HAIGHT, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Paul F. Meyers brings this action against Defendant the City of Hartford and various individuals (collectively, "Individual Defendants").
Specifically, Plaintiff asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the Individual Defendants in their official and individual capacities based on violations of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights (Count One),
The following facts are derived from the parties' submissions pursuant to D. Conn. Local Rule 56(a) (referred to herein as "Defs. Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement," "Pl. Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement," and "Pl. Statement of Disputed Facts"); uncontroverted deposition testimony; and the exhibits attached to the parties' respective memoranda of law (respectively, "Defs. Ex." and "Pl. Ex."). Docs. 37, 41, 45, and 48. The facts recounted in this Part are undisputed or indisputable. All reasonable inferences have been drawn in Plaintiff's favor. The relevant period of time is from April 2013 to February 2014.
Defendants in this action are the City of Hartford, Christina Kishimoto, Kevin McCaskill, Jill Cutler Hodgman, Milly Ramos, Natasha Durrant, Janet Serrano, and Jennifer Allen.
Plaintiff was a physical education teacher at Simpson Waverly School in Hartford, CT and had been employed by the Hartford schools since 1998. See Pl. Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 1; Defs. Ex. 1. Plaintiff had a five-year certification from the State of Connecticut to teach Physical Education, Pre-K through Grade 12 that expired on October 24, 2013. Defs. Ex. 2. On April 25, 2013, Plaintiff was involved in an incident with a disruptive student at Simpson Waverly during a physical education class. Pl. Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 4; Pl. Ex. 6 at 2-4. An anonymous complaint was thereafter filed with DCF against Plaintiff. Pl. Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 5. Plaintiff was placed on paid administrative leave during the investigation, effective May 7, 2013. Pl. Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 6; Defs. Ex. 3. Initial efforts to take a required investigatory interview with Plaintiff regarding the incident were unsuccessful. See Defs. Ex. 20. Defendant Ramos sent a letter rescheduling the interview, reiterating that it is was mandatory and stating that failure to attend "may result in disciplinary consequences and unpaid leave." Id.
After completing the investigation, in or around late August 2013, DCF substantiated a finding of physical abuse and neglect against Plaintiff and placed Plaintiff on DCF's central registry. See Pl. Ex. 5 (Affidavit of Paul F. Meyers ("Meyers Aff.")) ¶¶ 15-17; Pl. Ex. 6 at 1. Shortly thereafter, on September 12, 2013, Plaintiff was informed that termination of his employment was under consideration by letter from Defendant Kishimoto. Pl. Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 12; Defs. Ex. 7. Plaintiff's union counsel followed up with Defendant Kishimoto by letter requesting a statement of reasons for Plaintiff's termination. Pl. Ex. 5 (Meyers Aff.) ¶ 38. After Plaintiff received this statement, Plaintiff's union counsel requested a hearing pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-151, Connecticut's tenure statute for teachers, by letter on September 20, 2013. Id. at ¶¶ 39-42.
While the DCF investigation was still pending, on July 9, 2013, Defendant Serrano emailed Plaintiff to inform him that his teaching certificate would expire on October 24, 2013 and that the Connecticut State Department of Education ("CSDE")
A CSDE brochure from October 2012 on certification advises that a teacher, such as Plaintiff, "should apply to continue your certificate no earlier than six months and no later than six weeks before the date of expiration of your professional educator certificate." Defs. Ex. 15a at 2.
On September 11, 2013, Defendant Serrano informed Plaintiff that his form ED 126 had been completed and was available for pick-up. Pl. Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 11; Defs. Ex. 6. A day later, on September 12, 2013, Victoria Hajdasz, another HBOE employee in the Office of Talent Management, reminded Plaintiff that his certification was going to expire on October 24, 2013 and that he needed to submit his paperwork to the "state dept. of certification." Pl. Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 13; Defs. Ex. 8. On September 25, 2013, Plaintiff responded to Ms. Hajdasz's email asking her about the status of his "paperwork" and stating that he had submitted it "a few weeks ago." Defs. Ex. 8. He emailed Defendant Serrano with a similar message inquiring about an update on his "paperwork" on the same day. Pls. Ex.11 (Deposition of Defendant Serrano ("Serrano Dep.")) at 51:12-24. Defendant Serrano responded to Plaintiff by re-sending her September 11, 2013 email and reiterating that the ED 126 was ready for pick up. Id. at 69:19-25; Defs. Ex. 9.
