MEMORANDUM OF DECISION DENYING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
VANESSA L. BRYANT, District Judge.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner Heriberto Mercado challenges his 2006 judgment of conviction for, inter alia, sexual assault. Respondent moves to dismiss the petition as time barred. The salient issue, raised by the pro se petitioner, is whether the prison mailbox rule governs the filing of a state habeas petition for the purpose of calculating the one-year limitations period governing the filing of section 2254 petitions. The Court holds that it does. Accordingly, Respondent's motion is DENIED, and Respondent is directed to file an answer addressing the merits of Mercado's section 2254 petition within 30 days from the date of this order. See Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.
Procedural Background
Mercado was convicted, following a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, and illegal sexual contact with a child. See State v. Mercado, CR-05-0046922-T, http://civilinquiry.jud.ct.gov (last visited Aug. 25, 2015). On direct appeal, Mercado challenged the introduction of hearsay testimony, the introduction of evidence constituting constancy of accusation evidence, and the jury charge with respect to an expert witness instruction. State v. Heriberto M., 976 A.2d 804, 807-09 (Conn. App. 2009). The Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed, id., and the Connecticut Supreme Court denied certification to appeal on October 14, 2009. State v. Heriberto M., 981 A.2d 1080 (Conn. 2009). Mercado did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.
On March 31, 2010, Mercado, proceeding pro se, filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus, raising several ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Mercado v. Warden, No. CV-10-4003473-S, http://civilinquiry.jud.ct.gov (last visited Aug. 25, 2015). Mercado signed and notarized his state habeas petition on January 14, 2010. See attached. The state court denied the petition. Mercado v. Warden, 2012 WL 4747257 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 2012). The Connecticut Appellate Court dismissed his appeal therefrom, Mercado v. Commissioner of Correction, 81 A.3d 277 (Conn. App. 2013), and the Connecticut Supreme Court denied certification to appeal on January 15, 2014. Mercado v. Comm'r of Corr., 83 A.3d 1164 (Conn. 2014).
In a section 2254 petition dated December 18, 2014, Mercado now challenges his 2006 criminal judgment, raising four purported claims for relief. Dkt. No. 1. His petition appears to reiterate his claims that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony, that the trial court gave an improper expert witness instruction, and that trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. Id. On May 8, 2015, the Court ordered Respondent to show cause as to why the petition should not be granted. Dkt. No. 7. Respondent moves to dismiss, arguing that the petition is time barred. Dkt. No. 9-1. Mercado opposes on the ground that "[w]hen filing the petitioner's state and federal habeas petitions, the `mailbox rule' would be in effect." Dkt. No 11.
Analysis
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") sets a one-year limitations period for filing Section 2254 petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year limitations period begins to run on the latest of one of four possible dates: the date on which (1) the petitioner's criminal conviction became "final"; (2) the State's unconstitutional action preventing the petitioner from filing his petition was removed; (3) the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court; or (4) the petitioner could have discovered the factual predicate for his claim through the exercise of due diligence. Id. Here, the relevant provision is the date on which Mercado's conviction became final because his allegations do not reasonably invoke sections two through four.
A criminal conviction becomes final within the meaning of section 2244(d)(1)(A) "only after the denial of certiorari or the expiration of time for seeking certiorari." Williams v. Artuz, 237 F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 2001). To be considered timely filed, a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a criminal judgment must be filed within 90 days after entry of judgment. S. Ct. Rule 13.1. Here, the Connecticut Supreme Court denied certification to appeal on October 14, 2009, and Mercado did not seek further review from the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, Mercado's conviction became final within the meaning of AEDPA on Tuesday, January 12, 2010, and the limitations period began to run the following day, or on January 13, 2010.
It is well-established, and the parties do not disagree, that "[t]he limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a properly filed petition for collateral review in state courts." Bethea v. Girdich, 293 F.3d 577, 578 (2d Cir. 2002); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The problem, here, is that the parties disagree about the date on which Mercado's filed his state habeas petition. Respondent argues that "`an application is `properly filed' when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filing." Dkt. No. 8 (quoting Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000)). Mercado argues that the prison mailbox rule governs state habeas petitions.
The Court agrees with Mercado. As an initial matter, AEDPA's limitations period is a federal question, and the tolling of that limitation period "asks whether federal courts may excuse a petitioner's failure to comply with federal timing rules, an inquiry that does not implicate a state court's interpretation of state law." Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 650 (2010). Further, the prison mailbox rule is an equitable rule "justified by the litigant's dependence on the prison mail system and lack of counsel to assure timely filing with the court." Noble v. Kelly, 246 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1988)). Extending this equitable rule for purposes of calculating AEDPA's filing deadline makes sense here because habeas corpus is "an area of the law where equity finds a comfortable home." Holland, 560 U.S. at 647. Moreover, the prison mailbox rule alleviates concerns over inefficiently litigating excusable neglect, see Houston, 487 U.S. at 275—an issue that parties would nonetheless be forced to litigate (under the guide of extraordinary circumstances) in the absence of a per se prison mailbox rule. In other words, fairness mandates that state prisoners challenging their convictions not be punished for delays caused by the prison mail system and judicial economy mandates that courts not weigh in on the intricacies of that prolix system for the purpose of determining, on a case-by-case basis, how long is too long.
The Court's ruling is supported by persuasive authority from the Second Circuit and district courts in this Circuit. The Second Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, has applied the prison mailbox rule to New York state post-conviction motions. Milbank v. Senkowski, 2000 WL 1459030 (2d Cir. 2000) (summary order); but see Catlett v. Greiner, 76 F. App'x 345, 347 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Whether a federal court calculating a federal statute of limitations must defer to the New York Court of Appeals's interpretation of state filing law is a question we need not resolve. . . ."). Observing that Milbank does not constitute binding authority, the Southern District of New York readdressed the question and held that the prison mailbox rule applied to a petitioner's state post-conviction motion. Fernandez v. Artuz, 175 F.Supp.2d 682, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The Fernandez Court similarly reasoned, in relevant part, that a state court law is not binding on federal courts for purposes of calculating AEDPA's limitations period and that efficiency is better served by applying the prison mailbox rule to state habeas petitions. Id. 686-87.
Applying the prison mailbox rule here, Mercado's state habeas petition was filed on January 14, 2010, or one day after the limitation period began to run. Mercado's state habeas petition remained under review in state court until January 15, 2014 when the Connecticut Supreme Court denied certification to appeal. Because Mercado filed his instant section 2254 petition less than eleven months later (well within the remaining 364 days), it is not barred by AEDPA's statute of limitations. Accordingly, Respondent's motion to dismiss is denied. Within 30 days from the date of this order, Respondent is directed to file an answer addressing the merits of Mercado's § 2254 petition. See Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. Respondent should not submit piecemeal responses.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent's motion to dismiss is DENIED. Within 30 days from the date of this order, Respondent must file an answer addressing the merits of Mercado's § 2254 petition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
