González, J.
¶ 1 Petitioner Chelan Basin Conservancy (Conservancy) seeks the removal of six acres of fill material that respondent GBI Holding Co. added to its property in 1961 to keep the formerly dry property permanently above the artificially raised seasonal water fluctuations of Lake Chelan. The Conservancy brings this action pursuant to Washington's public trust doctrine, which protects the public right to use water in place along navigable waterways. At issue is whether the State consented to the fill's impairment of that right and, if so, whether such consent violates the public trust doctrine.
¶ 2 As explained in this opinion, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the legislature consented to the fill's impairment of navigable waters under RCW 90.58.270 (the Savings Clause), but the Court of Appeals prematurely concluded such consent did not violate the public trust doctrine. Because the trial court never reached the highly factual public trust issue, we reverse and remand to the trial court to determine in the first instance whether RCW 90.58.270 violates the public trust doctrine.
¶ 3 Our state constitution grants the State "ownership to the beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state." CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (article 17). We have interpreted this provision to mean the State possesses an alienable fee-simple private property interest in those beds and shores subject to an overriding public servitude to use the waters in place for navigation and fishing, and other incidental activities. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wn.2d 662, 668-69, 732 P.2d 989 (1987). The parties agree that Lake Chelan is a navigable body of water and that GBI's property along the lake is subject to the public trust servitude.
¶ 4 In its natural state, GBI's property stood above the lake's peak water levels and was continuously dry throughout the year. See Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wn.2d 306,
¶ 5 In 1961, GBI added fill to its property to elevate it once more permanently above the lake's seasonal fluctuations. The fill is locally referred to as "the Three Fingers" because it resembles, in aerial photographs, three rectangular fingers protruding into the lake.
¶ 6 Eight years after GBI filled its property, we held in Wilbour, a case involving a neighboring landfill abutting Lake Chelan, that the neighbor's fill violated the public trust doctrine and ordered the fill be abated. Id. at 315-16, 462 P.2d 232. Although we acknowledged the existence of other similarly situated fills along the lake, our Wilbour decision did not order their abatement. Id. at 316, 462 P.2d 232 n. 13. Despite its limited disposition, Wilbour was publicly hailed as a watershed case that placed title to thousands of properties along Washington's shores in question. See 1 SENATE JOURNAL, 42d Leg., 1st Ex. Sess., at 1411 (Wash. 1971). That is because much of Washington's shores and tidelands were improved during our early years of statehood, when private settlement and development were widely encouraged with little consideration given to the effect these developments would have on public trust rights. See State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wn. 158, 171, 135 P. 1035 (1913). By 1969, thousands of acres of Washington's tidelands and shorelands had been reclaimed and developed with significant improvements, including the creation of Harbor Island and much of downtown Seattle. Edward A. Rauscher, The Lake Chelan Case — Another View, 45 WASH. L. REV. 523, 531 (1970); Port of Seattle v. Or. & W. R. Co., 255 U.S. 56, 59, 41 S.Ct. 237, 65 S.Ct. 500 (1921); Ralph W. Johnson & Eileen M. Cooney, Harbor Lines and the Public Trust Doctrine in Wash. Navigable Waters, 54 WASH. L. REV. 275, 289 n.64 (1979) (noting that the state had sold approximately 60 percent of its tidelands to private parties between 1889 and 1971) (citing DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, WASH. STATE COASTAL ZONE MGMT. PROGRAM 73 (1976)).
¶ 7 The legislature responded to the Wilbour decision by enacting the Savings Clause, RCW 90.58.270, that gave post hoc consent to pre-Wilbour improvements to protect them from public trust challenges. See 1 SENATE JOURNAL at 1411. The Savings Clause was enacted as part of a much broader piece of legislation known as the Shoreline Management Act of Chelan Basin Conservancy v. GBI Holding Co., No. 93381-2 1971 (SMA), chapter 90.58 RCW, and directly responded to our directive to the legislature in Wilbour that it, as trustee of public trust resources, was responsible for determining how best to preserve and promote the State's public trust interests. See Wilbour, 77 Wash.2d at 316 n. 13, 462 P.2d 232.