On October 25, 2013, Rosemarie Forzano, another Staffing Specialist in the Office of Talent Management, emailed the CSDE explaining that their records "indicate that
Subsequent to Plaintiff's termination, on October 29, 2013, Mr. Szczepanski emailed Plaintiff stating that the CSDE had received his ED 126, but that Plaintiff's "certificate expired on October 24, 2013 and an application had not been filed to date." Defs. Ex. 12; Pl. Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 19. Plaintiff responded by sending his ED 126 again to the CSDE on October 30, 2013. Defs. Ex. 13. At that point, it was explained to him that the ED 126 is "NOT an application form" and he must submit an ED 179. Defs. Ex. 13; Pl. Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 20 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff was informed that if he did so that day, his certification would not lapse. Id. Plaintiff filled out the ED 179 and sent it back to Mr. Szczepanski on October 30, 2013. Defs. Ex. 14; Pl. Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 21. Plaintiff's ED 179 Application was marked received by the CSDE on October 31, 2013 and the CSDE acknowledged receipt on October 31, 2013 via an email to Plaintiff. Defs. Exs. 14-15; Pl. Ex. 7; Pl. Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 22.
At some point after Plaintiff's termination, Plaintiff's union counsel was informed that Plaintiff did not have a right to a due process hearing on his termination. See Pl. Ex. 5 (Meyers Aff.) ¶¶ 75. Plaintiff's union counsel on November 5, 2013, challenged this by letter and attached the CSDE's email dated October 31, 2013, and that agency's prior statement about considering Plaintiff's application not to have lapsed. Id. ¶¶ 75-78. The HBOE never held a hearing on Plaintiff's termination. See id. ¶¶ 78, 85.
On November 5, 2013, the CSDE informed Plaintiff that his ED 126, dated September 11, 2013, needed to be updated
After Plaintiff received the certification denial letter, he requested a review of the decision. Defs. Ex. 19 at 3. Meanwhile, Plaintiff had a two-day hearing in January 2014 on the substantiated finding by DCF of physical abuse and neglect that led to his placement on the central registry. Pl. Ex. 6 at 2. The hearing officer reversed DCF's initial determination and removed Plaintiff from the central registry. Id. at 1. DCF notified the CSDE that effective January 9, 2014 Plaintiff had been removed from the central registry. Defs. Ex. 19 at 3. The CSDE then notified Plaintiff by letter that his certification would be processed on February 8, 2014. Id. The date of Plaintiff's application on this letter from the CSDE, again, was October 31, 2013. Defs. Ex. 19 at 1. On February 8, 2014, the CSDE retroactively reinstated Plaintiff's full certification, without any lapse, for another five years, October 25, 2013 through October 24, 2018. Pl. Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 28; Pl. Ex. 1. There is no evidence that Plaintiff re-applied for his position with the HBOE subsequent to his reinstatement. Pl. Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 29. For the 2015-16 school year, Plaintiff was a physical education teacher and wrestling head coach for Rocky Hill Public Schools. Defs. Ex. 26.
