WIGGINS, J.
¶ 1 In response to questions certified to this court, we hold that debt buyers fall within the definition of "collection agency" under the Washington Collection Agency Act (WCAA), chapter 19.16 RCW, when they solicit claims for collection. Accordingly, if the court finds that Midland Funding LLC solicited claims, then Midland Funding is a collection agency and it cannot file collection lawsuits without a license.
¶ 2 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington certified the following questions to us:
Certification from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, No. CV-09-251-EFS consolidated with No. CV-10-5132-EFS (E.D.Wash.2013).
¶ 3 This lawsuit involves two consolidated suits: Gray v. Suttell & Assocs., No. CV-09-251-EFS (E.D.Wash.), and Lauber v. Encore Capital Grp., No. CV-10-5132-EFS (E.D.Wash.).
¶ 4 Midland Funding purchases defaulted receivables, i.e., consumers' unpaid financial commitments to credit originators such as banks, credit unions, consumer finance companies, commercial retailers, auto finance companies, and telecommunication companies. Midland Funding has no employees and is merely a holding company for the delinquent accounts it purchases.
¶ 5 Midland Credit Management (MCM) services the defaulted accounts on behalf of Midland Funding. Pursuant to the "Servicing Agreement," MCM decides how to collect on the defaulted accounts purchased by Midland Funding. MCM's employees manage the collection process and perform the collection acts for these defaulted accounts. MCM is licensed by the State of Washington as a collection agency. To fulfill its servicing duties, MCM contracts directly with Suttell & Associates, a law firm, to file collection lawsuits in Midland Funding's name. From 2005 to 2010, 1,082 cases were filed in Washington superior courts naming Midland Funding LLC as plaintiff.
¶ 6 Defendants Midland Funding and Suttell argue that prior to recent amendments to the WCAA, debt buyers did not fall within the definition of "collection agencies." Thus, Midland Funding did not need not to obtain a collection agency license. In February 2013, the federal district court certified the above questions to this court.
¶ 7 Both state and federal law regulate collection agencies. The WCAA, chapter 19.16 RCW, enacted in 1971, requires collection agencies to obtain a license, follow certain internal procedures, and adhere to a code of conduct. Prior to recent amendments, the WCAA defined "collection agency" as:
Former RCW 19.16.100(2) (2003) (emphasis added).
¶ 8 A recent amendment, effective October 1, 2013, adds subsection (d) to this definition:
LAWS OF 2013, ch. 148, § 1 (emphasis added) (codified at RCW 19.16.100(2)(d)).
¶ 9 The federal FDCPA was enacted in 1977 to combat abusive debt collection practices. 15 U.S.C. § 1692. Some provisions of the WCAA parallel provisions of the FDCPA, but there are notable differences. For instance, the FDCPA regulates "`debt collector[s]'" as opposed to "collection agencies." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Because the FDCPA's definition of "debt collectors" differs from the WCAA's definition of "collection agency," we do not find courts' interpretations of the FDCPA definition instructive in this case.
¶ 10 Since the enactment of the WCAA, the debt collection industry has grown and changed to keep up with the increasing amount of consumer delinquent debt.
¶ 11 There is growing concern that collection practices employed by debt buyers are
Id. at 3.
¶ 12 Indeed, up to one-half of all purchased debt is resold several times over, which can make it difficult for the original debtor to recognize the debt because the collector is no longer the original creditor. FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 5 (2010). Responding to these concerns, the Washington State Legislature amended the WCAA in 2013 to explicitly reach debt buying entities. The issue here is whether the preamended definitions also cover debt buyers.
¶ 13 Certified questions from federal court are questions of law that we review de novo. Bradburn v. N. Cent. Reg'l Library Dist., 168 Wn.2d 789, 799, 231 P.3d 166 (2010). We consider the legal issues not in the abstract but based on the certified record provided by the federal court. Id. (citing RCW 2.60.030(2)). Once the court has decided to rule on a certified question pursuant to RCW 2.60.020, the ruling is not advisory but resolves actual issues pending in the federal proceeding and will be legal precedent in all future controversies involving the same legal question. In re Elliott, 74 Wn.2d 600, 446 P.2d 347 (1968).
