GRUENDEL, J.

The self-represented plaintiff, Nancy Burton, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, her administrative appeal from a decision of the named defendant, the Connecticut Siting Council (council). The dispositive issue is whether the plaintiff had standing to pursue that appeal. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.1

This case concerns the construction of an independent fuel storage facility (facility) for spent nuclear fuel at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station in Waterford (Millstone) by the defendant Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Dominion). In 2003, Dominion filed an application with the council for a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need in order to construct a dry storage facility pursuant to General Statutes § 16-50k. Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting Council, 286 Conn. 57, 61, 942 A.2d 345 (2008). At that time, Millstone utilized "wet storage to store both spent fuel and all the fuel in a reactor core in the event of the need for refueling, maintenance or emergency measures...." Id. Due to "dwindling space in the wet storage facilities," Dominion submitted that the construction of a "dry storage facility was necessary to compensate" therefor. Id.

In 2004, the council approved Dominion's application to complete all subsurface infrastructure work to accommodate 135 horizontal storage modules (modules) on the Millstone site. In addition, the council permitted Dominion to construct a concrete pad large enough to accommodate the installation of forty-nine modules. The council ordered Dominion to install those modules "in numeric order as identified in the record...." The council's approval also provided that Dominion could petition for permission to install additional modules in the future. Two parties who intervened in that proceeding pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 22a-19 (a),2 including the plaintiff, appealed that decision to the Superior Court, which ultimately dismissed the appeal. Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting Council, supra, 286 Conn. at 65, 942 A.2d 345. Our Supreme Court affirmed that judgment on appeal. Id., at 88, 942 A.2d 345.

On October 31, 2012, Dominion filed an application for "certain modifications to the existing [facility] and ... to install all remaining concrete pads to accommodate the full build-out of 135 [modules]." Significantly, Dominion did not seek approval to install any additional modules as part of this application, a distinction the council specifically noted in its findings of fact.

The plaintiff intervened in that administrative proceeding pursuant to § 22a-19 (a) and thereafter participated through the submission of interrogatories, direct testimony, cross-examination, and the introduction of various exhibits and motions. The council held a public hearing over the course of two days, conducted a site visit, and solicited comments from state agencies and nearby municipalities. In its May 2, 2013 decision, the council found that the proposed activity "would have no effect on wetlands or watercourses" and "would not significantly increase stormwater run-off from the site and no modifications to stormwater discharge structures would be required." The council noted that the facility was not within a flood hazard area and that "[n]o vegetation or habitats would be directly affected, as all modifications would be within previously disturbed and currently industrially maintained areas. The project would not affect any State or federally endangered, threatened, or special concern species." The council also found that "[t]he project is consistent with the provisions of the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act [ (CEPA), General Statutes § 22a-14 et seq.], as it will not have the effect of unreasonably polluting, impairing, or destroying the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state." It thus concluded that "the effects associated with the modification of the existing [facility], including the effects on the natural environment; ecological integrity and balance; public health and safety; scenic, historic, and recreational values; forests and parks; air and water purity; and fish and wildlife are not disproportionate either alone or cumulatively with other effects when compared to need, are not in conflict with the policies of the state concerning such effects, and not sufficient reason to deny this application to amend and modify" its prior approval of the facility. Accordingly, the council approved Dominion's application and ordered in relevant part that "[t]he Certificate Holder shall install a concrete pad large enough to accommodate 135 [modules]...." The council did not authorize the installation of any additional modules on that concrete pad.3

From that decision, the plaintiff timely appealed to the Superior Court. The operative complaint, the plaintiff's second amended complaint dated June 7, 2013, alleges that the council acted arbitrarily and capriciously in nine respects.4 Both Dominion and the council thereafter moved to dismiss the administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.5 By memorandum of decision dated March 11, 2014, the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked the requisite standing and thus dismissed the appeal. This appeal followed.

It is well established that "[a] party must have standing to assert a claim in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lewis v. Slack, 110 Conn.App. 641, 643, 955 A.2d 620, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 953, 961 A.2d 417 (2008). "Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sadloski v. Manchester, 228 Conn. 79, 84, 634 A.2d 888 (1993), on appeal after remand, 235 Conn. 637, 668 A.2d 1314 (1995). "[T]he court has a duty to dismiss, even on its own initiative, any appeal that it lacks jurisdiction to hear.... Where a party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause."6 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lewis v. Slack, supra, at 643-44, 955 A.2d 620.