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If, after discovery, the nonmoving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [his] case with respect to which [he] has the burden of proof," then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party must "demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in dispute" to be entitled to summary judgment. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc. v. London Am. Int'l Corp., 664 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (2d Cir. 1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d
The Court now turns to the arguments presented by Defendants regarding each of Plaintiff's claims. The Court will address Defendants' arguments regarding Plaintiff's § 1983 claims first, because a viable federal claim is necessary to support this Court's subject matter jurisdiction. While Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the operative pleading, contains a number of state law claims, none of them falls within this Court's original subject matter jurisdiction, which depends upon the existence of a federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or complete diversity of citizenship between the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A federal district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims other than these, but only if such state claims are included in a complaint which alleges a viable federal claim within the district court's original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
In the case at bar, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to allege a viable federal claim.
"With respect to a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) actions taken under color of law; (2) deprivation of constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; and (4) damages." Doe v. City of Waterbury, 453 F.Supp.2d 537, 542 (D. Conn. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983), aff'd, Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2008). Plaintiff claims that the Individual Defendants deprived him of certain rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, namely: (1) procedural due process afforded under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-151 and his status as a
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot sustain any cause of action based on alleged violations of his procedural due process rights because he was not a certified teacher at the time of his termination, and consequently had no property right or interest protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defs. Br. at 7-10.
Plaintiff makes two principal arguments in response. First, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' argument that he lacked a property interest is based entirely on a genuinely disputed material fact, namely that Plaintiff was not certified at the time of his termination, or was not, at the very least, in the process of renewing his certification. Pl. Br. at 4-12. Therefore, Plaintiff's argument concludes, this genuine factual issue precludes summary judgment for Defendants on this claim, even if Defendants' argument regarding the legal impact of an expired certification is correct. Id. Second, Plaintiff argues that, regardless of his certification status at the time of his termination, he had a property interest in his continued employment as a tenured teacher and that he could not lose that status. Pl. Br. at 5-8.
The Court first addresses Plaintiff's argument regarding whether there is a genuine issue of fact as to the status of his teaching certification at the time of termination. Then the Court turns to the legal question of the implication, if any, that an expired certification has on a teacher's reasonable expectation of continued employment in Connecticut.
Defendants urge that the record shows "unequivocally" that Plaintiff did not submit the ED 179 to renew his certification until October 31, 2013, seven days after his certification had expired. Defs. Br. at 10. Thus, their argument proceeds, Plaintiff
Plaintiff disputes that characterization of the facts, arguing that (1) the Individual Defendants are responsible for any lapse in Plaintiff's certification, since they conspired to avoid Plaintiff's tenure protections and terminate his employment; and (2) Plaintiff's certification application was in fact pending at the time of his termination. Id. at 4-11.
The record reflects that Plaintiff's certification expired on October 24, 2013, through no fault of Defendants or any of them. There is no genuine dispute about that fact. Plaintiff, despite his repeated assertion that a dispute exists, has failed to demonstrate any basis in the record which supports the assertion. The CSDE confirmed via email to the HBOE on October 25, 2013 that Plaintiff's certification had expired on October 24, Defs. Ex. 10, and that Plaintiff had "
Plaintiff professes the belief that the CSDE email on October 25, 2013 proves his "application was incomplete" at the time his certification was to expire on October 24, and that subsequent correspondence between the CSDE and Plaintiff demonstrate that Plaintiff needed only the ED 126 to complete his application. Pl. Br. at 5. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants "held up" this form and that is what caused Plaintiff's certification to lapse. Id.; see also Pl. Ex. 5 (Meyers Aff.) ¶¶ 45-56. Plaintiff, in his Affidavit, states that he completed and turned in the ED 179 to Defendant Serrano on August 26, 2013.
First, Plaintiff repeatedly confuses the ED 179, which is required to start a certification renewal application and create a "pending" application (as well as an "incomplete" application as opposed to an "expired" one), with an ED 126, an additional form requiring input from Plaintiff's employer which, although required to evaluate a certification renewal application, does not appear to be necessary to characterize an application as "pending."