¶ 8 The legislature referred the SMA to the people the following year for ratification. State of Washington Voters Pamphlet, General Election 34-35, (Nov. 7, 1972) (App. to Supp'l Br. of Resp't State of Wash.). The legislature presented the SMA to Washington voters along with an alternative measure, Initiative 43. Id. at 32-33. Although both the SMA and Initiative 43 established guidelines for the development of Washington's waterways and shorelines, one major difference between the two plans was how they treated pre-Wilbour fills. Id. at 108. The SMA provided legislative consent to pre-Wilbour fills; whereas Initiative 43 did not. Id. The people ratified the SMA and rejected Initiative 43 by a substantial margin. WASH. SEC'Y OF STATE, Initiative to the Leg. No. 43 (General Election Nov. 7, 1972) (285,721 voters preferred Initiative 43, while 611,748 voters preferred the SMA). Following ratification of the SMA, little legal attention was given to pre-Wilbour fills.
¶ 9 The Three Fingers fill gained attention in 2010 when GBI submitted a permit application to the city of Chelan to develop the fill. GBI later withdrew its application, following public opposition to the proposed development. Eventually, GBI submitted a second application; this time to subdivide the property
¶ 10 Meanwhile, while GBI was going through the permitting and short plat process, a local environmental group, the Conservancy, filed this action against GBI, seeking the abatement and removal of the Three Fingers fill pursuant to the public trust doctrine and Wilbour.
¶ 11 GBI moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that the Conservancy lacked standing to bring the present action and that any public trust claim seeking the removal of the Three Fingers was barred by the SMA's Savings Clause, RCW 90.58.270. The Conservancy moved for summary judgment on the applicability of the Savings Clause and the public trust doctrine as well.
¶ 12 Regarding the justiciable question of standing, the trial court found the Conservancy had standing to raise its public trust claim. As for the Savings Clause and its interplay with the public trust, the trial court initially found the Savings Clause violated the public trust doctrine but later rescinded that decision, choosing instead to avoid the public trust question altogether by holding the Savings Clause did not apply. After finding the legislature never consented to the creation of the Three Fingers fill, the court ordered the fill be removed.
¶ 13 GBI appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings. Chelan Basin Conservancy v. GBI Holding Co., 194 Wn.App. 478, 495, 378 P.3d 222 (2016). The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the Conservancy had standing to sue but departed from the trial court's analysis regarding the applicability of the Savings Clause. Id. at 487-95, 378 P.3d 222. The Court of Appeals held the Savings Clause applied and its bar on public trust claims was enforceable since the Conservancy failed to prove the statute violated the public trust. Id. at 488-95, 378 P.3d 222.
¶ 14 The Conservancy petitioned this court for review of the Savings Clause and public trust issues. In its answer, GBI requested pursuant to RAP 13.4(d) that if we grant review, we should also address the issue of standing. We granted review without limitation. Chelan Basin Conservancy v. GBI Holding Co., 186 Wn.2d 1032, 385 P.3d 769 (2016). We therefore address three issues: (1) whether the Savings Clause, RCW 90.58.270, applies to the Three Fingers fill, (2) if so, whether the clause violates the public trust doctrine, and (3) whether the Conservancy has standing to bring this public trust action.
¶ 15 The public trust doctrine is an ancient common law doctrine that recognizes the public right to use navigable waters in place for navigation and fishing, and other incidental activities. E.g., Caminiti, 107 Wash.2d at 668-69, 732 P.2d 989. The principle that the public has an overriding interest in navigable waterways and the lands underneath them has been dated by some jurists as far back as the Code of Justinian, which was developed in Rome during the 6th century. While there is some debate whether this attribution to Roman law holds water, it is generally accepted even among the most skeptical of critics that the public trust doctrine has a long history and was firmly ingrained in English and American common law by the 19th century. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths — A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 12-19 (2007).
