RULING AND ORDER

ROBERT N. CHATIGNY, District Judge.

Plaintiff Louis Pierro brings this action alleging age discrimination in hiring in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act ("CFEPA"), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(a)(1). Defendant Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. ("Bimbo") has moved for summary judgment. Whether plaintiff must prove that his age was the "but for" cause of the adverse action, as would be necessary if the claim were brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, see Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 1876 (2009), or may prevail by showing that his age was a "motivating factor," the standard under the ADEA until the Supreme Court's decision in Gross, has not been authoritatively decided. Judge Shea has predicted that the Connecticut Supreme Court will continue to apply the more lenient "motivating factor" standard to age discrimination claims under the CFEPA. See Weisenbach v. LQ Management, No. 3:13-cv-1663(MPS), 2015 WL 5680322, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2015). In this case, assuming the "motivating factor" standard applies, the evidence in the record is insufficient to sustain plaintiff's claim that the adverse action was motivated by the plaintiff's age. Bimbo has provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the adverse action, one that is well-supported by the record, and plaintiff has not shown that the explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is granted.

I. Background

The parties' submissions show the following. Plaintiff was born in 1953 and worked in the "route sales industry" for multiple food companies from 1972 to 2012. Am. Compl. (ECF No. 15) ¶¶ 8-10. Most recently, he worked for Hostess Foods from 2002 until 2012.1 Pl.'s Resume, Cover Ltr. (ECF No. 40-1) at 76, 77. He was laid off in November 2012 when Hostess filed for bankruptcy. Am. Compl. (ECF No. 15) ¶ 10; Pl.'s Opp'n (ECF No. 40) at 1. As a route sales representative, plaintiff was responsible for delivery and sales of bakery products. Lundy Dep. (ECF No. 40-1) at 74. The work required lifting boxes of up to fifty pounds and communicating clearly with customers. Id. at 75. Plaintiff was also a union steward for many years. Pl.'s Dep. (ECF No. 36-2) at 37:23-25.

After plaintiff was laid off at Hostess he attended a job fair and subsequently sought employment with Bimbo. Between January and June 2013, he applied for route sales representative jobs with Bimbo through an online job application portal. Id. ¶ 13; Pl.'s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement (ECF No. 40-7) ¶ 40. His application contained a one-line resume ("TABLE TALK PIES 1974-1979 HOSTESS CAKE 1979-1982 DRAKES 1983-2002 IBC 2002-2012") and a short cover letter explaining that he had worked for forty years in the industry.2 Pl.'s Resume, Cover Ltr. (ECF No. 40-1) at 76, 77. Plaintiff's friend, Kevin O'Toole, who was well-known in the industry, called Bimbo to recommend him. Pl.'s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement (ECF No. 40-7) ¶ 33.

Plaintiff was interviewed at Bimbo for two route sales representative positions. The individuals responsible for filling these positions at Bimbo, Brian Lundy and Jeannette Depew, have stated that they were looking for three qualities in a candidate: an entrepreneurial spirit, ability to sell, and desire to grow the business. Lundy Dep. (ECF No. 40-1) at 23:14-18. Plaintiff was interviewed but he received no offer.3 He was informed that "the company decided to go in a different direction." Am. Compl. (ECF No. 15) ¶ 14. He then learned that the company had hired younger people for the jobs. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff did not seek other employment; instead he collected his pension early and retired in July 2013. Pl.'s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement (ECF No. 40-7) ¶¶ 8-10.

Plaintiff has stated that he suspects Bimbo hired the other candidates "because they were younger than me." Pierro Dep. (ECF No. 36-2) at 30:14-16. However, he has testified that no one made any comments about his age. Pierro Dep. (ECF No. 36-2) at 31:12-20. Plaintiff has also stated that it's possible the adverse action was motivated by his involvement in union activities as a shop steward. Id. at 37:18-38:22.

Plaintiff claims that he should have been hired because he was one of the top sellers in his former route. Mr. Lundy stated that there is "usually a bidding process, and those with more experience or seniority usually can bid on better routes." Id. at 25:3-5; 59:25-60:4. Thus, plaintiff's sales record was not a compelling indication of his sales skills.

Plaintiff also points to his on the job experience. It is undisputed he had enough experience to be considered for the job, but so did the candidates who were hired. Pl.'s Resp. (ECF No. 40) at 3 (Trevor Wright had 12 years' experience); Lundy Dep. (ECF No. 40-1) at 20:13-16; 31:1-18 (Nick Conklin had five years of experience); id. at 43:12-23 (Edwin Nunez had sixteen years of experience); Rodriguez Resume (ECF No. 40-1) at 103 (Angel Rodriguez had over three years of experience). Both parties agree there is no linear relationship between amount of time on the job and competence. Lundy Dep. (ECF No. 40-1) at 58:4-7 (noting that a candidate with 43 years of experience would not necessarily be more qualified than Mr. Pierro); Pierro Dep. (ECF No. 36-2) at 17:13-18:4 (stating that he could do the job better after a few months than other people who had been there longer).

Lundy and Depew have testified that the candidates who were hired submitted better applications, did better in the interview performance and had stronger references. Mr. Lundy testified that Nick Conklin's references highly recommended him, saying, "[h]e's good. I would love to keep him, but I can't." Lundy Dep. (ECF No. 40-1) at 36:8-13. Mr. Edwin Nunez "interviewed much better" than the plaintiff and had extensive familiarity with the route he would be hired to drive. Id. at 43:22-44:10. Mr. Angel Rodriguez had previously worked closely with Mr. Lundy, so he did not feel that it was necessary to bring Mr. Rodriguez in for a second interview as he did for Mr. Pierro. Id. at 48:25-49:24.4 Trevor Wright was hired because he "came in with a very outgoing attitude, talked safety." Depew Dep. (ECF No. 40-3) at 43:18-25.