Second, as a general matter the CSDE is responsible for the certification of all teachers within the school system. Each individual teacher is personally responsible for his or her particular certification: a responsibility that does not fall upon the HBOE or any of the Defendants. Defs. Ex. 15a; Pls. Ex. 2. Defendant Serrano at the HBOE assisted individual teachers and professionals with certification issues by sending out reminders about upcoming expirations of certifications and filling out a portion of the ED 126 as necessary. Pl. Ex. 11 (Serrano Dep.) at 43:12-23, 45:14-30, 58:5-59:1.
Finally, Plaintiff, in his Affidavit, claims that he submitted all "paperwork" to the CSDE. See Pl. Ex. 5 (Meyers Aff.) ¶ 46 (Plaintiff "always cooperated and filed any and all paperwork to both the [CSDE] and the Hartford School District for re-certification"); id. ¶ 47 (Plaintiff worked "against a difficult series of obstacles and poor communication by defendants" to provide documents for the renewal of his certification). Plaintiff's averments are conclusory, devoid of all details, and unsupported by
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his certification expired on October 24, 2013. Even if I draw every reasonable inference in Plaintiff's favor, as Rule 56 practice requires me to do, the evidence and lack of evidence on this record combine to compel the finding, which I make, that Plaintiff's certification as a teacher expired, through no fault of Defendants or any of them, on October 24, 2013.
The Court must now determine the legal implication of Plaintiff's expired certification and its impact on Plaintiff's procedural due process claim.
To sustain a constitutional claim for deprivation of procedural due process — a claim of a lack of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard — under the Fourteenth Amendment, "a plaintiff must `first identify a property right, second show that the state has deprived him of that right, and third show that the deprivation was effected without due process.'" Fletcher v. City of New Haven, No. 11-00708, 2012 WL 1032967, at *2 (D. Conn. March 27, 2012) (quoting Mehta v. Surles, 905 F.2d 595, 598 (2d Cir. 1990)) (emphasis in original). "Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).
For constitutional purposes, this is a limited concept: "the mere violation of a state law does not automatically give rise to a violation of federal constitutional rights." Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 682 (2d Cir. 1995). In the case at bar, Plaintiff Meyers charges various Defendants with violating Connecticut statutes and local rules promulgated by the HBOE with respect to the hiring, retention and disciplining of public school teachers. One may assume without deciding that these charges are well founded; nonetheless, they do not suffice to state a federal constitutional claim. The Supreme Court expanded upon that concept in Roth: "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (emphasis added). If state or local law or practice confer upon an individual an entitlement to the position or benefit in question, that individual has a protectable interest for purposes of constitutional analysis, which is to say, an interest the Constitution protects. Failing that element, a plaintiff does not state a constitutional claim, however sincere, heartfelt or even reasonable his sense of aggrievement may be.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff Meyers's procedural due process claim depends on the existence of a property right in his continued public employment as a teacher. See Ritz v. Town of E. Hartford, 110 F.Supp.2d 94, 102 (D. Conn. 2000). "Plaintiff has the burden of proving a legitimate, enforceable claim of entitlement to his continued employment." Id. The Court looks to Connecticut state law to determine
It is well established that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-151 creates a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment for Connecticut teachers with tenure. See Mirabilio v. Regional Sch. Dist. 16, 761 F.3d 212, 213-14 (2d Cir. 2014); Chisholm v. Ramia, 639 F.Supp.2d 240, 244 n.2 (D. Conn. 2009); Rado v. Bd. of Educ., 216 Conn. 541, 555, 583 A.2d 102 (1990).