¶ 14 Here, we hold that debt buyers are collection agencies under the WCAA when they solicit claims for collection. Accordingly, if Midland Funding solicits claims for collection, it is a collection agency and may not file collection lawsuits in Washington without a license. RCW 19.16.110 (no person shall act as a collection agency without first having applied for and obtained a license).
¶ 15 The first issue is whether debt buyers are "collection agencies" subject to licensure under the WCAA. The relevant statutory provision defines a "collection agency" as
RCW 19.16.100(2)(a).
¶ 16 The purpose of statutory interpretation is "to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature." State v. Sweany, 174 Wn.2d 909, 914, 281 P.3d 305 (2012); State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003); In re Pers. Restraint of Williams, 121 Wn.2d 655, 663, 853 P.2d 444 (1993). When possible, the court derives legislative intent solely from the plain language enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. State v. Ervin, 169 Wn.2d 815, 820, 239 P.3d 354 (2010); Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). We employ traditional rules of grammar to discern plain meaning. State v. Jim, 173 Wn.2d 672, 689, 273 P.3d 434 (2012) (citing State v. Bunker, 169 Wn.2d 571, 578, 238 P.3d 487 (2010)). If the statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, it is ambiguous. City of Seattle v. Fuller, 177 Wn.2d 263, 269-70, 300 P.3d 340 (2013).
¶ 17 Here, the use of a comma and the disjunctive "or" to separate "soliciting claims for collection" and "collecting or attempting to collect claims owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another person" strongly suggests that there are two types of collection agencies. See HJS Dev., Inc. v. Pierce County ex rel. Dep't of Planning & Land Servs., 148 Wn.2d 451, 473 n. 94, 61 P.3d 1141 (2003); accord Riofta v. State, 134 Wn.App. 669, 682, 142 P.3d 193 (2006) ("or" is disjunctive unless there is clear legislative intent to the contrary). In addition, the absence of a comma before the qualifying phrase "owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another person" indicates that the phrase refers only to the second type of collection agency. Bunker, 169 Wash.2d at 578, 238 P.3d 487 (under the last antecedent rule, a qualifying phrase refers to the last antecedent, but a comma before the qualifying phrase indicates that the phrase applies to all antecedents).
¶ 18 "Solicit" appears once more in another part of the statute listing prohibited activities applicable to licensees; under RCW 19.16.250, licensees may not attempt to enforce a claim by advertising or threatening to advertise sale of that claim and may not solicit a claim by agreeing to advertise or threaten to advertise sale of that claim. Thus, in both provisions, the two regulated actions are (1) enforcement/collection of a claim and (2) solicitation of a claim.
¶ 19 Accordingly, a reasonable reading of the statute is that it defines two types of "collection agencies": those that solicit claims for collection and those that collect claims owed to another. Collection agencies that fall within the first category of entities — entities that solicit claims for collection — need not collect claims owed to another. Accordingly, we reject defendants' argument that debt buyers cannot be collection agencies simply because they collect claims they purchase and own, and we hold that debt buyers qualify as collection agencies under the WCAA as long as they solicit claims for collection.
¶ 20 The statute does not define "solicit." See RCW 19.16.100. Webster's dictionary defines "solicit" as "to endeavor to obtain by asking or pleading." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2169 (2002). In other words, soliciting claims for collection involves conduct aimed at procuring a claim for collection. A passive market participant does not "solicit" claims for collection. There must be some affirmative act on the part of the solicitor. For example, the solicitor could advertise that it is purchasing claims, target individual sellers, enter into contracts with sellers to purchase claims, or perform market-based research to generate lists used to purchase claims. See, e.g., RCW 19.182.010(7) ("direct solicitation" means "the process in which the consumer reporting agency compiles or edits for a client a list of consumers who meet specific criteria and provides this list to the client or third party on behalf of the client for use in soliciting those consumers for an offer of a product or service"). By contrast, if a company is formed, sits idle, and never actually solicits or acquires any claims for collection, that
¶ 21 Here, it is possible that Midland Funding solicited claims for collection if it affirmatively acted to acquire the claims it collected on.
