MICHAEL P. SHEA, District Judge.
Plaintiff Protegrity Corporation ("Protegrity") brings this patent infringement action against Defendant TokenEx, LLC ("TokenEx"). TokenEx has moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because Connecticut's long-arm statute does not reach TokenEx, I GRANT the motion to dismiss.
Protegrity is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the Cayman Islands and owns a portfolio of patents relating to data security solutions. (Am. Compl. [ECF No. 42], ¶¶ 1, 9.) Its principal subsidiary, Protegrity USA, Inc. ("Protegrity USA") has its principal place of business in Stamford, Connecticut. (Id.) Protegrity alleges that TokenEx, a limited liability company in Oklahoma that is in the business of providing software services in the field of "tokenization,"
TokenEx previously moved to dismiss Protegrity's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. (See ECF No. 26.) I allowed the parties to take discovery on the jurisdictional issue, and the parties fully briefed the issue of personal jurisdiction. (See ECF No. 32.) However, because the parties analyzed the issue under the improper long-arm statute—Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-929 instead of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59b
In a patent infringement case, the law of the Federal Circuit applies to a personal jurisdiction challenge. Electronics For Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("Our prior decisions make clear that where the personal jurisdictional inquiry is 2017intimately involved with the substance of the patent laws,' we apply Federal Circuit law.") (quoting reference omitted). "Determining whether specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is proper entails two inquiries: whether a forum state's long-arm statute permits service of process, and whether the assertion of jurisdiction would be inconsistent with due process." Id. "In the procedural posture of a motion to dismiss, a district court must accept the uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and resolve any factual conflicts in the affidavits in the plaintiff's favor." Id. When the evaluation of personal jurisdiction "is based on affidavits and other written materials in the absence of an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff need only to make a prima facie showing that defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction." Id.
Plaintiffs argue that TokenEx is subject to personal jurisdiction under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59b(a)(1), which authorizes jurisdiction over a foreign limited liability company that transacts business in Connecticut. The statute provides as follows, in pertinent part:
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59b(a)(1). Plaintiffs must satisfy two requirements to establish jurisdiction under this provision. First, they must make a prima facie showing that TokenEx "transacts any business" in Connecticut. "[A]lthough the term 2017transacts any business' is not defined by statute, we previously have construed the term 2017to embrace a single purposeful business transaction.'" Ryan v. Cerullo, 282 Conn. 109, 119 (2007) (quoting Zartolas v. Nisenfeld, 184 Conn. 471, 474 (1981)). Second, Plaintiffs' "cause of action against [the defendant must arise] from [the defendant's] business activity in this state." Id. at 121-22. "A claim 2017arises out of' a defendant's transaction of business when there exists a substantial nexus between the business transacted and the cause of action sued upon." Agency Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Grand Rent A Car Corp., 98 F.3d 25, 31 (2d Cir.1996) (internal citations omitted) (interpreting N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 302(a), upon which the Connecticut long-arm statute was modeled).
Neither the allegations in the Amended Complaint nor any of the evidence in the record, even when construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, satisfies either of these requirements. First, Plaintiffs have made no showing—even after discovery—that TokenEx "transacts any business" in Connecticut; rather, Plaintiffs concede that TokenEx does not sell its product in Connecticut and fail to provide evidence of even a single TokenEx customer in Connecticut. (Pls.' Response [ECF No. 44], at 9.) Plaintiffs also do not dispute that TokenEx has no clients, offices, representatives, employees, officers, shareholders, bank accounts, or post office box in Connecticut; that TokenEx owns no property and pays no taxes in Connecticut; and that none of TokenEx's employees have ever even visited Connecticut. (Def.'s MTD [ECF No. 43], Pezold Aff. ¶ 7.) Instead, Plaintiffs' argument—that TokenEx's contact with Plaintiffs, its advertising, and its website are sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction—is unavailing, even when viewing all such activity collectively.
First, Plaintiffs argue that personal jurisdiction may be exercised because TokenEx "had contact with a Connecticut entity"—presumably, Protegrity USA, which has its principal place of business in Connecticut.
Plaintiffs' alternative argument, that TokenEx "transacts any business" in Connecticut through its nationwide advertising, is similarly unavailing. TokenEx's only yellow page listing is in Oklahoma. (Def.'s MTD [ECF No. 43], Pezold Aff. ¶ 10.) It has never advertised on radio, television, or in a newspaper. (Id.) While TokenEx has had a presence on Twitter, Google, and LinkedIn, TokenEx's only current advertising,
Finally, Plaintiffs' argument that TokenEx's website is sufficiently "interactive" to confer personal jurisdiction over them misconstrues the applicable law. The mere existence of a website providing contact information is not enough; instead, the court must evaluate the website's level of interactivity:
On-Line Techs. v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 141 F.Supp.2d 246, 265 (D. Conn. 2001). The undisputed evidence shows that TokenEx's website falls on the "passive" end of the spectrum. See Dorchester Fin. Sec. Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2013) ("[A] district court may [consider materials outside the pleadings] without converting a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction into a motion for summary judgment."). The website lists TokenEx's phone number, email address, and physical address. (Def.'s MTD [ECF No. 43], Pezold Aff. ¶ 13.) It provides no information specifically targeting Connecticut customers and does not require its guests to submit geographic information. (Id.) The website does not provide pricing information for TokenEx's products or allow for purchases. (Id.) While a visitor may print out information about TokenEx's services and request a 30-day trial of TokenEx services, TokenEx first evaluates the request before deciding whether to respond. (Id.) In other words, the website requires any prospective customers first to contact TokenEx before obtaining its services. (Id.) Thus, the website is best characterized as "passive" because it does not allow a prospective customer unilaterally to make purchases from TokenEx. See Carson Optical, Inc. v. Telebrands Corp., 3:06-cv-821, 2007 WL 2460672, at *4 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2007) (finding that defendant's website, which included pricing information, was nonetheless passive and did not confer personal jurisdiction under § 52-59b(a)(1) because customers could not purchase defendant's products on the website and had to first contact defendant to order products offered on the site). And to the extent TokenEx has made sales from its website, Plaintiffs have not made any showing that such sales were to Connecticut customers or that the website specifically targeted Connecticut customers in any way. Bell v. Shah, No. 3:05-cv-0671, 2006 WL 860588, at *2 (D. Conn. March 31, 2006) ("Maintaining a website does not constitute transacting business under the long-arm statute unless the website specifically targets Connecticut customers, which is not alleged here."). TokenEx's website thus does not subject it to the jurisdiction of this Court.
Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that any or all of the above allegations were sufficient to demonstrate that TokenEx "transacts any business" in Connecticut, Plaintiffs have still failed to satisfy the second requirement of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59b(a)(1)—that their cause of action arises out of TokenEx's business activity in this state. Ryan, 282 Conn. at. 121-22. In other words, they have not demonstrated that their patent infringement claim has a "substantial nexus" to their communications with TokenEx, or to any business activity by TokenEx in Connecticut resulting from TokenEx's advertising or website. As discussed above, the parties' communications were all initiated by Plaintiffs, were focused on the possibility of patent infringement, and, in any event, did not result in a business relationship. In short, Plaintiffs cannot vest a Connecticut court with personal jurisdiction over a person simply by hurling an accusation of patent infringement across the country at that person and then receiving responses in Connecticut.
Because I have determined that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59b(a)(1) does not reach TokenEx, I need not evaluate whether exercising personal jurisdiction over it would comport with due process.
For the reasons above, I GRANT TokenEx's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.