroom, it is unclear whether he fully understood the consequences of his departure.10 The court did not make any concerted effort to ensure that he was personally apprised of and understood the consequences. See id., at 148, 81 A.3d 1209 (respondent failed to make affirmative showing that court ensured that petitioner knew of and understood consequences of withdrawing prior petition with prejudice). The lack of such effort appears particularly incautious when, due to the petitioner's incarcerated status, the court still had the ability to attempt to communicate with him, and his counsel represented to the court that the petitioner had psychological impairments. Furthermore, before the court dismissed the amended petition with prejudice, the petitioner's counsel was not provided with an opportunity to meet with the petitioner to discuss his actions and to explain the meaning of the court's warning. Although we do not condone the petitioner's inappropriate act of leaving the courtroom while the court was addressing him, we do not conclude that his discourteous and disruptive conduct was particularly egregious or that he expressed a "deliberate, contumacious or unwarranted disregard for the court's authority" on the basis of the record.11 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Ascanio v. Toyota Industries Corp., supra, 309 Conn. at 672, 72 A.3d 1019; cf. Fox v. First Bank, 198 Conn. 34, 39-40, 501 A.2d 747 (1985) (dismissal did not constitute abuse of discretion where plaintiff persistently failed to comply with court order without explanation and court expended considerable judicial resources in attempt to accommodate plaintiff).

Furthermore, "[d]ismissal was not the only option available to vindicate the legitimate interests of the [respondent] and the court." D'Ascanio v. Toyota Industries Corp., supra, 309 Conn. at 683, 72 A.3d 1019. At a minimum, the court could have called a brief recess to provide the petitioner's counsel with an opportunity to meet with the petitioner, advise him in regard to his actions, explain the court's warning to him, and potentially convince him to return to the courtroom.12 If the petitioner remained steadfast in refusing to reenter the courtroom after his counsel conferred with him and explained to him the court's inclination to dismiss his amended petition with prejudice, the court then could have inquired into whether the petitioner's counsel was capable of proceeding with the habeas trial in the petitioner's absence. See Saunders v. Commissioner of Correction, 157 Conn.App. 257, 263, 116 A.3d 338 (2015) ("the physical presence of the petitioner is ordinarily not necessarily required [at his or her habeas trial]"). Additionally, the court could have considered rescheduling the trial or further considered the request by the petitioner's counsel to dismiss the petition without prejudice.13 In summation, this was not a case wherein the "last resort" sanction of dismissal with prejudice was "the only reasonable remedy available to vindicate the legitimate interests of the [respondent] and the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Ascanio v. Toyota Industries Corp., supra, 309 Conn. at 672, 72 A.3d 1019.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the habeas court abused its discretion by denying the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal and by dismissing his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus with prejudice.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with law.

In this opinion, the other judges concurred.