¶ 16 Although the public trust doctrine originates from a common source, "`it has
¶ 17 Even though Washington's public trust right to use navigable waters in place is sometimes described as a right that can be "neither destroy[ed] nor abridge[d]," New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 24 Wn. 493, 499, 64 P. 735 (1901), this does not mean that the State must hold all the beds and shores of navigable waters inviolate. Davidson v. State, 116 Wn.2d 13, 16, 802 P.2d 1374 (1991); Caminiti, 107 Wash.2d at 668, 732 P.2d 989. Under article 17, "the state of Washington has the power to dispose of, and invest persons with, ownership of tidelands and shorelands subject only to the paramount right of navigation and the fishery." Id. at 667, 732 P.2d 989. This is because the State owns article 17 lands in two distinct capacities. Longshore, 141 Wash.2d at 427, 5 P.3d 1256; Caminiti, 107 Wash.2d at 668-69, 732 P.2d 989; Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wn.2d 621, 639, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987); Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wn. 236, 240-41, 26 P. 539 (1891).
¶ 18 First, as title owner, "the state holds full proprietary rights in tidelands and shorelands and has fee simple title to such lands" so that it "may convey title to [those lands] in any manner and for any purpose not forbidden by the state or federal constitutions and its grantees take title as absolutely as if the transaction were between private individuals." Caminiti, 107 Wash.2d at 668, 732 P.2d 989. This title interest is referred to as the State's jus privatum interest.
¶ 19 Second, because such land is also held by the State in trust and for the benefit of the people, any right conveyed generally remains subservient to the public right to use water in place for navigation, see Hill v. Newell, 86 Wn. 227, 231, 149 P. 951 (1915), much like "`a covenant running with the land,'" Orion, 109 Wash.2d at 640, 747 P.2d 1062 (quoting Scott W. Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is it Amphibious?, 1 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 107, 118 (1986)). This public servitude is referred to as the State's jus publicum interest.
¶ 20 Although title to property burdened by the public trust remains continuously subject to the servitude, the competing rights and interests of the public and private owner rise and fall with the water. "As the level rises, the rights of the public to use the water increase since the area of water increases; correspondingly, the rights of the landowners decrease since they cannot use their property in such a manner as to interfere with the expanded public rights." Wilbour, 77 Wash.2d at 315, 462 P.2d 232. "As the level and the area of the water decreases, the rights of the public decrease and the rights of the landowners increase as the waters drain off their land, again giving them the right to exclusive possession until their lands are again submerged." Id.
¶ 21 A private landowner whose lands are burdened by the public trust cannot unilaterally extinguish the public right to use navigable waters in place by artificially elevating his or her property above the high-water mark absent legislative consent. Id. at 314-16, 462 P.2d 232. GBI contends the legislature and Washington voters consented to the retention of the Three Fingers fill when the legislature enacted and the people ratified the Savings Clause. We agree.
¶ 22 The Savings Clause, RCW 90.58.270, provides legislative consent to the impairment of public trust rights by pre-Wilbour improvements and bars private actions challenging that impairment unless the improvements were "in trespass or in violation of state statutes." RCW 90.58.270(1), (2). GBI argues that because the Three Fingers fill was created pre-Wilbour, the Savings Clause protects the fill and bars this action. The Conservancy disagrees. It argues the Savings Clause is inapplicable in this case because the Three Fingers fill "`obstruct[ed] or impede[d] ... the passage of [a] river, harbor, or collection of water'" in violation of the public nuisance statute. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r Conservancy at 17 (quoting RCW 7.48.140(3)). According to the Conservancy, this public nuisance violation disqualified the Three Fingers fill from the protections of the Savings Clause since the fill was "`in violation of state statutes.'" Id. at 3 (quoting RCW 90.58.270(1)). GBI disagrees with the premise of the Conservancy's argument; that is, that the Three Fingers fill constitutes a public nuisance. To resolve this debate, we must construe the public nuisance statute as it relates to the Savings Clause.
