DOMINIC J. SQUATRITO, District Judge.
The plaintiff, Monica Giacomi ("Giacomi"), brings this action for monetary damages and equitable relief against the defendant, The Waterbury Hospital, Inc. ("the Hospital"), pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101
A motion for summary judgment may be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact is or cannot be disputed must support that assertion by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
A "material fact" is one whose resolution will affect the ultimate determination of the case.
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after discovery, the nonmoving party "failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof."
Before reciting the facts which the Court finds to be undisputed, the Court wishes to address an issue concerning the plaintiff's filings in opposition to the defendant's motion. The Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut contain specific requirements pertaining to papers filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Those papers must include a "`Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement,' which states in separately numbered paragraphs meeting the requirements of Local Rule 56(a)3 and corresponding to the paragraphs contained in the moving party's Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement whether each of the facts asserted by the moving party is admitted or denied." L. Civ. R. 56(a)2. In the Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement, each denial of a fact asserted by the moving party "must be followed by a specific citation to (1) the affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the facts at trial and/or (2) evidence that would be admissible at trial." L. Civ. R. 56(a)3. "The `specific citation' obligation of this Local Rule requires counsel and pro se parties to cite to specific paragraphs when citing affidavits. . . ."
In connection with the consideration of a motion for summary judgment, a district court is not obligated to "perform an independent review of the record to find proof of a factual dispute. A district court is obligated only to consider the materials [properly] cited to it by the parties."
(Doc. #35-8, at 125-26, p. 124:18-25, p. 125:1-16).
The Court notes that the cited deposition testimony is related to an age discrimination claim which was subsequently withdrawn from this case. In any event, Giacomi's statements merely convey her beliefs or feelings and are unsubstantiated by the evidence presented to the Court. The Court also notes that the plaintiff cited to her entire affidavit as support for her denial of this factual assertion. This is not a "specific citation" as required by Local Rule 56(a)2 and is therefore an inappropriate citation. To the extent that the defendant's factual assertions are properly supported by the evidence and the plaintiff's denials of those assertions are not, the Court will deem those assertions admitted. See L. Civ. R. 56(a)3 ("failure to provide specific citations to evidence in the record as required by this Local Rule may result in the Court deeming certain facts that are supported by the evidence admitted in accordance with Rule 56(a)1").
In 1977 Giacomi was hired by the Hospital. From 1977 to 2005 Giacomi was employed by the Hospital as a staff registered nurse. From 2005 to 2012 she was the Hospital's Assistant Director of Cardiopulmonary Services. As the Assistant Director of Cardiopulmonary Services Giacomi managed the day-to-day operations of six departments, including the Catheterization Laboratory, the Cardio-Pulmonary Rehabilitation Unit, the Stress Laboratory, the EKG Laboratory, the Pulmonary Functional Laboratory, and the Echo-Cardiography Laboratory. Her duties included managing staff, preparing work schedules, evaluating personnel, managing payroll, working on department budgets, and overseeing all quality issues in her departments.
In December 1992 Giacomi fell and injured her right knee and lower back in the
Hospital's parking lot. She was out of work on a medical leave of absence from December 14, 1992 to November 8, 1993.
In December 2009 Giacomi underwent an additional surgery for her back. At her follow-up examination in June of 2010, Giacomi was medically assigned an additional 15% permanent partial disability. (Doc. #35-3, at 2). This raised the permanent partial disability rating of her lumbar spine to a total of 35%. Giacomo's knee and back impairments limited her abilities to walk, stand, and climb stairs. She experienced persistent back pain and knee instability and was unable to stand, walk, or climb stairs for more than five to six minutes without having to stop or rest.
Giacomi's office was located in the Ambulatory Outpatient Services Department of the Hospital. As part of her usual work practice, Giacomi walked back and forth from her office to the Catheterization Laboratory ("Cath Lab") multiple times a day to perform her work duties relating to that particular lab. The Cath Lab was initially located directly across the hall from Giacomi's office. Giacomi also walked to and from the Hospital's cafeteria, which was located at the opposite end of the building from where her office was located, approximately four times a week to buy lunch. In 2005 Giacomi did not have any difficulty getting to the cafeteria. By 2010, because she was experiencing discomfort walking to and from the cafeteria, Giacomi had to plan her trips to the cafeteria.
In 2009-2010 the Hospital decided to renovate the Cath Lab in order to update the lab's equipment. In planning for the Cath Lab renovation, the Hospital decided to move the Cath Lab to a new location closer to the Hospitals' Emergency Department ("ED"). This decision was made for two reasons: (1) there was insufficient space in the existing Cath Lab for the new equipment, and (2) locating the Cath Lab near the ED was better for patient care, e.g., a patient experiencing a heart attack could be quickly transported from the ED to the new location of the Cath Lab. The Cath Lab's new location near the ED was at the opposite end of the building from where Giacomi's office was located.
