RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS

STEFAN R. UNDERHILL, District Judge.

Defendant Roberto Rodriguez filed a motion pursuant to Rule 41(g)1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the return of property, specifically, for $3,257.09 in U.S. currency seized upon his arrest during the prosecution of his underlying crime (doc. 828).2 Shortly thereafter, the United States ("the Government") filed its opposition to Rodriguez's motion (doc. 829), and Rodriguez filed his reply brief (doc. 832) and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (doc. 837). For the reasons set forth, Rodriguez's motion for return of property is denied, and his motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied, with prejudice, as moot.

I. Background

On June 4, 2009, a grand jury returned an indictment (doc. 11) charging Rodriguez with conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(B) and 846 [Count One]; three-counts of distribution of 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) [Counts Two, Seven, Ten]; and six counts of distribution of five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B) [Counts Six, Eight, Nine, Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen]. At the time of Rodriguez's arrest, agents seized $3,257.09 in cash from his person. Gov't Opp'n Br. 1 (doc. 829).

Rodriguez then entered into a plea agreement with the Government (doc. 294) and pleaded guilty to Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment (docs 149, 164, 178). Rodriguez's plea agreement with the government included a provision in which Rodriguez consented to forfeit the $3,257.09 that had been seized upon his arrest to the Government.3 Plea Agreement 3 (doc. 294). Rodriguez also waived the requirements of Rules 32.2 and 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. At Rodriguez's sentencing hearing, I imposed a sentence that included forfeiture of that cash to the Government. Judgment 2 (doc. 301).

Rodriguez then timely filed a Rule 41(g) motion for return of the $3,257.09 (doc. 810), which I denied on the merits (doc. 320). In the prior motion, Rodriguez argued that the cash seized was "unrelated to the crime nor was the source of that crime," that the cash constituted his proceeds from selling used cars and conducting repairs, that he was not charged with a forfeiture count nor pleaded guilty to forfeiture proceedings allowing the seizure of the money, that he was not served with notice of any forfeiture proceedings, and that he never waived his ownership rights to the seized money. Def.'s R. 41(g) Mot. 1-2 (doc. 810). Rodriguez now renews that motion on substantively the same grounds.

II. Discussion

Under a district court's equitable jurisdiction, the law allows that property once-seized for a particular criminal case will be returned to the owner unless the Government can demonstrate why retaining that property is reasonable. Adeleke v. United States, 355 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2004) (referencing Mora v. United States, 955 F.2d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 1992)). Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the mechanism for such a request, providing that "a person aggrieved by . . . the deprivation of property may move for the property's return." To prevail on a Rule 41(g) motion, the claimant must demonstrate that (1) he is entitled to lawful possession of the seized property; (2) the property is not contraband; and (3) either the search was illegal or the government's need for the property as evidence has ended. 3A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 690 (3d ed. 2004); see also Awan v. United States, slip op., No. 12-cv-3844 (JS), 2014 WL 1343129, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014); Ferreira v. United States, 354 F.Supp.2d 406, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.3d 424, 433 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988)).

Neither the Second Circuit nor U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a standard for assessing Rule 41(g) motions. In the absence of a standard of review, the Advisory Committee Note to the 1989 amendments to current Rule 41(g) encouraged district courts to adopt an approach that evaluated the request's "reasonableness under all of the circumstances." 124 F.R.D. 397, 427 (1989); see also Committee Note to 2009 Amendments, Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) ("Rule 41(g) . . . provides a process for the `person aggrieved' to seek an order from the court for a return of the property . . . under reasonable circumstances"). Several federal appeals courts, as well as other district courts in the Second Circuit, have adopted that recommendation as their standard of review regarding Rule 41(g) motions. Gov't of V.I. v. Edwards, 903 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Hess, 982 F.2d 181, 186 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gladding, 775 F.3d 1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Gotti, 244 F.Supp.2d 120, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); United States v. Taft, 769 F.Supp. 1295, 1307 (D. Vt. 1991) (citing In re Search of Kitty's East, 905 F.2d 1367, 1375-76 (10th Cir. 1990)).

Rule 41(g) only applies, however, to circumstances in which the claimant is lawfully entitled to possession of the seized property. A claimant is not entitled to the return of property that has been forfeited or seized in satisfaction of a fine or penalty owed to the Government. Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir. 2007). A party has no ownership interest or right to property that has been forfeited or turned over as part of a criminal judgment. See United States v. David, 131 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 303 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (property that is statutorily forfeit need not be returned); Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569, 577 (6th Cir. 1982) (claimant must demonstrate it holds a property interest in the seized property), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983); Cauwenberghe, 827 F.3d at 433 (claimant who transferred certain property in satisfaction of criminal judgment was no longer lawfully entitled to that property).

Rodriguez maintains that he is the lawful owner of the property at issue, and he states that he never consented to the forfeiture of that property and that the Government failed to provide him adequate notice and process prior to claiming lawful title in that property. Rodriguez's argument squarely contradicts the record in this case.

A defendant who has forfeited property pursuant to a plea agreement and criminal sentence cannot later seek the return of that property. See, e.g., Awan, supra, at *4; Mosley v. United States, No. 95-cv-69, 1995 WL 118180, at *5-*6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1995). Rodriguez had ample notice of, and voluntarily consented to, the forfeiture of the $3,257.09. Rodriguez received that notice in his plea agreement with the Government, during his change of plea hearing, and again at his sentencing hearing — all proceedings in which he was informed of the forfeiture provision and asked if he voluntarily entered into the agreement and understood that he had forfeited any right, title or interest in the seized currency. As noted above, the terms of Rodriguez's plea agreement contained an express forfeiture, in addition to a waiver of the notice and announcement requirements for forfeiture, and a waiver of his right to challenge the forfeiture on "in any manner." Plea Agreement 3. Having transferred his interest in the seized property at issue, Rodriguez cannot now claim to be the lawful owner of that property.

III. Conclusion

Rodriguez voluntarily, willingly and expressly transferred any interest he may have had in the seized currency in his plea agreement and over the course of his criminal prosecution. As a result, he no longer holds any property right, title, or interest in that currency. Because he is not the lawful owner of the seized currency, he cannot now seek its return. Accordingly, Rodriguez's Rule 41(g) motion is denied, and his motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied as moot.

It is so ordered.