By the statute's own terms, only a "teacher," as defined in § 10-151, is entitled to tenure and the rights that accompany that status. A "teacher" is defined as "each certified professional employee below the rank of superintendent employed by a board of education for at least ninety calendar days in a position requiring a certificate issued by" the CSDE. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-151(a)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, § 10-151 makes certification a requirement to being considered a "teacher," and a requirement for any "teacher" to obtain tenure. See Cimochowski v. Hartford Public Schools, 261 Conn. 287, 292, 802 A.2d 800 (2002) (holding that an individual must satisfy three requirements to be considered a "teacher" under § 10-151 and entitled to tenure, including that "the employee must be certified and employed by a board of education for at least ninety days"). Further underscoring this requirement, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-145 generally prohibits the employment of, and the payment of a salary to, any teacher who does not possess a valid teaching certificate. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-145(a). The Connecticut Supreme Court has affirmed this reading of the statute (§ 10-151). In Ames v. Board of Education Regional School District 7, the court held that a teacher who lacked the appropriate certification "had no legal status as a teacher during" the period in which he was employed as a teacher without certification. 167 Conn. 444, 445-48, 356 A.2d 100 (1975). The court concluded that the teacher was not entitled to tenure status or to judicial review of his termination, because his employment without certification was "contrary to law" and could not count toward tenure. Id. at 448, 356 A.2d 100.
It follows that, based upon a plain reading of the statute and the Ames decision, a teacher who is not certified and whose employment would be "contrary to law" could not have a reasonable expectation in continued employment and, it necessarily follows, no longer has a property interest protected by the Constitution. District Judge Droney (as he then was) recognized as much when he observed that it is "highly unlikely that [a teacher] could have any property interest in maintaining even a tenured position if he did not make reasonable efforts to remain in compliance" with newly applicable certification requirements. Sutton v. Hughes, No. 06-1333, 2009 WL 2208080, at *11 (D. Conn.
Moreover, a legislature generally has the power to impose constraints on the way in which vested property rights are used, or to condition the continued retention of vested property rights on the performance of certain affirmative duties. See Conn. Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. Tirozzi, 210 Conn. 286, 296-97, 554 A.2d 1065 (1989) (citing United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985)). The constraint or duty imposed must be reasonable and designed to further legitimate objectives. Id. Teacher certification undeniably furthers legitimate objectives of the state in employing only qualified professionals. The requirement that a teacher be certified in order to obtain and retain tenure status as expressed in § 10-151, and the protections such status offers, are reasonable.
To sum up on this issue: Whether a teacher possesses a property interest in his or her employment, and is thereby entitled to certain procedural protections, hinges on his or her status as a "teacher" (meaning a "certified professional employee") pursuant to § 10-151 of the Connecticut statute. A teacher who is not certified "ha[s] no legal status," Ames, 167 Conn. at 448, 356 A.2d 100, and accordingly cannot have a reasonable expectation of continued
Because there is no genuine issue concerning the material fact that Plaintiff's teaching certification expired on October 24, 2013, the Individual Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims based on procedural due process violations resulting in the deprivation of a property interest owned by Plaintiff.
If the tenor and substance of Plaintiff's communications with these public agencies left him uncertain or confused about the certification process, that is regrettable and unfortunate. However, given the termination date of October 24, 2013, known to all parties, Plaintiff bore the responsibility of working with the CSDE in order to achieve a timely renewal. The record does not contain evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether any Defendant did anything less than or different from what they were required to do. The failings to understand and to act, as the process of certification renewal went forward and eventually came to nothing, were those of the Plaintiff. Under Connecticut law, Plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of continued employment once his certification expired, which it did without fault of Defendants (or any HBOE employees) on October 24, 2013. From that point forward, Plaintiff lacked any property interest protected by the Constitution. The Individual Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this due process claim.
In Plaintiff's opposition papers, Plaintiff asserts in cursory fashion that he is making a "stigma-plus" claim for the deprivation of a liberty interest pursuant to Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155,
A "stigma-plus" claim is one "brought for injury to one's reputation (the stigma) coupled with the deprivation of some tangible interest [such as the loss of employment] or property right (the plus), without adequate process." Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 209 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 302 (2d Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish a stigma-plus claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the government made stigmatizing statements calling into question plaintiff's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity; (2) such stigmatizing statements were made public; and (3) the statements were made concurrently with, or in close temporal proximity, to plaintiff's dismissal from employment. See Segal, 459 F.3d at 212-13.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff points to no specific examples of any stigmatizing statements. The Court is left without any specific guidance as to what these alleged statements were. However, the record suggests that Plaintiff may be referring to statements made in the September 2013 letters written to him from the HBOE regarding the possibility of his termination because of the April 2013 incident with the student and the DCF finding.