Joanne Borduas ("Borduas"), Giacomi's direct supervisor, was on the Hospital's Executive Management Team, which was responsible for decisions and plans concerning the Cath Lab renovation. Giacomi was added to this team after the decision had been made to move the Cath Lab to a location near the ED. Giacomi did not raise any concerns about the new location of the Cath Lab at any of the planning meetings she attended, but she did raise a concern about the distance from her office to the new location in a conversation she had with Borduas. Giacomi agreed that it made sense, for purposes of patient care, to relocate the Cath Lab closer to the ED.
The Cath Lab renovation was completed in the summer of 2011. Because the renovated Cath Lab was located at the opposite end of the building from her office, Giacomi had to travel a greater distance from her office in order to access the renovated lab. Giacomi visited the Cath Lab up to six times during the course of a normal workday. After the renovated Cath Lab opened, Giacomi began to express her concerns about the new location to Borduas, telling her that she was having difficulty walking back and forth from her office to the lab due to pain in her back and knee. Giacomi expressed these concerns to Borduas on more than ten occasions after July 2011. On one occasion in the fall of 2011 Giacomi asked Borduas if any accommodation could be made because "it was becoming increasingly more difficult for me to get up to the cath lab and I was having increasing pain." (Doc. #35-8, at 80, p. 79:7-9). Borduas's response to Giacomi was, "We'll have to see." (Id. at 81, p. 80:15-16). After Giacomi asked Borduas about an accommodation, Borduas would frequently ask Giacomi how her back was. On each such occasion, Giacomi told Borduas that her back was not good and that she was in a lot of pain. She also would tell Borduas that in addition to experiencing pain in her back she had pain in her knee which was being aggravated by standing and walking for long periods. In the fall of 2011 Giacomi asked Borduas if it would be possible for Giacomi to get an office closer to the Cath Lab because she "was having more and more difficulty and more and more pain trying to walk up to the cath lab multiple times during the day. . . ." (Id. at 93, p. 92:14-17). Giacomi never received a response to her inquiry.
In September 2011 Giacomi experienced an episode of chest pain while at work and underwent a cardiac catheterization procedure to determine her medical condition. In April 2012 Doctor Dennis Dobkin, a cardiologist, provided Giacomi's counsel with a letter stating his opinion that her chest pain in 2011 was most likely a result of increased stress at work. In Doctor Dobkin's opinion, stress at work was a "substantial causative factor in her coronary spasm syndrome," classifying it as "most likely and medically probable." (Doc. #35-4, at 6). Giacomi returned to work sometime after experiencing this episode of chest pain.
The Hospital experienced substantial economic hardship starting in 2008 and continuing into 2012. From fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2011 the Hospital lost approximately $34 million. The Hospital saw a loss of $2 million in the first four months of fiscal year 2012 and faced the risk of losing $6 million by the end of that fiscal year. As a result of these losses, the Hospital was in jeopardy of violating its financial bond covenants with the bank that supported its financing.
The Hospital took measures to address its financial difficulties. It initially renegotiated contracts and leases in order to reduce expenses and outsourced some of its services to reduce costs. These measures by themselves, however, were insufficient to address the Hospital's financial losses. Consequently the Hospital began to consider a Reduction in Force ("RIF") to further reduce expenses. The individuals who decided that an RIF needed to be implemented were John Evans, Interim Chief Operating Officer; Darlene Stromstad, Chief Executive Officer; Charles Thorne, Interim Chief Financial Officer; Michael Cemeno, Chief Information Officer; Diane Woolley, Vice President of Human Resources; and Sandra Iadarola, Chief Nursing Officer (collectively, the "RIF decision-makers"). The decision to implement the RIF was made only because of the Hospital's financial situation.
The RIF decision-makers held planning meetings concerning the implementation of the RIF. In these meetings, the group reviewed the Hospital's organizational chart and decided to evaluate how administrative and management tasks could be realigned among fewer middle managers, since many of these managers performed overlapping or duplicative functions. The RIF decision-makers agreed that the Outpatient Medical Therapies Department, which included the Cath Lab and the Cardio-Pulmonary Rehabilitation Unit, was one of the Hospital's departments that should be reorganized to realign the duties and responsibilities of management among fewer middle managers.
Interim Chief Operating Officer John Evans identified several middle management positions for potential elimination, including Giacomi's position of Assistant Director of Cardiopulmonary Services.