¶ 23 "Issues of statutory construction... are questions of law" subject to de novo review. State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 191, 298 P.3d 724 (2013). "The purpose of statutory interpretation is to `determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature.'" Id. at 192, 298 P.3d 724 (quoting State v. Sweany, 174 Wn.2d 909, 914, 281 P.3d 305 (2012)). "`A statute that is clear on its face is not subject to judicial construction.'" HomeStreet, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 166 Wn.2d 444, 452, 210 P.3d 297 (2009) (quoting State v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001)). "If the plain language is subject to only one interpretation, our inquiry ends because plain language does not require construction." Id. at 451, 210 P.3d 297. Typically, where an act has a doubtful or ambiguous meaning, it is the duty of the court to adopt a construction that is reasonably liberal, in furtherance of the obvious or manifest purpose of the legislature. Evans, 177 Wash.2d at 193, 298 P.3d 724; State v. Rinkes, 49 Wn.2d 664, 667, 306 P.2d 205 (1957). However, because we are dealing with a public trust impairment, albeit one passed directly by the people, the statute must be strictly construed in preservation of the public trust interest absent express contrary language or necessary implication. See Hill, 86 Wash. at 229, 149 P. 951 ("`The general rule of construction applying to grants of public lands by a sovereignty to corporations or individuals is that the grant must be construed liberally as to the grantor and strictly as to the grantee, and that nothing shall be taken to pass by implication.'" (quoting 26 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW 425 (2d ed. 1904))); City of Berkeley v. Superior Ct., 26 Cal.3d 515, 528, 162 Cal.Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362 (1980) ("[S]tatutes purporting to abandon the public trust are to be strictly construed; the intent to abandon must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied; and if any interpretation of the statute is reasonably possible which would retain the public's interest in tidelands, the court must give the statute such an interpretation.").
¶ 24 RCW 7.48.140(3) declares it a public nuisance, among other enumerated actions, "[t]o obstruct or impede, without legal authority, the passage of any river, harbor, or collection of water." (Emphasis added.) Another statute further explains that "[n]othing which is done or maintained under the express authority of a statute, can be deemed a nuisance." RCW 7.48.160 (emphasis added). GBI and the State interpret the Savings Clause as providing the requisite legal and express statutory authority for the retention and maintenance of pre-Wilbour improvements
¶ 25 The Savings Clause provides legislative "consent and authorization" "to the impairment of public rights of navigation, and corollary rights incidental thereto, caused by the retention and maintenance of" "structures, improvements, docks, fills, or developments placed in navigable waters prior to December 4, 1969." RCW 90.58.270(1).
¶ 26 The legislature undeniably intended the Savings Clause to foreclose private actions for the removal of pre-Wilbour improvements based on their impairment of navigable waters alone. As one of the prime sponsors of the statute, Senator Gissberg, explained during a senate floor debate, the purpose of the Savings Clause was to "make[ ] legal any fills that took place prior to December 4, 1969," which is the date Wilbour was decided. 1 SENATE JOURNAL at 1411. Senator Gissberg further explained the reasoning for and the intended effect of the Savings Clause as follows:
Id. We therefore interpret the Savings Clause as authorizing the retention and maintenance of the Three Fingers fill and barring private public nuisance claims based on the fill's impairment of navigable waters.
¶ 27 Washington's public trust doctrine operates under the principle that "`[t]he control of the State for purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and water remaining,'" Caminiti, 107 Wash.2d at 670, 732 P.2d 989 (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 S.Ct. 1018 (1892)); Palmer v. Peterson, 56 Wn. 74, 76, 105 P. 179 (1909) (adopting Illinois Central's description of the public trust doctrine as consistent with Washington's public trust doctrine). This means the legislature can dispose of the public right to use navigable waters in place only to promote the interests protected by the public trust doctrine or to further some other interest if doing so does not substantially impair the public trust resource. 2 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 30.02(d)(3), at 30-46 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2013). Accordingly, when evaluating a public trust claim, we consider: "(1) whether the State, by the questioned legislation, has given up its right of control over the jus publicum and (2) if so, whether by so doing the State (a) has promoted the interests of the public in the jus publicum, or (b) has not substantially impaired it." Caminiti, 107 Wash.2d at 670, 732 P.2d 989.
