JEFFREY ALKER MEYER, District Judge.
Plaintiff Brandon Scozzari filed this lawsuit pro se and in forma pauperis against several Department of Correction ("DOC") officials, claiming that they violated his constitutional rights while he was confined as a pretrial detainee. Scozzari principally alleges that he was subjected to administrative segregation and placed in the DOC's Security Risk Group ("SRG") program—a program that allows for detainees who are suspected of certain gang affiliations to be placed in more restrictive conditions of confinement—in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The following facts are derived from Scozzari's allegations in his complaint, as well as the parties' new submissions related to the instant motion. Docs. #1, #39 (Declaration of Scozzari), #28-1 (Affidavit of SRG Coordinator Captain Papoosha).
In October of 2018, while Scozzari was confined as a pretrial detainee in the New Haven Correctional Center ("NHCC"), he was questioned by Lieutenants Paine and Russell about posts on his Facebook page indicating that he was a member of the "Piru Blood" gang. Docs. #1 at 5-6 (¶¶ 1-10); #39 at 1 (¶ 3). Scozzari denied any affiliation. Doc. #1 at 6 (¶ 6). Shortly thereafter, Paine came and took Scozzari to the restrictive housing unit. Id. at 9 (¶¶ 21-22). When Scozzari arrived at the restrictive housing unit at NHCC, he did not receive notice of the charges against him from Paine or from Investigator Acevedo, and he also was deprived of an opportunity to present his views "orally or in writing." Id. at 10 (¶¶ 24-25). Scozzari emphasizes that this segregation was not the result of committing any infractions or for disciplinary issues. Doc. #39 at 2 (¶ 4).
On October 31, 2018, while still at NHCC, Scozzari received an SRG member hearing notification, which informed him that he would have a hearing due to his possible affiliation with the Bloods, pointing to Scozzari's Facebook page, id. at 2 (¶ 5), and advised him that he was afforded an opportunity to have an advocate and witnesses at his hearing, an opportunity he declined, Doc. #28-1 at 3-4 (¶¶ 14-15).
At the SRG hearing, Scozzari acknowledged that the Facebook page was his. Doc. #39 at 2 (¶ 7); see also Doc. #28-1 at 4 (¶ 15). He said that he posted "what are lyrics to a song in memory of a friend who passed away." Doc. #39 at 2 (¶ 7). Scozzari denied posting a picture containing known gang hand symbols. Ibid. But defendants submit that the Facebook page stated, "1700 block 1700 shots IMG MOB PIRU," and it contained a photograph of Scozzari displaying a well-known Blood hand sign. Doc. #28-1 at 3 (¶ 14).
After the SRG hearing, Scozzari received a Notification of Decision that he was designated as an SRG member Phase 3. Docs. #39 at 3 (¶ 10); #28-1 at 4 (¶ 16). Scozzari was then transferred to the Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Center ("Corrigan"), where he entered into the SRG program in Phase 3. Docs. #39 at 3-4 (¶ 12); #28-1 at 4 (¶ 16).
Scozzari commenced this lawsuit in February 2019, claiming, inter alia, he was unconstitutionally placed in administrative segregation at NHCC and the SRG program at Corrigan. Doc. #1. Scozzari further claims he was kept under unconstitutional conditions of confinement at Corrigan. He seeks damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 27 (¶¶ 114-22).
In April 2019, Scozzari was sentenced. See State v. Scozzari, No. N07M-CR18-0297876-S (Conn. Super. Ct. April 3, 2019). Later that month, I permitted, inter alia, Scozzari's claims for injunctive relief under the Fourteenth Amendment against Aldi, Santiago, Faucher, and Kelly in their official capacities to proceed. Doc. #7 at 12.
After my initial review order was issued, Scozzari received two Class A discipline reports that were "un-related to anything Security Risk Groups." Doc. #39 at 4 (¶ 15). Due to these infractions, Scozzari was regressed first to the beginning of SRG Phase 3 in April, then to Phase 2 in May. Doc. #28-1 at 4 (¶ 17). Scozzari was also transferred to MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution ("MWCI"). Doc. #9 (Notice of Change of Address).