On January 2, 2012, Susan Arcari, a Senior Account Claim Representative of PMA Companies, sent an email to Susan Keeley, a Workers' Compensation Analyst at Waterbury Hospital. (Doc. #35-5 at 2). This email read in part as follows: "Heads up! Since I am paying the remaining PPD [permanent partial disability] that is owed her she now has to treat again and they want MRI lumbar and CT scan. . . . It's my understanding she still works at WH [Waterbury Hospital] — is she really the asst director for the cardiopulmonary dept?" (Doc. #35-5, at 2). According to Giacomi, she was being ridiculed in this email by the Hospital's agents due to the increased activity, i.e., need for medical treatment, in her workers' compensation file. During a telephone conversation with Keeley on or about February 1, 2012, Giacomi "was cautioned that [her] workers' compensations claims (medical treatment) were becoming extremely active again. Since 1977, the Hospital has always contributed monetarily to fund its employees welfare benefits." (Doc. #34-1, at 6, ¶ 36).
The Hospital's RIF was implemented over the course of several days in late February 2012. In total, the Hospital laid off fifty-two employees, eliminated approximately twenty vacant positions, and decreased hours for approximately fifteen employees. The RIF affected approximately 5% of the Hospital's total workforce of 1,700 full-time positions. The Hospital estimated that it saved approximately $4.4 million through the RIF. As part of the RIF, Borduas was laid off on February 20, 2012.
On February 21, 2012, Giacomi was notified that her position had been eliminated. Evans told Giacomi that her employment with the Hospital was being terminated for financial reasons. The Unemployment Notice given to Giacomi had the "Lack of Work" box checked under the section "Reason for Unemployment." (Doc. #35-7, at 2). The other options under the "Reason for Unemployment" section were "Voluntary Leaving," "Discharge/Suspension," "Leave of Absence," and "Other." (
Giacomi brings her Amended Complaint in two counts, each of which raises a claim under the ADA.
In Count One of her Amended Complaint, Giacomi claims that the Hospital violated the ADA by not providing her with reasonable accommodations for her disabilities. An employer may violate the ADA by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation. As the Second Circuit has noted:
The Hospital acknowledges that it is subject to the ADA and, for purposes of this motion only, is not disputing that Giacomi is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA
Giacomi contends that she has a qualifying disability under the ADA on the basis of permanent physical impairments to her spine and knee which significantly restrict her ability to walk, stand, or climb stairs and produce persistent back pain and knee instability. The Hospital argues that "the plaintiff has failed to establish that the Hospital had notice of her disability." (Doc. #31-3, at 15). The Hospital concedes, however, that for purposes of this motion Giacomi is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA. Giacomi has produced evidence that the Hospital accepted a workers' compensation claim and paid benefits relating to Giacomi's spine and knee injuries. She has also produced evidence that after the relocation of the Cath Lab she informed her supervisor, Borduas, on numerous occasions of the pain and difficulties relating to her spine and knee impairments that she was experiencing as a result of having to make the longer trip to the relocated lab. Giacomi testified at her deposition that she told Borduas "it was becoming increasingly more difficult for me to get up to the cath lab and I was having increasing pain." (Doc. #35-8, at 80, p. 79:7-9). As previously noted, the Hospital does not dispute, for purposes of this motion, that Giacomi has a qualifying disability under the ADA. Since Giacomi has identified her disability in terms of permanent physical impairments to her spine and knee, and since Giacomi has produced evidence that the Hospital was aware of the permanent physical impairments to her spine and knee, the Court concludes that Giacomi has demonstrated notice for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of failure to accommodate.
For purposes of a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA, "generally, it is the responsibility of the individual with a disability to inform the employer that an accommodation is needed."
Giacomi testified at her deposition that she asked Borduas if any accommodation could be made to address the increased pain and difficulty she was experiencing traveling to and from the relocated Cath Lab multiple times per day. When asked about the details of her conversation with Borduas, Giamcomi answered as follows:
(Doc. #35-8, at 80, p. 79:2-10). Giacomi could not give an exact date when this conversation took place, but she thought it was in the fall of 2011. When asked what Borduas' response was to the request for an accommodation, Giacomi answered, "Just that we'd have to see." (
At a later point in her deposition, Giacomi testified as follows:
(
(
Giacomi has provided competent evidence that she requested an accommodation from her direct supervisor.
Giacomi has testified that the Hospital failed to respond to her accommodation request. The Hospital, since it contends that no accommodation request was made, does not argue that it responded to any request made by Giacomi. The Second Circuit has "laid out a two-step process to evaluate whether the failure to provide a proposed accommodation constitutes a violation of the ADA. First, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving . . . that an accommodation exists that permits her to perform the job's essential functions. If the plaintiff meets that burden, the analysis shifts to the question whether the proposed accommodation is reasonable; on this question the burden of persuasion lies with the defendant."
Giacomi testified at her deposition that she requested as an accommodation the relocation of her office to a site closer to the renovated Cath Lab. She has also submitted an affidavit in which she avers that "space was available" for such a move. (Doc. #34-1, at 6, ¶ 35). The Court finds that Giacomi has satisfied her burden of "suggest[ing] the existence of a plausible accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not clearly exceed its benefits. Once the plaintiff has done this, she has made out a prima facie showing that a reasonable accommodation is available, and the risk of nonpersuasion falls on the defendant."