Such statements are insufficient to maintain a stigma-plus claim because these statements were true at the time they were written and sent to Plaintiff. See Patterson v. City of Utica, 370 F.3d 322, 330 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiff need not prove the falsity of the statements but must at least "raise the falsity of these stigmatizing statements as an issue"). It is not disputed that DCF initially made a finding against Plaintiff. While Plaintiff subsequently appealed from and obtained reversal of that adverse finding, the September 2013 letters were accurate at the time the Defendant in question sent them. Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that Defendants were under a duty to take any corrective action other than what DCF did in reversing the finding and removing Plaintiff from the central registry.
In any event, Plaintiff makes no argument and provides no evidence to show that these letters or his placement on the DCF registry were ever made public. See Skiff v. Colchester Bd. of Educ., 514 F.Supp.2d 284, 296-97 (D. Conn. 2007) (noting that plaintiff failed to allege that a letter from a school to a plaintiff was ever made public), aff'd, 316 Fed.Appx. 83 (2d
Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege and support the elements necessary to establish a stigma-plus, liberty interest due process constitutional claim. The Individual Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's stigma-plus claim.
Plaintiff also alleges a § 1983 claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Pl. Br. at 12; Am. Cmplt. ¶ 80. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not identified himself as the member of any protected class and Plaintiff is asserting a "class of one" equal protection claim, which is not cognizable in the public employment context. Defs. Br. at 12-13. Plaintiff's response is to assert that he has stated a claim based on the fact that he was not afforded the same process as other teachers, and that Defendant Serrano could not identify anyone else treated in the manner plaintiff was treated.
"The Equal Protection Clause requires that the government treat all similarly situated people alike." Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)). This clause is most commonly used to bring claims alleging discrimination based on a plaintiff's membership in a protected or vulnerable class. Id. Plaintiff has not sought to establish that he (1) is a member of any protected class and (2) was treated differently because of his membership in any protected class. One must assume, therefore, that Plaintiff intends to assert an equal protection claim based on a class-of-one theory.
To prove a class-of-one theory of equal protection claim, Plaintiff must show that he "has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2010). However, the "class-of-one theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context." Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 598, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008) ("[R]ecognition of a class-of-one theory of equal protection ... is simply contrary to the concept of at-will employment," id. at 606, 128 S.Ct. 2146); see also Valenti v. Torrington Bd. of Educ., 601 F.Supp.2d 427, 440 (D. Conn. 2009) ("[S]ince Valenti is a public employee with the school district, his class of one theory, that he was intentionally treated differently, is not available.") (citing and quoting Engquist, 553 U.S. at 606, 128 S.Ct. 2146). Therefore, Plaintiff has no basis to assert any such claim in this case.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim based on alleged violations of his substantive due process rights. Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on such a claim because Plaintiff has not alleged conduct so egregious or outrageous that it "shock[s] the contemporary conscience," and Plaintiff has not alleged a right worthy of due process protection. Defs. Br. at 14-17. Plaintiff responds that he was subject to "malicious and out-rageous conduct" by Defendants related to his termination and the stigma accompanying it because of the DCF charges. Pl. Br. at 13-14.