In June 2019, Scozzari received two more disciplinary reports, one of which was unrelated to the SRG program. Docs. #39 at 4-5 (¶ 16); #28-1 at 4 (¶ 18). The other infraction was SRG-related, based on the discovery that Scozzari sent a letter discussing Blood hierarchy and instructing that it be forwarded to a known Blood member. Doc. #28-1 at 4 (¶ 18). Scozzari also placed a phone call to this known Blood member and discussed the hierarchy of the Blood sect and associated information. Ibid. After both of these infractions, Scozzari's SRG status was reviewed, and he was further regressed to Phase 1. Ibid. (¶ 19). In July 2019, Scozzari was transferred to Northern Correctional Institution ("Northern"), where he is currently housed. Doc. #39 at 4-5 (¶16); see also Doc. #17 (Notice of Change of Address).
In August 2019, Scozzari filed this motion for a preliminary injunction. Doc. #20. He seeks preliminary injunctive relief in connection with his Fourteenth Amendment claims, asking for a court order removing him from the SRG program and reinstating him in general population. Ibid.
A district court has wide discretion in determining whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief. See Moore v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 511 (2d Cir. 2005) (Sotomayor, J.).
The Second Circuit has cautioned that preliminary injunctive relief "is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." Moore, 409 F.3d at 510 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "In deciding a motion for preliminary injunction, a court may consider the entire record including affidavits and other hearsay evidence." J.S.R. by & through J.S.G. v. Sessions, 330 F.Supp.3d 731, 738 (D. Conn. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
Further, when a movant seeks a "mandatory preliminary injunction that alters the status quo by commanding some positive act," rather than a "prohibitory injunction seeking only to maintain the status quo," then the burden of proof is even greater. Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A mandatory injunction "should issue only upon a clear showing that the moving party is entitled to the relief requested, or where extreme or very serious damage will result from a denial of preliminary relief." Ibid. A party seeking a mandatory injunction must therefore demonstrate "a substantial likelihood of success" on the merits, in addition to a showing of irreparable harm. Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473-74 (2d Cir. 1996).
I will first address Scozzari's likelihood of success on the merits of his Fourteenth Amendment claims. By seeking an order requiring defendants to remove him from the SRG program and place him back in the general population, Scozzari seeks to alter, not maintain, the status quo during the ongoing litigation. Accordingly, Scozzari must meet the higher burden of proof for a mandatory injunction and demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his due process claims for injunctive relief.
In his complaint, Scozzari alleges his due process rights were violated when he was placed in the restrictive housing unit at NHCC and in the SRG program at Corrigan without adequate process, which he describes as "essentially administrative segregation," and he seeks injunctive relief. Doc. #1 at 9-10, 12-13 (¶¶ 22-26, 40-48). In my initial review order, I read Scozzari's complaint as alleging a deprivation of a protected liberty interest, which triggers a right to procedural due process, while he was a pretrial detainee. See Doc. #7 at 8.
The standard analysis for a procedural due process claim "proceeds in two steps: [a court] first ask[s] whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so . . . whether the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient." Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (per curiam). Liberty restrictions on a pretrial detainee may not amount to punishment of the detainee, and a pretrial detainee who is placed in segregation for administrative reasons is entitled to "some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views." See Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 188, 190 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) and Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)). These procedural steps "must occur within a reasonable time following an inmate's transfer." Taylor v. Comm'r of New York City Dep't of Corr., 317 F. App'x 80, 82 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476 & n.8).
Scozzari challenges his placement in administrative segregation and the SRG program as lacking due process. In my initial review order, I permitted Scozzari's procedural due process claim to proceed on the basis of Scozzari's allegations that he did not receive any notice or hearing (or other opportunity to present his views).
Now Scozzari admits that he was given notice and an opportunity to present his views at a SRG hearing shortly after he was placed in administrative segregation at NHCC and before he was placed as Phase 3 in the SRG program at Corrigan. Indeed, in his own submissions for this motion, Scozzari acknowledges that he received an SRG hearing notification one day after being placed in administrative segregation at NHCC. Doc. #39 at 2 (¶¶ 4-5). Scozzari concedes that the notification informed him the SRG hearing was due to his apparent affiliation with the Bloods (as indiciated by his Facebook page), ibid. (¶ 5), and defendants submit that the notification advised Scozzari that he could have an advocate and witnesses at his hearing, which he declined, Doc. #28-1 at 3-4 (¶¶ 14-15). Scozzari also concedes that he had an opportunity at that SRG hearing to present his views: he acknowledged that the Facebook page was his, but he denied any affiliation with the Bloods. Doc. #39 at 2-3 (¶ 7); see also #28-1 at 4 (¶ 15). Scozzari further appears to acknowledge that it was only after that SRG hearing that he received a Notification of Decision that he was designated as an SRG member Phase 3. Doc. #39 at 3 (¶ 10); see also Doc. #28-1 at 4 (¶ 16).