"To be entitled to invoke the judicial process, a party must have suffered an aggrievement." Kelly v. Dearington, 23 Conn.App. 657, 660, 583 A.2d 937 (1990). "Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory.... Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the [controversy], as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share.... Second, the party must also show that the [alleged conduct] has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest.... Statutory aggrievement ... exists by legislative fiat.... In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McWeeny v. Hartford, 287 Conn. 56, 64-65, 946 A.2d 862 (2008). "[T]he question of whether the pleadings set forth sufficient facts, if presumed true, to establish a party's aggrievement presents a question of law over which we exercise plenary review." Connecticut Independent Utility Workers, Local 12924 v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 312 Conn. 265, 273, 92 A.3d 247 (2014). With those principles in mind, we turn to the question of whether the court properly concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to maintain this administrative appeal.

I

At the outset, we note what is not in dispute. In her complaint, the plaintiff did not specify whether her appeal was brought pursuant to CEPA or the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. With respect to the latter, our Supreme Court has explained that "[b]ecause the UAPA does not, by itself, render the plaintiffs statutorily aggrieved for standing purposes," a party must establish that it is classically aggrieved. Financial Consulting, LLC v. Commissioner of Insurance, 315 Conn. 196, 227, 105 A.3d 210 (2014); see also Bingham v. Dept. of Public Works, 286 Conn. 698, 704, 945 A.2d 927 (2008) ("the UAPA ... requires that the appealing party be aggrieved in order to bring the appeal"). In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the plaintiff was not classically aggrieved because she failed to allege a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision rendered by the council, rather than a general interest shared by members of the community. See Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 486, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). The plaintiff in this appeal does not contest the propriety of that determination. Accordingly, our consideration of the question of the plaintiff's standing is confined to whether the allegations of her operative complaint establish statutory aggrievement under CEPA.

II

Although "[t]raditionally, citizens seeking to protect the environment were required to show specific, personal aggrievement to attain standing to bring a legal action," CEPA waives that requirement by providing that "any person or other entity, without first having to establish aggrievement, may intervene in any administrative proceeding challenging conduct which has, or which is reasonably likely to have, the effect of unreasonably polluting, impairing or destroying the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542, 556, 23 A.3d 1176 (2011). With respect to administrative proceedings, § 22a-19 (a) confers such statutory standing on intervening parties.7

As our Supreme Court has explained, "in order to survive a motion to dismiss, [a plaintiff seeking to assert a claim under § 22a-19] must articulate a colorable claim of unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of the environment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Finley v. Inland Wetlands Commission, 289 Conn. 12, 35, 959 A.2d 569 (2008). "A complaint does not sufficiently allege standing ... by merely reciting the provisions of § [22a-19], but must set forth facts to support an inference that unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of a natural resource will probably result from the challenged activities unless remedial measures are taken." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. To ascertain whether the plaintiff has articulated a colorable claim of environmental harm, we therefore must scrutinize the allegations of the operative complaint.

Paragraph 12 of that complaint contains nine distinct allegations of arbitrary and capricious action by the council. See footnote 4 of this opinion. Paragraph 12(C) alleges that "[t]he council failed to adequately consider the environmental and health implications and consequences of the application as required by law...." Bereft of any factual allegations of environmental harm, subparagraph (C) merely asserts a legal conclusion, and thus plainly is inadequate.8 See Finley v. Inland Wetlands Commission, supra, 289 Conn. at 35, 959 A.2d 569 (complaint does not sufficiently allege standing by merely reciting provisions of § 22a-19); Wucik v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 113 Conn.App. 502, 507-508, 967 A.2d 572 (2009) (conclusory statement devoid of any specific factual allegations cannot establish aggrievement); Hendel's Investors Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 62 Conn.App. 263, 274, 771 A.2d 182 (2001) (conclusory statements purporting to allege aggrievement insufficient without adequate accompanying factual allegations).

The remaining eight allegations of impropriety set forth in paragraph 12 of the complaint all allege procedural error. Subparagraphs (A), (B), and (H) challenge the sufficiency of the evidence submitted by Dominion, while subparagraphs (D) and (E) allege bias on the part of the council.9 Subparagraphs (G) and (I) allege that the council's decision is inconsistent with its prior decision in 2004, with unspecified "state policies," and with "the council's own analysis" regarding "the need for Millstone generation of electricity...." Lastly, subparagraph (F) alleges that the council "acted prematurely" on Dominion's 2012 application, claiming that the council instead should have waited until after the Nuclear Regulatory Commission promulgated "an Environmental Impact Statement ... in the year 2014...."10 None of those claims of impropriety contain any allegations of fact that "support an inference that unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of a natural resource will probably result from the challenged activities...."11 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Finley v. Inland Wetlands Commission, supra, 289 Conn. at 35, 959 A.2d 569. They thus do not constitute a colorable claim of environmental harm.