¶ 28 The answers to those questions are factually dependent. Because the trial court never reached Caminiti's factual analysis, we reverse and remand to the trial court to decide the matter in the first instance. To assist the trial court on remand, we answer the following legal questions presented by the parties: (a) Is judicial review of the Savings Clause precluded by legislative preemption? (b) Who bears the burden of proving a legislative action violates the public trust doctrine? (c) Did the State abdicate control over the Three Fingers property when it enacted the Savings Clause? And finally, (d) what is the proper geographical focus for evaluating the interests affected by the Savings Clause under Caminiti?
¶ 29 GBI and the State argue that since legislative action preempts the common law, it follows that the SMA and its corresponding Savings Clause should preempt Washington's common law public trust doctrine and preclude judicial review as well. We disagree. While GBI and the State correctly identify the doctrine's common law origin, they overlook the doctrine's constitutional footing.
¶ 30 As we have explained, the public trust doctrine is "partially encapsulated" in article 17 of our state constitution. Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 122 Wn.2d 219, 232, 858 P.2d 232 (1993). Because of the doctrine's constitutional underpinning, any legislation that impairs the public trust remains subject to judicial review. This includes the SMA. "Holding otherwise [would] elevate[ ] an exercise
¶ 31 The fact that the State never acquired title ownership to the Three Fingers property under article 17 does not mean the public trust doctrine has no constitutional force as to this property. As previously mentioned, article 17 recognized two distinct interests: the State's responsibility to protect Washington's public trust interests and the State's title ownership in specific lands. See id. at 666-67, 732 P.2d 989. Therefore, any legislative act arguably in dereliction of the State's constitutional responsibility to protect the public trust interest is subject to judicial review regardless of article 17 title ownership.
¶ 32 The party challenging the constitutionality of a legislative act, whether enacted by the legislature itself or the people through their initiative power, generally bears the burden of proving the act's invalidity. Lee v. State, 185 Wn.2d 608, 619, 374 P.3d 157 (2016). Even though public trust claims are only "quasi-constitutional," Ralph W. Johnson et al., The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management in Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REV. 521, 527 (1992)), our courts have generally treated public trust claims as constitutional challenges in presuming the constitutionality of the challenged legislation and placing the burden on the challenging party to prove otherwise. E.g., Chelan Basin, 194 Wash.App. at 494, 378 P.3d 222; Samson v. City of Bainbridge Island, 149 Wn.App. 33, 58, 202 P.3d 334 (2009); Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 124 Wn.App. 566, 570, 103 P.3d 203 (2004); Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass'n v. Dep't of Nat. Res., 124 Wn.App. 441, 447, 101 P.3d 891 (2004).
¶ 33 The Conservancy disagrees with this approach, arguing it is inconsistent with our duty to review legislation that impairs public trust rights with a heightened degree of scrutiny. The Conservancy misconstrues that duty. Heightened scrutiny does not mean the party bearing the burden of proof should be different in the context of public trust challenges than constitutional challenges. As we explained in Weden v. San Juan County, we "review legislation under the public trust doctrine with a heightened degree of judicial scrutiny, `as if [we] were measuring that legislation against constitutional protections.'" 135 Wn.2d 678, 698, 958 P.2d 273 (1998) (quoting Johnson et al., supra, at 526-27). Thus, just like with other constitutional challenges, the party claiming a legislative act violates the public trust doctrine bears the burden of proving that violation. See id. at 693, 958 P.2d 273 (placing the burden on the party challenging a governmental action to prove it violates the public trust doctrine).
¶ 34 Having addressed the parties' threshold questions regarding judicial review and allocation of proof, we now address their substantive arguments relating to the proper application of Caminiti's two-part test.