In light of the foregoing, Scozzari is hard-pressed to successfully show that prison officials denied him "some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views" after he was placed in administrative segregation and before he formally received his SRG classification, as is required for procedural due process for a pretrial detainee whose protected liberty interest is implicated. See Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 188.
In his complaint, Scozzari also challenges his conditions of confinement at Corrigan, seeking injunctive relief. Doc. #1 at 15-19 (¶¶ 52-83).
As an initial matter, because Scozzari focuses on the alleged lack of notice and hearing throughout his submissions in support of an order restoring him to general population, I understand him to be seeking preliminary equitable relief in connection with his procedural due process claim. Nevertheless, in accordance with principles of liberal construction afforded to submissions from pro se litigants, I will construe Scozzari's motion as also seeking preliminary injunctive relief in connection with his substantive due process claim for his conditions of confinement.
Substantive due process requires that restrictions on pretrial detainees be reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose, such as facility security. See Almighty Supreme Born Allah v. Milling, 876 F.3d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 2017). Pretrial detainees also have a Fourteenth Amendment right against unconstitutional conditions of confinement or treatment that is the result of deliberate indifference by prison officials to their safety. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must first establish a risk of harm that is objectively serious, and then establish the defendant's deliberate indifference to that harm. See ibid; cf. Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2013).
In addition, a court may enter an order of prospective injunctive relief against a state official in his official capacity only if that state official is engaged in an ongoing violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 254-55 (2011) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). It is for this reason that a prisoner's transfer from one correctional facility to another generally moots his claims for prospective injunctive relief against correctional staff at that facility or for conditions of confinement at a particular correctional institution. See Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 2011); Pagan v. Pafumi, 2013 WL 2244353, at *1 (D. Conn. 2013) (concluding that "[plaintiff's] request for injunctive relief pertaining to conditions of confinement at Northern is moot" after he was transferred to MWCI). And if the underlying claim for injunctive relief is moot, a preliminary injunction motion is properly denied. See, e.g., Davidson v. Kelly, 100 F.3d 945 (2d Cir. 1996) (preliminary injunction motion properly denied as moot when prisoner who had sought change of conditions at his prison facility was transferred to a different facility) (unpublished disposition).
Scozzari claims that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement at Corrigan. In my initial review order, I determined that Scozzari had stated a substantive due process claim for deliberate indifference to his conditions of confinement. Doc. #7 at 10. I therefore permitted Scozzari's claims for injunctive relief on this basis to proceed against Aldi, Santiago, Faucher, and Kelly to the extent that "he continues to be held . . . in unconstitutional conditions" and to the extent that those defendants "may remedy the allegedly unconstitutional conditions to which he is subjected at Corrigan." Id. at 11.
But as noted above, Scozzari is no longer housed at Corrigan, which means he is no longer being held under the allegedly unconstitutional conditions of which he originally complained. Accordingly, because Scozzari was transferred from Corrigan, he can no longer maintain a substantive due process claim for injunctive relief arising from his prior conditions of confinement at that facility. I therefore conclude that Scozzari cannot show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his substantive due process claim, as is required for a mandatory preliminary injunction.
To satisfy the irreparable harm requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that absent a preliminary injunction, he "will suffer an injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent, and one that cannot be remedied if a court waits until the end of trial to resolve the harm." Grand River Enterprise Six Nations Ltd. v. Pryor, 481 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because I conclude that Scozzari has not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of either his procedural due process or his substantive due process claim for injunctive relief, thereby precluding entry of a preliminary injunction, I conclude that I need not address the question of irreparable harm at this time.
For the foregoing reasons, I will DENY Scozzari's motion for a preliminary injunction with prejudice (Doc. #20). It is so ordered.