III

Our Supreme Court "consistently [has] acknowledged ... that an intervenor's standing pursuant to § 22a-19 strictly is limited to challenging only environmental issues covered by the statute and only those environmental concerns that are within the jurisdiction of the particular administrative agency conducting the proceeding into which the party seeks to intervene." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pond View, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 288 Conn. 143, 157, 953 A.2d 1 (2008); see also Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 490, 400 A.2d 726 (1978) (intervenor that has filed verified pleading at administrative level pursuant to § 22a-19 has standing to appeal on basis of that pleading "limited to ... environmental issues only"). The court nevertheless has carved a limited exception to that general rule involving cases in which an intervenor alleges that it was denied the right to fundamental fairness in the administrative proceeding.12 FairwindCT, Inc. v. Connecticut Siting Council, 313 Conn. 669, 713-14, 99 A.3d 1038 (2014). The court reasoned that if parties intervening pursuant to § 22a-19 can prove their factual allegations that "the council refused to provide them with a fair opportunity to present their claim"; id., at 714, 99 A.3d 1038; that "alleged deprivation ... could result in decisions by the council that did not give adequate consideration to environmental issues." Id., at 713, 99 A.3d 1038. The court therefore held that "[t]he right to a fundamentally fair hearing is implicit in the right to intervene pursuant to CEPA."13 Id., at 714, 99 A.3d 1038.

As with any standing issue, it remains that the plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to substantiate such an allegation. For example, in FairwindCT, Inc., the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant violated their right to fundamental fairness by "preventing [them] from cross-examining witnesses, issuing protective orders and not allowing [them] adequate time to prepare for cross-examination...." Id., at 713, 99 A.3d 1038. In contrast, the operative complaint in the present case contains no such allegations, nor does it reference the right to fundamental fairness. Rather, the complaint acknowledges that the plaintiff "intervened in the proceedings ... and participated through the submission of interrogatories, cross-examination, direct testimony and the introduction of various exhibits and motions." None of the allegations of the complaint, including the nine claims of the arbitrary and capricious conduct on the part of the council, set forth any factual allegation of specific conduct that would support a finding that the council violated the plaintiff's right to fundamental fairness. Accordingly, the narrow exception outlined in FairwindCT, Inc., is inapposite to the present case.

IV

The plaintiff also claims that her status as an intervenor in the proceeding before the council conferred "automatic statutory standing" for purposes of her appeal to the Superior Court. That contention is contrary to well established law.

Section 16-50j-17 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies addresses the status of intervenors before the council. It provides in relevant part that "[n]o grant of leave to participate as an intervenor shall be deemed to be an expression by the council that the person permitted to intervene is a party in interest who may be aggrieved by any final decision, order, or ruling of the council unless such grant of leave explicitly so states." Regs. Conn. State Agencies § 16-50j-17 (b). The record in the present case does not contain such an explicit statement by the council.

Furthermore, our appellate courts consistently have "held that [m]ere status ... as a party or a participant in a hearing before an administrative agency does not in and of itself constitute aggrievement for the purposes of appellate review. Hartford Distributors, Inc. v. Liquor Control Commission, 177 Conn. 616, 620, 419 A.2d 346 (1979); see also New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 226 Conn. 105, 132, 627 A.2d 1257 (1993); Milford v. Local 1566, 200 Conn. 91, 96, 510 A.2d 177 (1986); Bakelaar v. West Haven, 193 Conn. 59, 66, 475 A.2d 283 (1984); Fox v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 84 Conn.App. 628, 637, 854 A.2d 806 (2004); Olsen v. Inland Wetlands Commission, 6 Conn.App. 715, 718, 507 A.2d 495 (1986)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Concerned Citizens for the Preservation of Watertown, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 118 Conn.App. 337, 344, 984 A.2d 72 (2009), cert. denied, 294 Conn. 934, 987 A.2d 1028 (2010). Our courts similarly have held that "[t]he mere statement that the appellant is aggrieved, without supporting allegations as to the particular nature of the aggrievement, is insufficient." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bongiorno Supermarket, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 266 Conn. 531, 542-43, 833 A.2d 883 (2003). We decline to depart from that settled precedent.