The record establishes that plaintiff's application was not very detailed. Ms. Depew stated that plaintiff provided only a "bare" resume without any "detail in it," and when there are "that many candidates and that many resumes, you have to be distinctive to have yourself stand out." Depew Dep. (ECF No. 40-3) at 60:18-61:17.

Lundy and Depew have testified that when they contacted others to gain information about the plaintiff (he provided no references), they received negative feedback about him. The feedback specifically noted problems with his "overall work and demeanor." Lundy Dep. (ECF No. 40-1) at 25:5-16. Mr. Lundy learned that there might be "some trouble" if plaintiff were hired, and he was concerned about maintaining a productive work environment. Id. at 58:18-24 ("Basically, [I was told] to kind of stay away from him. . . . It would be like having another shop steward in the building and probably create some tension or concerns."); id. at 64:10-19 ("The concern was that he was a troublemaker. Not that he was a union guy, that he was a troublemaker."). Regarding feedback from others, Ms. Depew has testified, "I got some good. I got some bad. And really with the amount of candidates we had, any bad kind of knocked him out of the pool because we had so many. So I got some negative feedback from my shop stewards in the building that have worked alongside Mr. Pierro in the market." Depew Dep. (ECF No. 40-3) at 45:23.

Plaintiff did receive a positive reference from Mr. O'Toole, Depew testified that O'Toole called "and really asked me to consider him for the position." Depew Dep. (ECF No. 40-3) at 46:10-18.5 Mr. O'Toole stated that he "was only going to send them [his] best guys." O'Toole Dep. (ECF No. 40-5) at 9:15-24. According to Mr. O'Toole, plaintiff had never missed a day of work in over thirty years and would always volunteer for more work. Id. at 10:19-23. However, Mr. O'Toole never worked with Mr. Pierro; he was simply a fellow union member and social friend. Def.'s Reply (ECF No. 41) at 15:9-16.

Lundy and Depew have testified that they were not impressed with plaintiff's interview responses. Lundy stated, "I felt that Lou seemed to feel like he was a shoe-in and was entitled and basically a guarantee for the role." Lundy Dep. (ECF No. 40-1) at 22:22-23:18. Depew stated that the plaintiff seemed "disinterested" and had a "laid back entitled persona, I guess, because he's been in the business so long he thought that he just had an entitlement." Depew Dep. (ECF No. 40-1) at 40:25-41:5. Lundy stated that plaintiff did not provide satisfactory answers about his interest in growing the business. Id. at 27:4-23. Plaintiff's own recommender, Mr. O'Toole, conceded that Mr. Pierro was not interested in growing the business. O'Toole Dep. (ECF No. 40-5) at 11:8-14.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment may be granted when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court's role is not to weigh the evidence but to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue. In assessing the evidence, the court must review the record as a whole, and give the nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). Summary judgment should be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The nonmoving party must provide admissible evidence and "may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible." Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Conclusory allegations, conjecture and speculation are insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial. Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998).

III. Discussion

Connecticut courts analyze employment discrimination claims under the CFEPA using the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which helps a plaintiff establish a case of discrimination through inference by presenting "facts sufficient to remove the most likely bona fide reasons for an employment action . . . ." Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1180 (2d Cir. 1992).

The analysis proceeds in three steps:

Irizarry v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 3:11-CV-1658 (JCH), 2014 WL 1246684, at *11 (D. Conn. Mar. 24, 2014)(quoting McPherson v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2006).

Plaintiff has satisfied the minimal burden of presenting a prima facie case. He is a member of a protected class because at the time of the alleged discrimination he was 59 years of age. He was objectively qualified for the route sales representative position. He was denied a position. And the denial occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Bimbo hired younger applicants for the three route sales representative positions and did not make an offer to the plaintiff although he had more experience.

Bimbo has satisfied its burden of proffering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. As discussed above, it explains that the candidates who were hired had more than adequate experience, submitted better applications, performed better in the interviews, had stronger references and, unlike the plaintiff, were not the subject of negative feedback.

Because Bimbo has met its burden, it is entitled to summary judgment "unless the plaintiff can point to evidence that reasonably supports a finding of prohibited discrimination. Specifically, plaintiff must demonstrate that the proffered reason is merely a pretext or cover-up for age discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). He has not met this burden.

Plaintiff states that the defendant's explanation is merely a pretext because his credentials were so superior to the credentials of the persons selected that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen one or more of the other candidates over him. I disagree. The evidence in the record does not support a finding that plaintiff was objectively a superior applicant. Plaintiff relies on his long experience in route sales. It is undisputed, however, that the nature of the position did not require extensive experience and all the candidates who were hired were qualified. A reasonable jury could not find that plaintiff was objectively a better candidate for the position just because he had more experience.

No other factors support a finding of pretext. Plaintiff has no evidence that suggests Bimbo's explanation is unworthy of credence. See Bombero v. Warner-Lambert Co., 142 F.Supp.2d 196, 203 n.7 (D. Conn. 2000) (plaintiff may sustain burden of demonstrating that employer's explanation is a pretext by pointing to weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies or contradictions in the explanation). Plaintiff's only recommendation came from a friend, as opposed to a daily supervisor. He was the subject of negative feedback provided by people in the industry; the successful applicants had only positive recommendations. Bimbo wanted people with an interest in growing the business and, as far as it knew at the time, plaintiff had no such interest, unlike the successful candidates.

Because the evidence does not support a finding of pretext, summary judgment is appropriate.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.

So ordered.