¶ 22 Regarding the remainder of the definition, there is no dispute that debt buyers like Midland Funding are purchasing "claims" because Midland Funding purchases portfolios of consumer debt, particularly credit card obligations, arising from agreement or contract. See former RCW 19.16.100(5) ("claim" is "any obligation for the payment of money or thing of value arising out of any agreement or contract, express or implied"). In addition, Midland Funding solicits claims "for collection" even if it outsources the collection as long as its purpose for soliciting the claim is collection. None of the statutory exemptions applies to persons who outsource collection. See former RCW 19.16.100(3)(a)-(f). In sum, debt buyers like Midland Funding fall within the statutory definition of "collection agency" if they solicit claims for collection. This interpretation gives effect to the overall purpose of the WCAA-to prohibit unfair or deceptive debt collection practices.
¶ 23 Although we generally presume that a new legislative enactment is an amendment that changes a law, the presumption may be rebutted by clear evidence that the legislature intended an interpretive clarification. State v. Elmore, 154 Wn.App. 885, 905, 228 P.3d 760 (2010) (citing Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wn.2d 922, 926, 557 P.2d 1299 (1976)); see also Roe v. TeleTech Customer Care Mgmt. (Colo.) LLC, 171 Wn.2d 736, 751, 257 P.3d 586 (2011). The new amendment provides that a collection agency includes:
LAWS OF 2013, ch. 148, § 1 (codified at RCW 19.16.100(2)(d)). There are two indications that this amendment is a clarification and not a change in the law.
¶ 24 First, as discussed, former RCW 19.16.100(2)(a) was ambiguous with respect to whether debt buyers who collect on claims they purchase and own are "collection agencies."
¶ 25 Second, the legislature amended RCW 19.16.100 following uncertainty as to whether the original enactment encompassed debt buyers. When an amendment is adopted soon after a disagreement regarding the meaning of the law, courts have concluded that the amendment is clarifying. See, e.g., Barstad v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 145 Wn.2d 528, 536-37, 39 P.3d 984 (2002) (legislature amended definition after we declined to interpret definition in four consecutive decisions, holding that amended statute resolved ambiguity); McGee Guest Home, Inc. v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 142 Wn.2d 316, 324, 12 P.3d 144 (2000) (amendments clarified legislature's view of statute that a recent superior court decision had called into question). Here, for eight years the Board struggled to determine whether debt buyers fell within former RCW 19.16.100(2)(a), ultimately deciding at a meeting in September 2012 that the issue required yet further examination. Just a few months later, H.B. 1822 was introduced in the House of Representatives. H.B. 1822, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.2013) (first reading on Feb. 11, 2013). Thus, the amendment's aim was to clarify uncertainties that arose from the enforcement of the WCAA.
¶ 26 To conclude, we hold that the preamended definition of "collection agency" includes debt buyers who solicit claims for collection. Midland Funding meets this requirement if it sought to purchase delinquent debts for collection. The recent amendment clarifies that debt buyers are collection agencies.
¶ 27 The second certified question is whether a company, such as Midland Funding, can file lawsuits in the state of Washington on delinquent consumer accounts without being licensed as a collection agency. We hold that it cannot if it is found to be a "collection agency" under former RCW 19.16.100(2) because RCW 19.16.110 unambiguously requires persons acting as a collection agency to first obtain a license.
¶ 28 RCW 19.16.110 provides:
All persons who act as a collection agency under the WCAA must obtain a license under RCW 19.16.110.
¶ 29 To conclude, we answer the first certified question: Yes, the definition of a "collection agency" in RCW 19.16.100 includes debt buyers if the debt buyer solicits claims for collection. We answer the second certified question: No, Midland Funding may not file lawsuits in Washington on delinquent consumer accounts without a license if the district court finds that Midland Funding is a collection agency.
WE CONCUR. MADSEN, C.J., J.M. JOHNSON, J.P.T., C. JOHNSON, OWENS, FAIRHURST, STEPHENS, GONZALEZ and GORDON McCLOUD, JJ.,
ECF 128-1, at 5 (Encore Capital Grp. Inc. Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 3 (Aug. 2, 2010)). Although the SEC filing does not conclusively establish that Midland Funding solicits claims for collection, it has no employees and acts only through employees of other Encore Capital subsidiaries.