Substantive due process "protects against `certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.'" Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 460 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986)). To sustain a substantive due process claim, Plaintiff must prove that "(1) [he] had a valid property interest [in his employment and reputation]; and (2) `defendants infringed on that property right in an arbitrary or irrational manner.'" Royal Crown Day Care LLC v. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene of City of N.Y., 746 F.3d 538, 545 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 2007)). Only the most egregious conduct can be said to be arbitrary or irrational, and such action must be "so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." Grasson v. Bd. of Educ. of Town of Orange, 24 F.Supp.3d 136, 146 (D. Conn. 2014) (quoting Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"It is well settled that, where the alleged right cannot be considered so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, notions of substantive due process will not apply." Local 342, Long Island Pub. Serv. Emps. v. Town Bd. of Town of Huntington, 31 F.3d 1191, 1196 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing and quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993)) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). "Substantive due process protects only those interests that are `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 S.Ct. 288 (1937)). Courts must "exercise the utmost care" when defining and developing rights in this area. Id. (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In essence, Plaintiff is claiming that he had a property or liberty interest arising through his tenure rights and in his
Plaintiff provides no explanation or analysis to demonstrate why his claimed interests support a substantive due process claim. On the contrary: The rule of these cases is that Plaintiff's interest in continued public employment, while certainly understandable in human terms, is not on its own sufficient to support a substantive due process claim.
Even if, contrary to this conclusion, Plaintiff's interests were protected by substantive due process, the Defendants' alleged conduct cannot possibly be characterized as "so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience," the demanding language used by the Supreme Court in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998), and reiterated by the Second Circuit in Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d at 142. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' conduct was egregious because they had no legitimate basis to fire Plaintiff, having instead concocted a scheme to subvert his due process rights. Although Plaintiff's termination the day after his certification expired may seem to some to be harsh, these Individual Defendants, public servants themselves with their own areas of responsibility, had a legitimate basis to terminate Plaintiff's employment, based upon the expiration of his certification and the wording of the governing Connecticut statute.
Defendants' conduct bears no resemblance to that of the defendants in the case relied upon by Plaintiff, Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 93-94 (2d. Cir. 2005). In Velez, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had "maliciously fabricated and disseminated falsehoods in a common effort to deprive plaintiff of her job" for no reason other than to "oppress" her, "cause her injury," and did so without any other legitimate purpose. The defendants in Velez acted without any legitimate purpose and took malicious actions to deprive the plaintiff of her job. On the evidentiary record on the present motion in this case, that cannot be said of these Individual Defendants.
For these reasons, the Individual Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim based on a substantive due process violation.
Alternatively, Defendants argue that the doctrine of qualified immunity shields each of the Individual Defendants from civil liability for their individual actions. Defs. Br. at 17-20. Plaintiff argues again that Defendants' argument is based on a disputed fact, whether Plaintiff was a "teacher" within the meaning of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-151 at the time of his termination, and that Plaintiff, as a tenured employee, had a clearly established
"The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Mullenix v. Luna, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a right is clearly established, "[t]he dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established ... in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011).
The conduct at issue here is the Defendants' termination of a tenured public employee without notice and a pre- or post-termination hearing, when that employee has failed to meet his reasonable, continuing certification requirement mandated by the governing Connecticut statute. I am unable to conclude that Defendants' conduct violated Plaintiff's rights "without debate." Defendants have identified cases reaching the opposite conclusion in other jurisdictions, at least suggesting that such a right is not "clearly established" and not placed "beyond debate." See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074. By contrast, Plaintiff has not identified any such precedent here, nor has this Court found any case that suggests, much less holds, that Defendants' particular conduct would have violated plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Individual Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity even if Plaintiff had established the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right sufficient to support his § 1983 claims.
Plaintiff alleges the same § 1983 claims against each of the Individual Defendants in their official capacities. Am. Cmplt. ¶¶ 7-13. Defendants argue that these official capacity claims are in effect a suit against the governmental entity, the HBOE, and the Individual Defendants are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has failed to point to any policy, practice or custom of the HBOE that deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Defs. Br. at 25-26. Plaintiff responds only by reciting the law regarding official capacity claims. Pl. Br. at 18-19.