Under Connecticut law, "[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised.... A plaintiff has the burden of proof with respect to standing.... To establish aggrievement ... the plaintiff [must allege] facts which, if proven, would constitute aggrievement as a matter of law...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Emerick v. Glastonbury, 145 Conn.App. 122, 128-29, 74 A.3d 512 (2013), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 901, 83 A.3d 348 (2014); see also Martin v. Brady, 261 Conn. 372, 376, 802 A.2d 814 (2002) (reviewing court must examine pleadings to decide if plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish subject matter jurisdiction); New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, supra, 226 Conn. at 120, 627 A.2d 1257 ("[p]leading and proof of facts that constitute aggrievement are essential prerequisites to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over an administrative appeal"). With respect to matters brought pursuant to § 22a-19, to survive a motion to dismiss for lack for standing, the plaintiff's "complaint ... must set forth facts to support an inference that unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of a natural resource will probably result from the challenged activities unless remedial measures are taken." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Finley v. Inland Wetlands Commission, supra, 289 Conn. at 35, 959 A.2d 569. It therefore was incumbent on the plaintiff to allege such facts in her operative complaint to establish standing to maintain her appeal before the Superior Court.

The plaintiff has not met that burden. Absent from her operative complaint is any colorable claim of probable environmental harm or deprivation of her right to fundamental fairness before the council. Perhaps cognizant of that deficiency, the plaintiff argues that the Superior Court improperly confined its review to the operative pleadings before it at the time that the defendants moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. She posits that the court was required to consider not only the allegations set forth in the operative complaint, but also those contained in the December 7, 2012 notice of intervention that she filed with the council in the underlying proceeding. For two reasons, we disagree.

First and foremost, the plaintiff has provided no legal authority in support of that novel contention, which runs contrary to our law. Connecticut is a fact pleading jurisdiction. See Practice Book § 10-1; Florian v. Lenge, 91 Conn.App. 268, 274, 880 A.2d 985 (2005). In the context of administrative appeals brought pursuant to § 22a-19, our Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff's "complaint ... must set forth facts to support an inference that unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of a natural resource will probably result from the challenged activities unless remedial measures are taken." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Finley v. Inland Wetlands Commission, supra, 289 Conn. at 35, 959 A.2d 569; see also Connecticut Independent Utility Workers, Local 12924 v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 312 Conn. at 273, 92 A.3d 247 (noting that reviewing court "must examine the complaint to determine whether it contains allegations" sufficient to establish aggrievement [emphasis in original]); Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541, 545, 427 A.2d 822 (1980) ("[w]e must examine each count of the complaint ... to determine whether [the] plaintiff ... has standing to sue"). Indeed, General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 22a-19 (a) expressly requires an intervening party to file "a verified pleading" that specifies "conduct which has, or which is reasonably likely to have, the effect of unreasonably polluting, impairing or destroying the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state." As we already have discussed, the operative complaint in the present case lacks such factual allegations.

Second, the operative complaint does not reference the plaintiff's December 7, 2012 notice of intervention in any manner, and it was not appended thereto. Moreover, at the time that Dominion moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on July 29, 2013, that notice of intervention was not in the record before the Superior Court. It is well settled that if "the plaintiff's standing does not adequately appear from all materials of record, the complaint must be dismissed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., supra, 300 Conn. at 550, 23 A.3d 1176. Because the December 7, 2012 notice of intervention was neither referenced in the operative complaint nor submitted into the record at the time that the defendants moved to dismiss the appeal, we cannot agree with the plaintiff's assertion that the Superior Court made a "deliberate decision to disregard the notice of intervention," as she argues in her appellate brief.14

Rather, it appears to us that, consistent with Connecticut precedent, the court properly halted the proceeding upon the filing of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As our Supreme Court has noted, because aggrievement implicates subject matter jurisdiction, "[a] possible absence of subject matter jurisdiction must be addressed and decided whenever the issue is raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stauton v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 271 Conn. 152, 157, 856 A.2d 400 (2004). "It is axiomatic that once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised, it must be immediately acted upon by the court.... [O]nce raised, either by a party or by the court itself, the question [of subject matter jurisdiction] must be answered before the court may decide the case." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fennelly v. Norton, 103 Conn.App. 125, 136-37, 931 A.2d 269, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 918, 931 A.2d 936 (2007); see also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996) (once motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed, trial court "obligated" to scrutinize initial complaint to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction was lacking before considering motion to amend complaint); Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 545, 590 A.2d 914 (1991) ("as soon as the jurisdiction of the court to decide an issue is called into question, all other action in the case must come to a halt until such a determination is made"). We refuse to assign error to a court's failure to consider a document that was not properly part of the record before it.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.