¶ 35 The first part of the Caminiti test asks "whether the state, by the questioned legislation, has given up its right of control over the jus publicum." 107 Wash.2d at 670, 732 P.2d 989. The parties disagree whether the State abdicated control over the jus publicum when it consented under the Savings Clause to the permanent impairment of navigable waters by thousands of pre-Wilbour improvements. GBI and the State argue the enactment of the Savings Clause
¶ 36 The Caminiti test derives from the Supreme Court's opinion in Illinois Central. Caminiti, 107 Wash.2d at 670, 732 P.2d 989. At issue in Illinois Central was whether Illinois could grant to a private railroad company an irrevocable interest to fill or otherwise develop more than 1,000 acres of submerged lands comprising a substantial portion of Lake Michigan and the entire shoreline along the city of Chicago to support the railroad's private commercial enterprise. 146 U.S. at 454, 13 S.Ct. 110. The Supreme Court held the State could not. Id. at 452-55, 13 S.Ct. 110. The Court explained that while the State must generally protect its public trust resources, a state may abdicate control over some public trust properties without violating its public trust obligations if in doing so it promotes trust interests or does not substantially impair the public trust interest in the lands and waters remaining. See id. at 452, 13 S.Ct. 110. Applying that rule, the Court found Illinois had abdicated control when it granted to a private company the authority to fill and develop more than 1,000 acres of submerged public trust lands. Id. at 452-54, 13 S.Ct. 110.
¶ 37 Here, the legislature consented to the impairment of significantly more property. Rather than a thousand acres, the Savings Clause impairs thousands of acres. See Rauscher, supra, at 531; Port of Seattle, 255 U.S. at 59, 41 S.Ct. 237; Johnson & Cooney, supra, at 289. Such authorization clearly constitutes an abdication of control comparable to the land grant in Illinois Central. Whether the abdication of control comports with the State's public trust obligations depends on part two of the Caminiti test.
¶ 38 The second part of the Caminiti test asks whether the challenged legislation "has promoted the interests of the public in the jus publicum" or "has not substantially impaired it." 107 Wash.2d at 670, 732 P.2d 989. If the Savings Clause satisfies either question, then it also satisfies judicial scrutiny under the public trust doctrine. See id. The parties debate whether the public trust interests promoted or impaired by the Savings Clause should be analyzed on a statewide basis or as it relates to the Three Fingers fill on Lake Chelan. We hold, in this case, that the interests should be evaluated statewide.
¶ 39 As discussed earlier, the legislature enacted the Savings Clause in response to our decision in Wilbour. The Wilbour decision had a significant effect on land titles throughout Washington not because it ushered in a new rule (the public trust doctrine had already been recognized), but because it awoke the doctrine from a decades-long slumber. See Caminiti, 107 Wash.2d at 670, 732 P.2d 989 ("Although not always clearly labeled or articulated as such ... the doctrine has always existed in the State of Washington." (citing Johnson & Cooney, supra, at 285-87)). Following the doctrine's awakening, the legislature grappled with the possibility that the long-settled property expectations of Washington residents and businesses who had relied on legislative encouragement in building homes and investing significant resources in the improvement of Washington's shorelands and tidelands could be upended by public trust claims. Sturtevant, 76 Wash, at 171, 135 P. 1035; 1 SENATE JOURNAL at 1411 (explaining "most of industry in the state that is on the water ... is there illegally and subject to mandatory injunction to being removed by anyone that wants to bring the lawsuit"). Indeed, Washington's then governor, Governor Evans, was so concerned about color of title in these properties that he placed a statewide moratorium on all tideland fill projects, which caused Washington's economy to stagnate. See Orion, 109 Wash.2d at 627, 747 P.2d 1062.
¶ 40 Other jurisdictions faced with similar problems regarding historic improvements also acted swiftly through a single decisive action. Maine responded to the issue of historic fills by enacting legislation that granted all fills a 30-year easement to protect them temporarily from public trust claims. Op. of Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 599 (Me. 1981). In 1981, Maine sought a permanent solution and enacted a single bill to release all filled lands from any public trust servitude. See id. The California Supreme Court took a similar approach as the Maine legislature and extinguished the public trust interest over all historical fills in a single opinion. Berkeley, 26 Cal. 3d at 534-35, 162 Cal.Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362.