Plaintiff provides no argument in response to Defendants' assertion, and fails to assert any policy, practice or custom of the HBOE that resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See id. Instead, Plaintiff appears to confuse his official capacity claims with his claims against the City of Hartford (discussed infra, Part III, B) and argues that the City of Hartford is the correct Defendant and/or that
Defendant City of Hartford argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on all claims asserted against it because the HBOE — not the City of Hartford — is Plaintiff's employer, and therefore, Plaintiff has no proper claim against the City. Defs. Br. at 35-37. Defendants urge that "C.G.S. § 10-220 gives a Board of Education (not the City) the authority to `employ and dismiss the teachers of the schools of such district ....'" Id. at 35 (quoting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-220(a)). Plaintiff does not challenge Defendants' assertion other than by making a vague statement, without citation to any support, that the City of Hartford funds the HBOE. Pl. Br. at 18.
The Court concludes, based on the record before it, that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the HBOE was Plaintiff's employer. See Prashad v. City of Hartford, No. 13-01381, Doc. 23 (D. Conn. August 28, 2015) (granting summary judgment to defendants when presented with a similar situation). Accordingly, the City of Hartford is improperly named as one of the Defendants. First, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was a physical education teacher at Simpson Waverly School, a public school in Hartford, CT. Second, the parties do not dispute that each of the Individual Defendants in this action were employees of the HBOE. See Pl. Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ¶¶ 30, 33, 36, 39, and 45 (admitting that each Individual Defendant is employed by the HBOE or supervised by an HBOE employee). Third, Plaintiff is seeking to invoke the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-151, a statute which states that tenure is given only for "continuous employment for the same board of education" Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-151(a)(6)(A) (emphasis added), clearly noting the board of education as the teacher's employer. In addition, Plaintiff admitted as an undisputed fact that "there is no evidence that the plaintiff reapplied for his position with the HBOE." Pl. Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 29 (emphasis added). Finally, Plaintiff has provided no evidence that the HBOE is not, in fact, his former employer and that the City of Hartford is his true employer or in someway directly connected to the HBOE sufficient to support the claims against it. Thus, Defendants' motion for summary judgment for claims asserted against the City of Hartford is granted.
For the reasons stated supra, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing each federal claim Plaintiff alleges in his complaint. The federal claims, over which this Court has original jurisdiction, are dismissed in the conclusion to this Ruling.
Plaintiff also pleads a number of state law claims in his Amended Complaint. In the absence of diversity of citizenship between the parties, the Court lacks original jurisdiction over those state claims. They can be litigated in this Court only if the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over them. A federal district court's supplemental jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Section 1367(a) provides that in any case of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the courts "shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy." That relationship would exist between Plaintiff Meyers's state law claims and his federal claims if the federal claims remained in the case. But Plaintiff's federal claims are dismissed as the result of this Ruling. That brings the case within § 1367(c), which provides that the district courts "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which the court has original jurisdiction."
Section 1367(c) has been interpreted to mean that the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in the specified circumstances is entrusted to the district judge's discretion, subject to review for abuse. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cnty., 665 F.3d 408, 436 (2d Cir. 2011); Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) ("[P]endent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right.").
District judges in this Circuit are bound by Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions which impose limitations upon the exercise of that discretion. In Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988), the Court cited Gibbs for the proposition that "when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice." The Second Circuit echoed that rule in Oneida Indian Nation:
665 F.3d at 437 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). That second sentence may resonate in the case at bar, to the extent that Plaintiff's state law claims implicate the effect of the expiration of Plaintiff's teaching certificate upon his entitlement to statutory procedural safeguards. Such a question would require interpretation of the governing Connecticut statutes.
For these reasons, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims asserted by Plaintiff Meyers in his Amended Complaint. Those claims will accordingly be dismissed without prejudice, a phrase that allows Plaintiff, whose sincerity in the belief he has been treated wrongfully is apparent, to pursue such remedies as may be available to him in the courts of Connecticut.
In light of the foregoing, Defendants' motion to for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Counts One and Four of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Plaintiff's remaining state law claims in Counts Two, Three, Five, Six and Seven are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for Defendants and close this action.
