WARREN W. EGINTON, District Judge.
Plaintiffs are employees of the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection who paid fair-share or "agency" fees to Local 2001 prior to the United States Supreme Court decision,
Defendant CSEA and the defendant state officials have filed motions to dismiss, which assert that plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are now moot. Defendant CSEA argues further that plaintiffs' request for repayment of such fees should be dismissed because defendant had a good faith reliance on existing law authorizing collection of such fees.
For the following reasons, the motions to dismiss will be granted.
On a motion to dismiss, the Court considers the facts alleged in the complaint to be true. For purposes of considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court also considers factual issues outside of the pleadings, including the affidavits attached to the motions to dismiss
Defendant Local 2001 serves as the collective bargaining representative for a bargaining unit comprising employees of the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection ("DEEP"). Plaintiffs are not union members.
Prior to June 27, 2018, the collective bargaining agreements governing plaintiffs' bargaining unit required non-members to pay fair-share fees to Local 2001 to cover their portion of the costs of collective bargaining representation.
The day after
Local 2001 as part of a Coalition representing all state employee unions and the State of Connecticut signed a formal agreement eliminating from their collective bargaining agreements any provisions requiring payment of fair-share fees. In September 2018, the parties signed a stipulated agreement providing, in part, "any provisions of . . . [the parties'] collective bargaining agreements requiring or authorizing the collection of fair share fees from non-union bargaining unit members without the specific affirmative consent of such non-union members are and shall be null and void as of the date of issuance of the
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint recognizes that "the State Defendants stopped deducting forced fees from the Plaintiffs and class members' wages;" and that "the Defendants on September 17, 2018, entered a stipulated agreement which made the forced fees provisions in the existing CBA null and void in light of Janus." However, plaintiffs assert that defendants "failed to notify Plaintiffs or the proposed class that the CBA no longer requires forced fees even though the existing CBA's other provisions are still ongoing until June 30, 2021." Plaintiffs maintain that "the bargaining unit's membership knowledge that the forced fees provisions continue to exist chills their exercise of First Amendment rights to free speech and association." Plaintiffs allege that "Local 2001 has not refunded the fees it collected before July 6, 2018, to Plaintiffs and the class." Plaintiffs maintain that defendants were on notice regarding the Supreme Court's misgivings about
A motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(1) "challenges the court's statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case before it." 2A James W. Moore et. al., Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 12.07, at 12-49 (2d ed. 1994). Once the question of jurisdiction is raised, the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction rests on the party asserting such jurisdiction.
The function of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is "merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof."
Plaintiffs seek entry of declaratory judgments, stating that the forced fee provisions of the collective bargaining agreements are unconstitutional; that defendant Local 2001 violated plaintiffs' and class members' constitutional rights by accepting fees from plaintiffs' wages and failing to inform them that the CBA no longer requires forced fees; and that defendant Local 2001 unjustly enriched itself by collecting forced fees from their wages. Plaintiffs request that the Court enjoin defendant Local 2001 from requiring, requesting, collecting, receiving, possessing or obtaining forced fees from nonmembers; and order defendants to notify the employees that any relevant agreements no longer require forced fees or automatic deduction of union fees without an employee's affirmative consent and waiver of First Amendment rights.
Article III requires a live case or controversy to exist at the time that a federal court decides a case.
Thus, pursuant to Article III, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when the question before it becomes moot.
Here,
Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief regarding the collection of agency fees from non-members are moot because (1) the Supreme Court has already determined the issue, and (2) defendants have demonstrated that collection of such fees has ceased and is unlikely to recur. Plaintiffs cannot assert a claim for prospective relief based on past unconstitutional conduct that has now ceased or based on a subjective belief that the unconstitutional conduct may reoccur. It is well established that a defendant cannot reasonably be expected to resume conduct that it acknowledges is contrary to binding precedent.
Plaintiffs assert that Local 2001 continues to violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States constitution by retaining these fees and that plaintiffs are entitled to a full refund with interest of all union fees collected by Local 2001 prior to
Prior to
Since
Plaintiffs have alleged a state law claim of unjust enrichment. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), The Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the such state law claim. This claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss [doc. 37 and 39] are GRANTED. Plaintiffs' claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief are dismissed as moot; plaintiffs' claims for compensatory damages or repayment of fees with interest are dismissed based on the affirmative defense of good faith reliance on existing law. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claim for unjust enrichment, which is dismissed without prejudice. The clerk is instructed to close this case.