In Count Two of her Amended Complaint, Giacomi claims that the Hospital violated the ADA by terminating her employment due to her disabilities. The ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a). ADA employment discrimination claims are analyzed using the burden-shifting framework articulated by the Supreme Court in
To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show:
A plaintiff's burden at the prima facie stage of
The burden then shifts back to Giacomi to "produce[] evidence that would tend to show that the proffered reason was merely a pretext for discrimination, which may be demonstrated either by the presentation of additional evidence showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence, or by reliance on the evidence comprising the prima facie case, without more."
Giacomi's argument relies, in part, on a remark made to her by Susan Keeley ("Keeley"), a Workers' Compensation Analyst at the Hospital. On or about February 1, 2012, twenty days before her termination, Giacomi "was cautioned [by Keeley] that my workers' compensations claims (medical treatment) were becoming extremely active again. Since 1977, the Hospital has always contributed monetarily to fund its employees welfare benefits." (Doc. #34-1, at 6, ¶ 36). "Assuming that a reasonable juror could identify [disability] bias in the cited remarks, we nevertheless conclude that they do not raise a triable issue of employment discrimination."
The adverse employment action at issue in this case is Giacomi's termination. In that regard the Court notes that Giacomi admits in her Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement that Keeley was not involved in the decision to implement the RIF or to select Giacomi's position for elimination. She further admits that the decision to implement the RIF was made only because of the Hospital's financial situation and that in the meetings held by the RIF decision-makers, no one discussed or suggested that the RIF should be conducted because any Hospital employee had a disability or because the Hospital wanted to terminate Giacomi's employment because of any medical condition or disability she may have had. Given these facts, the Court concludes that the remark made to Giacomi by Keeley is not probative of discriminatory intent on the part of the decision-makers with respect to Giacomi's termination.
Giacomi also argues that the Hospital provided two different reasons for her termination. At the time of her termination she was told by Interim Chief Operating Officer John Evans that the decision to lay her off was a "financial decision." (Doc. #34-1, at 6-7, ¶ 40). In the Unemployment Notice relating to Giacomi, however, the Hospital checked the box marked "Lack of Work" as the Reason for Unemployment. (Doc. #35-7, at 2). Giacomi contends that this inconsistency shows that the proffered reason, i.e., financial difficulties, was merely a pretext for discrimination "[A] plaintiff may rely on evidence comprising her prima facie case, including temporal proximity, together with other evidence such as inconsistent employer explanations, to defeat summary judgment at [the pretext] stage."
The Hospital counters with the argument that the "Lack of Work" box was checked on the Unemployment Notice because Giacomi's position was eliminated and, since she had no position to perform, she lacked work. Consequently, according to the Hospital, there is no inconsistency between what Giacomi was told at the time she was terminated and what is indicated on the Unemployment Notice.
The Court believes a reasonable juror might find that there is an inconsistency between what Giacomi was told and what is indicated on the unemployment form. That does not end the Court's inquiry, however. "`To get to the jury, it is not enough to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must also believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination.'"
It is undisputed that fifty-two Hospital employees were laid off through the implementation of the RIF. There is also evidence in the record that "[t]he Hospital checked the box `lack of work' for each of the employees laid off pursuant to the RIF, including Ms. Giacomi. . . ." (Doc. #38-1, at 4, ¶ 9). According to the Hospital the lack of work box was checked for all these employees "because their positions were eliminated, and, therefore, those employees no longer had a position to perform. As such, they lacked work." (
Relying on the Second Circuit's decision in
Giacomi does not dispute that the RIF decision-makers "agreed that the Outpatient Medical Therapies Department was one of several Hospital departments that should be reorganized to streamline its functions and realign the duties and responsibilities of management among fewer middle managers." (Doc. #31-2, at 8, ¶ 47; Doc. #34, at 3, ¶ 47). The transfer of Giacomi's duties to other Hospital employees is consistent with that objective. The evidence before the Court indicates that no new employee was hired to perform duties formerly performed by Giacomi and that no employee has held the position of Assistant Director of Cardiopulmonary Services since Giacomi's employment was terminated in February 2012. Under theses circumstances the transfer of Giacomi's duties to other Hospital employees is not evidence that the Hospital's proffered reason for her termination is a pretext for disability discrimination.
Under
For the foregoing reasons, the Hospital's motion for summary judgment (
This case will proceed only as to the claim that the Hospital failed to provide Giacomi with a reasonable accommodation for her disability between the time she alleges she first requested an accommodation and the time her employment at the Hospital ended.
SO ORDERED.