¶ 41 Piecemeal scrutiny of such legislative actions would undermine the very purpose of these actions, which was to provide security to settled property expectations and protect the state's economy from languishing in protracted litigation while waiting for titles to clear in thousands of cases. For the foregoing reasons, the question of whether the Savings Clause sufficiently promotes or does not substantially impair public trust interests should be evaluated on a statewide basis. Because that analysis is factually dependent, we remand to the trial court to determine in the first instance whether the Savings Clause comports with the public trust doctrine.
¶ 42 Finally, we address GBI's challenge to the Conservancy's standing to raise a public trust claim. GBI classifies this action as a public nuisance action and argues the Conservancy has failed to allege the Three Fingers fill is "specially injurious" to its members as is statutorily required under RCW 7.48.210.
¶ 43 There are many types of public nuisance actions, including actions to remove an animal carcass or an impediment on a river or highway and actions to abate pollution or the manufacture of dangerous chemicals near businesses. RCW 7.48.140. An action seeking the removal of an impediment on a waterway because it interferes with the public right to
¶ 44 Although RCW 7.48.210 requires the plaintiff be "specially injur[ed]," it does not indicate the injury needed to satisfy that requirement is more demanding or exacting than the injury needed for noneconomic standing generally. For an organization to have standing to raise noneconomic injuries, it must allege an "`injury in fact.'" Save a Valuable Env't (SAVE) v. City of Bothell, 89 Wn.2d 862, 866, 576 P.2d 401 (1978) (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (S.C.R.A.P.), 412 U.S. 669, 722, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973) (White, J., dissenting in part)). That means the organization "must show that it or one of its members will be specifically and perceptibly harmed by the action." Id. (citing S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669, 93 S.Ct. 2405). An interest that is only speculative or indirect is not enough. Id. at 867, 576 P.2d 401 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). Thus, in the absence of a statutory definition, we will treat "specially injurious" harms needed for public nuisance claims the same as "specific and perceptible" "injuries in fact" needed for noneconomic claims.
¶ 45 Injury to the aesthetic appeal and environment of an area is sufficient to support standing if the plaintiff establishes that he or she uses that area for recreational purposes. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). The Conservancy satisfies that showing. Its members claim that they are recreational users of Lake Chelan and that the Three Fingers fill obstructs their desire and right to use navigable waters over the property during the lake's high-water season. According to the Conservancy's complaint:
Clerk's Papers at 4; see also id. at 374-76 (Decl. of Tammy Hauge) (explaining how she could access the lake more easily if the fill was not there), 379-81 (Decl. of William Schuldt) (declaring the same and adding that he fishes in the lake too), 384-86 (Decl. of John Page Jr.) (explaining how the fill has made kayaking dangerous for him). We hold the harms alleged by the Conservancy's members are sufficiently distinct from the general public to satisfy the standing requirements of RCW 7.48.210. The fact that the Conservancy's members have never been able to use the lake waters over GBI's property despite their desire to do so further shows their injury is real, not just speculative.
¶ 46 Contrary to GBI's arguments, neither Lampa v. Graham nor Kemp v. Putnam support its claim that the Conservancy lacks standing. Lampa v. Graham, 179 Wn. 184, 36 P.2d 543 (1934); Kemp v. Putnam, 47 Wn.2d 530, 288 P.2d 837 (1955). In Lampa, we held a fisherman would have standing to challenge the construction of a wing dam on
¶ 47 The Conservancy seeks the abatement of fill material GBI added to its property to elevate it above the waters of Lake Chelan because the increased property elevation obstructs the public right to use navigable waters in place over that property. We hold the Conservancy has standing to bring this claim and conclude the legislature expressly consented to the fill's impairment of navigable waters under the Savings Clause, RCW 90.58.270. We reserve ruling on whether the Savings Clause violates the public trust doctrine since the trial court never reached Caminiti's factual analysis. We therefore reverse and remand to the trial court to decide that issue.
WE CONCUR:
Fairhurst, C.J.
Johnson, J.
Madsen, J.
Owens, J.
Stephens, J.
Wiggins, J.
Gordon McCloud, J.
Yu, J.